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ABSTRACT 
SIR JOHN ELDON GORST AND 
BRITISH SOCIAL POLICY 1875-1914 
The period of Liberal rule in Britain between 1906 and 1914 is 
justly remembered for its social reforms. The "New Liberalism" of these 
years produced the social legislation which constituted the nucleus of what 
is now the British "Welfare State". These measures represented a reversal 
of the individualistic, laissez-faire doctrines of the nineteenth century, 
a reversal effected partly through the efforts of social investigators, 
partly as a result of hard-headed political expediency and the ambitions 
of particular Government ministers, and partly the Liberal Government's 
response to the threat of Socialism. These reforms also resulted from the 
efforts of various individuals and many of them, particularly those of 
Cabinet rank, such as Lloyd George and Winston Churchill, have received 
recognition from historians for their efforts. Other equally concerned 
and energetic reformers have virtually been ignored. One of these is Sir 
John Eldon Gorst. Through examination of Gorst's speeches in the House of 
Commons, his writings in the periodic press, and his communications to the 
Times, plus reports therein of his various activities connected with social 
reform measures, it is shown that Gorst made a significant contribution to 
late Victorian and Edwardian social legislation. 
(iv)
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INTRODUCTION 
During the quarter century between 1880 and 1914, mounting 
social, economic and political problems gradually effected a change in 
attitudes concerning the role of the State in society which dramatically 
transformed British social policy by the eve of the First World War. In 
responding to the various problems, successive British governments found 
themselves being drawn into ever-increasing areas of national life until 
governments themselves became prime agents of social change. During the 
period 1880-1914, the functions of the State expanded steadily, culminating 
in a concentrated burst of social reform activity during the Liberal 
Administration of 1906-1914. This period saw the introduction of school 
meals and medical services for children, old-age pensions, and insurance 
against health and unemployment. Minimum wages were fixed in certain 
industries and labour exchanges were instituted. The enactment of these 
measures owed much to practical politics, most specifically, to successive 
governments' reactions to the social, economic, and political developments 
of the period and to their desire not to be outbid by their parliamentary 
rivals. However, much of this legislation was patterned on ideas 
formulated and promoted by social reformers and progressive politicians 
1 during the final decades of the nineteenth century. Many of these 
1 For background to these various social, economic and political developments 
see Keith Burgess, The Challenge of Labour: Shaping British Society, 1850-1930 
(London, 1980), Chap. 2-4. H.V. Erny, Liberals, Radicals and Social Politics, 
1892-1914 (Cambridge, 1973). Eric Evans, Social Policy, 1830-1914: Individualism, 
Collectivism, and the origins of the Welfare State (London, 1978). J.R. Hay, 
The Origins of the Liberal Welfare Reforms, 1906-1914 (London, 1975). 
·nonald Read, England, 1863-1914 (London, 1979). Paul Thompson, The Edwardians: 
The Remaking of British Society (London, 1975). 
1. 
2. 
individuals have received recognition from historians for their efforts 
while other equally concerned and energetic reformers have been largely 
ignored. Included in the latter group is Conservative politician, 
Sir John Eldon Gorst. 
Gorst had a long and noteworthy political career. He gave 
forty years of service to the Tory Party, thirty-three of them in 
Parliament. Between 1868 and 1874 he served as Party Agent, during 
which time he effected a reorganization of party machinery which resulted 
in the resounding Conservative victory in the 1874 General Election, 
He subsequently held the offices of Solicitor-General (1885-86), Under-
Secretary for India (1886-1891), Financial Secretary to the Treasury 
(1891-92), and Vice-President of the Committee of Council on Education 
(1895-1902). He was also a member of the Tory party's prominent parlia-
mentary ginger group, the Fourth Party, and was British Plenipotentiary 
to the 1890 Berlin Labour Conference. Throughout his career Gorst 
actively promoted social issues, in the Commons, on public platforms, and 
in the press, and his efforts had a marked influence upon the social 
legislation of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Certain aspects of Gorst's colourful career have been the subject 
of individual historical studies. His work in the reorganization of the 
2 Conservative Party has been examined in detail; the exploits of the 
2see, for example, James Cornford, "The Transformation of Conservatism 
in the Late Nineteenth Century", Victorian Studies 7 (1963-64): 35-66. 
E.J. Feuchtwanger, "J.E. Gorst and the Central Organization of the 
Conservative Party, 1870-1882", Bulletin of the Institute of Historical 
Research, 32 (1959), 192-208. 
3. 
Fourth Party, a quartet of Parliamentarians which included the renowned 
Randolph Churchill and future Prime Minister A.J. Balfour, have been 
3 frequently recorded; and Gorst's role in the development of the 
extensive educational reforms of the period 1896-1902 has been scrutinized.4 
However, because of his undeniable success in reorganizing and invigorating 
the Tory party machinery during the 'seventies and 'eighties, historians 
in general, "have been content to accept him as a good deed in a naughty 
world, and he has passed into undergraduate history as a byword for an 
imaginative approach to borough Conservatism which an insensitive party 
orthodoxy foolis_hly chose to ignore". 5 Consequently, Gors t I s efforts to 
obtain the reform and extension of British social welfare institutions, 
which have been acknowledged by many of his contemporaries, have largely 
been neglected by historians. In his work, Tory Democracy, W.J. 
6 Wilkinson has touched upon Gorst's social reform endeavours, while those 
he put forth during Disraeli's last Administration have been noted by 
Paul Smith; 7 and Gorst's early twentieth-century agitation for increased 
3
see Winston S. Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchill (1906, London, 1952), 
Chap. 3. H.E. Gorst, The Fourth Party (London, 1906). R.R. James, Lord 
Randolph Churchill (London, 1959), Chap. 3. 
4 See, for example, Eric Eaglesham, From School Board to Local Authority 
(London, 1956). Bernard M. Allen, Sir Robert Morant (London, 1934), Part 3. 
See also, N. Daglish, "The Educational Work of Sir John Gorst" (Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Durham, 1974). 
5J .R. Vincent, " 1 A Sort of second-rate Australia': A note on Gorst and 
democracy, 1865-8", Historical Studies (Australia and New Zealand), 15 
(1973), 539-544. 
6
w.J. Wilkinson, Tory Democracy (New York, 1925). 
7 P. Smith, Disraelian Conservatism and Social Reform (London, 1967). 
4. 
State responsibility for child welfare has been discussed by Bentley B. 
Gilbert. 8 However, as yet there has been no work devoted solely to the 
examination of Gorst's contributions to British social policy of the 
later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. One explanation for 
this omission may be the absence of both personal papers and an auto-
biography but, whatever the reason, this neglect is regrettable because 
Gorst's achievements in the area of social reform were even more 
innovative and permanent than his successes in party organization. This 
dissertation will attempt to justify this latter claim by providing a 
comprehensive study of the social reform dimension of Gorst's career. 
8 Bentley B. Gilbert, "Sir John Eldon Garst and the Children of the Nation", 
Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 28 (1954), 243-251. "Sir John Eldon 
Garst: Conservative Rebel", Historian, 18 (1956), 151-169. 
CHAPTER I 
THE EARLY YEARS 
As W. T. Stead observed, "Sir John Gorst was not born in the 
purple" .
1 
The second son of Elizabeth and Edward Chaddock Gorst, John 
Eldon Gorst was born at Preston on May 24, 1835 into an old established 
Lancashire family which had been Tory since at least the second half of 
· 2
the seventeenth century. Edward Gorst, who took the name of Lowndes upon 
succeeding to the family property in 1853
3
, was, at the time of his second
son's birth, a solicitor in Preston and Clerk of the Peace for the County 
of Lancashire. As a child, Gorst was not banished to a public school but 
remained at home to be educated locally at Preston Grammar School, after 
which he entered St. John's College, Cambridge. There he distinguished 
himself, becoming Third Wrangler in the Mathematical Tripos of 1857 and 
being elected Fellow of his college in the same year.
4 
It was also during 
those years, through participation in the activities of the Cambridge 
Union, that Gorst developed the debating skills which were later to become 
renowned within the House of Commons and upon political and public platforms 
111Character Sketch: December. Sir John Gorst", Review of Reviews 3 (1891):
575-585. Hereafter referred to as "Character Sketch".
2
H.W. Clemesha, A History of Preston in Amounderness (Manchester, 1912), 
p. 210. Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford, 1927), pp. 218-219.
3
The eldest son of this branch of the Gorst family assumed the name Lowndes 
under the testamentary injunction of Robert Lowndes of Palteron. See, Sir 
John Bernard Burke, A Genealogical and Heraldic Listing of the Landed Gentry 
of Great Britain, ed. Ashworth P. Burke, 14 ed. (London, 1925), p. 1130. 
4
Dictionary of National Biography, p. 218. The Times, 5 April, 1916. 
4.
5. 
throughout Britain and abroad.
5 
This phase of his education completed,
Gerst decided upon the Bar as his profession and, following a European 
holiday, began reading Law at the Inner Temple. However, a few months 
later his father fell seriously ill and Gerst abandoned his legal studies 
and took a position as mathematics master at Rossall School, Lancashire, 
6 
in order to be close to his ailing parent. Following the death of his 
father, in 1859, Gerst decided against resuming his preparations for the 
Bar and resolved to leave the "tame and unadventurous life in England" in 
order to "try a more active existence in the Colonies". 
7
This new existence Gerst now decided to seek abroad was that of 
lay missionary in the South Seas and when, in late December 1859, he left 
Liverpool aboard the White Star liner 'Red Jacket', bound for Auckland, it 
8 
was under the auspices of Bishop Selwyn, a fellow of St. John's, who 
intended that the new recruit assist Bishop Patteson with his work among 
the Polynesian natives.9 Confidence in Gorst's suitability for this task,
5
Leslie Stephen, Life of Henry Fawcett, 4th ed. (Lendon, 1886), p. 28.
6 
H.E. Gerst, The Fourth Party (Lendon, 1906), p. 25. Hereafter referred 
to as H.E. Gerst, Fourth Party. 
7 
H.E. Gerst, Fourth Party, pp. 25-26. 
8
New Zealand National Archives (hereafter referred to as NZNA), Gore-Browne
Papers 2/3, p. 24. Sir T. Gore-Browne to Sir Charles Clifford, 20 September 
1862. George Augustus Selwyn (1809-1878), Bishop of New Zealand, 1841-1868. 
9
11Character Sketch", p. 576. Some years later, following his return to
England, Gerst offered a totally different explanation of the underlying 
motives precipitating his departure for the Antipodes. "My object in visiting 
the Colony", he wrote, "was to investigate for myself the question how half­
civilised people ought to be managed. From my arrival in May 1860, to my 
departure in August 1863, this was my one employment and pursuit". (Parlia­
mentary Papers, [hereafter referred to as PP], 1865, 37: 198-199. J.E. 
Gerst to Sir Frederick Rogers, 20 December, 1864.) The explanation for this 
discrepancy in Gorst's interpretation of his reasons for going to New Zealand 
may be that, in retrospect, Gorst's latter claim corresponded more closely to 
the actual nature of the work carried on by him there, where the majority of 
his time had been spent as a Government Officer. 
6. 
and his sincerity in embarking upon it, was expressed by Bishop Patteson 
himself shortly after Gerst' s departure for New Zealand. "All we have 
heard of him promises well. He has great ability as a mathematician and 
seems desirous of working away from the right motive". lO During the voyage 
out, between fulfilling the role of substitute ship's doctor and helping 
suppress a mutiny aboard the 'Red Jacket', Gorst found time to fall in love 
with fellow passenger Miss Mary Elizabeth Moore, daughter of the Rev. 
Lorenzo Moore of Christchurch, and when the ship docked in Melbourne, the 
couple was engaged to be married. 11 Gorst continued his journey to New 
Zealand, arriving in Auckland on May 17, 1860. Shortly after his arrival 
he met Bishop Selwyn and Gorst's first weeks in the colony were spent 
assisting the Bishop in a variety of tasks, at the same time becoming 
oriented to his new environment. During the month of June he helped the 
Bishop prepare his Melanesian Mission College at Kohimarama to host a 
conference convened by the Governor, Sir Thomas Gore-Browne, to explain to 
the invited Maori chiefs the government's policies which had precipitated 
the recent native uprisings at Taranaki. Later that month Gorst accompanied 
Selwyn on an expedition to re-float the Melanasian Mission schooner, 
"Southern Cross", which had gone aground near Whangarei north of Auckland. 
Although this operation proved abortive, the vessel resisting all their 
attempts to re-float it, the episode proved valuable for Gorst. During the 
two-week excursion he received instruction in the basics of the Maori 
language from Bishop Selwyn, was introduced to Maori village'life, and 
became acquainted with the versatility of the New Zealand civil servant in 
the person of the government's local representative at Whangarei, a Mr. 
lOAlexander Turnbull Library New Zealand, MSS Collection. Bishop Patteson 
to Sir J. Patteson, 23 March, 1860. 
11 J.E. Garst, New Zealand Revisited (London, 1908), pp. 6-22. 
7. 
Aubrey, who held every civil office in the settlement, including those of 
postmaster, customs officer, harbour master, magistrate and policeman, a 
role Gorst later admitted he had found "extraordinary at the time, little 
thinking that I was to fill a similar post in Waikato 11 • 12 
Late in July, Gorst returned to Australia for his marriage to 
13 Miss Moore, and by early October, the voyage to New Zealand behind them, 
the newly-married couple was preparing to journey to the mission station 
at Waikato at the invitation of the Rev. Benjamin Yates Ashwell of the 
Church Missionary Society. The timing of Gorst's visit proved to be less 
than auspicious. Coincidental with his return to New Zealand, the corpse 
of an apparently-murdered Maori had been discovered south of Auckland, 
rousing in settlers fears that the natives would fasten upon this incident 
as an excuse for an attack upon the city. Having been assured by Ashwell 
that the affair presented no real danger to them, the Gorsts proceeded with 
their trip as arranged. However, following their arrival in Taupiri, the 
situation became sufficiently tense to cause Gorst to dispatch his bride 
14 back to Auckland as a precautionary measure. 
It was during this crisis at the mission station at Taupiri that 
Garst first made the acquaintance of the Christianized and peace-loving 
Maori chief, Wiremu Tamihana, 15 with whom he formed a lasting friendship, 
who was later to serve frequently as an intermediary between Gorst and 
hostile Maoris. 16 
12 J.E. Garst, New Zealand Revisited, pp. 28-35. 
13Keith Sinclair, "Introduction" in J.E. Gorst, Maori King, ed. K. Sinclair 
(London, 1959), pp. ix-xxv. 
14J.E. Gorst, The Maori King, ed. K. Sinclair (London, 1864. Reprint ed. 
London, 1959), pp. 3-4. Hereafter referred to as J.E. Gorst, Maori King. 
15Also known by the name Te Waharo, after his father, and as William Thompson 
by the Europeans. 
16J.E. Garst, Maori King, p. 7. 
8. 
Following the peaceful settlement of the crisis, achieved 
primarily as a result of Wiremu Tamihana's mediation, 17 Gorst remained in 
the Waikato area for several months and spent part of this period teaching 
Maori boys at a school in Hopuhopu, close by Taupiri, initiating his 
educational work in the colony which eventually led to him becoming a 
"favourite of the Church of England Board of Native Education, the chairman 
of which was Bishop Selwyn11 • 18 
The crisis in which Gorst had become involved while at the mission 
station at Taupiri was but one incident in a larger struggle being waged 
between the settlers and the Maoris, which had erupted in the Taranaki 
province a month prior to Gorst's arrival in Auckland. This conflict arose out 
of Ngatiatiawa chief Wiremu Kingi 1s resistance to further land sales to the 
settlers. This opposition to the continuing sale of native land to the 
19 Pakehas was widespread amongst the natives and had been a major factor in 
the establishment of the Maori King in 1858, and there was a general fear 
among the colonists that the land cause might be actively supported by the 
Waikato tribe, resulting in the escalation of the dispute into a general war 
between the Maoris and the settlers. 20 
The entire King movement, which according to Gorst had been 
generated by Maori discontent over Government indifference to native 
17Ibid., pp. 98-100 
18 
"Letters and Journals of the Rev. John Morgan", (Typescript), Auckland 
Institute and Museum, 17 December, 1863, quoted in Sinclair, "Introduction", 
p. xi. 
19Maori term for white man or foreigner. 
20J.E. Gorst, Maori King, pp. 1-2, pp. 47-48, p, 101. 
9. 
grievances, 21 was treated with contempt by the majority of the settlers, 
regarded as "a nuisance and an obstruction" rather than - as the Maoris 
claimed - a legitimate response to government mistreatment and apathy; 
considered an irritant which, because of its potential threat to British 
22 
supremacy, must be suppressed. The government's reaction to the resistance 
of Wiremu Kingi had been the application of military force, resulting in the 
Taranaki War. In Gorst' s view this approach to the King movement was mis-
guided. Against the popularly-held belief that there was "something 
pre-eminently manly in gaining an end by downright strength", Gorst argued 
that "There is one display of force •.• that has never been dignified by 
the name 'manly', that of the strong towards the weak." He doubted if the 
world at large would "think that there is much glory in a highly civilised 
nation of 28,000,000 men crushing 50,000 'half-naked' savages. 1123 
Having informed himself on the background to the development of the 
King movement and through personal contact become familiar with the natives' 
current situation, Gorst concluded that this manifestation of Maori 
independence could be best eradicated through the introduction of an 
extensive scheme of English education and law into the Waikato province, 
thereby undermining the base of the movement which was located at the Maori 
capital of Ngaruawhamia. "If we had educated the natives in civilisation, 
and fitted them for the enjoyment of these full rights, as British subjects 
nothing would have been heard of .•. 'King movements' 11 , he asserted. 24 
21Ibid., pp. 47-53, p. 57. 
22J.E. Gorst, Maori King, pp. 1-6, p. 84. 
23 Quoted in H.E. Gorst, Fourth Party, p. 28. 
24J.E. Gorst, Maori King, p. 26. 
10. 
These conclusions Gorst set forth in a series of three letters to 
the Auckland newspaper, The New Zealander, which were published under the 
pseudonym, "Fabius". 25 
response in the form of 
newspaper, The Southern 
Gorst 1 s initial letter met with an immediate negative 
a derogatory leading article in the other Auckland 
26 Cross. More positively, the letters so impressed 
the New Zealand Governor, Sir T. Gore-Browne, that he considered engaging 
Gorst for the government service, despite the fact that the latter's views 
concerning the solution to the King problem "differed widely" from the 
governor's own, and the opportunity to do so not having arisen during 
Governor Gore-Browne's term of office, before his departure from New Zealand 
he took the opportunity to "recommend him [Gorst] officially to Sir G. 
27 Grey", Browne's successor in the colony. 
The arrival of Sir George Grey in September 1861 "gave some hope 
28 for a peaceful solution" of the Maori problem. Following his installation 
in office, Grey decided upon a pacific approach to the native question in 
the form of a new system of administration involving a measure of Maori 
29 
self-government and closely resembling the policies advocated by Gorst 
in his "Fabius" letters. In this design he was aided by recent political 
events in the colony. 30 The commencement of Grey's second term as governor 
25H;E. Gorst, Fourth Party, pp. 27-29. 
26Cited in Sinclair, "Introduction", p. xii. 
27 NZNA, Gore-Browne 2/3, p. 24. Sir T. Gore-Browne to Sir Charles Clifford, 
20 September, 1862. 
28J.E. Gorst, Maori King, p. 6. 
29J.E. Garst, Maori King, pp. 133·34, pp. 144-145. 
30 Grey's first term covered the period 1845-1853. 
11. 
followed closely upon the defeat of the incumbent Colonial ministry, which 
had conducted the Taranki War, and the formation of a new ministry headed 
by William Fox who had previously demonstrated himself to be a defender of 
native rights. 31 The similarity of outlook shared by the new Imperial and 
Colonial administrators facilitated the speedy introduction of the new 
scheme by the Governor and it was in connection with this new departure in 
policy that Fox dispatched Gorst, in October 1861, to the Waikato district, 
"ostensibly to inspect and report upon all the schools supported by the 
missionary societies, and the natives, and at the same time to keep my ears 
open, and learn all I could as to the state of things in general, and the 
sentiments at present prevailing among Waikato chiefs as to peace or war. 1132 
By late October, Gorst was reporting to Fox that native resistance 
to government authority remained strong in the Waikato area33 and, shortly 
31 J.E. Gorst, Maori King, p. 150. 
32Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, New Zealand 
(hereafter referred to as AJHR), 1862 E-1 Section II, Despatches from 
Governor Sir George Grey to the Duke of Newcastle, p. 12. J.E. Gorst, 
New Zealand Revisited (London, 1908), p. 160. It is not clear who made the 
initial decision to utilize Gorst 1 s services in this way. It may have been 
made by Grey, arising out of Gore-Browne's recommendations, or by Fox, based 
upon a personal assessment of Gorst's abilities and suitability for the task 
made following a reading of the "Fabius" letters. In any event, Gorst's 
appointment appears .to have been a popular one. F. Dillon-Bell, the Native 
Minister in the Domett ministry which replaced Fox's administration in 1862, 
observed that "Nothing was ever done by the present Government so good as 
sending Gorst up to the Kingites of Waikato ..• A thoroughly conscientious, 
just, truthful, and highly-educated man, which he is, will have more weight 
with the Assembly than anyone else ..•. " (NZNA, Gore-Browne Papers, 1/2/146. 
F.D. Bell to T. Gore-Browne, 29 May, 1862.) 
33 AJHR, 1862, E-1, Section II, p. 14. J.E. Gorst to William Fox, 23 
October, 1861. 
12. 
thereafter, the Governor appointed Gorst as Resident Magistrate in the Upper 
Waikato and charged him "with the duty of fully explaining" to the Maori 
chiefs "the scope and object of my plans 11 • 34 Gorst, together with his wife 
and baby son, now took up residence at Te Tomoto, Upper Waikato, and by 
early December he had concluded his inspection of all the Waikato and Bay 
of Islands native schools and completed a detailed report on their condition 
for the Minister of Native Affairs. Gorst's report was highly critical of 
the government's role in Maori education.35 He enunciated a long litany of 
deficiencies. The government exercised no control over the monies it 
contributed to the religious bodies supervising native schools and exerted 
"just so much influence as the fear of the withdrawal of the subscription 
confers". Although by law certain conditions were to be fulfilled before 
such grants were made, "these regulations ... are not always practically 
carried out, and the Government has used no means for ascertaining or 
compelling their observance". Despite legislation directing that "schools 
be visited each year by an Inspector, the office has been honorary and 
irregular, and never discharged twice by the same person. His function is 
simply that of reporting and though the duties have often been most ably 
performed by gentlemen of high position in the colony, I do not learn that 
their reports ever produced action on the part of the Government 11 • 36 Gorst 
urged the government to upgrade and expand its native schools in order that 
34AJHR, 1862, E-1, Section II, p. 45. Dispatches from Sir G. Grey to His 
Grace the Duke of Newcastle, 8 December, 1861. 
35AJHR, 1862, E-4, Native Schools. Reports of Inspectors. Report of 
J.E. Gorst, Inspector of Schools, pp. 3-11. 
36AJHR, E-4, Native Schools. Reports of Inspectors, pp. 2-11. Report of 
J.E. Gorst, Esq., Inspector of Schools, December 5, 1861. 
13. 
the children might be taught "the decencies of civilization, as well as 
the learning habits of industry 11 • 37 
This report exposed native schooling as one more facet of the 
government's administrative indifference with respect to its indigenous 
population, indifference which Gorst claimed had helped establish the Maori 
King, and his recommendations reflected his continuing conviction - first 
aired in his "Fabius" letters· that education could play an important 
role in reducing Maori intransigence. Moreover, Gorst's report reveals 
the thoroughness and degree of perceptiveness which he applied to the task 
in hand, qualities which were evinced time and time again during his 
subsequent political life, in situations ranging from his re-organization 
of the Conservative party to his campaign for child feeding. The report 
also exhibits Gorst's propensity never to mince words which later became 
the hallmark of his parliamentary career. 
Gorst remained in Te Tomoto as magistrate until June 1862, during 
which time he grew increasingly disillusioned by the inefficacy of the 
government's new scheme of native administration and the farcical nature of 
his own office.38 Although he arrived "armed with proper legal powers", 
37AJHR, E-4, p. 11. 
38
rn May, 1862, Sir Donald McLean told Gore-Browne that Gorst was "disgusted" 
with the state of affairs in the Waikato (NZNA, Gore-Browne. 1/2. No. 121. 
Sir Donald McLean to T. Gore-Browne, 26 May, 1862), and three days later 
F.D. Bell wrote to the former Governor that "Gorst is getting extremely 
dissatisfied with things in general" in that area. (NZNA, Gore-Browne 
Papers. 1/2/146. F.D. Bell to T. Gore-Browne, 29 May, 1862.) Also, in 
a series of letters to Gore-Browne, written between January and September 
of 1862, the Rev. J. Morgan of Otawhao repeatedly referred to the futility 
.of Gorst's position as Resident Magistrate. (NZNA, Gore-Browne Papers. 
1/2 d.) For references 1/2. No. 121 and 1/2 d. above, I am indebted to 
Kay M. Sanderson of the New Zealand National Archives. See also, J.E. 
Gorst, Maori King, pp. 158-171. 
14. 
his magistracy was "repudiated and set at naught" by the Maoris, who "from 
the first refused their consent to my exercising any kind of authority 
39 40 
among them". Prior to Gorst' s arrival in the district the Runanga of 
Ngaruawahia had passed an "abstract" resolution barring the installation of 
Queen's magistrates within the Maori domain41 and, although thereafter the 
Maoris took no direct action to expel him from the area - save for one 
unsuccessful and inept attempt by Ngatimaniapoto Chief, Patene42 - Gorst's 
authority was effectively negated by the subsequent enactment by the King's 
loyal Runangas in Waikato of laws prohibiting, under severe penalties, 
43 
natives from resorting to European courts. So effective was this measure 
that Garst found his duties "limited to settling disputes among Pakeha 
settlers 11 44 
Garst ventilated his dissatisfaction in a general report on 
conditions in the Upper Waikato issued by him in June 1862.45 A state of 
"utter lawlessness and anarchy" existed among the native population, brought 
about by the declining authority of the traditional internal Maori rule and 
39 J.E. Garst, New Zealand Revisited, p. 93. 
40Native court or assembly. 
41J.E. Garst, Maori King, p. 162. 
42AJHR, 1862, E-9, Papers Relative to Sir George Grey's Plans of Native 
Government, Section III, pp. 3-4. Report from J.E. Garst to the Colonial 
Secretary. 
43J.E. Gorst, Maori King, p. 164. 
44J.E. Gorst, New Zealand Revisited, p. 197. 
45AJHR, 1862, Section III, pp. 9-19. Commissioner's Report - Upper Waikato. 
NZNA, Gore-Browne 2/4. 
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the impotency of the Colonial administration. "The great mischief of all 
is not that the Natives choose to be governed by a King instead of by us", 
he argued, "but that they are not in any real sense governed at all". 
Garst readily admitted that the initial high hopes he had entertained for 
the Governor's new policies had been dissipated by the realities of practical 
service in the field. Experience had shown that the ministry's new scheme 
of administration could not diminish support for the King movement nor effect 
a reconciliation between the government and the Maori population. That an 
organized legislative system did not in itself guarantee law and order had 
been demonstrated by the Waikato experiment. "My residence in Waikato is 
bringing me to look upon vigour and power as the highest qualities in 
Government", he told F. Dillon Bell. 46 Consequently, Gorst concluded that 
the existing chaos could only be remedied through more positive government: 
... but I mean vigorous Government - I mean authority which is able to 
protect life and property by enforcing obedience to the law. We do not 
want additional laws - there is a very madness of law-making infesting 
the country; we do not want Magistrates - they exist in abundance. It 
is the last link between the sovereign and the subject, it is the 
police which is defective.47 
Gorst quite expected that his report would incur his swift 
dismissal from the Colonial service but, instead, the government pr.essed 
him to attend a personal interview with Sir George Grey in Auckland. 
Although the Colonial ministry had acknowledged the accuracy of Gorst's 
report they had persisted in maintaining the administrational status quo 
in the Waikato and, thus, he declined the invitation on the grounds he had 
46 NZNA, Gore-Browne Papers, 1/2/146, F.D. Bell to T. Gore-Browne, 29 May 
1862. 
47AJHR, E-9, Section III, pp. 18-19. 
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nothing new to add to his previous connnents, and that if the government 
disagreed with his views he was willing to resign. However, at the 
government's insistence he subsequently met with Sir George Grey who 
professed support for Gorst's viewpoint and persuaded him to return to 
Waikato as Civil Commissioner, under the Governor's rather than the 
Colonial ministry's jurisdiction.48 
In addition to his normal duties as Connnissioner, Gorst was 
entrusted with the implementation of two special projects - the formation 
of a native police force at Kohekohe, Lower District, and the establishment 
of an industrial school at Otawhao, Upper Waikato. The school was the 
brainchild of Gorst who persuaded Grey to substitute it for his original 
scheme for a police force at that location also, Gorst rationalizing that 
so overt a government institution as the latter would simply result in its 
innnediate suppression by the militant King Maoris. The new plan was to 
develop the Otawhao establishment into a police station at a later date. 
Both projects were to form part of Grey's revised approach to native 
administration, designed to secure the peaceful subjection of the Maoris 
to British authority. The force of native youths at Te Kohekohe would be 
"gradually and cautiously made use of, to suppress dangerous offenders 
and establish a real system of law and order" in the area. The school, at 
which both basic subjects and trade skills were to be taught, would exhibit 
to native youth the advantages of physical comfort and civilization offered 
by the government in exchange for "barbarous independence", thus working 
as a "trap to catch the King's soldiers", thereby serving to undermine the 
48J.E. Gerst, New Zealand Revisited, pp. 209-210, pp. 223-225. 
49 
nationalist movement. 
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Gorst returned to the Waikato and immediately proceeded to 
introduce Grey's new schemes. The venture at Te Kohekohe progressed little 
beyond the planning stage, but the second enterprise at Otawhao was 
successfully launched. An existing mission station at Te Awamuto, 50 
consisting of school house and 200 acres of land, was relinquished by Church 
authorities and given over to Gorst for his new educational venture, 51 in 
support of which "neither expense nor trouble was spared".52 However, the 
project soon aroused the suspicions of the Maoris who viewed it, in combina-
tion with the proposed police force at Te Kohekohe, as part of a new scheme 
for reducing the Waikato. The institution was promptly denounced by the 
militant Ngatimaniapoto chief, Rewi Manipoto, and his supporters who urged 
that Gorst be immediately expelled by force. The more moderate Waikatos, 
49AJHR, 1863, E-4, Papers Relative to Native Affairs. Section VI - Upper 
Waikato, pp. 35-36. Memorandum by J.E. Garst, R.M., on the Establishment 
of a Police Station at Kohekohe, and an Industrial School at Otawhao. 
J.E. Garst, Maori King, pp. 193-194. J.E. Garst, New Zealand Revisited, 
pp. 223-225. 
SOThe Maori name of Otawhao. 
51 J.E. Garst, Maori King, p. 194. According to Garst, the incumbent of 
twenty years, Rev. John Morgan, gave up his station with grace, so as not 
to obstruct a project which might benefit the natives. However, Morgan's 
personal papers reveal that he deeply resented the way the Church authorities 
treated him in this matter and, as a consequence, resigned from the Church 
Missionary Society. See J.E. Gorst, New Zealand Revisited, p. 227. 
Sinclair, p. xvi. 
52 AJHR, 1863, E-1, Papers Relative to Native Affairs, pp. 1-2. Memorandum 
by Native Minister F. Dillon Bell to Governor G. Grey, 30 April 1863. 
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however, called for lawful and peaceful opposition to the school and at 
their Runangas passed laws forbidding their youth from attending the 
institution and prohibiting the sale of timber for the construction of its 
new buildings. Despite this opposition, building commenced and a sufficient 
number of native boys enrolled in the school as to permit it to open as 
planned, and progress made during its first months of operation gave promise 
for considerable future success. 53 
This initial hope remained unfulfilled, however, as Gorst's 
project came to an untimely end as a consequence of renewed Maori insurgence. 
In the winter of 1862-63 the land disputes, in abeyance since the Taranaki 
War, were revived threatening a renewal of the conflict and causing both 
sides to actively prepare for the expected confrontation. In their newspaper, 
Te Hokioi, the King party accused the Governor and the settlers of deceit 
in the land issue, charging them with ignoring legally-acquired native land 
rights and questioning the Governor's anticipated action against their King. 
At Grey's suggestion, Gorst countered this Maori attack by establishing a 
printing office at Te Awamutu and issuing a rival journal named Te Pihoihoi 
54 Mokemoke, the first number of which contained an article, in Maori, by 
Gorst - "The Evil of the King's Government" - outlining the anarchy 
prevailing in the Waikato and citing the King and his Council's inability 
55 
to maintain law and order as the root of the problem. 
53AJHR, 1863, E-1, pp. 1-2. J.E. Gorst, Maori King, pp. 195-202. 
54Its full title was Te Pihoihoi fukemoke I Runga I Te Tuanui - "The Sparrow 
Alone Upon the House Top", but it was generally known simply as Te Pihoihoi 
fuke, which translates as "The I.Dnely Groundlark". See Sinclair's footnote 
in J.E. Gorst, Maori King, p. 217. 
55J.E. Gorst, Maori King, pp. 205-207, pp. 209-213. J.E. Gorst, New Zealand 
Revisited, pp. 254-256. 
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The article incensed the more militant Maoris and reinforced 
their belief that Gorst's activities at Te Awamutu were part of a calculated 
scheme to overcome the King movement. Earlier, Grey had assured the Maoris 
that he would not "fight against your King with a sword" but would "dig 
around him with spades, until he falls of his own accord". To the Maoris 
Garst now appeared the most active spade and his school the centre of the 
digging and the decision was made to eject the Civil Commissioner and his 
56 press from Te Awamutu. On March 24, Chief Rewi Maniapoto and a band of 
Ngatimaniapotos descended upon the school, occupied the printing office, 
and carried off the press. After first declaring their intention to expel 
Garst by force, they were persuaded to withdraw and allow him three weeks 
in which to obtain Grey's authorization to leave Te Awamutu. However, 
during this period of grace, in a letter to Grey, they reiterated their 
intention to remove Garst and warned the Governor that "if you say he is to 
h · 11 d" II 57 stay, e wi i e . 
When informed of the revolt at Te Awamutu, Grey and Dillon Bell, 
the Native Minister, advised Garst to use his own discretion in deciding 
his future course of action, but giving him full authority to abandon his 
58 post should his life or the lives of anyone on the station be endangered. 
56J.E. Garst, Maori King, pp. 219-220, p. 223. J.E. Garst, New Zealand 
Revisited, pp. 251-252. 
57 AJHR, 1863, E-1. Further Papers Relative to Native Affairs: Native 
Disturbances at Te Awamutu, pp. 3-4. J.E. Garst to F.D. Bell, 25 March, 
1863. AJHR, 1863, E-1, p. 4. Memorandum by J.E. Garst to Mr. Wood, 
25 March, 1863. AJHR, 1863, E-1, p. 5. Rewi Maniapoto to G. Grey, 
25 March, 1863. 
58AJHR, 1863, E-1, p. 7. F.D. Bell to J.E. Garst, 27 March, 1863. F.D. Bell 
to J.E. Garst, March 28, 1863. NZNA Governor Archives. G36/3, p. 446. Sir 
George Grey to J.E. Garst, 28 March, 1863. 
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Having ascertained from the moderate Maoris there was a "universal consent 
to get rid of the Government establishment at Awamutu", that the authority 
of the King was at an end, and that the militants were in control and 
determined to remove the Civil Commissioner by force, Gerst concluded that 
"the experiment at Awamutu" was over. Consequently, on April 18, with 
59 general war imminent, Gerst and his party departed for Auckland. Grey 
considered the abandonment of Te Awamutu a temporary expedient and ensconced 
its personnel at his private residence on the Island of Kawi, pending their 
expected reinstatement at the school, but on July 12 government forces 
occupied Kohera Heights, in the Maoris' alleged domains, signalling the 
resumption of the Waikato War, nullifying these plans and Gorst's party was 
returned to Auckland for dispersai. 60 
Immediately following his expulsion from Te Awamutu, Gerst stayed 
for one week in New Plymouth with Bell, drafting minutes on the situation 
in Waikato for the Governor and then spent the next few months in Auckland 
serving as Bell's private secretary. When, in August 1863, Bell departed 
for Australia to raise a Colonial force, Gerst, who believed the Waikatos 
to be victims of circumstance rather than willing participants in the war, 
found this assignment abhorrent and agreed to accompany the Native Minister 
only after being granted the option of returning to England if he so desired. 
Before Gerst embarked for Australia, Bell and the New Zealand Prime Minister, 
Alfred Domett, indicated to Gerst their intention to appoint him to the 
59 AJHR, 1863, E-1, pp. 13-14. J.E. Gerst to F.D. Bell, 11 April, 1863, 
pp. 14-15. J.E. Gerst to F.D. Bell, 14 April, 1863, pp. 20-21. J.E. Gerst 
to F.D. Bell, 23 April, 1863. AJHR, 1863, E-3, Dispatches from the Secretary 
of State and the Governor of New Zealand. Section I. Dispatches from Governor 
Sir George Grey KCB, pp. 28-29. J.E. Gerst to F.D. Bell, 16 April, 1863. 
60J.E. Gerst, Maori King, p. 247. J.E. Gerst, New Zealand Revisited, pp. 24-26. 
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Legislative Council but, after only a few weeks brief stay in Australia, 
Gerst departed for the United Kingdom without waiting for verification of 
this offer. 61 
Following his return to England in late December, 1863, Gerst 
resumed his legal studies at the Inner Temple and, at the same time, set 
about informing the public of the situation in New Zealand and publicizing 
his personal solution to its problems. In the daily and periodical press 
and in his book The Maori King, published in 1864, he denounced both the 
62 Imperial and Colonial Governments for their policies in the colony. 
The inconsistency of the Imperial government, with its repeated changes of 
administration and vacillation between indifference and haphazard regulation 
had gradually destroyed the Maoris' confidence in British authority. 63 
The native wars were in essence struggles against nEuropean aggression", 
argued Gerst. The Colonial administration had consciously taken steps to 
"make the continuance of the war certain and the submission of the natives 
impossible" for the benefit of the Auckland Province at the expense of the 
Imperial government. Moreover, the New Zealand government's policy of land 
61AJHR, 1864, E-3. Further Papers Relating to the Native Insurrections, pp. 
88-89. J.E. Gerst, "Observations and the Native Inhabitants of Ranglaowhia 
and Kihlkihi", 21 May, 1864. J.E. Gerst, New Zealand Revisited, pp. 46-47, 
p. 326. PP, 1865, Vol. 37, pp. 98-99. J.E. Gerst to Sir F. Rogers, 
20 December, 1864. Sinclair, "Introduction", pp. xiv-xv. 
62 J.E. Gerst, "Our New Zealand Conquests", Macmillan's Magazine, 12 (1865): 
168-175. Hereafter referred to as J.E. Gerst, "New Zealand Conquests". 
J.E. Gerst, Maori King, passim. The Times, 24 December, 1863, p. 10. Ibid., 
6 May, 1864, p. 5. The Maori King analyzes the inception and development of 
the King movement in New Zealand and recounts Gorst's personal experiences 
with Maori nationalism, and the Imperial government's responses to it, 
during Gorst's years in the colony. 
63J.E. Gerst, Maori King, Chap. 4. 
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confiscation was essential to that administration because "they had enlisted 
militia in Australia and other places by promising them a share of the 
spoil 11 • 64 In order to resolve the native question, Gorst advocated an end 
to double government in the colony and the placing of all native districts 
under direct Imperial rule. A central Council of Chiefs with law-making 
powers, reinforced with a native police force, and under the direction of 
a British Resident, could be constituted to conduct affairs in Maori 
. 65 provinces. 
Gorst was later to discard these views. By the close of the 
eighteen sixties, events in both England and New Zealand combined to effect 
a revision of Gorst's attitudes towards colonial rule. In 1869, with the 
native rebellions still not finally quelled and the supposedly "Separatist" 
Gladstone government apparently poised to set the colonies adrift, Gorst 
suggested, along with a plea for retention of the self-governing colonies 
in the Empire, a different approach to colonial management. As the Maori 
Wars had resulted, in part, from the "injudicious interference of the 
Imperial Government", it was wrong of Britain to now expect the colony to 
single-handedly retrieve a situation the former had helped to create. 
While wholeheartedly supporting the current government's policy of 
evacuating Imperial troops from New Zealand as "the first necessary step 
in the pacification of the colony", he urged that the Imperial government 
guarantee the colonists a loan which would enable them to provide for their 
own internal security and to assume sole responsibility over native affairs. 
64J.E. Gorst, "New Zealand Conquests", p. 168, pp. 170-171, p. 173. 
65J.E. Gorst, Maori King, pp. 257-262. 
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This granting of colonial freedom would not involve the dismemberment of 
the Empire, as critics charged, but on the contrary, could result in the 
preservation of its unity, argued Garst. Just as in America the independence 
of individual states was found to be compatible with the maintenance of the 
Union, " .•. there is no reason why Great Britain, and the other enfran-
chised countries which acknowledge the sovereignty of the Queen, should 
not continue in one free confederation". Although he offered no detailed 
scheme to be followed, Gorst's advocacy of a federal solution to the 
colonial question places him amongst the earliest proponents of federation. 66 
Meanwhile, however, Gorst's efforts during 1863-1865 to promote 
direct Imperial rule in New Zealand failed to effect a change in British 
policy, or notably stir public interest in that colony, but his views were 
angrily received there producing a tirade of criticism in the columns of 
the daily press. It was suggested that Gorst's viewpoint was coloured by 
his failure to obtain an appointment to the Legislative Council - a rather 
illogical argument considering Garst had repeatedly criticized the govern-
67 
ment's native policies whilst serving in the colony; another correspondent 
intimated that Gorst's desire for an Imperial appointment was behind his 
68 
new scheme for native government; and the Daily Southern Cross bluntly 
asserted that Gorst penned the Maori King in order to demonstrate "he •.. 
66J.E. Garst, "What Ought to be the Legal and Constitutional Relations 
between England and her Colonies?", Transactions of the National Association 
for the Promotion of Social Science 14 (1870): 97-100. See also, C.A. 
Bodelsen, Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialism (New York, 1968), pp. 80-100. 
C.C. Eldridge, Victorian Imperialism (London, 1978), pp. 80-101. The Times, 
29 July, 1869, p. 10 
67 For example, see AJHR, 1862, E-9, pp. 18-19. AJHR, 1862, E-4, pp. 9-11. 
68
cited in Sinclair, "Introduction", p. xv. 
24. 
69 70 
was an uncommonly clever fellow". Gorst 1 s genuine concern for the 
native population, evidenced by his tireless efforts on their behalf while 
in the colony, and his subsequent publicity campaign in England, along with 
his service to the New Zealand government - which had prompted the colonial 
administration to officially acknowledge its gratitude and admiration 
71 following the abandonment of Te Awamutu, were now apparently forgotten or 
ignored. 
Gorst's call for direct Imperial control of native affairs sprang 
from his deep distrust of the existing state of representative government 
in the colony. In his view the New Zealand Assembly was merely a tool of 
the avaricious colonists who utilized the legislature for personal gain: 
••• the moment a question is stated affecting any pecuniary interest, 
the House becomes ••. a mere Assembly of delegates from the various 
provinces of the colony; each member well knows how he is expected to 
vote, and knows also, that any eccentricity in voting on his part, would 
evoke a speedy and unanimous call from his constituents for his resignation. 
69
rbid,, p. xv. Gorst 1 s Maori King has now come to be regarded in a more 
favourable light in New Zealand. According to Sinclair, the work can now be 
considered "one of the very best of nineteenth-century accounts of life among 
the Maoris" and seminal to the understanding of the development of the British 
Empire in that century, whilst at the same time being of "relevance to the 
modern world where nationalist movements, often anti-European in tendency, and 
Imperial (or Imperialist) wars continue to occur". See ibid., p. xvi. 
70This concern was most forcefully expressed in The Maori King in which he 
reveals a deep sympathy for and understanding of the Maori nation and Maori 
grievances and a solicitude for their cause and the future welfare of the 
New Zealand native population. 
71 Following Gorst's expulsion from the Waikato, F. Dillon Bell wrote in glowing 
terms of the success of the project in Te Awamutu and of Gorst personally. 
After enumerating the goals of the scheme, Bell wrote: "Their prosecution was 
confided to a man who, to a real interest in the Native people, united peculiar 
abilities for the task: willingly relinquishing the advantages which private 
fortune gave him in a country where wealth is so easily accumulated, and 
content, a Master of Arts of Cambridge University, to live in the hush, almost 
without society and without books for the sake of laying the foundations with 
a few poor Native boys, of a school that should replace the indolence and dirt 
of a pa, by the industry, discipline, and comfort of a civilised home". (See 
AJHR, 1863, E-1, p. 1.) 
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Moreover, the increasingly democratic nature of the Assembly had resulted 
in its repeated dismissals at the hands of disgruntled constituents, thereby 
destroying the Colonial government's viability as administrator of the 
b . 72 su J ect races. It is evident that Garst believed that this form of 
"popular government" was responsible for the policies which provoked the 
resurgence of Maori hostility and the resumption of the native wars which 
had abruptly ended his schemes, so successfully launched at Te Awamutu, for 
the government and pacification of the Maori nation. 
This experience with "popular" government led Garst to actively 
oppose parliamentary reform along democratic lines when, in July of 1866, 
he stood as the Conservative candidate for Hastings at the general election. 
Although Reform was not a national issue at this election73 and locally the 
electorate was apparently most concerned with maintaining resistance to 
"further concessions to the Romanists 11 , 74 Reform Bills had been introduced 
in Parliament by the Liberals in 1854 and 1860, and by the Conservatives in 
1859, and this general movement towards Reform, combined with his recent 
experiences in New Zealand, evidently provoked Gorst's anti-democratic stand 
at the election. "Having witnessed the results of democratic government 
in our Australasian Colonies I am opposed to the lowering of the franchise 
he declared in his election address. 75 In these colonies the colonists had 
72 J.E. Garst, Maori King, p. 258. 
73see Robert Stewart, The Foundation of the Conservative Party 1830-1867 
(London, 1978), pp. 339-346. 
74Hastings and St. Leonards News, 7 July, 1865, p. 2. Mr. North, the Liberal 
incumbent, who was accused of supporting such concessions, was defeated. 
75Hastings and St. Leonards News, 26 May, 1865, p. 2, p. 3. 
II 
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the main power in the election of members to the Colonial Assemblies and it 
was lodged in one class - the labouring class, which was a great and 
monstrous evil". In his view, certain reformers were determined to change 
England "into a sort of second-rate Australia". If universal suffrage was 
introduced at home, where the labouring masses were vastly inferior 
economically to their counterparts in Australia, the nation would "get 
something a great deal worse" than in that country. "Instead of lowering 
the franchise they should try to raise the working man11 • 76 He was, however, 
willing to countenance an extension of the suffrage "provided it was not 
one which would overthrow the present constituencies 11 • 77 
76 
Hastings and St. Leonards News, 9 June, 1865, p. 3. Gorst apparently 
feared that any reduction in the franchise would ultimately lead to 
universal suffrage and a form of economically-motivated electoral pressure 
potentially more disruptive than that exercised by the colonists in New 
Zealand. 
77Ibid., 16 June, 1865. See also, ibid., 26 May, 1865, p.2, p.3, 
9 June, 1865, p.3. Gorst no doubt had in mind a form of lateral extension 
which would increase the potency of the traditional Conservative vote, 
very much along the lines of the Tories' 1858 Reform Bill which, through 
various devices, aimed to make the Tory strength in the counties more 
effective. (See Stewart, pp. 354-358.) Gorst was also amongst those 
willing to extend the franchise to females. In the May 20, 1867 debate 
on the Representation of the People Bill, he voted in favour of J.S. 
Mill's amendment to include women in the vote. (Parliamentary Debates 
[hereafter referred to as PD], 3rd Series, 187 [1867]: 845.) 
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78 Gorst's bid for a CollUllons seat proved unsuccessful and he, 
therefore, resumed his preparations for the Bar, to which he was called 
during the same year. However, in Spring of 1866, seemingly undaunted 
by his defeat at Hastings, Gorst agreed to contest the Borough of Cambridge 
seat at the April 24 by-election which had resulted from the disqualification 
79 
of one of the two sitting members. In this campaign Gorst again voiced 
his objections to Reform, revealing his continuing resentment of the New 
80 Zealand Assembly and mistrust of "popular government". 
This election occurring whilst the Liberal Reform Bill was before 
the Commons resulted in the interjection of the suffrage issue into the 
78 Result: July 12, 1965: 
Mr. Waldengrave-Leslie 
Mr. Robertson 
Mr. North 
Mr. Gorst 
(Lib.) 
(Con.) 
(Lib.) 
(Con.) 
749 
737 
725 
591 
Gorst's anti-democratic stance does not appear to have been a factor in his 
defeat. His successful running mate, Robertson, whilst declaring "It was 
not of the working men he was afraid; not of going too low - it was the 
masters", at the same time "saw no particular advantage in lowering the 
franchise ••. ". Although he agreed that the suffrage "might be greatly 
extended" he did not know how it could be done, because it was necessary 
to maintain some standard ••. " He believed that "Lord Derby's scheme" 
(the 1859 Reform Bill) would have provided "a great extension of the 
Suffrage". (Hastings and St. Leonards News, 6 June, 1865, p. 3; 16 June, 
1865, p. 3.) From the outset Gorst was considered the underdog in this 
election, which was seen as a contest between "three old combatants". 
Gorst's candidacy was viewed as the trial run of an aspiring politician. 
"Mr. Gorst is quite right to try his way, and to introduce himself in the 
constituency", observed one local newspaper editor, "but it is not likely 
that a borough which has twice rejected so old and respected a resident as 
Mr. Robertson, will elect on his first appearance, an untried stranger •.• ". 
(Ibid., 16 June, 1865, p. 2; 2 June, 1865, p. 2.) 
79
cambridge Chronicle, 21 April, 1866, p. 4. 
80His highly critical "Our New Zealand Conquests" had appeared in Macmillan's 
one month earlier. 
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contest and Gorst's opposition to the lowering of the franchise now took 
the form of a direct attack upon the current Bill. The proposed legislation 
was merely an expedient to capture votes declared Gorst81 and he did not 
believe the Bill would bring any benefit to the people. On the contrary, 
the measure would serve to unbalance the Constitution by giving the working 
class a preponderant influence, thereby opening the door to class representa-
tion. Consequently, if elected, he would oppose the Bill in Parliament, 
"not from fear of the Working Class but because neither that nor any other 
class should have undue preponderance in the country What was needed 
was a balance of power - the poor should not be able to do without the 
rich nor the rich to do without the poor 11 .82 Moreover, the Liberal Bill 
was an inadequate measure, dealing solely with the lowering of the franchise 
83 to the exclusion of other elements of Reform. 
8111The object of the Government's Franchise Bill is not so much to benefit 
the people as to redeem the pledges rashly given to catch popularity by the 
party that calls itself Liberal ... ", Gorst stated. (Cambridge Chronicle, 
21 April, 1866, p. 5.) 
82
cambridge Chronicle, 21 April, 1866, p. 5, p. 9. 
8311 He was quite willing that the question of Reform should be well and 
carefully considered; but let us have an honest and complete Reform •.. If 
they wanted to bring in a Reform Bill why did they not bring in the whole 
bill and nothing but the bill? Why put off the question of redistribution 
of seats ... ?, he said. "Let us have a bill which dealt fairly with all 
those questions which Reform involved •.. ". (Speech at Nomination of 
Candidates, 23 April, 1866. Speech at Conservative Meeting, 23 April, 
1866. Supplement to the Cambridge Chronicle, 28 April, 1866J Gorst 
evidently shared the majority of the Conservatives' fear that the provisions 
of this Bill would produce a situation in which a combination of county 
leaseholders in the boroughs and the newly-enfranchised in the non-borough 
towns and the suburbs would swamp the safe Conservative tenant farmers. 
(See Robert Blake, Disraeli [New York, 1967], pp. 339-340.) 
29. 
In Gorst's view the working class needed social rather than 
84 political reform. Amongst the many conditions requiring amelioration 
were the situation of manual labourers, lack of education, low wages -
especially among agricultural labourers - and inadequate housing. Thus, 
any suggestion that the workers' sole requirement for happiness was the 
vote was abhorrent to him. If he was a worker he would say "Don't degrade 
the franchise to my level, but raise me to the level of the franchise". 85 
However, Gorst did not believe that legislation could effect economic 
improvement. He was of the opinion that "the people could not be made 
richer by anything but labour, industry and frugality". 86 
Gorst's advocacy of economic improvement through self-help was 
consistent with mid-nineteenth century society's laissez-faire attitude 
towards social reform. The current accepted social philosophy, produced 
from a synthesis of political economy and utilitarianism, attributed 
material advancement to the individual's pursuit of self-interest unencum-
bered by state intervention. At the political level, this philosophy was 
subscribed to by Conservatives as well as Liberals, the traditional party 
of laissez-faire, Tory paternalism of the early decades of the century 
having largely dissipated. The limited social legislation enacted up to 
this period, such as the Poor Law, Factory and Health Acts, was undertaken 
to remedy only what was viewed as the most flagrant of social injustices 
84
cambridge Chronicle, 21 April, 1866, p.9. Speech at Barnwell, 23 April, 
1866. Speech at Cambridge Theatre, 23 April, 1866. Supplement to the 
Cambridge Chronicle, 28 April, 1866. 
85 Speech at Barnwell, Cambridge. Cambridge Chronicle, 21 April, 1866, p.9. 
86 Speech at the Lion, Cambridge. Ibid., 21 April, 1866, p. 9. 
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and in the case of the Derby government's reforms of 1866-1867, safe 
measures designed to appear as social concern for the working classes. In 
the mid-sixties, even most social reformers could not conceive of collectivism 
as a solution to social distress. Acceptance of the need for state inter-
vention in social affairs developed only gradually during the latter half 
87 
of the century. Gerst was amongst the first Tory reformers to recognize 
this need and during the early eighteen seventies began to agitate for 
social reform measures. Another Conservative reformer, Richard Assheton 
Cross, who was later to achieve recognition for his social legislation 
while Horne Secretary between 1874 and 1880, displayed both antisocial 
reform and anti-democratic tendencies. 88 
It would appear that Gorst's anti-democratic attitude was in tune 
with the bulk of popular sentiment for he succeeded in gaining the support 
of a sufficient proportion of the Cambridge electorate to narrowly defeat 
89 his Liberal opponent at the polls. Following Gorst's entry into 
Parliament on April 25, 90 the House remained in session only until 
87For nineteenth-century social philosophy, see Eric J. Evans, Social Policy 
1830-1914: Individualism, Collectivism and the Origins of the Welfare State 
(London, 1978). Derek Fraser, The Evolution of the British Welfare State 
(London, 1973), Chap. 5. E.C. Midwinter, Victorian Social Reform (London, 
1968). For mid-nineteenth century Conservative attitudes towards social 
reform, see Paul Smith, Disraelian Conservatism and Socjal Reform (London, 1976), 
pp. 18-36, pp. 40-47, p. 130. 
88see Dennis J. Mitchell, "Richard Assheton Cross, a Political Biography" 
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of Mississippi, 1976, pp. 68-78). 
89 Election result, 24 April, 1866. Gorst 774. Torrens 755. Cambridge Chronicle, 
28 April, 1866, p .4. According to the Chronicle's editor, "The victory showed 
that the majority of the electors of Cambridge were averse to the passing of 
that dangerous measure ... " (Ibid., p. 4). 
90Ibid., p. 4. 
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August 10 and he did not address the Commons during that time. When 
Parliament met again on February 5, 1867, it was under a Conservative 
administration91 destined to take its "leap in the dark1192 with the second 
Reform Act. Gorst witnessed the progress of the Reform Bill through the 
House with mixed feelings. 93 Party advantage dictated an extension of the 
94 franchise at this time, a political expedient Gorst was prepared to accept, 
but when, during the Bill's passage through the House, the Opposition 
proceeded to dismantle the restrictions designed to keep the working class 
from effectively becoming the electoral majority, with which the Conservatives 
had surrounded the measure, he felt obliged to sound a note of resistance in 
the House. 
A succession of Radical amendments having secured unsafeguarded 
household suffrage in the Bill, Garst now attempted to draw Parliament's 
attention to what he believed were the dangers inherent in the proposed 
91The Liberals resigned in June 1866, following the defeat of their Reform 
Bill and the Conservatives formed a new administration under Lord Derby. 
92This phrase was first used, in 1860, by Philip Rose, Tory election 
manager, in a letter to Lord Derby commenting upon the moderate Liberal 
Reform Bill of 1860. (See Stewart, p. 358, p. 371.) 
9311 Character Sketch", p. 578. According to W. T. Stead, at this point 
Gorst was not opposed to Reform per se but shared the opinion of those, 
like Lord Salisbury (Second Marquess), who were agreeable to a lowering of 
the franchise provided safeguards against democracy were preserved, (See 
also, F.B. Smith, The Making of the Second Reform Bill [Cambridge, 1966], 
p. 209.) 
94Robert Blake, The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill (London, 1970, 
Fontana Paperback edition, 1976), pp. 103-105. Hereafter referred to as 
Blake, Conservative Party. T.E. Kebble, A History of Toryism (London, 1886. 
Republished Edition with Introduction by E.J. Feuchtwanger, London, 1972, 
p. 352.) 
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franchise. The innnediate electoral advantage which the party leaders 
anticipated would flow from passage of the Bill were poor compensation for 
its long-term effects, he warned. The most harmful consequence of the 
measure "would be its demoralising effect upon men who would._be compelled 
to make themselves popular". He dreaded the influence which "the opinions 
of a constituency" would exert "upon young men whose political character 
was not formed and who would have to make themselves popular". He urged 
the adoption of a minority representation clause because it would provide 
a way "in which hereafter it might be possible for people who were unable 
to make themselves popular with the masses to find their way into 
parliament". He reminded the Members that it was their boast that the 
House "at present represented all classes, and could not afford to be 
indifferent to the opinions of any class of their constituents, but after 
this Bill passed they would represent only one class, and that, generally, 
95 the lowest". Evidently, memories of the electoral pressures exerted by 
a democratic electorate upon the members of the New Zealand Assembly 
continued to influence Gorst's attitude towards Reform. 
Gorst perceptively observed that his Tory colleagues would vote 
for the Bill "only because they believed it must pass 11 • 96 Failure of the 
95
~, 3rd series, 188 (1867): 1073-1074. The minority clause supported by 
Gorst which was an attempt to reverse the drift towards single votes of 
equal weight, was closely akin to the Hare system of proportional representa-
tion backed by Radical J.S. Mill in Parliament and agitated for by the 
Reform League. Both measures were "desperate attempts to preserve the 
balance of class interest in the constituencies by minimizing the pressure 
of the mob". (See F.B. Smith, pp. 240-241.) 
96PD, 3rd series, 188 (1867): 1558. 
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measure would almost certainly have seen the initiative for electoral 
reform pass to the Liberals, resulting in a Radical measure even more 
d . 1 T . 97 etrimenta to ory interests. Thus, Disraeli was willing to adopt 
Radical amendments in order to ensure passage of a Bill in which he was 
able to retain the initiative in redistribution and the re-drawing of 
constituency boundaries. He and his supporters calculated that the 
possible electoral disadvantage resulting from the granting of household 
suffrage in the mainly Radical boroughs would be offset by an increase of 
98 Conservative strength accruing from the expansion of county seats. 
Gorst, however, did not share this confidence and accurately 
predicted that if the Bill passed the Conservatives would be rejected by 
the people at the next election. Because "the measure was one which greatly 
disturbed the balance of political power, and gave to one class in the 
country a preponderating power over the rest .•• , " presenting a threat to 
the country's political future, Gorst announced his intention to oppose 
Third Reading of the Bill: "Without a decent interval in which to change 
his opinions he could not support the Bill further; if there were an 
opportunity of voting against it he would do so 11 99 Thus, during his 
first term in Parliament Gorst displayed what a critic was later to describe 
as that "rebellion against the bonds of party'which was to be "the chief ..• 
97P. Smith, p. 89. 
98Maurice Cowling, 1867: Disraeli, Gladstone and Revolution. The Passing of 
the Second Reform Act (Cambridge, 1967), pp. 70-72. In the general election 
of 1868, the franchise provisions of the Second Reform Act gave the edge to 
the Liberals who were returned to office. However, as the Tories had 
anticipated, redistribution had increased their representation in the counties. 
99 PD, 3rd series, 188 (1867): 1557-1558. 
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cause of his want of (political) success"_ lOO 
Gorst's protests attracted little attention in Parliament and had 
no impact upon the Reform legislation in the House. During this period 
Gorst gained what little recognition he achieved principally through one 
of Disraeli I s speeches in which he referred to "the Honourable Member for 
Cambridge who seems so proud of his extreme youth". 101 However, during 
1867 Gorst also became closely associated with party organization, through 
his involvement in the formation of the National Union of Conservative and 
Constitutional Associations, which was to effectively bring to an end his 
brief term of political obscurity. 
Gorst did not allow his personal antipathy to democracy blind 
him to political reality. He no doubt recognized that the movement towards 
parliamentary reform was irresistible and that, once it was enacted, 
political survival would require the Conservatives to mobilize the support 
of the newly-enfranchised urban workers. He predicted that "when the 
constituencies of the country were enlarged by the present Reform Bill, 
the victory would go to the party possessing the best organisation ... 11 • 102 
lOO Arthur A. Bauman, "Sir John Gorst", The Saturday Review 123 (1916): 
345-346. 
101sir Edward G. Clarke, The Story of My Life (London, 1918), p. 96. 
Gorst had come to Disraeli's attention initially as a result of the farmer's 
attack upon the Colonial Under-Secretary, Sir Charles Adderley, for his 
alleged insensitivity to the grievances of the colonists in Ceylon. Gorst's 
speech so impressed Disraeli that he instructed Spencer Walpole to acquaint 
the Member for Cambridge of the fact and Walpole duly told Garst, "I thought 
you would like to know that Mr. Disraeli was extremely pleased with your 
smart attack upon Mr. Adderley". See H.E. Garst, Fourth Party, p. 31. 
"Character Sketch", p. 578. 
102
speech on the occasion of a 
Union, Monday, 29 April, 1867. 
meeting held to discuss proposed Conservative 
Cambridge Chronicle, 4 May, 1867, p. 4. 
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Thus, when, early in 1867, there developed within the Tory party a scheme 
designed to organize support among the urban working class, Garst was among 
its initiators. 
The basis for such an organization already existed.in the form 
of a smattering of Conservative working-men's associations which operated 
around the country, primarily in northern districts. Some were remnants 
of the old Operatives' Conservative Societies, originally founded in 
support of Oastler's democratic Toryism during the 1830s and 1840s; others 
had developed during the second half of 1866 to counteract the influence 
of Reform agitators. 103 The introduction, and eventual passage, of the 
Reform Bill, which ultimately added approximately one million householders 
to the electorate104 - the majority of which were members of the urban 
working and lower-middle classes - necessitated a more vigorous approach 
to the organization of Conservative working men on the part of the Tories. 
The party could scarcely presume that this new electorate would instinctively 
recognize its identity of interest with the Conservatives. Thus, the 
wooing of this new group of voters and its formation into a mass organization 
of local associations, capable of dealing efficiently with the tasks of 
registration and canvassing necessary to obtain maximum attendance at the 
polls on election day, became of vital importance during 1867. 105 
103H.J. Hanham, Elections and Party Management: Politics in the Time of 
Disraeli and Gladstone (London, 1959), pp. 105-106. R.H. Hill, Toryism and 
the People 1832-1846 (London, 1929. Reprinted ed. Porcupine Press, 
Philadelphia, 1975), Chaps. 2-3. P. Smith, p. 116. 
104R.T. McKenzie, British Political Parties, 2nd ed. (New York, 1967 ), 
p. 146. 
105R.T. McKenzie, pp. 146-147. P. Smith, p. 116. 
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Efforts in this direction were initiated early in 1867, at the 
behest of Lord Nevill, 106 a party manager and supporter of Disraeli, 107 
by a group of young "Disraelian" Tories led by H.C. Raikes, the most active 
of whom - in addition to Raikes - were W.T. Chorley, A.G. Marten, W.C. 
Harvey, Edward Clarke and Gorst. 108 At a meeting held at the office of the 
Imperial Review, a weekly paper which Raikes had just begun publishing, a 
provisional committee was created and plans were formulated for the estab-
lishment of a Conservative Working Men's Association in London and for a 
nationwide Union of all such organizations. In April the Imperial Review 
reported that both organizations were in the process of formation and 
shortly thereafter the inaugural mee~ing of the Metropolitan Working Men's 
Association took place in London, followed ten days later by a Manchester 
meeting of representatives of the Conservative and Constitutional Associa-
tions of Lancashire, convened to co-ordinate measures for the organization 
of the party. During the Autumn months Raikes and Gorst traversed the 
country promoting the national organization and, finally, on November 12, 
1867, representatives of 70 associations from 55 cities and towns met at 
h F I T L d 1 h h U · 
109 
t e reemason s avern, on on, to aunc t e new nion. 
Gorst occupied the Chair at this conference and in his opening 
address set forth the purpose of the meeting, namely, "to consider by what 
106H. St .J. Raikes, The Life and Letters of Henry Cecil Raikes (London, 
1918), p. 59. 
107 Clarke, p. 96. E.J. Feuchtwanger, Disraeli, Democracy and the Tory Party 
(Oxford, 1968), p. 123. (Hereafter referred to as Feuchtwanger, Democracy 
and The Tory Party.) 
108 Clarke, p. 97; Raikes, p. 60. 
109 Clarke, pp. 97-98; H. St.J. Raikes, pp. 60-62. 
37. 
particular organisation we may make •.. Conservative principles effective 
110 
among the masses". A proposal outlining the methods to be used to 
achieve this object was presented by the honorary secretary pro tern, 
Mr. Harvey. The new central union "will afford a centre of communication 
and action between local associations" and "strengthen the hands of the 
local associations where existing in their respective districts, and •.. 
encourage the establishment of associations in districts where they are 
wanting", in order to "help disseminate the Conservative creed and 
111 facilitate the recruitment of party supporters". The meeting thereafter 
drew up a constitution, elected officers - Gorst being amongst the Vice-
Presidents selected - and settled upon the National Union of Conservative 
and Constitutional Associations as the name for their new organization. 112 
Gorst presided at this inaugural meeting because, as he explained 
in his opening remarks, both Lord Holmesdale and Lord Dartmouth had found 
it necessary to decline the invitations extended them to serve as Chairman 
th . . 113 on is occasion. The absence of Conservative notables from this 
founding conference reflected the party hierarchy's initial cool response 
to the National Union. The Conservative leadership experienced misgivings 
regarding this venture into mass organization among the working classes. 
llOMinutes of the Proceedings of the First Conference of the National Union 
of Conservative and Constitutional Associations, 1867, p. 3. 
111Minutes of the Proceedings of the First Conference of the National Union 
of Conservative and Constitutional Associations, 1867, pp. 5-6. 
112Ibid., pp. 7-78; pp. 89-90. 
113Ibid., p. 3 
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Party organizer Major, the Honourable C.J. Keith-Falconer, expressed his 
hope that the party "shall not be like Frankenstein, and have raised a 
spirit that we cannot control'." Disraeli halted the issue of a National 
Union circular because he believed its terms committed the party too 
114 strongly. According to R.C. Raikes, the members of the Conservative 
Cabinet declined to serve the Union in any official capacity for fear 
"they might be connected by the Radical press with some pamphlet or 
publication, or some act of the Union which they might not endorse"; 115 
and those prominent Tories whose political positions depended upon influence 
d 1 d d f 1 . . 116 were isinc ine to a opt orma organisation. 
Gorst's participation in the formation of the National Union 
marked the commencement of his involvement in party organization, in which 
he was to play an important role in the near future. The Tories' failure 
114P. Smith, pp. 117-118. 
115M::Kenzie, p. 155. 
116
sir Ivor Jennings, Party Politics, 3 vols. (Cambridge, 1960-1962), 2, 
148. J.R. Vincent has suggested that the lukewarm reception given to the 
National Union by the Conservative Party hierarchy, especially "the 
absence of top brass from its first meeting", may have arisen from the 
fact that this elite, "while keen to build up new forms of organisation 
•.. wished to steer clear ... of a body in which Garst had somehow become 
a moving spirit", in view of the latter's attitude towards Conservative 
Reform measures. (J.R. Vincent, "'A Sort of Second-Rate Australia': A 
Note on Garst and Democracy, 1965-8", Historical Studies [Australia and 
New Zealand, April 1973]: 539-544.) However, it appears highly unlikely 
that the Conservative leadership would consider as a threat a novice back-
bencher who, in Vincent's words, was "an unknown young lawyer", of whom 
even the anti-democratic Tory notables in the Rouse "appear not to have 
been aware". (Ibid., pp. 541-542.) Moreover, it is doubtful that party 
chieftains who were reluctant to support the Union because of Gorst's 
participation in that association would, less than three years later, 
acquiesce in the decision to entrust him with the key office of party 
agent. (See below, pp.40-53 for an account of Gorst's tenure in this 
office.) 
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to regain power in the 1868 general election prompted Disraeli and some 
of his more forward-looking associates to re-appraise the party's management 
methods, leading them to conclude that Conservative central organization 
was totally inadequate for the new era of household suffrage and large 
popular constituencies. 117 At this period, ·this organization was 
unmethodical and loosely-structured, being shared by the Whips, the party 
agent, Markham Spofforth, who was responsible for the daily work of party 
management, and a variety of federal bodies including the National Union. 118 
The resignation of Spofforth, in March 1870, provided the 
opportunity to introduce some new blood into central organization. Spofforth's 
management of party affairs, which, according to Disraeli, had been conducted 
"not always with perfect judgement", 119 had become the target for criticism 
from within the party and it was resolved that his successor should be a 
man of a totally different stripe, one capable of formulating a scheme of 
party management more in tune with the needs arising out of the creation of 
120 
a new borough electorate. By April, Gerard Noel, the Chief Whip, was 
117 Hanham, p. 114. W.F. Monypenny and G.E. Buckle, The Life of Benjamin 
Disraeli, 2 vols. (revised ed. London, 1929), 2, p. 524. 
118 Feuchtwanger, Democracy and the Tory Party, p. 106. E.J. Feuchtwanger, 
"J.E. Gerst and the Central Organisation of the Conservative Party, 1870-1882'J 
Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, 32 (1959), 192-208. 
Hereafter referred to as Feuchtwanger, "Central Organisation". 
119Disraeli to Cairns, 13 January, 1875, quoted in Feuchtwanger, Democracy 
and the Tory Party, pp. 106-107. 
120 Feuchtwanger, Democracy and the Tory Party, pp. 111-114. "Central 
Organisation", pp. 193-194. 
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suggesting to Disraeli that Spofforth's former post could be more than 
adequately filled by Gorst: " ... we could not find a better successor 
than Mr. Gorst ... I think that Gorst combines the necessary qualifications, 
he is a gentleman, with a good manner ... , has had a legal education, and 
121 is also very energetic in all he undertakes". With Disraeli's approval, 
Noel offered the position to Gorst but the latter was at first reluctant 
to accept the appointment for doing so meant relinquishing his hopes for 
an early return to the House of Commons, a stipulation clearly outlined 
122 by Noel. However, during these negotiations Gorst was apparently given 
to understand that his efforts on behalf of the party would be rewarded 
with the offer of an office in the government when the Conservatives were 
again returned to power, and, thus, he accordingly agreed to serve as 
123 Principal Agent. 
Perhaps to emphasize the new direction he hoped to take in party 
management, Gorst did not occupy the office formerly used as Conservative 
headquarters by Spofforth but, instead, established himself at 53, Parliament 
St., Westminster, the home of the newly-reorganized Conservative Registration 
Association, which over the course of the next year become known as the 
Central Office. Gorst's chief goal as party agent was the formation of an 
organization capable of harnessing to the Tory party the urban conservative 
electorate, including both the newly-enfranchised working classes and the 
121 Hughenden Papers,B/xxi/N/114, Noel to Disraeli, 14 April, 1870. 
122 Hughenden Papers, B/xxi/N/102, Noel to Disraeli, 2 April, 1870. 
B/xxi/N/115, Noel to Disraeli, 22 April, 1870. 
123According to Gorst's son, his father was assured by Disraeli that "If 
the party comes to power ..• you can look with certainty for some substantial 
gratification of your laudable ambition". (Quoted in H.E. Gorst, Fourth Party, 
p. 32.) 
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middle-class professionals and businessmen who were becoming alienated 
from Gladstonianism, a potential source of future local leaders. This 
infusion of urban political strength was essential if the Conservatives 
were to undermine the Liberal domination of the larger boroughs, given a 
substantial boost by the 1867 Reform Act's granting of household suffrage 
to the urban workers - traditionally Radical supporters - which was a pre-
124 
requisite for any future Conservative electoral success. As Gorst 
explained to the Chief Whip: "We are generally strong in the counties and 
weak in the boroughs, and we shall never attain stable political power until 
125 the boroughs are conquered". 
The type of difficulties confronting the party in its pursuit of 
a "new Conservatism" were reflected in one of Gorst' s first reports on 
conditions in the larger borough constituencies, in this instance, Rochester, 
which he compiled after only a few months in office: 
The register has not been attended to for years; no Conservative agent 
appears at the revision court. The mayor, the entire town council, the 
overseers, assistant overseers, and rate collectors are all radicals: 
both register and burgers-roll are no doubt affected by this circumstance. 
The chief employers of labour are of the same party. . •• There are no 
Conservative large employers of Labour. Mr. Nicholson (a retired Banker), 
Mr. Manclark and other of the gentry who take interest in the county 
elections take little in borough elections •.• The Chapter has been 
'antediluvian' and exercised no influence at a11.126 
124Blake, Conservative Party, pp. 146-148. Feuchtwanger, Democracy and the 
Tory Party, p.91, p.114. The granting of household suffrage established a ratio 
of electors to population in the English boroughs at one to eight, and in the 
counties at one to fifteen, at the time of the 1868 General Election. In the 
Scottish boroughs, the ratio was one to nine, in Scottish counties one to 
twenty-seven (F.B. Smith, p. 239). In the 1868 electoral contest the 
Conservatives were successful in only 25 out of 114 seats for boroughs over 
50,000 and won only 4 out of 25 London seats. (Blake, Disraeli, p. 512.) 
125 Hughenden Papers, B/xxi/N/120a, Gorst to Noel, 22 September, 1870. 
126 Hughenden Papers, B/xxi/G/234, J.E. Gorst to B. Disraeli, 25 July, 1870. 
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In order to eradicate these forms of political and organizational weakness, 
the Central Office, under Gorst's supervision, worked to establish local 
associations, primarily in the larger boroughs, 127 which were to function 
as constituency electoral organizations by assuming responsibility for the 
selection and management of local candidates at election time128 and, at the 
same time, propagate the Conservative doctrine, chiefly among the newly-
129 
enfranchised working classes. To facilitate the formation of these new 
bodies, Gerst travelled around the country making personal contact with 
Tory leaders in the constituencies urging them to form committees from 
130 
which the local associations might develop. 
At first the activities of the Central Office closely duplicated 
the work being undertaken by the National Union, under Secretary Leonard 
Sedgwick's direction, resulting in some confusion at constituency level, a 
state of affairs which, according to Gerst, constituted a "method of 
127 In the smaller boroughs and the counties, where electioneering remained 
largely influence-based, there was as yet little scope for the development 
of new organizational methods. In 1873, Disraeli did establish a separate 
committee of prominent Conservatives to oversee safe seats, presumably 
chiefly in the counties. (Feuchtwanger, "Central Organisation", p. 197.) 
128Disraeli told Gerst that priority in the new scheme of electoral organization 
was to be given to the advance selection of candidates at constituency level. 
(H.E. Gerst, The Earl of Beaconsfield [London, 1900], p. 125.) Hereafter 
referred to as H.E. Gerst, Beaconsfield. See also, Monypenny and Buckle, 
2, 524-525. 
129 Feuchtwanger, "Central Organisation", p. 197. 
130H.E. Gerst, Beaconsfield, p. 126. "Character Sketch", p. 579. 
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proceeding ... not calculated to create confidence on the part of the 
country associations in the central organisation of the party 11 • 131 This 
difficulty was surmounted by the resignation of Sedgwick, the appointment of 
132 Gorst as Honorary Secretary of the National Union, in 1871, and the 
subsequent transfer of National Union headquarters to the Central Office 
premises at 53 Parliament St., from where, during the next few years, the 
two bodies worked in close co-operation. 133 
Gorst was convinced that the future electoral success of the Tory 
party rested with working-class Conservatism, the so-called Tory Democracy, 
which he rather mistakenly assumed formed the core of Disraeli's domestic 
· 134 policy, and it was towards the newly-enfranchised workers in the boroughs 
that the main thrust of his organizational efforts was directed. 135 However, 
Gorst's enthusiasm for working-class Toryism was not shared by certain 
influential sections of the party, particularly the county squirearchy, as 
the cool reception given the formation of the National Union illustrated. 
131 Garst to H.C. Raikes, 8 March, 1871, quoted in H. St.J. Raikes, p. 63. 
132 Report of the National Union of Conservative and Constitutional Associations, 
presented at the Fifth Annual Conference of the Union, June 2, 1871: 1871 
Annual Conference Report. 1872 Annual Conference Report, p. 7. 
133 E.J. Feuchtwanger, "Central Organisation", pp. 196-197. 
134 Hughenden Papers, B/xxi/G/259, Garst to Disraeli, 4 April, 1878. Blake, 
Conservative Party, p. 145. For Disraeli and Tory Democracy see: James Cornford, 
"The Transformation of Conservatism in the Late Nineteenth Century", Victorian 
Studies, 7 (1963): 35-66. Richard W. Davis, Disraeli (Boston, 1976), pp. 
170-181; P. Smith, pp. 2-3; Stewart, pp. 358-366. 
135F h "c t 1 0r · · " 197 euc twang er, en ra gam.sat1.on , p. • 
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Moreover, the defeat of 1868 was perceived to be the bitter fruits of Tory 
democracy by large numbers of Conservatives, which, in addition to weakening 
Disraeli's position in the party, served to discredit further Gorst's policy 
in their eyes. Consequently, Gerst received virtually no encouragement 
from party management in his efforts to rally the support of urban workers 
to the Conservative cause; only Disraeli and Cairns among the party 
hierarchy concerned themselves with Central Office activities. 136 
Gerst believed that the principal source of increased working-
class support was to be found in the northern industrial boroughs, 
particularly those of Lancashire where the party had gained additional seats 
in the 1868 election. 137 Based upon his close personal acquaintanceship 
with the County Palatine, Gerst concluded that the operatives of Lancashire 
were "genuine bona fide Conservatives" and this county the "stronghold of 
the party". Because in the urban centres such as London, Birmingham and 
a number of smaller boroughs, where the craftsmen laboured in small-scale 
industries producing goods for the wealthier sections of society, the 
workers were largely under the sway of radical influences, Gerst reasoned 
that "It was amongst the employers of large staple trades like cotton and 
shipbuilding that we must look in the first instance for conservative 
workmen11 • 138 
Although Tory gains in Lancashire at the 1868 general election 
gave credence to Gorst's assumptions, they had not succeeded in convincing 
136Feuchtwanger, "Conservative Organisation", p. 197. Feuchtwanger, Democracy 
and the Tory Party, pp. 3-8. H.E. Gerst, Beaconsfield, Chap. 8 and pp. 84-87. 
137 Hanham, Chap. 14 
138 Hughenden Papers, B/xxi/N/120a, Gerst to G. Noel, 22 September, 1870. 
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opponents of Tory Democracy within the party of the viability of borough 
Conservatism. Thus, when, in autumn 1870, representatives of urban 
Lancashire's Tories pressed him to have their party leader visit the 
139 Go · d h · h . . . h county, rst seize t e opportunity to promote sue a visit int e 
belief that Disraeli's participation in a large public demonstration of 
working-class support would consolidate his leadership position within the 
party and fire public imagination, while at the same time serving to 
illustrate the strength of popular Toryism and its attraction for working 
men, and the value and effectiveness of Gorst's organizational methods. 140 
Gerst also anticipated that Disraeli's attendance would bring political 
benefits in the form of a Conservative swing in the neighbouring large 
boroughs of Yorkshire's West Riding. 141 
In November 1870, Gerst informed Disraeli that he would shortly 
receive an invitation to attend a "County Demonstration" in Lancashire, 
"signed by every class in every part of the County", which the operatives 
in particular had been most enthusiastically supporting. 142 However, this 
was overly optimistic. While the middle and working class Conservatives 
in the boroughs were genuinely eager to receive their leader, certain 
sections of the county gentry, still bitter towards Disraeli on account of 
the Reform Bill, were opposed to any such visit. 143 Only one month later 
139Hughenden Papers, B/xxi/N/120a, Gerst to Noel, 22 September, 1870. 
14
°Feuchtwanger, "Central Organisation", pp. 198-199. 
141 Hughenden Papers, B/xxi/N/120a, Gerst to G. Noel, 22 September, 1870. 
142 Hughenden Papers, B/xxi/G/235, Gerst to Disraeli, 19 November, 1870. 
143 Hughenden Papers, B/xiii/109a, Algernon Egerton to Disraeli, 25 December, 
1870, quoted in Feuchtwanger, Democracy and the Tory Party, p. 9. 
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Garst himself was obliged to acknowledge to his leader, "in south west 
Lancashire ... there was lukewarmness" towards the proposed visit, whilst 
again stressing the extent of working-class enthusiasm for the event. 
"Among the working classes of Preston, Bolton, Blackburn, Accrington, 
Clitheroe, Darwen, Burnley - the men by whom the Lancashire borough elections 
were carried - there is a very strong desire that a workingman's meeting 
should take place at either Blackburn or Preston. They want to see and 
hear you and they want you to see the newly-enfranchised electors of your 
own creation. Amongst them at least you would receive a genuine thanks 
for the Reform Bill of 1867 11 144 
The lack of unanimity amongst Lancashire Tories, and the reluctance 
of Lord Derby to sanction the proposed demonstration, convinced the county's 
Conservative leadership that a visit by Disraeli would be inopportune in 
1870, 145 a conclusion apparently also reached by the party leader himself 
146 for he declined the proffered invitation shortly thereafter. Consequently, 
the project hung fire for over a year, awaiting the development of a 
favourable consensus on the question, and the demonstration eventually took 
place in Manchester on April 3, 1872. In the interim, Garst worked 
assiduously to promote the event. In April 1871 he passed along to 
Disraeli a resolution issued by the Lancashire invitation committee 
expressing its regret that circumstances in the county had prevented the 
144 Hughenden Papers, B/xxi/G/236, Garst to Disraeli, 22 December, 1870. 
145 Feuchtwanger, Democracy and the Tory Party, p. 9. 
146 Hughenden Papers, B/xxi/G/237, Garst to Disraeli, 4 April, 1871, 
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proposed visit from taking place and reiterating their desire to have him 
attend a meeting in the county, 147 and following a visit to the area in 
December of the same year, Gorst assured his chief that "The people are as 
eager as ever for your promised visit, but they thoroughly understand your 
position as leader of the party, and they will wait confidently and 
patiently until you yourself give the signal for such a demonstration as 
148 they contemplate". Once the decision to hold the meeting was finally 
made, Gorst played a key role in formulating the arrangements, which 
included consultations with influential Manchester Tories, meetings with 
local party leaders around the county, and the preparation of detailed 
information on individual constituencies to assist Disraeli respond to 
addresses delivered by their representatives at a monster rally in 
149 Manchester. 
Disraeli's visit proved to be an immense personal triumph which 
d d . h . h" 1 d h" . t. 
150 
"'- th" succee e in strengt ening is ea ers ip posi ion. ,,.,reover, is 
success, and the volume of work undertaken by Gorst in preparation of the 
event, reflected both his political insight and the efficacy of his 
organizational system. 151 However, opposition which had served to delay 
the demonstration for over a year after it was first proposed indicated 
the degree of mistrust with which a large proportion of the party viewed 
147Hughenden Papers, B/x:xi/G/237, Gorst to Disraeli, 4 April, 1871. 
148Hughenden Papers, B/x:xi/G.239, Gorst to Disraeli, 8 December, 1871. 
149 Feuchtwanger, Democracy and the Tory Party, pp. 118-119. 
150 Monypenny and Buckle, 2, p. 532. 
151H.E. Gorst, Beaconsfield, p. 135. 
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Gorst's ideal of popular Toryism. 152 
Important as it was, the Manchester demonstration represented 
only one aspect of Gorst's organizational endeavours during the early 
'seventies. While the preparations for the Lancashire visit were proceeding 
he continued to conduct the day-to-day operations of the Central Office 
which embraced a formidable amount and variety of tasks including the 
compilation of national registration and election statistics, assistance 
with the candidate selection at constituency level, promotion of and 
assistance with the formation of new local Associations, and the publication 
of National Union pamphlets on diverse political questions. 153 In the 
summer of 1871, Central Office established a Conservative Central Press 
Association154 to help foster the Conservative provincial press and, in 
order to further publicize the Tory viewpoint. Gorst also served as 
political representative for the London Conservative daily, the Standard, 
which he provided with authoritative information relating to party policy.
155 
Under Gorst's direction the activities of the Central Office developed 
slowly but steadily after 1870. Less than two years after his appointment 
as Principal Agent, Garst was able to inform Disraeli "that during the past 
year no less than 69 new Conservative Associations ... have been formed in 
England and Wales ••. , and there are at the present moment 420 Associations, 
the great majority of which are in good working order, and most of which 
have largely increased their number of members since last year 11 • 156 
152 Freuchtwanger, Democracy and the Tory Party, p. 120. 
153H.E. Gorst, Beaconsfield, pp. 126-131. Hanham, pp. 359-361. 
154Hughenden Papers, B/x:xi/G/238, Gorst to Disraeli, 23 September, 1871. 
155 Feuchtwanger, Democracy and the Tory Party, p. 120. 
156Hughenden Papers, B/x:xi/G/240, Gorst to Disraeli, 12 February, 1873. 
49. 
Central Office enterprise was also reflected in a series of Conservative 
by-election victories occurring between 1871 and 1873. 157 
However, despite these achievements the progress of Central 
Office's organizational work fell short of what Garst had anticipated. By 
1874 only thirty-three of the forty-nine boroughs with a population 
exceeding 50,000 possessed official Conservative Associations. Of the 
remainder, eight were under the jurisdiction of registration associations, 
three were regulated by Conservative clubs, in another three a solicitor 
functioned as agent, and two were without any Conservative organization 
158 whatsoever. Moreover, the majority of the traditional elements within 
the party continued to be openly antagonistic towards, or remained aloof 
from, Central Office activities. Thus, notwithstanding Gorst's crucial 
role in party organization, the leadership made no attempt to establish a 
rapport with him159 and he was not kept fully informed of policy decisions 
on matters falling within Central Office areas of concern, as events during 
the Ministerial crisis of 1873 illustrated. 160 
Following the Liberals' defeat in the House in March 1873, Garst 
informed the Standard that Disraeli was prepared to form a government, an 
assumption he based upon what he divined to be the general feelings of the 
party, having been kept "entirely in the dark as to the opinions and wishes 
161 
of the Leader". However, Disraeli refused office and the resulting 
disparity between Gorst's expectations, as expressed in the Standard, and 
157R.T. McKenzie, p. 263. 
158 Hanham, p. 115 
159Hughenden Papers, B/xxi/G/249, Garst to M. Corry, 19 February, 1874. 
16
°For background to this crisis see Blake, Disraeli, pp. 527-529. 
161Hughenden Papers, B/xxi/G/241, Garst to M. Corry, 17 March, 1873. 
50. 
the actual course of events not only reflected the extent to which he was 
excluded from the mainstream of party affairs but, in his eyes at least, 
also served to lessen his credibility as an authoritative source of 
information on party policy. Consequently, Gorst bluntly, and with ill-
concealed bitterness, requested Disraeli's secretary, Montague Corry, 
that he be kept better informed of party decisions in order that he might 
fulfil his obligation to the Standard "in a manner consistent with my own 
honour". Gorst also made known his dissatisfaction over the lack of 
communication existing between himself and the Conservative hierarchy: 
"Since I have been political representative of the Standard I have never 
been ... thoroughly 'en rapport' with the leaders of the Party as I 
d b h N 1 1 I 1 1 d h . . II 162 expecte to e wen at oe s request re uctant y accepte t e position . 
Here perhaps can be seen the beginnings of a disillusionment with his 
position as party agent, his treatment during the Ministerial crisis no 
doubt having diminished the expectations of political advancement he had 
earlier expected would be derived from the post. 
Despite his dissatisfaction, Gorst carried on his duties at 
Central Office with his customary diligence which included keeping Disraeli 
informed on a variety of matters, amongst them proposed National Union 
publications, by-election prospects, and the progress of the Liberal 
government's negotiations with leaders of the Nine Hour Movement, the 
162ttughenden Papers, B/xxi/G/249, Gorst to M. Corry, 19 February, 1874. 
The leadership's reluctance to familiarize Gorst with key Conservative 
issues was apparently increased as a result of his association with the 
Standard. This newspaper represented the views of the new Conservatism 
of the commercial middle class which was anathema to certain aristocratic 
and landed elements within the party (Feuchtwanger, "Central Organisation", 
pp. 199-200.) 
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latter information being obtained from a Tory M.P. contact of Gorst's in 
the West Riding. 163 Gorst continued to pay particular attention to the 
furtherance of borough Conservatism. When, in Spring of 1873, Disraeli 
contemplated opposing Forster's Education Bill, Gorst counselled against 
such a move on the grounds that it would alienate an important section of 
the party, namely, those in the boroughs and populous county ridings, who 
were "zealous and active promoters of Education", and who Gorst anticipated 
would supply the future electoral strength of the party. "I confess that 
the idea of defeating the Government and having an appeal to the country 
on this question fills me with dismay. We cannot carry the English 
majority we hope for without the active help of those, who on the question 
will be opposed to our policy". 164 
Early the following year Gladstone unexpectedly dissolved 
parliament presenting Gorst with the opportunity to demonstrate the 
efficacy of the organization he had worked so tirelessly to perfect since 
1870. The premise upon which he had structured party re-organization -
the potential of borough Conservatism - received overwhelming justification 
from the Tory victory at the general election which gave them an overall 
165 
majority of 50 seats, their first majority in over twenty years. Of the 114 
163 Hughenden Papers, B/xxi/G/244, Gorst to Disraeli, 11 September 1873: 
B/xxi/G/245, Gorst to Disraeli, 23 September, 1873; B/xxi/G/247, Gorst to 
Disraeli, .19 January, 1874. 
164Hughenden Papers, B/xxi/G/243, Gorst to Disraeli, 21 June, 1873. A 
party council convened to discuss the Bill also advised Disraeli against 
his proposed action, leading him to give way on the issue. (P. Smith, p. 180.) 
165Blake, The Conservative Party, p. 77. According to W.T. Stead, immediately 
prior to the election Gorst predicted precisely such a majority, a calculation 
received with derision by the "old gang" at the Carlton Club who dubbed the 
figure "Gorst's Champagne Estimate" on the grounds that it could only have 
been arrived at following "liberal libations of champagne". ("Character 
Sketch", p. 579.) 
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boroughs with populations over 50,000, where the majority of working-class 
voters were to be found, the Conservatives took 44, compared to 25 in 1868. 
The party also obtained a higher proportion of seats in the "industrial" 
counties than in the English counties as a whole. Moreover, substantial 
gains were made in the former Liberal strongholds in middle-class areas 
of London and its environs: in addition to the city itself, suburban Surrey, 
Kent and Essex swung to the Tories, whilst Middlesex and Westminster each 
elected two Conservative members. 166 Although this triumph could not be 
credited solely to Gorst's endeavours, they were a crucial factor in the 
8 4 167 d " D 1 1 d d h . revival of 1 7 , an •.. israe i a ways regar e t e victory .•. as 
largely due to his (Gorst's) arrangements". 168 
Despite the role played by urban Conservatism in restoring the 
Conservatives to office, its representatives were noticeably absent from 
the seats of power when Disraeli's new government was formed in February 
1874. Ministerial positions went almost exclusively to members of the 
166Hanham, p. 92, note 2, pp. 225-226. Donald Southgate, "From Disraeli 
to Law", in The Conservatives: A History from their Origins to 1965, ed. 
The Rt. Hon. Lord Butler (London, 1977), p. 183. P. Thompson, "Liberals, 
Radicals and Labour in London 1880-1900", Past and Present, no. 27 (1964): 
74. (Thompson erroneously gives 1875 as the date of this election.) 
167 Hanham, p. 222. 
victory see Blake, 
For a discussion of other factors contributing to the 
Disraeli, pp. 553-558. Hanham, pp. 227-228. 
168w.s. Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchill, new ed. (London, 1951), 
p. 114. 
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d . . 1 1 · 1 169 tra itiona ruing c ass. Only two representatives of the industrial 
and connnercial middle-class received such appointments: Richard Cross 
became Home Secretary and, outside the Cabinet, W.R. Smith received the 
170 post of Financial Secretary to the Treasury. Gorst himself was left 
entirely out in the cold; he received no recognition whatsoever for his 
171 
services to the party. 
Gorst's official engagement as Principal Agent terminated 
following the general election, and he now looked to the party to reward 
him with a government office and assistance in securing an early re-entry 
into Parliament, in fulfillment of the promise supposedly made to him at 
the time of his appointment in 1870. An opportunity to discharge this 
latter obligation soon arose. In May 1874 a vacancy occurred at Midhurst 
and a reconnnendation from the Tory leadership would have placed it in 
Gorst's hands. However, the new Chief Whip, apparently with Disraeli's 
approval, threw the party's support behind another aspiring candidate, 
172 Admiral Hornby. Not unnaturally, Gorst felt himself to have been 
treated shabbily in this affair. "Now I would have given way in a moment 
169w. T, Stead describes this process more colourfully: "The old aristocratic 
gang, which had sulked in its tent during the time Mr. Gorst was toiling 
and moiling in the constituencies, returned with a rush as soon as the 
spoils of office were within reach and established themselves in full 
possession of the field". ("Character Sketch", p. 580.) 
170 Even these concessions to middle-class support were resented by some 
aristocratic and squirearchial elements within the party. For example, 
Lord Randolph Churchill very soon dubbed the pair "Marshall and Snelgrove" 
and they became the butt of his sarcasms on "bourgeois placemen". (See 
Viscount Chilston, W.R. Smith (London, 1965, pp. 83-86.) 
171According to his son, "There was some talk afterwards of a dinner and 
the presentation of some plate, but nothing came of it". (H.E. Gorst, 
Fourth Party, p. 34.) 
172Hughenden Papers, B/xxi/G/251, Gorst to Disraeli, 7 May, 1874. 
54. 
to Admiral Hornby, if I had been asked to do so for the good of the cause, 
but I think that my claim to consideration of the Party should have been 
recognised and not ignored", he complained to Disraeli. 173 
As the months elapsed following the election without bringing 
Gorst any offer of preferment, he grew increasingly resentful towards the 
party leadership. Upon receiving a rejection to his request for the 
consideration of his brother for a minor post at the Treasury, he 
acknowledged to that department's Financial Secretary, W.R. Smith: 
I am by this time so accustomed to the refusal of every request I make 
of the Conservative Government, whether on political or personal grounds, 
that I am neither surprised nor mortified at the announcement that the 
promise made to me on my brother's behalf is not to be fulfilled . 
.•. I greatly deplore the forgetfullness which all the members of the 
Government exhibit of those men, to whose exertions they largely owe 
their present positions ... and I cannot see how we are to keep our 
party together, unless those who have worked and made sacrifices for 
the party in the days of adversity are to have some share in the 
advantages which attend success.174 
This treatment at the hands of the party leadership also prompted Garst to 
complain to Hart Dyke regarding the general distribution of rewards by 
party management: II looking back on the nine months that we have been 
in office, I cannot but perceive that all our patronage has been divided 
between the personal friends of the ministers and our political opponents; 
nothing whatever has been done to reward those who have shared with us the 
labours and troubles of opposition .•. ", a practice which Gorst asserted 
had produced "general discontent •.. among their most faithful adherents 11 • 175 
173 Hughenden Papers, B/xxi/G/251, Garst to Disraeil, 7 May, 1874. 
174 Hughenden Papers, B/ xxi/D/ 463c, Garst to W.R. Smith, 11 November, 1874. 
175 Hughenden Papers, B/xxi/D/463b, Gorst to W.R. Dyke, 19 November, 1874. 
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When,in January 1875, the resignation of the Tory Member for 
Chatham provided another chance for the Conservatives to compensate Gorst, 
the party hierarchy opposed his candidature. 176 Despite their opposition, 
Gorst on this occasion succeeded in obtaining the nomination, was 
177 
successfully elected, and entered the House on February 18, 1875 
"with a somewhat cynical determination to say his say and go his own way 
without regard to the convenience of party chiefs 11 • 178 
176 H.E. Gorst, Fourth Party, pp. 34-35. 
177 Chatham News, 16 January, 1875. Ibid., February 20, 1875. 
178 
"Character Sketch", p. 580. 
CHAPTER II 
THE QUEST FOR TORY DEMOCRACY: GORST AND 
PARTY ORGANIZATION, 1875-1885 
Gorst's success at the polls in 1875 brought no accompanying 
reward of office from the Conservative Government. Finally, in November 
1875, ten months after his return to the House, he was offered a minor 
government position, that of Secretary to the Local Government Board. 
However, after a few days' reflection he declined the offer, being 
convinced that with the President of the Board also in the Commons the 
post would lead only to "political extinction" 1 Thereafter, no further 
offers were made to Gerst and he later expressed regret at not having made 
a personal appeal to Disraeli for preferment at that time. 2 This came to 
light during an exchange of letters between Garst and Disraeli, now Lord 
Beaconsfield, which took place in the aftermath of the Prime Minister's 
final cabinet re-shuffle of 1878 in which Garst had again been excluded 
from office. Beaconsfield reportedly told Gerst, "I have always been 
accustomed to people pestering me for appointments, and could not understand 
you keeping away. You have been very badly treated, and I am extremely 
sorry for it. 113 Gerst hastened to re-assure Disraeli that he exonerated 
1Hughenden Papers, B/xxi/G/254, Garst to Disraeli, 20 November, 1875; 
ibid., B/xxi/G/259, Gerst to Disraeli, 4 April, 1878. 
2 Hughenden Papers, B/xxi/G/259, Garst to Disraeli, 4 April, 1878. 
3Quoted in H.E. Garst, The Fourth Party (London, 1908), p. 34. 
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his leader from any vestige of responsibility for his mistreatment: 
I am sorry that my letter of Saturday last was so ill-expressed as to 
convey anything like a 'reproach'. I have never supposed that you 
were either responsible for, or even cognizant of, the way in which 
the party managers have since 1874 behaved towards me: and I have 
regarded their hostility as a natural consequence of my steadfast 
adherence to those popular principles in politics, which you taught 
me, which won the boroughs in 1874, and which though for the time being 
in discredit must ultimately prevail. 
I am to blame for not having asked for an interview with you before 
declining the offer you so kindly made me in 1875. I then believed 
that, for a person like myself without social interest, the acceptance 
of such an offer meant political extinction.4 
Disraeli was certainly "cognizant" of the party management's 
hositility towards Gorst. He had apparently acquiesced in Dyke's decision 
5 to by-pass Garst at the time of the Midhurst vacancy, and on at least two 
occasions thereafter had received from Garst correspondence outlining the 
leadership's continuing disregard of him. 6 Garst had apparently fallen 
victim to Disraeli's conservative strategy of the post-election years. In 
order to preserve his newly-eminent position and party unity, both largely 
products of the 1874 electoral victory, Disraeli created a mainly patrician 
government, traditional in Tory administrations: half the Cabinet were 
peers, the Whips were drawn from the landed gentry, and preferment in 
other areas was given chiefly to representatives of the great Tory families. 
Consequently, "men without aristocratic connections, but with considerable 
claims on grounds of merit, political weight, or services to the party in 
4 Hughenden Papers, B/xxi/G/259, Garst to Disraeli, 4 April, 1878. 
5 Hughenden Papers, B/xxi/G/251, Garst to Disraeli, 7 May, 1874. 
6 Hughenden Papers, B/xxi/G/257, Garst to Disraeli, 30 March, 1876. Ibid., 
B/xxi/G/258, Garst to Disraeli, 3 March, 1877. In his letter of March 1876, 
in which he sought Disraeli's consideration for a rumoured vacancy at the 
Treasury, Garst reminded his leader that "I am the only person engaged in 
party management in 1874 to whom our accession to office has brought no 
political advancement as yet. 11 
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7 
many cases received no preferment". Among this latter group were to be 
found many middle-class borough members, representatives of the urban 
Conservatism espoused by Gorst. Disraeli's failure to act on Gorst's 
behalf was thus compatible with his current policy with regard to non-
aristocratic elements within the party. 
Meanwhile, whilst working to establish his legal practice, Gorst 
continued to serve the party management informally, although his official 
engagement as party agent had ended with the victory of 1874.8 However, 
circumstances soon rendered this arrangement increasingly unworkable. 
Relations between Gorst and the party management, already strained because 
of their indifference to his requests for preferment, were to deteriorate 
further as a consequence of changes occurring in central organization after 
the general election. Gorst now found himself being consulted less and 
less as the Whips gradually assumed control over electoral management, thus 
negating much of the work carried out by Gorst 
1870 and 1874, particularly with regard to the 
and his colleagues between 
9 boroughs. Gorst's reaction 
was expressed in a letter to Disraeli shortly after the November 1874 
municipal elections: 
7 E.J. Feuchtwanger, Disraeli, Democracy and the Tory Party (Oxford, 1968), 
pp. 16-17 and Chap. 3. Hereafter referred to as Feuchtwanger, Democracy 
and the Tory Party. 
8After the election, Gorst had "consented, at Sir W. Dyke's request and out 
of personal regard to him, to remain in a sort of undefined position until 
some fresh arrangement could be made". (Hughenden Papers, B/xxi/G/258, 
Gorst to Disraeli, 3 March, 1877.) 
9 Hughenden Papers, B/xxi/G/258, Gorst to Disraeli, 3 March, 1877. 
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... These returns show that whereas in the contests of 1873 we won 112 
seats and lost 83, in the contests of 1874 we have won 93 and lost 100 
... I do not dissent from your view that the mass of the people is, or 
may be made, Tory. But masses cannot move without leaders; and in 
English Boroughs we are grievously deficient in Tory leaders. Those 
of the higher classes in Boroughs who take part in politics have 
everything to lose and nothing to gain by attaching themselves to the 
Tory party; and we therefore find wealth, influence, ability, and all 
local political forces arranged against us. 
I am in hopes that the power and patronage which the possession of office 
has given us might have been to some extent at least so used as to create 
in the Boroughs a permanent Tory faction.10 
Gorst went on to complain that the party management, none of whom were 
Borough members, were either unable to appreciate the situation or had 
resigned themselves to an erosion of borough electoral strength. 
However, the leadership was not prepared to take Gorst's warnings 
seriously. When they were brought to the attention of Dyke he brushed 
them aside. Although he was obliged to admit that the returns appeared to 
support Gorst's view that the party was losing ground, he assured Disraeli 
that Gorst's diagnosis of the situation was overly pessimistic. He 
apparently felt that the latter's conclusions were coloured by what he 
perceived to be mistreatment by the party leadership, citing Gorst's 
complaints concerning the direction of party patronage and his failure to 
obtain office for his brother as examples of Gorst's resentment. Despite 
the friction between them, Dyke apparently found Gorst too valuable an 
associate to dispense with his services at this time for he concluded his 
letter to Disraeli with the admission, "He is I am bound to say of great 
use to me with all his crotchets and since our talk the other day he writes 
me a cheerful letter and he is working hard now at the St. Ives Election 
Things are so quiet now that I am much disposed to keep Gorst in hand, 
10 Hughenden Papers, B/xxi/D/463a, Gorst to Disraeli, 2 December, 1874. 
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crotchets and all". 11 
The municipal elections of 1875 resulted in further reverses 
12 for the Conservatives, and further calls to action from Gorst, all of 
which went unheeded by Disraeli and the party management. This indifference, 
together with their continuing insensibility towards Gorst's requests for 
preferment, intensified his criticism of the party management, increasing 
the acrimony between them. At the same time, Gorst's behaviour in the 
House following his re-entry into Parliament in February 1875, succeeded 
in further alienating the leadership. As he had intimated whilst on the 
Chatham hustings ("if returned ... he should always be sufficiently 
13 independent to say what he thought" ), Gorst refused to toe the party line. 
On two occasions he led the Opposition into the lobby against the Govern-
14 
ment. Consequently, early in 1877 the decision was made to dispense with 
his services and, after being notified of this by Dyke, Gorst wrote to 
Disraeli outlining his grievances and warning him again of the perilous 
state into which party organization had fallen since 1874: 
During this period I have found myself without any power and with continually 
decreasing influence, having had little or no voice in the selection of 
candidates and the management of elections; and I have had the misfortune 
to witness the whole system, to establish which so much trouble was taken, 
gradually fall into decay. Our organisation in 1877 is greatly inferior to 
what it was in 1874; and the attempt to renovate and improve it has not 
come a day too soon. But to succeed in the attempt you must put a stop to 
that which has been the chief cause of all the mischief that has occurred 
- the system which Sir W. Dyke has been required to follow - of managing 
elections at the Treasury. I always thought this a most unwise policy on 
11 Hughenden Papers, B/xxi/D/ 463, W. Dyke to Disraeli, 8 December, 1874. 
12Hughenden Papers, B/xxi/G/253, Gorst to Disraeli, 10 November, 1875; 
B/xxi/G/255, Gorst to Disraeli, 22 November, 1875. 
13 Chatham News, Feb. 13, 1875. 
1411
character Sketch: December. Sir John Gorst", Review of Reviews, 3 (1891): 
580. Hereafter referred to as "Character Sketch". 
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the part of the late government, and since we have been in office 
experience has justified that opinion. Instead of the management being 
vested in my office, under Sir W. Dyke's control, I have been consulted 
intermittendly ...• The established principle of non-interference with 
the local leaders has in many instances been neglected; and these 
leaders have been constantly offended and alienated both in distribution 
of patronage and in other matters.15 
In order to mitigate these problems, Gorst advised Disraeli to divorce 
electoral management from the Treasury. He suggested that an independent 
M.P. be placed in charge of party management, but that a finance committee, 
other than any one individual, oversee electoral expenditures. Gorst 
concluded with the admonition that if nothing was done the Conservative 
organization at the next general election would be as inferior to that of 
the Liberals as it was superior in 1874. 
Once again Gorst's counsel was ignored and his prophesies of 
disaster were soon to be proved correct. His replacement at Central Office, 
W.B. Skene, was ineffectual and the Whips' practice of controlling electoral 
management from the Treasury continued through 1879, at which time 
organization collapsed completely when Dyke fell ill from over-work and 
the 1880 general election was conducted amid dislocation and disarray. 16 
The election result, a resounding Liberal victory, undoubtedly owed something 
to the Conservative leadership's neglect of the party machinery following 
Gorst's departure in 1877. 17 Gorst himself survived the swing to the 
Liberals, retaining his seat at Chatham, albeit with a reduced majority, 18 
15 Hughenden Papers, B/xxi/G/258, Gorst to Disraeli, 3 March, 1877. 
16 Hanham, pp. 362-363. 
17 T.O. Lloyd, The General Election of 1880 (London, 1968), pp. 79-81. 
Election Results: Conservatives 237; Liberals 353; Irish Nationalists, 62. 
18F.S. Craig, British Parliamentary Election Results, 1885-1918 (London, 
1974), p. 82. 
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and the Gladstone Parliament which followed was to witness the further 
development of both his political independence and his commitment to Tory 
democracy which had marked his apprenticeship in the House between 1875 
and 1880. 
Rumblings of discontent with party organization echoed through 
Conservative circles in the wake of the 1880 election fiasco. There were 
numerous complaints that the liaison between Tory headquarters and the 
constituencies was highly ineffective. 19 According to one defeated 
Conservative candidate, and future Solicitor-General, the party machinery 
at this period suffered grave defects: "Election affairs had gone to the 
dogs ... The care, the experience, the personal supervision which Mr. 
Disraeli, assisted by a few practised hands, had bestowed upon the prepara-
tions for the general election of 1874 disappeared. A weak but widespreading 
centralisation enervated the vigour of the provincial organization" 20 
During the National Union's post mortem of the defeat, held during its 
annual conference of that year, Gorst concluded that "compared with the 
organization of their opponents they were left far behind". 21 
The advantages to be derived from efficient organization were 
evidenced by the Liberal victory. Moreover, the distinct possibility of 
the extension of the franchise to the counties in the not too distant 
future made the overhaul of Tory party organization an urgent necessity. 
19
see "Conservative Reorganisation", Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine 127 (1880): 
' 804-810; "A Tory View of the Election", Nineteenth Century 7 (1880): 905-916. 
20
sir Edward Clarke, The Story of My Life (London, 1918), p. 95. 
21Minutes of the 1880 Conference of the National Union, quoted in T.O. Lloyd, 
p. 80. 
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Consequently, when the Conservative Cabinet assembled for its final meeting 
it resolved to take "some serious steps to improve our organization1t and a 
standing committee, headed by W.R. Smith, was established to consider the 
22 problem. The chief results of this body's deliberations, to which Gorst 
contributed, 23 were the appointment of a permanent committee to oversee 
party organization and the re-appointment of Gorst as party agent. The new 
committee, which eventually became known as the Central Committee, was 
composed of individuals experienced in party management - the Wbips and a 
number of party officials and prominent Tory politicians - plus a represen-
tative of the National Union, with the Principal Agent, Gorst, as executive 
officer and W.R. Smith as Chairman. It was essentially just another 
version of the ad hoc elec_tion committees utilized by the party in the 
contests of 1868 and 1874 resurrected in more formal guise. 
The decision to re-engage Gorst was apparently made with some 
reluctance; memories of the acrimony which had developed between Garst and 
the party managers during the final stages of his previous term of office 
as party agent obviously remained fresh. There were, however, compelling 
arguments in favour of his reinstatement. The party was sorely in need of 
his expertise and, in addition, it was thought that his recall would work 
to conciliate borough leaders currently venting their anger in the National 
Union Council over the election defeat. 24 Consequently, the Tory hierarchy 
relinquished their initial objections and re-appointed him agent. 
22Iddesleigh Papers, Add. MS.500 63A, Northcote's Diary 20, (April 1880), 
quoted in Feuchtwanger, Democracy and the Tory Party, p. 143. 
23Ibid., 5, 21, 26 May, 1880, cited in Feuchtwanger, Democracy and the 
Tory Party, p. 144. 
24 James Cornford, "The Transformation of Conservatism in the Late Nineteenth 
Century", Victorian Studies 7 (1963-64): 35-66. 
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Nevertheless, Northcote proposed that Gorst's re-instatement should be 
initially an "experimental arrangement", apparently allowing for a trial 
period during which the party could assess his performance in office. 25 
However, the party management's willingness to accede to Gorst's 
terms during negotiations conducted between them, prior to his re-
engagement, reveal that despite their reservations, they still wanted to 
have Garst in harness once again. At a meeting held between Northcote, 
W.R. Smith and Gorst in early July 1880, the offer of the position of 
agent was made to the latter along with the promise that "if he gave his 
assistance in re-organizing the electoral machinery of the constituencies, 
and the party were successful, his services would be recognised by the 
offer of office for which he might be eligible". Gorst at once declined 
the offer because, as he pointed out to Northcote and Smith, the same 
assurance had been given to him before the victory of 1874 "and the only 
offer he got was an Under-Secretaryship with the Chief in the Commons, thus 
practically shelving him". Smith hastened to reassure Garst that he could 
expect a Law Officer's appointment consistent with his qualifications, and 
he now agreed to serve on a part-time basis on the condition that the future 
offer "should be one which would not silence him in the House or deny him 
the chance of showing his own ability and claim for further political 
promotion" 26 
At a subsequent meeting between the three, Garst succeeded in 
obtaining further concessions to his independence. The Central Committee 
had intended to keep control of party monies in its own and the Whips' 
25 Hambledon Papers, PS6/617, Northcote t.o W.R. Smith, 15 May, 1880. 
26 Hambledon Papers, Ps6/626. Notes of an interview between Sir S. Northcote, 
W.R. Smith and Mr. Gorst, 7 July, 1880. 
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hands, allowing Gorst jurisdiction over candidate selection, but at his 
insistence Smith was obliged to grant him some measure of authority over 
finances. Thus, Smith's original proposal stating Gorst was "not to be at 
liberty to promise any money" was changed to read "Mr. Gorst should in all 
cases initiate proposals though he should have no power to do this without 
the sanction of the committee11 • 27 
Personal differences proved to be one impediment to the 
development of a rapport between Gorst and party management. In the wake 
of the 1880 election an analyst of the Conservative defeat had suggested 
that the much-needed party reorganization ought to include the appointment 
of a London agent "of high social position, the equivalent of the Chief 
Whip, so that he could mix with the wealthy supporters of the party11 • 28 
This reflected the desire of the Tory traditionalists, including some 
members of the party management, to preserve the party as a bastion of the 
landed gentry supported by an electoral system based upon wealth and 
influence. 
Gorst failed to match this party image; his middle-class background 
rendered him out of step socially with a large section of the party and most 
of its management, the latter being a close-knit group of predominantly 
country gentlemen. Gorst did not enjoy the confidence of the great landed 
families and was thus denied access to upper-class social life, the milieu 
for the development of those contacts with rich and influential Tories 
which many in the party considered essential to successful party management. 
27 Hambledon Papers, PS6/646. Memorandum on Party Organization by W.R. Smith, 
undated. 
2811
conservative Reorganisation", p. 808. 
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However, political differences rather than personal dissimilarities 
were the crucial factor in the development of animosity between Gorst and 
party management. During July 1880, when Gorst was resuming his duties as 
party agent, Dyke's successor as Chief Whip, Rowland Winn, assumed office 
and the widely-differing political outlooks of these two individuals very 
soon led to disagreements over policy. Winn was a Tory of the old school; 
his political experience had been gained in the influence-dominated, small 
electorates in the counties and he feared and resisted democratic and 
radical tendencies. Thus his viewpoint contrasted sharply with that of 
Gorst who, in the wake of the 1880 debacle, was more than ever convinced 
that the fortunes of the Tory party rested with Tory Democracy: only by 
seeking and obtaining the support of the middle and working-class electorates, 
particularly in the boroughs, would the Conservatives obtain future success. 29 
Consequently, Gorst and Winn were very quickly at odds over 
electoral methods, particularly with regard to the deployment of party funds. 
Gorst, who was strongly opposed to corrupt practices and determined to 
dissociate Central Office from its methods, complained to Smith regarding 
the activities of one T.C. Shaw, a party agent at Sheffield and Winn's 
protege: 
I will do my best to 'menager' Winn and his protege Shaw. My objection 
to the latter is more complex than the former supposes. Chiefly he is 
prone to corrupt practices, which accounts for his being in such request 
among corrupt constituencies. What Winn's phrases about not appreciating 
the money etc. spent for Birmingham come to is that I won't fight 
corruption by corruption. To this I plead guilty: it is our policy to 
force the Government to pass an Act that will stop as much corruption as 
possible, and if Harry Thynne and his friends will have corrupt practices 
on our side they must have them locally, not fostered and organised from 
headquarters by Mr. Shaw or anybody else ...• I am quite in favour of 
treating Winn and the old identity with consideration, but they can 
29 Feuchtwanger, Democracy and the Tory Party, pp. 56-57. Viscount Chilston, 
W.H. Smith (London, 1965), pp. 159-160. 
hardly expect us to take their modus operandi as our model or accept 
Dyke's judgment of character as infallible .30 
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The limitation of corrupt practices, as advocated by Garst, by reducing 
the power of influence and corruption and increasing the role of the party 
organization in election contests, would provide the Central Office with 
a greater voice in candidate selection, a development clearly in accordance 
with Gorst's concept of party management. 
On the question of corrupt practices Garst had the full support 
31 
of Northcote, but was opposed by W.H. Smith, who later objected to the 
Corrupt Practices Bill on the grounds that its passage, by reducing expen-
diture on elections and thereby creating the necessity for voluntary help, 
would place the party at a disadvantage to their opponents who, unlike the 
Conservatives, had the trade unions, dissenting chapels and other Radical 
organizations working for them. 32 Gorst's convictions also met with 
little sympathy amongst the "old identity", the members of the 1880 electoral 
committee such as Lord Abergavenny (formerly Lord Nevill) and Henry Thynne, 
who preferred the prevailing system of influence and corruption and to 
whom the Tory Democracy advocated by Gorst was anathema. 
To these tensions arising from corrupt practices were also added 
friction resulting from Gorst's continuing independence in the House of 
Commons, particularly his activities as a member of a Conservative ginger 
30 Hambledon Papers, PS6/639, Garst to W.H. Smith, 8 September, 1880. 
31 Feuchtwanger, Democracy and the Tory Party, p. 149. 
32
w.H. Smith to Lord Salisbury, August 14, 1883, quoted in H.J. Hanham, 
Elections and Party Management (London, 1959), p. 247. 
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33 group known as the Fourth Party. This small clique of freelancers, 
consisting of Sir Henry Wolff, Lord Randolph Churchill, Arthur Balfour and 
Gorst, rose to prominence during the Gladstone Parliament of 1880-1885. 
The Fourth Party was created out of the turmoil of the first stages of the 
notorious and protracted Bradlaugh controversy, early in the opening 
session of the new Parliament. Radical Liberal Charles Bradlaugh, whose 
writings and speeches advocating atheism, birth control and republicanism 
had earned him the contempt of many within the middle and upper-classes, 
sought to avoid the usual oath of allegiance required of new members of 
Parliament, claiming the right to affirm instead. When a select committee, 
appointed by the Speaker to examine Bradlaugh's request, ruled against 
him, he publicly announced his intention to take, to him, the meaningless 
oath. The apparent willingness of the Liberal Ministers to acquiesce in 
Bradlaugh's manoeuvre prompted the Fourth Party to oppose Bradlaugh's 
attempt to take his seat in the Commons, Wolff, Gorst and Churchill providing 
the debating skills, Mr. Balfour contributing mainly voting strength. What 
began as personal, independent resistance on the part of these individuals 
very quickly developed into concerted group action as they perceived the 
advantages to be gained from a unified campaign. In debate after debate 
upon Bradlaugh's status, the Fourth Party adopted obstructionist tactics 
which won the support of the House and succeeded in having the Radical 
33The origin of the group's designation as the "Fourth Party" is unclear. 
Sir Winston Churchill suggests the name derived from an interjected 
conversation in a House of Commons' debate: upon an M.P.'s remarks that 
there existed "two great parties in the State", Mr. Parnell interposed, 
"Three", whereupon Lord Randolph Churchill retorted, "Four". (Winston 
S. Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchill (New Edition, London, 1951), p.122). 
For other explanations see: W.L. Arnstein, The Bradlaugh Case (Oxford, 
1965), pp. 44-45; H.W. Lucy, Memories of Eight Parliaments (London, 1908), 
p. 255, hereafter referred to as H.W. Lucy, Eight Parliaments. 
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repeatedly barred from Parliament. 34 
In the playing out of this drama, the Fourth Party colleagues 
formed an informal alliance to assault Bradlaugh's stance; at the conclusion 
of the battle they had been forged into an identifiable political unit 
constituting a vocal, independent Opposition to the Government. Once this 
liaison was formed, the Fourth Party very rapidly expanded its activities 
beyond the Bradlaugh issue, taking every opportunity to attack the Gladstone 
Ministry in the Commons. The Government's legislative proposals and its 
Imperial and foreign policies were systematically subjected to Fourth-Party 
35 assault. By the end of August 1880, Wolff, Churchill and Gorst together 
had contributed a grand total of 247 speeches and asked 73 questions in 
the Commons, Gorst personally having delivered 105 of the former and put 
36 forward 18 of the latter. 
In executing these tactics, the Fourth Party sought not only to 
embarrass the Liberals but also to supply some vigour to a Conservative 
Opposition demoralized by its electoral defeat and apparently unable to 
present an effective parliamentary counter attack against the Government. 
However, according to Gorst's son, his father's decision to cast his lot 
with the Fourth Party was made "not only because he perceived the tactical 
advantage of such a combine in the absence of an effective and united 
34Arnstein, Chaps. 4,5 and 8. H.E. Gorst, The Fourth Party (London, 1906), 
p. 43, pp. 51-68. Hereafter referred to as H.E. Gorst, Fourth Party; 
W.H. Lucy, Peeps at Parliament (London, 1903), pp. 168-171; Sir Henry 
Drummond Wolff, Rambling Recollections, 2 vols. (London, 1908), 2, p. 258. 
Following the general election of 1885, Bradlaugh was allowed to take the 
oath without challenge and in 1886 he successfully steered an Affirmation 
Bill through Parliament. 
35H.E. Gorst, Fourth Party, pp. 119-131. 
36H.W. Lucy, A Diary of Two Parliaments (London, 1886), p. 87, hereafter 
referred to as H.W. Lucy, Two Parliaments. 
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Opposition", but because he believed that his colleagues shared his desire 
37 
to revive Tory-democratic ideals within the party. 
It was also the Fourth Party's intention to highlight the 
weakness of the Tory party's Commons' leadership, particularly that of Sir 
Stafford Northcote whose authority they repudiated and to whom they were 
openly disrespectfui. 38 Northcote, who had assumed leadership of the 
Commons upon Disraeli's elevation to the Lords, was an agreeable, unassuming 
man whose earlier service as Gladstone's private secretary had rendered him 
excessively deferential to the Liberal premier and, consequently, no match 
for him in Parliament. 39 Disraeli himself admitted to Wolff that he would 
have remained in the Commons had he known that Gladstone would return as 
Liberal leader. Northcote's repeated failure to take the initiative in 
the House during the first session eventually prompted the Fourth Party to 
launch a direct attack upon the Conservative leader, without specifically 
naming him, in a speech delivered by Balfour at a party meeting at the 
Carlton Club in August 1880, whilst Wolff made a formal complaint to 
Beaconsfield concerning Sir Stafford's over-cautious and indecisive 
b h . 40 e av1.our. Meanwhile, frustration with the leadership's continuing 
37 H.E. Garst, Fourth Party, p. 74, pp. 245-246. 
38winston Churchill, pp. 124-125; H.E. Garst, Fourth Party, p. 130; 
H.W. Lucy, Two Parliaments, pp. 76-77; Edith Vane-Tempest-Stewart, 
Marchioness of Londonderry, Henry Chaplin (London, 1926), pp. 160-161. 
39winston Churchill, pp. 123-126; H.E. Garst, Fourth Party, pp. 3-4; 
Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, 2, 253. 
40
winston Churchill, pp. 125, 131. 
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irresolution led the group to ever-increasing parliamentary independence. 
By early September, Lord Granville was reporting to the Queen that "Sir 
Stafford Northcote has lost all authority over a portion of Conservative 
M. P. Is ,, 41 
Not surprisingly, the party management considered Gorst's Fourth-
Party activism incompatible with his official position as party agent. 
His participation in the group's attacks on Northcote in Parliament were 
in direct conflict with his role as loyal officer to a Central Committee 
answerable to the official Conservative leadership for party business 
outside the Commons. 42 Consequently, attempts were made to break up the 
rebel clique. Gorst, however, was quite unrepentant and determined to 
continue actively involved with the Fourth Party and to remain independent 
of officialdom. In September 1880, he complained to Smith: " ... There 
is a regular intrigue going on on the part of Bourke and others against 
Lord Randolph Churchill, Wolff and myself. They tried to detach Balfour 
from us but failed. We mean to stick together and we shall be loyal to 
Northcote if he is loyal to us. But self-preservation is the first law of 
politics as well as nature and contingencies may happen which will end in 
your being obliged to take the place of leader in the Commons whether you 
like it or not". 43 
Shortly afterwards, Northcote himself, under cover of regular 
management correspondence with Gorst, asked for a cessation of the Fourth 
41Quoted in The Letters of Queen Victoria, ed. George E. Buckle, 2nd Series, 
1862-1885, 3 vols. (London, 1928), 3, 143, note 2. 
42 Feuchtwanger, Democracy and the Tory Party, p. 148. 
43Hambledon Papers, PS6/639, Gorst to W.R. Smith, 8 September, 1880. 
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Party's parliamentary activities. After a discussion of party business, 
Northcote cautioned Gorst: "I am inclined to think that the Fourth Party 
has done enough for its fame, and that it will be the wiser course for its 
members now quietly to take their places in the main body wheFe they will 
h k h d ,,44 ave war enoug an to spare •... Gorst's reply was cordial but 
uncompromising. He lauded the group's steadfastness and loyalty to the 
party, whilst avoiding any mention of their dissolution. 45 However, on 
the same day he wrote to Churchill commenting on Northcote's actions and 
revealing his determination not to yield. "I got a letter a day or two 
ago from the Goat46 which nearly gave me a fit ... After some banalities 
about organisation he went on to propose the dissolution of the Fourth 
Party I have replied that we shall prove one of his best instruments 
of political warfare •.. ; that each of us feels stronger for the support 
and wiser for the counsels of his fellows; and that we are all determined 
to back him up loyally in fighting the combination of Whigs and Radicals 
who oppose us II 47 However, after reflecting further upon Northcote's 
letter, Gorst conceived a plan to turn his leader's suggestion to the 
Fourth Party's advantage, and he immediately outlined his plan to Churchill: 
44 Balfour Papers, BL. Add. MS. 49791, ff.1-4. Northcote to Gorst, 11 
September, 1880. 
45rddesleigh Papers, BL. Add. MS. 50041,ff.25-3& Gorst to Northcote, 
15 September, 1880. 
46 The "Goat" was the Fourth Party's name for Northcote. It was originally 
coined in reference to his beard but later became the designation for all 
Tories the Fourth Party considered "weak-kneed". (Winston Churchill, p. 124.) 
47 churchill Papers, 11, Garst to Churchill, 15 September, 1880. Gerst also 
wrote similar letters to Balfour and Wolff. (Balfour Papers, BL. Add. MS. 
49791, ff5-6, Gorst to Balfour, 15 September, 1880; H.E. Gorst, Fourth Party, 
pp. 132-133.) 
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Suppose we were to treat the proposition of the Goat as a serious one 
and after mature deliberation accept it, that we should at his request 
give up the idea which we had never seriously entertained of a separate 
Fourth Party, and consent at his invitation to take our 'places in the 
ranks'. We could then next session, all four of us plant ourselves in 
a body on the second bench innnediately behind Northcote. There we 
should have him completely under our thumb .•. : we should cut him off 
from his satellites ..• In short, we should invade the front bench, 
make prisoner of the Goat and set him up as.our leader.48 
Gorst's main reason for opposing Northcote was the latter's inability to 
provide an effective Opposition, the consequence, so Garst believed, of 
over-reliance upon the advice of subordinates, particularly Richard Cross 
and W.R. Smith. Thus, if his plan succeeded, placing the Fourth Party in 
a position to implement Tory Democracy, he was willing to accede to 
Northcote's stewardship.49 
Gorst's colleagues, however, were not prepared to accept 
Northcote's leadership, even under Fourth Party control, and rejected his 
suggestion. 50 Balfour's opposition stennned from his desire to avoid 
strengthening Northcote's position to the detriment of his uncle's, Lord 
Salisbury's, prospects as Beaconsfield's successor, 51 and both Churchill 
and Wolff believed Northcote too mediocre ever to cope effectively with 
the demands of leadership.52 Consequently, Garst conceded to his colleagues 
48
churchill Papers, 12, Garst to Churchill, 16 September, 1880. 
49 H.E. Garst, Fourth Party, p. 215. 
50
churchill Papers, 10, Garst to Churchill, 21 September, 1880. 
51 H. Drummond Wolff, 2, p. 258. 
52 H.E. Garst, Fourth Party, p. 134, p. 215. Some years later, Churchill 
confessed to Charles Dilke that he regretted not having adopted Gorst's 
plan because it would have rendered their endeavours more effective. 
(Stephen Gwynn and Gertrude M. Tuckwell, The Life of the Right Honourable 
Sir Charles Dilke, 2 vols. [London, 1917], 1, pp. 267-268.) 
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on the issue and the Fourth Party maintained its independent Opposition 
role. Gorst did, however, continue to keep Northcote informed of Central 
Office activities and to offer him suggestions concerning the direction of 
Conservative policy, and on this level at least their relationship remained 
53 
a cordial one. 
Meanwhile, following his return to Central Office, Gorst resumed 
his earlier practice of corresponding with Beaconsfield on organizational 
matters and their relationship remained unruffled by the friction which 
marred his association with party management. 54 Gorst believed that 
Beaconsfield approved of the Fourth Party's parliamentary independence. 55 
In August 1880, Beaconsfield had made one of his infrequent visits to the 
Commons to view the group in action and was apparently very impressed by 
their tactics56 and following a meeting with Beaconsfield at Hughenden, 
early in November, Garst triumphantly reported to Churchill that his 
Lordship had praised their energy, expressed great confidence in their 
ability, offered them his advice and assistance and suggested that "just 
53Hambledon Papers, P6/644, Northcote to W.R. Smith, 21 December, 1880; 
Iddesleigh Papers, Vol. 29, BL. Add. MS. 50041, ff.39-40, Garst to Northcote, 
30 October, 1880; ibid., ff,41-42, Northcote to Gorst, 1 November, 1880. 
54Hughenden Papers, B/xxi/G/260-264, Garst to Beaconsfield, 30 September, 
4 November, 14 December, 29 December, 1880. 24 February, 1881. 
55H.E. Gorst, Fourth Party, pp. 147-151. 
56
w.F. Monypenny and G.E. Buckle, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, 2 vols. 
(New ed. London, 1929), 2, 1460-1461. 
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at present we need not be too scrupulous about obeying our leader". 
However, Beaconsfield had also admonished Garst to have the Fourth Party 
"courteously inform Northcote ..• of any step we are about to take in the 
House of Commons and listen with respect and attention to anything he may 
say about it"; because "An open rupture between us would ..• be most 
disastrous 11 • 57 This would seem to indicate that Beaconsfield was willing 
to condone Fourth Party attempts to rejuvenate a demoralized Conservative 
b t h f . 58 party u not at t e expense o party unity. 
Despite the demands of his parliamentary duties and Fourth Party 
activities, Garst continued to apply himself conscientiously to his work at 
Central Office, as his letters to Beaconsfield during the Autumn and Winter 
59 
of 1880-1881 reveal. However, the current political situation being 
unconducive to bold initiatives on the part of the Conservatives60 meant 
that the bulk of Central Office activity was restricted to routine 
organizational work. 61 However, the party management was evidently inclined 
to attribute Conservative malaise to what they perceived to be Gorst's 
neglect of party organization. In April 1881, Garst wrote to Smith in 
defence of his organizational policies, apparently in reply to the latter's 
criticism of his performance. In Gorst's view, revitalization in the 
57Churchill Papers, 23, Garst to Churchill, 9 November, 1880. 
58Robert Blake, Disraeli (London, 1966), pp. 729-730. Hereafter referred to 
as Blake, Disraeli. 
59 Hughenden Papers, B/xxi/G/260-264, Garst to Beaconsfield, 30 September, 
4 November, 14 December, 29 December, 1880; 24 February, 1881. 
60 Feuchtwanger, Democracy and the Tory Party, p. 152. 
61 See, for example, 
24 February, 1881. 
Hughenden Papers, B/xxi/G/264, 
Also reproduced in Hanham, pp. 
Garst to Beaconsfield, 
359-361. 
76. 
constituencies was dependent upon local initiative rather than Central 
Office stimulus: " •.. I will have the work we are doing in stimulating 
local effort pushed on. I do not however expect much practical result. 
Political activity seems to me to depend on causes too wide and deep to 
be controlled .•. We may to some extent guide political activity when it 
does arise into useful channels - but create it - no. We can gain 
thoroughly reliable information as to the state of the constituencies and 
we can let the local leaders know that there is a body at headquarters to 
communicate with. Further than this we cannot go until local feeling 
awakes 11 • 62 
This episode served to accentuate the tensions existing between 
party management and Gorst, tensions reminiscent of their difficulties of 
the 'seventies which had precipitated his dismissal from office. 
Consequently, he now evidently became concerned over his future prospects 
with the party. Thus, following a conversation with Smith during which 
the question of recompense for Gorst's services seemingly aros~ he hastened 
to reject any offer of monetary reward, evidently fearing that such a 
payment would prejudice his claims to future political office.63 Smith, 
however, immediately seized the opportunity to press exactly such a settle-
ment on Garst, at the same time indicating that he would be expected to 
64 give more time and effort to his duties under the new arrangement. No 
doubt because of his past experiences with the party in the matter of 
political rewards, Gorst apparently concluded that this offer did indeed 
62 Hambledon Papers, PS7/21, Gorst to W.H. Smith, 20 April, 1881. 
63 Hambledon Papers, PS7/40, Garst to W.H. Smith, 27 May, 1881. 
64 Hambledon Papers, 10/3, W.H. Smith to Garst, 21 June, 1881. 
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represent the only compensation he was likely to receive and, thus, he now 
agreed to a pecuniary settlement. 65 
Perhaps because of financial necessity, 66 or simply out of 
justifiable chagrin at his continuing exclusion from political office, 
Gorst determined to extract maximum financial benefit from his position. 
The party offered him one thousand guineas for the year 1881-1882, which he 
accepted, assuming that a similar sum would be paid him retroactively for 
the year 1880-1881. However, party management presented him with a cheque 
for only half that amount stating that this payment was outside their formal 
agreement and was proffered to him as a gesture for services rendered to the 
party. After several unsuccessful attempts to obtain the full amount to 
which he believed he was entitled, Gorst finally relinquished his claim. 67 
Following this disagreement, Gorst found himself on the defensive 
once again in response to continuing criticism from the party. Within a 
few weeks Smith was reprimanding Gorst for absenting himself from Central 
Office without informing his colleagues there and suggesting that this 
68 involved a dereliction of duty on Gorst's part, despite having received a 
letter from him just one week earlier in which Gorst outlined the extensive 
65 Hambledon Papers, PS7/52, Gorst to W.H. Smith, 23 June, 1881. 
66The demands of political office effectively prevented Gorst from establishing 
a lucrative legal career and this lack of income combined with the expenses 
of parliamentary life, seems to have kept Gorst in modest circumstances 
throughout his political career. His friend, Charles Dilke, described him 
as being "a poor man all his life". (S. Gwynn and G.M. Tuckwell, p. 565.) 
67Hambledon Papers, 10/3, W.H. Smith to Gorst, 21 June, 1881; PS7/52, Gorst 
to W.H. Smith, 23 June, 1881; PS7/59, Gorst to W.H. Smith, 15 July, 1881; 
PS7/60, W.H. Smith to Gorst, 16 July, 1881; PS7/61, Gorst to W.H. Smith, 
18 July, 1881; PS7/63, Note by W.H. Smith on reply to Gorst's letter of 
July 18 (undated). 
68 Hambledon Papers, PS7/81, W.H. Smith to Gorst, 17 August, 1881. 
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organizational work he had undertaken in the month previous to his departure 
for holidays, including preparations for a promotional tour of constituencies 
69 in Northern England, Ireland and Scotland. In addition, when Gorst 
returned from this tour70 he found that management dissatisfaction with him 
had spread to a small but influential group of his constituents in Chatham 
who were seeking to deny him the parliamentary nomination for that borough 
in the future. This prompted him to solicit, apparently successfully, the 
intervention of Lord Salisbury on his behalf, 71 the latter being one 
Conservative notable with whom Gorst appears to have been still on amicable 
72 terms. 
Meanwhile, notwithstanding Gorst's promotional efforts, there were 
few indications of Tory rejuvenation at the constituency level during Autumn 
and Winter of 1881-1882, further increasing management's discontent with 
. . 1 h d 73 organizationa met o s. The Central Committee apparently moved to usurp 
Gorst's authority, particularly his privileges in the delicate area of 
electoral finance granted him at the time of his re-appointment in 1880, a 
move he strenuously resisted. 74 By the late Summer of 1882, Gorst's frustra-
tion with the leadership's continuing commitment to class interest at the 
69Hambledon Papers, PS7/79, Gorst to W.H. Smith, 10 August, 1881. Both 
Feuchtwanger and Viscount Chilston suggest that Gorst's action in absenting 
himself from Central Office at this time indicates a weakening of his commitment 
to his official duties, arising from his monetary dispute with the party 
(Viscount Chilston, p. 164; Feuchtwanger, Democracy and the Tory Party, p. 154.) 
However, Gorst's letter of August 10, 1881, to Smith shows that he continued to 
involve himself actively in organizational work at this time. 
70
churchill Papers, 52, Gorst to Churchill, 21 October, 1881. 
71
salisbury Papers, 41, Gorst to Salisbury, 5 December, 1881. 
72
salisbury Papers, 40, Gorst to Salisbury, 26 November, 1881; ibid.' 42, Gorst 
to Salisbury, 15 December, 1881; 44, Gorst to Salisbury, 30 December, 1881. 
73 Feuchtwanger, Democracy and the Tory Party, pp. 154-155. 
74 Hambledon Papers, HA 10/4, Gorst to W.H. Smith, 24 February, 1882. 
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expense of Tory Democracy, in the running of the Conservative organization, 
prompted him to contemplate a public critique of the party's ineptness as 
a political institution and a denunciation of its self-seeking, oligarchic 
leadership. 75 
Gorst's censure of Conservative management and party organization 
duly appeared as an unsigned article entitled "Conservative Disorganisation" 
in the November 1882 issue of the Fortnightly Review. Once again, Gerst 
recapitulated the many criticisms he had been making since the early 
'seventies. The Conservative party continued to be a bastion of the upper 
classes, its leadership existing in an environment in which "a sense of 
their own importance and of the importance of their class interests and 
privileges is exaggerated, and to which the opinions of the common people 
can scarcely penetrate". In order to survive as a political power the 
party must become a "popular party", he argued. The majority of upper-class 
Tories were unconcerned with party organization; since the great victory of 
1874 social influence had again become predominant in the party, resulting 
in a heightening of class distinctions and the neglect of borough interests 
and, as a consequence, those areas had swung to the Liberals in 1880. If 
the Conservatives persisted in adhering to these methods as a means of 
returning to political power, "they had a long time to wait", concluded 
76 Gerst. 
75churchi11 Papers, 76, Gerst to Churchill, 10 September, 1882. 
7611conservative Disorganisation", Fortnightly Review 32 (1882): 42-45. 
The article was signed "Two Conservatives" and Gorst1 s collaborator is 
thought to have been his Fourth Party colleague, Sir Henry Drummond Wolff. 
(See R.T. McKenzie, British Political Parties, 2nd ed. [New York, 1963], 
p. 168; J.H. Robb, The Primrose League 1883-1906 [AMS Press ed. New York, 
1968], p. 30; W.J. Wilkinson, Tory Democracy [New York, 1925], p. 90.) 
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Not surprisingly, party reaction to this attack was extremely 
hostile77 and, once its authorship was established, it served to end Gorst's 
second term as party agent. At a meeting of the Chelsea Conservative 
Association a resolution was passed condemning Gorst's conduct towards the 
party leaders. This decision, strongly endorsed by the meeting's chairman, 
Sir Claude Hamilton, was sent by him to Northcote who thereupon forwarded 
the resolution to Garst. Upon receipt of Northcote's letter, Garst tendered 
78 his resignation to Northcote, at the same time informing Salisbury of his 
. 79 
action. 
Thus, as in 1877, Gorst's departure from office was prompted by 
the basic incompatibility existing between himself and party management, 
resulting primarily from political rather than personal differences. 
Gorst's continuing commitment to popular Conservatism and the party leaders' 
persistent promotion of upper-class interests to the neglect of Tory 
Democracy had once again created an acrimonious situation which rendered 
Gorst's position untenable. 
As party agent, Garst had been a thorn in the side of the Tory 
hierarchy. His resistance to party discipline, combined with his outspoken 
parliamentary criticisms of Conservative policies and leadership, particularly 
77This reaction was evidently so strong that Randolph Churchill thought 
it politic to publicly denounce the article, intimating that its authors 
were not "Two Conservatives" but, rather, two dissatisfied Whigs. 
(Minutes of the 1882 Conference of the National Union, cited in T.O. Lloyd, 
p. 81.) 
78 Iddesleigh Papers, BL. Add. MS. 50041, f.114, Garst to Northcote, 
17 November, 1882. 
79
salisbury Papers, SO, Garst to Salisbury, 17 November, 1882. 
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after 1880, had earned him a reputation as a "malcontent Tory". 80 Once 
released from his official duties, and the restraints they entailed, he 
' 
was to prove an even more formidable adversary of traditional Toryism. 
Having once again failed in his efforts to obtain the Conservative 
hierarchy's support for the development of Tory Democracy, Garst now adopted 
new tactics to achieve this goal. If party management was unwilling to 
reform the Tory machine so as to permit its borough supporters a larger 
share in organization and the rewards of office then, Garst concluded, the 
entire organization of the Tory Party must undergo a "radical revolution" 
81 in order to effect the change. 
The vanguard of this "revolution" was to be the National Union, 
the representative organ of the Conservative rank and file around the 
country, and Garst now entered upon a campaign to make that body pre-
eminent in Tory party organization. The "revolution" had in fact been 
brewing for several years. Following its inception in 1867, the National 
Union had served chiefly as a propaganda organ for the party rather than 
a vehicle for Tory Democracy as Garst, one of its founders, had intended. 
One year prior to his resignation from the party agency in 1877, Garst, 
at the Union's tenth annual conference, had proposed measures be adopted 
to democratize the Union Council, but was overruled.82 Thereafter, Garst 
and his supporters among the conference delegates, mainly middle-class 
80Bernard Holland, Life of Spencer Compton, Eighth Duke of Devonshire, 
2 vols. (London, 1911), 2, p. 269. 
8111Conservative Disorganisation", p. 43. 
82Minutes of the Tenth Annual Conference of the National Union, 1876. 
82. 
Conservatives of which the Union's local associations were now increasingly 
d 83 · 1 · d h 1 t · 1 tf f h. h t . compose, uti ize t e annua mee ings asap a orm rom w ic o issue 
' 
their repeated demands for party reorganization. 84 Provincial Tories' 
discontent with party management had intensified following the defeat of 
1880 and their criticism had contributed to the leadership's decision to 
appoint the Central Committee to supervise and rejuvenate party organization. 
However, the Committee had retained for itself the direction and management 
of party machinery and the control of party funds, while maintaining the 
National Union in its traditional role of "handmaid to the party", 85 much 
to the dissatisfaction of the growing numbers of middle-class urban 
C . • h • i 86 onservatives int e constituenc es. Consequently, Gorst's criticisms 
of Tory party machinery, as outlined in "Conservative Disorganisation", 
were sympathetically received by many of these newer elements in the party 
and it was from their ranks that he was to receive backing for his campaign 
to obtain a more vital role in party management for the National Union. 
83Robert Blake, The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill (London, 1970; 
Fontana Paperback ed. London, 1976), p. 151. Hereafter referred to as 
Blake, The Conservative Party; McKenzie, p. 169. 
84see Minutes of the Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth Annual Conferences of the 
National Union, 1876-1879. 
85The Union's function was so designated, in 1873, by its then Council 
Chairman, H.C. Raikes. See Minutes of the Seventh Annual Conference of the 
National Union, 1873. 
86As Ostrogorski observed, the middle-class business and professional men 
who were now finding their way into the party were intensely dissatisfied 
with the "hole-and-corner management of affairs". (M. Ostrogorski, 
Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties, trans. Frederick Clarke, 
2 vols. [London, 1902], 1, 267-268.) 
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Gorst's campaign was conducted in concert with Randolph Churchill, 
who devised the strategy designed to-bring Gorst's aspirations for the 
Union to fulfillment. 87 This plan involved nothing less than making the 
Fourth Party "masters" of that body by garnering the support of its local 
party organizations and,thereafter, utilizing this backing to capture its 
Council which could then be used to wrest from the hands of the Central 
Committee control of candidate selection and administration of party 
88 funds. Gerst apparently intended that, once acquired, this authority 
could be employed to democratize party organization in order to reduce 
the power of social influence and allow borough Conservatives a larger 
role in party affairs. For Gerst, this transformation was a matter of some 
urgency for he anticipated that the County members who formed the bulk 
of the parlaimentary party were destined to political extinction at the 
next election, as a result of their resistance to the upcoming Franchise 
Bill, leaving the smaller group of borough members to provide "the nucleus 
89 
of the Tory party of the future". 
90 Although he professed to share Gorst's goal of Tory Democracy, 
87churchill Papers, 146, Gerst to Churchill,2 August, 1883. 
88
rddesleigh Papers, BL. Add. MS. 50041, Bartlett to Northcote, 20 September, 
1883, quoted in Feuchtwanger, Democracy and the Tory Party, p. 174; Churchill 
to Wolff, 28 September, 1883, quoted in R.R. James, Lord Randolph Churchill 
(London, 1959), p. 132, hereafter referred to as R.R. James, Randolph Churchill; 
A.J. Balfour, Chapters of Autobiography, ed. E. Dugdale (London, 1930), p.159; 
Winston Churchill, p. 237. 
89
churchill Papers, 105, Gerst to Churchill, 29 January, 1883. 
90 
. See Lord Randolph Churchill, "Elijah's Mantle", Fortnightly Review 33 (1883): 
1-3. Churchill wrote and spoke about Tory Democracy and the value of working-
class Conservatives but he produced no specific programme to assist this group. 
His own interpretation of Tory Democracy, given in a cynical moment, was 
"mostly opportunism, I think". (Quoted in Blake, The Conservative Party, p. 153.) 
84. 
the desire for personal aggrandizement appears to have been the principal 
91 
motive behind Churchill's participation in the National Union struggle. 
Churchill'apparently contemplated using Fourth Party dominance of the 
National Union Council to transform that organization into a policy-
determining caucus, along the lines of National Liberal Federation, which, 
following the defeat of the Central Committee, might be used to support 
his bid for party leadership. 92 
Churchill's opposition to Northcote had originally prompted the 
93 former to promote Lord Salisbury as sole leader of the party. He employed 
this strategy initially in conjunction with Wolff, but not Gorst, in the 
National Union Council following Beaconsfield's death in 1881, 94 and 
thereafter, in Spring of 1883, in the columns of the Times. 95 However, 
shortly afterwards he was intimating that he himself was willing to assume 
the leadership. 96 This development was received by Gorst with considerable 
misgivings. He wished to transform party organization, not overthrow its 
leadership, believing Churchill should aim to "succeed rather than supplant 
91Balfour, p. 159. According to Arthur Balfour, "the ingenious idea 
occurred to Lord Randolph, that if by judicious management he could dominate 
the institution (the National Union) and endow it with new powers, it might 
effectually further his political ends". 
92 Cornford, p. 48; R.R. James, Randolph Churchill, p. 132. 
93 Upon Beaconsfield's death in 1881, Salisbury had assumed the leadership 
of the party in the Lords, whilst Northcote retained that position in the 
Commons, and they were regarded as joint-leaders of the party. 
94Iddesleigh Papers, Add. MS. 50040, H.S. Northcote to Sir S. Northcote, 
30 April, 1881, quoted in Feuchtwanger, Democracy and the Tory Party, pp. 167-168. 
95The Times, 2 April, 1883, p. 8; ibid., 9 April, 1883, p. 8. 
96 Lord Randolph Churchill, pp. 1-3. 
85. 
97 Northcote". However, loyalty to his Fourth Party colleague, and the 
fact he was already persona non grata with the party leadership, led a 
somewhat reluctant Gorst to join Churchill in his battle for control of 
the party machinery. 98 Churchill also received the backing of Wolff but 
not Balfour. The latter's relationship with the Fourth Party had always 
been an ambivalent one99 and now, when Churchill's leadership aspirations 
became apparent, he immediately moved to dissociate himself from the group 
as he had no desire to support a campaign which threatened the position 
f h . 1 L d S 1 · b lOO o is unc e, or a is ury. 
Churchill and Gorst launched their campaign to achieve mastery 
of the National Union at the annual conference held in Birmingham in 
October, 1883. Prior to the opening of the conference, Gorst and Churchill 
had circulated among the delegates a letter requesting support for their 
candidates for Council, lOl and on its second day Churchill delivered a 
speech to the assembly attacking the Central Committee and issuing a call 
102 for popular control of the party. His sentiments seemingly echoed 
those of many of the delegates who had grown increasingly resentful of the 
97H.E. Gorst, Fourth Party, p. 247. Following the publication of Churchill's 
letter in the April 2 edition of the Times, a Memorial expressing confidence 
in Northcote was drawn up by Stanhope and a group of back-benchers loyal 
to their leader, and was signed by Gorst. (Cited in R.R. James, Lord 
Randolph Churchill, p. 125.) 
98H.E. Gorst, Fourth Party, pp. 242-247. 
99Mrs. George Cornwallis-West, The Reminiscences of Lady Randolph Churchill 
(London, 1908), p. 93; H.E. Gorst, Fourth Party, pp. 44-45; Lady St. Relier, 
Memories of Fifty Years (London, 1909), p. 273, p. 282. 
100 H.E. Gorst, Fourth Party, p. 249; D. Walker-Smith and Edward Clarke, 
The Life of Sir Edward Clarke (London, 1939), p. 152. 
101 Hambledon Papers, PS8/84, Northcote to W.H. Smith, 26 September, 1883. 
102
winston Churchill, pp. 241-242. 
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Committee's bureaucratic regulation of party machinery for they responded 
by carrying a resolution authorizing the new Council to obtain for the 
National Union "its legitimate influence in party organisation11 •
103 
Yet, despite their canvassing and the apparent success of 
Churchill's personal overtures, in the subsequent election for the Council 
the Fourth Party were unable to achieve a working majority. 104 However, 
at the Council's first meeting on December 7, Churchill successfully 
proposed the appointment of an Organization Committee authorized to take 
the necessary steps to implement the 1883 annual conference resolution 
seeking greater influence for the Union, and was duly elected its chairman. 
He thereupon commenced negotiations with Salisbury aimed at transforming 
these aspirations into reality. These negotiations continued into January 
1884 without agreement being reached but on February 1, Churchill strengthened 
his own position, and that of the National Union vis-a-vis the Central 
Committee, when he succeeded in getting himself elected chairman of the 
Union Council following the resignation of Lord Percy from that position. 105 
While these initial skirmishes between the leadership and the 
Organizing Committee were being conducted, Garst was absent from England, 
having left in November, 1883, for a three-month business trip to India.
106 
103 Garst to Wolff, 3 October, 1883, quoted in H.E. Garst, Fourth Party, 
pp. 257-258. 
104 Edward Clarke, The Story of My Life (London, 1918), p. 215; H.E. Garst, 
Fourth Party, pp. 257-258. 
105
winston Churchill, pp. 244-245. 
106churchill Papers, 206, Garst to Churchill, 7 November, 1883; ibid., 209, 
Garst to Churchill, 9 November, 1883; ibid., 230-240, Garst to Churchill, 
December 1883-February 1884. Garst was visiting India in his capacity of 
advisor to the Ministers of the Nizam of Hyderabad, a service he had performed 
for the previous ten years. On this occasion he was to consult with the 
Ministers on government affairs attendant upon the coming-of-age of the 
current Nizam. (See, Ibid., 209, Garst to Churchill, 9 November, 1883.) 
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Churchill, whose decision to utilize the National Union as a vehicle for 
his leadership aspirations had to some extent been motivated by the fact 
that his colleague-in-arms, Gorst, possessed intimate knowledge of the 
workings of the party machinery, 107 was greatly perturbed by Gorst's 
absence while the campaign was in progress and prior to his departure had 
made an unsuccessful attempt to dissuade him from leaving, arguing that 
his expertise would be sorely missed. 108 Gorst, however, professed the 
contrary view, suggesting to Churchill that "in the National Union you will 
have much less difficulty with Northcote and the Central Committee in my 
absence because the element of personal jealousy will be eliminated and 
Stanhope will capitulate to you far more readily than he would to you and 
me co-joined 11 • 109 
107 Feuchtwanger, Democracy and the Tory Party, p. 168. 
108churchill Papers, 209, Gorst to Churchill, 9 November, 1888: H.E. Gorst, 
Fourth Party, pp. 260-261. 
109churchill Papers, 209, Gorst to Churchill, 9 November, 1883. Feuchtwanger 
suggests that Gorst's decision to visit India at this crucial point in the 
campaign is possibly a reflection of his reluctance to support the former's 
bid for power. (Feuchtwanger, Democracy and the Tory Party, p. 168). This 
assessment is in conflict with Gorst's sentiments as expressed to Churchill. 
However, it is very likely that Gorst's reasons for embarking on the trip 
were completely free from political considerations, his assurances to 
Churchill being perhaps an attempt to restore the latter's confidence in his 
chosen course of action in the face of a fait accompli. Preparations for the 
visit had apparently been underway prior to the Birmingham Conference, a 
further indicator of its dissociation from the National Union controversy. 
(Churchill Papers, 206, Gorst to Churchill, 7 November, 1883; ibid., 209, 
Gorst to Churchill, 9 November, 1883.) Gorst's principal motive for making 
the trip appears to have been financial. He was being paid a fee of Jl,000 
per month for his services and had already received a ,}.2,000 advance before 
his departure, making it virtually impossible for him to withdraw from the 
arrangement. (See Churchill Papers, 210, Wolff to Churchill, 10 November, 
1883.) 
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Gorst's return in early March, 1884, coincided with the connnence-
ment of a critical stage of the Fourth Party's struggle for control of the 
Council which followed upon Churchill's election to the Council chairmanship. 
The ensuing battle waged during the Spring and Sunnner of 1884, becoming 
increasingly bitter as Churchill's demands for National Union control of 
policy, election expenses, and candidate selection were rejected by the 
leadership who remained determined to retain these functions for themselves. 
By late March, Gerst was evidently eager to achieve a settlement. Reluctant 
from the first to support Churchill's leadership bid, he now apparently 
became greatly concerned over the direction the campaign was taking - the 
tactics used to supplant Percy as Council Vice-Chairman he found particularly 
regrettable - and his anxiety proved deep enough to prompt him to attempt 
to accelerate the reconciliation process through a personal interview with 
110 Northcote. 
Meanwhile, negotiations were underway between Churchill and the 
leadership and by late Spring both sides were indicating a willingness to 
compromise. At the beginning of May a settlement appeared likely111 but 
at this stage the opponents of Churchill on the Union Council temporarily 
gained the upper hand and, unaware that an agreement was in the offing, 
passed a resolution expressing their desire to reach an acconnnodation with 
the Central Connnittee, despite Churchill's objections to this manoeuvre. 
Regarding this action as a want of confidence in his leadership, Churchill 
now resigned the Council Chairmanship but this resulted in an upsurge of 
110salisbury Papers, Northcote to Salisbury, 28 March, 1884, quoted in 
·Feuchtwanger, Democracy and the Tory Party, p. 182. 
111 Balfour, pp. 165-166. 
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popular opinion in his favour and the rallying of local Conservative 
associations in his support, and in May the Council unanimously re-elected 
' him Chairman. Following his re-instatement~ Churchill appeared to be in 
an even stronger position than before from which to continue the struggle 
and he now resolved to make his move to capture the Council at the upcoming 
annual conference of the Union to be held in July 1884. 112 
In the interim, developments in Parliament exacerbated the 
dispute. The Fourth Party were currently championing the Liberal Government's 
Reform Bill over which the Conservatives were divided, leading Northcote 
to fear that, given the backing of the local associations, many of which 
were pro-Reform, Churchill's challenge to the leadership under the banner 
of Tory Democracy would lead to schism in the party in the event of a 
general election fought on the Reform issue. 113 Consequently, Northcote 
sought to obtain postponement of the National Union Conference114 and when 
this failed, attempted a last-ditch reconciliation with Churchill, but did 
115 not succeed. Salisbury, however, apparently welcomed the opportunity to 
meet Churchill's challenge head-on at Sheffield, for he co-operated with 
the anti-Churchill faction in the preparations for their confrontation with 
112 H.E. Gorst, Fourth Party, pp. 285-290. 
113Northcote expressed his fears to Salisbury:" we may come to a split 
and the line of cleavage may alter and some new adjustment of party forces 
may take place". (Salisbury Papers, Northcote to Salisbury, 3 June, 1884, 
quoted in Feuchtwanger, Democracy and the Tory Party, pp. 185-186.) 
114salisbury Papers, Northcote to Salisbury, 22 June, 1884, quoted in 
Feuchtwanger, Democracy and the Tory Party, p. 186. 
115Sir Stafford Northcote to Lord Randolph Churchill, 10 July, 1884, quoted 
in Winston Churchill, p. 274. 
116 the Fourth Party. 
90. 
Jhe elections for the new Council were held on the opening day of 
the conference. When the ballots were tabulated the Fourth Party appeared 
to have scored a decisive victory. Churchill led the polls and both Garst 
and Wolff were elected; a total of 22 of Churchill's nominees were successful, 
compared to 19 from the opposition. The Fourth Party were jubilant. However, 
closer inspection of the results revealed that certain of those elected had 
appeared on both slates whilst three had appeared on neither. 117 Churchill's 
majority was slim at best. The opposition had been defeated but Churchill 
did not have effective control of the Council. The outcome was, in fact, 
a stalemate, virtually a return to the situation prevailing six months' 
earlier at the start of the Fourth Party's campaign. Thus, upon reflection, 
both parties recognized the necessity for reconciliation118 and, with Wolff 
acting as mediator, they swiftly came to terms: "Churchill and Salisbury, 
recognising each other tacitly as equals, agreed that they would work in 
harmony, that the Central Committee would be abolished, that Sir Michael 
Hicks-Beach ... would become Chairman of the Council, and that the Primrose 
League would become officially recognised11 • 119 
116
winston Churchill, p. 273. 
117 Edward Clarke, p. 217. 
118several explanations are offered as to the reasons behind this decision 
to reach an agreement. See A.J. Balfour, pp. 168-171; Winston Churchill, pp. 
276-277; H.E. Garst, Fourth Party, pp. 303-305; R.R. James, Randolph Churchill, 
pp. 154-155. 
1~ R.R. James, The British Revolution: British Politics, 1880-1939, vol. 1. 
From Gladstone to Asguith, 1880-1914 (London, 1976), p. 77. The Primrose League 
had been founded by the Fourth Party in 1883 as a means of "moulding into a 
compact body the more active and energetic partisans of the newer and more demo-
cratic school of Conservatism ... " (The Reminiscences of Lady Dorothy Nevill, 
ed. R. Nevill [London, 1906], p. 330.) Because of its association with the Fourth 
Party, the League had been coolly received by the Tory leadership but it now 
received their formal approval. However, although its army of volunteer workers 
became a valuable asset to the party, it thereafter lost much of its Tory Demo-
cratic flavour. (See J.H. Robb, The Primrose League, 1883-1906 [New York, 1968].) 
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These negotiations were conducted "without Mr. Garst either being 
consulted or informed". For him, the. election "victory" had appeared to 
mark the ~ttainment of his prime objective, the National Union's acceptance 
of Tory Democracy as its guiding principle, and, confident that the future 
belonged to the Fourth Party, he had departed Sheffield immediately following 
the conclusion of the Conference to spend a few days of well-earned rest on 
the Isle of Wight. Churchill informed him of the terms of reconciliation 
only after the arrangements had been completed, apparently contravening an 
agreement he had made earlier with Garst promising not to take any step 
120 
without the latter's approval. 
Not surprisingly, Garst was astonished to hear of the agreement 121 
but, apparently, his first impression of it was that it had effected no 
dramatic reversal of the Fourth Party's fortunes and, thus, his immediate 
response to the fait accompli was cordial. He commended Churchill's decision 
to decline the Chairmanship as "a good stroke of policy" on the grounds that 
"We shall have much more power as independent members of Council criticising 
the acts of the Executive and we are almost certain to get our own way 
whenever we like to interfere", at the same time expounding upon their 
considerable successes:" ••• We have destroyed the Central Committee: we 
have revolutionised party management: and defeated the leaders in their 
122 
attempt at Sheffield to suppress us". 
120H.E. Garst, Fourth Party, pp. 302-303, pp. 311-312 
1211b1.'d., p. 303 311 312 ' pp. - . 
· 
122churchill Papers, 455, Garst to Churchill, 27 July, 1884. 
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Gorst's cordiality was also born of political necessity. Because 
of the leadership's enmity towards him, resulting from his role in the 
123 National Union controversy, Garst obviously realized that any further 
effort on his part to implement Tory Democracy would be strenuously 
resisted by the party and, thus, his only possibility for success lay in 
working in harmony with Churchill. Gorst's recognition of the situation 
was clearly expressed in his reply to Churchill: 
I have no hope of being able to carry out my ideas. The leaders I can 
never trust again; I cannot like you throw myself on Tory Democracy. 
With you the thing was difficult: without you it becomes impossible. 
After the experience of the Central Committee and W.H. Smith, I know 
the forces are too strong to contend with and I am not disposed to 
recommence a fruitless struggle.124 
Shortly thereafter, however, perhaps following a closer examination 
of the terms of the pact, Garst concluded that Tory Democracy had been 
125 
sacrificed by Churchill in exchange for personal advancement. Although 
the Central Committee had been abolished it was to be replaced by a 
traditional executive of Whips and the Party Agent who, in their capacity 
as representatives of the Conservative leadership, would have control over 
party affairs, whilst the National Union was to continue its earlier function 
123Ever since Churchill initiated his tilt at the party leadership, with 
his letter to the Times in Spring 1883, many within the party had regarded 
Gorst as the Machiavellian influence behind the attack. "Garst is, I feel 
convinced, the real motive power in this business, the clever intriguer •.. 11 , 
Viscount Barrington observed to Northcote in April 1883. (Iddesleigh Papers, 
Add. MS. 50041, Barrington to Northcote, 4 April, 1883, quoted in Feuchtwanger, 
Democracy and the Tory Party, p. 169.) As early as June 1884, Garst had 
predicted the direction the "Old Gang's" animosity would take. "Seeing that 
Randolph is too strong and popular to be crushed, they will now make you and 
me object of their attacks". (Garst to Wolff, 4 June, 1884, quoted in H.E. Garst, 
Fourth Party, p. 294.) 
124
churchill Papers, 455, Garst to Churchill, 27 July, 1884. 
125 H.E. Gorst, Fourth Party, pp. 304-305, p. 12. 
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of "handmaid" to the party in Parliament. 126 Thus, Gorst's goal to achieve 
for that organization a more vital role in party affairs remained unfulfilled. 
' Garst was now understandably angered by what he saw to be Churchill's 
betrayal of both the principles of Tory Democracy and Gorst's personal 
interests. During the campaign, Garst had supplied Churchill with invaluable 
advice and assistance and had risked his own political future by loyally 
supporting him throughout the difficult period of negotiations with the 
party management. His reward was the surrender of his objectives by 
Churchill and the odium of the Conservative establishment. 
Gorst demonstrated his opposition to the settlement by refusing 
to attend the dinner given by Salisbury to celebrate the accord, and 
relations between Churchill and himself now became increasingly strained,
127 
their dissention even provoking them into open conflict in the Commons. 128 
126McKenzie, p. 173. In his reminiscences of the agreement, Balfour later 
observed, "We are told that Tory Democracy triumphed. Yet .•• the functions 
of the National Union, which was to be its organ, remained unchanged'." 
(A.J. Balfour, p. 168.) 
127A.J. B lf 172 a our, p. . Edward Clarke, p. 218; H.E. Gorst, Fourth Party, 
p. 312. 
1280n the second reading of the Reform Bill, an amendment designed to delay 
temporarily its passage as a means of protecting Conservative interests, and 
placed on the table by Churchill but presented in his absence by Stanhope, 
was denounced by Gorst. Next day Churchill responded by publicly castigating 
Gorst from the floor of the House. (See W.R. Lucy, Two Parliaments, pp. 437-
438; Winston Churchill, pp. 288-289.) According to Gorst's son, his father 
opposed the amendment in order to show that the events of July had in no way 
diminished his commitment to Tory Democracy. Gorst wished "to prove to the 
Conservative party and to his former colleagues that there had been no 
yielding of principles on his part •.. ". (H.E. Garst, Fourth Party, p. 313.) 
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Their relationship was never to regain its original harmony. Moreover, 
although to all appearances the Fourth Party continued to function right 
up until the formation of the Salisbury Government in 1885, 129 it was 
"virtually broken up and dissolved from the moment when the capitulation 
was carried out without the knowledge and consent of one of its three 
members", l30 
Notwithstanding his estrangement from Garst, upon the formation 
of the new Conservative Government in 1885, Churchill pressed Salisbury to 
provide a position therein for his former ally: 
I do feel very uneasy indeed about Wolff and Garst and cannot think that 
I have submitted to you their position as regards myself with the urgency 
which they are entitled to expect from me ... Gorst's disappointment is 
intense. He knows his powers, his position in the House, his hitherto 
barely recognised claims and it makes me perfectly wretched to feel that 
it must occur to his mind that his failure to obtain that for which so 
many persons of knowledge consider he is fitted for in every way, is due 
to lukewarmness on my part.131 
.However, not to have made such an appeal for this colleague who had 
contributed so much towards his success would have exposed him to accusations 
of callous ingratitude, and its attendant political repercussions - the 
possibility of which Churchill was evidently fully aware: 
If I did not know what the general feeling of the House of Commons will 
be as regards myself on this point I would have hesitated to trouble you, 
but I am certain that if with respect to these two cases things remain 
in the position you gave me to understand this morning they would be, I 
shall be considered to have failed my friends, and my powers, whatever 
they may be, of being useful to your Government will be impaired,132 
129 See A.J. Balfour, pp. 172-173; R.R. James, Randolph Churchill, Chap. 6; 
H. Drummond Wolff, 2, 272-273, 
130 H.E. Gorst, Fourth Party, p. 311. 
131 Salisbury Papers, 112, Churchill to Salisbury, 16 June, 1885. 
132
rbid. (Emphasis added). 
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Solely as a result of Churchill's patronage, Gerst was appointed Solicitor-
133 General, a minor office but one which carried with it a knighthood. 
Gorst's participation in the National Union controversy effectively 
sealed his political fate. As "Lord Randolph Churchill's position was too 
strong to be assailed •.• the full vengeance of the leaders eventually fell 
134 
upon Mr. Gerst". Because "time after time, he was the creative force 
and impetus behind a particular action or manoeuvre" of the Fourth Party, 135 
the Conservative hierarchy considered him "the dangerous man among them". 136 
Consequently, they were now determined to exclude him from the 
party's inner circles. Thus, during subsequent Conservative administrations, 
Gerst found himself occupying a succession of secondary parliamentary 
offices, condemned for the remainder of his career never to "obtain that 
political success to which he was entitled by reason of his undoubted 
talents 11 • 137 Had Gerst been willing to accept the settlement and renounce 
Tory Democracy, the leadership might have eventually forgiven and forgotten; 
but this Gerst would not do. His commitment to his political philosophy 
was too strong, and became even stronger as his parliamentary career progressed. 
133H.E. Gerst, Fourth Party, p. 317. 
134Ibid., p. 317. 
135Andrew Jones, The Politics of Reform, 1884 (Cambridge, 1972), p. 73. 
136 Charles Whibley, Lord John Manners and His Friends, 2 vols. (London, 1925), 
2, 202. 
137Wilkinson, p. 76. 
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His plan to utilize the National Union as a vehicle for Tory 
Democracy,having failed, and denied the opportunity to directly influence 
Tory policy by virtue of his exclusion from the highest councils of the 
party, Garst was now obliged to employ alternative methods in his fight 
to have the Conservative party embrace the Tory Democratic creed, Although 
only in the second rank of politicans, ten years of vigorous and frequently 
independent, parliamentary activity had gained for him a prominent 
parliamentary position. He now began to use this position to harrass 
successive Conservative governments, in and out of Parliament, with demands 
for measures designed to transform the Tory party into "a national party 
to whom the masses of the people could look with confidence for the 
protection and furtherance of their interests 11 • 138 
138 H.E. Garst, Fourth Party, p. 36. 
CHAPTER III 
THE QUEST FOR TORY DEMOCRACY: 
GORST AND SOCIAL REFORM, 1875-1890 
Gorst's pursuit of Tory democracy through the legislative process, 
following the failure of his National Union campaign, represented not a new 
departure in his policy but, rather, the continuation of a course of action 
he had been actively prosecuting throughout the previous decade. Gorst's 
philosophy encompassed much more than the democratization of party organiza-
tion and the subversion of antiquated party methods. His Tory democratic 
ideal was in essence that outlined by Disraeli in his address to the 
National Union at the Crystal Palace in June 1872, in which he set forth 
his concept of national and popular Conservatism. Declared Disraeli on 
this occasion, the principles of the Tory party involved not only the 
maintenance of the institutions of the country and the upholding of the 
empire but, also, "the elevation of the condition of the people". 1 
Disraeli's speech, together with others expressing similar sentiments which 
he had delivered in Lancashire earlier in that year, apparently deeply 
affected Gorst: " ... he was greatly impressed by the reality of Disraeli's 
sympathy with the working class, and by the keen understanding he displayed 
of the minutest circumstances of their humble lives. It gave him a genuine 
insight into his chief's political ideals .•• ". 2 However, whereas Disraeli I s 
commitment to social progress sprang primarily from his calculation of 
1The Times, 25 June, 1782, p. 8 
2 H.E. Gorst, The Fourth Partv (London, 1906), p. 72. Hereafter referred to 
H.E. Gorst, Fourth Party. 
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benefits to be derived from support of working-class interests, 3 Gorst's 
quest for social justice was more deeply rooted. Although he assuredly 
' recognized and appreciated the party advantage to be gained from embracing 
the cause of working-class welfare, Gerst was, according to Lady Dorothy 
Nevill, "undoubtedly animated by a sincere passion for social reform" 4 
Even one of his severest critics felt obliged to acknowledge that Gorst's 
"genuine sympathy with the suffering of poverty, the fruit of his deep 
religious feelings", lay at the root of his political philosophy; 5 and 
Gorst's son relates that his father entered the Fourth Party "because he 
believed that his colleagues shared with him the keen determination to 
revive Disraeli's policy of social reform " 6 Thus, following Gorst's 
by-election victory in 1875, his devotion to what he perceived to be 
Disraeli's philosophy of social progress found expression in agitation for 
social legislation in the House of Commons. 
When Gerst re-entered Parliament in February 1875, the year-old 
Conservative Government was in the process of enacting the most extensive 
series of social reform measures to be produced by a British administration 
prior to that of 1906. However, this reform activity represented not the 
3Paul Smith, Disraelian Conservatism and Social Reform (London, 1976), pp. 
157-161. 
4Ralph Nevill, Life and Letters of Lady Dorothy Nevill (London, 1919), p. 109. 
Hereafter referred to as Nevill, Life and Letters. 
5 Arthur A. Baumann, "Sir John Gerst", The Saturday Review 123 (1916), 345-346. 
6 H.E. Gerst, Fourth Party, p. 246. However, Lady Dorothy Nevill expressed 
the view that social reform "made no particular appeal to either of his 
colleagues", e.g., Churchill and Wolff. (See Nevill, Life and Letters, p. 109.) 
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implementation of a Disraelian programme of Tory Democracy but, rather, 
the party's ad hoc response to the exigencies of the hour. Despite his 
expressed' desire "for the elevation of the condition of the people", 
Disraeli entered office in 1874 without any coherent domestic policy in 
mind. Consequently, although he encouraged its creation, the formulation 
and management of subsequent Tory social legislation devolved upon a small 
group of his ministers, of whom the Home Secretary, Richard Cross, was to 
prove the most productive. Thus, in the absence of a definite social 
programme, the Conservative reform measures emerged as a series of piecemeal 
7 
reforms whose birth and character resulted from a variety of factors. 
The motives prompting Tory initiative in social reform were 
complex. In the 1874 e.lection campaign fear of alienating the reform-wary 
middle classes, whose votes they hoped to garner in the contest, prevented 
the Conservatives from making a special appeal to the working classes or 
placing too much emphasis upon social measures pertaining to their interests, 
except in the case of candidates in the large urban and industrial consti-
tuencies, However, once returned to office, the party recognized the 
necessity of making some effort to reward working men who had contributed 
to their electoral success in order to ensure their continued support in 
the future, a factor considered to be particularly crucial with respect to 
the populous urban boroughs. Furthermore, the enactment of judicious social 
reforms was considered an effective ploy in forestalling the growth of 
7Smith, pp. 198-202, pp, 257-259. For a detailed examination of the contribu-
tion of Cross to this legislation see Dennis J, Mitchell, "Richard Assheton 
Cross: A Political Biography". (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Mississippi, 
1976), Chap, 3. 
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dangerous working-class discontent. 8 Moreover, the Tories, aware that 
their victory at the polls to some extent resulted from the reaction of 
middle-class voters against the conduct of the previous Liberal administra-
tion, which had ''harassed every trade, worried every profession and assailed 
9 
every class, institution and species of property" through its domestic 
policies, were committed to providing a respite from "incessant and 
harassing legislation".lO Consequently, they now embraced social reform 
as an area of parliamentary activity open to their efforts, while at the 
same time being largely non-partisan in nature and, thus, not likely to 
create political turmoil. In addition, several of the measures tackled by 
the Tories were already under formulation at the various government depart-
ments when the party took office, others were extemporaneous products of 
official enquiries, while still others represented the consolidation of 
1 . 1 · 1 · ll ear ier egis ation. 
Further impetus for the Conservatives' drive for social legisla-
tion was provided by the emerging climate of opinion concerning social reform 
and the government's role in its implementation. As early as 1869, Sir 
Stafford Northcote had expressed the view that "social questions are assuming 
such large dimensions that they cannot be adequately dealt with except by 
8Smith, pp. 200-201, p. 203 
9 Quoted in H.J. Hanham, Elections and Party Management (London, 1959), p. 221. 
lO"Disraeli's Election Address", The Times, 26 January, 1874, p. 8. 
11Robert Blake, Disraeli (New York, 1967), pp. 552-558. Hereafter referred 
to as Blake, Disraeli; Smith, pp. 200-203, pp. 257-265. 
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the employment of the central administrative machinery 11 ; 12 and, speaking 
in Parliament in Spring of 1874, Disraeli observed that "the disposition of 
the country is favourable, beyond any preceding time that I can recall, to 
the successful consideration of the social wants of the great body of the 
13 people". These arguments reflect the changing attitude towards the role 
of the state, and the scope of the tasks it could justifiably undertake in 
social and economic matters, which was beginning to take place among 
thinking men in Britain in the eighteen seventies. The considerable 
extension of government intervention in both social and economic fields, 
14 
which had occurred during the previous forty years, had served to bring 
about the growing realization that, in the face of the continuing problems 
being generated by urban industrial society, the state's traditional role 
as 0 holder of the economic ring 11 , intervening only to prevent greater evil, 
was no longer a viable one. Government intervention_in socio-economic 
questions was increasingly accepted as a positive good and the most 
appropriate solution to an ever-increasing range of social and economic 
problems. 
However, despite the various benefits which the Conservatives 
anticipated they would derive from their venture into social reform legisla-
tion, the party as a whole lacked enthusiasm for the enterprise and was 
12sir Stafford Northcote, "Opening Address", Transactions of the National 
Association for the Promotion of Social Science (1869), 1-27. 
13PD, 3rd Series, 219 (1874): 259. 
14During the so-called "age of laissez-faire", between 1840 and 1970, British 
governments had enacted a succession of socio-economic legislation which 
included the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834, factory acts, and education and 
public health legislation. (See Ursula R.Q. Henriques, Before the Welfare 
State: Social Administration in Early Industrial Britain (London, 1979); 
David Roberts, The Victorian Origins of the British Welfare State (New Haven, 
Conn., 1960). 
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anxious to limit the scope of the measures to be adopted. At a time when 
increasing numbers of informed members of society were coming to appreciate 
the need for the tempering of individualism and laissez-faire through 
judicious state intervention, many Conservatives were experiencing a 
strengthening of their commitment to Government non-interference in socio-
economic affairs. By the early 'seventies, the party's absorption of large 
numbers of those members of the commercial and industrial middle-class 
seeking a nostrum for growing working-class militancy and Liberal Radicalism 
had served to reinforce the marked strain of Liberal-Conservatism already 
existing within its ranks. This resulted in a further decline of its Tory 
paternalism already diminished by the backlash against the 1867 Reform Act 
and the threat presented to the traditional dominance of property and the 
stability of the social order by evolving working-class consciousness and 
organization. At the moment of their return to power in 1874, "the 
Conservatives looked less than ever like the trustees of paternalism and 
the organic view of society, as they took up the cudgels of individual 
liberty and freedom of enterprise against the bogies of collectivism and 
socialism11 • 15 
The Conservatives' attachment to the individualistic creed, when 
combined with their suspicion of centralization, the inescapable constraints 
of prejudice and vested interest within Toryism, and the traditional 
reluctance shared by both parties to spend the ratepayers' and taxpayers' 
money, served to inhibit the party's social policy. The philosophy guiding 
the Conservative administration's social legislation was exemplified in 
15Blake, Disraeli, pp. 552-556; Smith, pp. 203-204. 
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Cross's speech to the Edinburgh Conservative Working Men's Association in 
October 1875. He assured his audience that the Government wished "to 
' promote, as far as lies in our power, the improvement of the social condition 
of the people ..• " but he cautioned them that acts of Parliament were of 
limited efficacy in accomplishing this amelioration. His intention was to 
show people "how they can improve themselves". In a genuflection to 
Benthanism, he stipulated that the Conservative policy was intended "to give 
the greatest amount of happiness to the largest possible number that is 
consistent with the actual rights of the few". 16 However, in the case of 
the Tories, this ideology was modified to ensure the limitation of the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number to that happiness which did not 
d f h · h f h · d · · 17 etract rom t e rig ts o t e propertie minority. 
Upon assuming office in 1874, the Conservative government was 
obliged to deal with labour issues, their consideration rendered necessary 
by the increasing political power of organized labour and the working-class 
contribution to the Conservatives' electoral success, particularly in the 
18 
north. Taking over Radical A.J. M.lndella's private member's bill designed 
to reduce the hours of labour in the textile industry, Cross adapted it to 
meet the Government's own specifications and brought it into Parliament as 
the Factories (Health of Women) Bill in May 1874. The bill, which met with 
little opposition and went through third reading without debate, emerged 
as the Factory Act of 1874 which established the ten-hour day and raised 
1611 Parliament Out of Session", The Times, 18 October, 1875, p. 8. 
17 Mitchell, p. 98. 
18Smith, pp. 208-214. 
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the age for half-time employment from 8 to 10 and for full-time from 13 
to 14. 19 Having earlier assured Parliament that the ten-hour provision 
would apply only to women and children, because "as far as adult males 
were concerned there could be no question that freedom of contract must 
be maintained, and men must be left to care for themselves", Cross presented 
his bill as being consistent with laissez-faire principles, assuring the 
House that his provisions would incur as little violation of the doctrines 
20 
of political economy as did the current factory acts. Yet, reducing the 
working hours to ten for females and young persons meant, in practice, 
curtailing the working hours for male workers also. "It was a good case 
of a Conservative minister doing in fact what he could hardly have attempted 
to justify in theory". 21 
The session of 1875 saw the passage of further reforms, including 
additional labour measures. This period saw the enactment of two important 
Trade Union Acts: the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act and the 
Employers and Workmen Act; the Public Health Act, which consolidated and 
systematized existing legislation; the Artizans Dwelling Act, which 
empowered local authorities to replace deficient insanitary dwellings with 
adequate housing; an Agricultural Holdings Act, a Friendly Societies Act, 
and a Sale of Food and Drugs Act. In addition, the 1876 session produced 
three more measures, the Rivers Pollution, Merchant Shipping and Education 
19PD, 3rd Series, 219 (1874): 455, 1415-1471; 220 (1874): 302-339, 
672-673. 
20PD, 3rd Series, 218 (1874): 1793-1794; 219 (1874): 1420. 
21
smith, p. 214. 
22 Acts. 
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The practical significance of these measures, however, was less 
impressive than the simple tabulation of the Acts suggests. Developed 
piecemeal and conceived and executed in a spirit of pseudo-Liberalism, 
the reforms were of varying quality and efficacy. Only the Conservatives' 
labour measures, the Trade Union Acts, which effectively settled the 
status of labour for the remainder of the century, can be considered a 
d . 23 resoun ing success. 
Thereafter, the Tory government's preoccupation with social 
reform dissipated. Beginning in 1877, increasing emphasis upon foreign 
and Imperial affairs, and their drain on revenues already weakened by 
economic depression, combined with a gradual reaction on the part of many 
Conservatives against what they regarded as excessive concessions to 
working-class interests in the wake of the 1867 Reform Act, served to 
impede the development of additional Tory reforms and the remainder of 
Disraeli's second ministry yielded only one social measure of note, the 
22For background to this legislation see Maurice Bruce, The Coming of the 
Welfare State (London, 1961), pp. 135-136; W.M. Frazer, History of English 
Public Health, 1834-1939 (London, 1950), pp. 114-120; P.H.J.H. Gosden, 
The Friendly Societies in England, 1815-1875 (Manchester, 1961), Chap. 7; 
Enid Gauldie, Cruel Habitations: A History of Working-Class Housing. 1780-1918 
(London, 1974), pp. 275-281; George Howell, Labour Legislation, Labour 
Movements and Labour Leaders, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (London, 1905), 2, Chap. 35; 
Nigel Middleton and Sophia Weitzman, A Place for Everyone: A History of 
State Education from the End of the 18th Century to the 1970s (London, 1976), 
pp. 72-73; Christabel Orwin and Edith H. Whetham, History of British 
Agriculture, 1846-1914 (London, 1964), pp. 170-173; P. Smith, Chapters 5 and 
6; John N. Tarn, Five Per Cent Philanthropy: An account of housing in urban 
areas between 1840 and 1914 (Cambridge, 1973), pp. 77-81. 
23For an evaluation of the working of these various Acts see Gauldie, 
pp. 276-278; Middleton and Weitzman, p. 73; Orwin and Whetham, pp. 170-173; 
Smith, pp. 257-260. 
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1878 Factory Act which consolidated earlier legislation into a unified 
scheme. 24 
Gorst appears to have made no significant parliamentary contribu-
tion to the passage of the bulk of this legislation, 25 a seemingly surprising 
abstention in view of his subsequent involvement in the development of 
British social policy. However, his lack of participation may have 
resulted from frequent involuntary absences from the House occasioned by 
the demands of his extra-parliamentary duties which were particularly 
onerous during this period. Between the years 1875 and 1877 Gorst's 
official duties as Principal Agent undoubtedly occupied a large proportion 
of his time. During 1875, when the majority of the Conservative social 
measures were under debate in the Commons, Garst was deeply engrossed with 
the municipal elections being contested around the country. His conviction 
that the party's future rested upon borough Conservatism prompted him to 
work assiduously for the promotion of Toryism at the local level, whilst 
urging the party leaders to give more attention to municipal elections and 
to regard them as an indicator of the fluctuations in public opinion. 26 
During Gorst's initial years as Agent, municipal elections had 
produced a succession of Tory victories, foreshadowing the general election 
triumph of 1874. However, the municipal elections of that year brought a 
reversal of this trend, inducing Garst to once again pressure the party 
24 Smith, Chapter 6. 
25Gorst did, however, give his verbal support to the Government's proposed 
social legislation in his by-election speeches during January and February, 
1875, promising to make "the elevation of the condition of the people .•. 
one of his cardinal principles so far as legislation was concerned " 
(Chatham News, 6 February, 1875. See also, ibid., 23 January 1875, 30 January 
1875; 13 February, 1875.) 
26 Hanham, pp. 388-389. 
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leaders to use their influence to stimulate local associations, but without 
27 
success. Consequently, during 1875, he worked through Central Office to 
nurture borough Conservatism with a view to stemming its decay but the 
adverse results of the 1875 municipal contests, carefully collated by him 
and presented to Disraeli, confirmed his fears of continuing Conservative 
decline. 28 
Meanwhile, the time which Gorst could allot to attending the 
Commons was further eroded by the duties entailed in fulfilling his role 
as honorary secretary of the National Union and by his efforts to establish 
simultaneously a legal practice, rendered necessary by his relatively 
impecunious state. 29 
One Conservative reform which did elicit Gorst's active involvement 
during the period was the merchant shipping measure. When Gorst took his 
seat in the Commons, in February, 1875, the Government had just introduced 
its Merchant Shipping Bill designed to secure greater protection for seamen 
against loss of life at sea. The Bill's principal provision was an attempt 
to place responsibility of safety upon the shoulders of the individual 
shipowner by rendering him accountable for unlimited liability with regard 
to damage to persons or property resulting from his consciously dispatching 
unworthy ships to sea. This proposal followed the recommendations of the 
27 Hughenden Papers, B/xxi/D/463a, Gorst to Disraeil, 2 December, 1874; 
ibid., B/xxi/D/463, Dyke to Disraeli, 8 December, 1874. 
28 Hughenden Papers, B/xxi/G/253, Gorst to Disraeli, 10 November, 1875; 
ibid., B/xxi/G/255, Gorst to Disraeli, 22 November, 1875. 
29
"Character Sketch: December. Sir John Gorst", Review of Reviews 3 (1891), 
575-585. Hereafter referred to as "Character Sketch". 
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1874 Report of the Royal Commission on Unseaworthy Ships which advocated 
that shipowners, not the government, must bear the responsibility for the 
safety of shipping. 30 The Conservatives were more than eager to comply 
with this directive for they sought to limit as far as possible state 
intervention in private enterprise, 31 preferring to follow the lead of the 
previous Liberal government whose Merchant Shipping Acts of 1871 and 1873 
had vested in the shipowners the responsibility for the seaworthiness of 
32 their vessels. 
The Conservative measure was attacked by the shipowners, who 
were fearful that the Government's scheme of unlimited liability would 
bring them to financial ruin, and by the allies of the seamen who argued 
h h 1 . d 33 tat t e proposa was ina equate. The chief agitator for the latter 
view was Liberal M.P. for Derby, Samuel Plimsoll, who claimed that the 
over-insuring of ships, followed by overloading to guarantee their sinking, 
was the greatest contributor to loss of life at sea and who, between 1870 
and 1874, had conducted a campaign for greater government control over 
shipping which had included the introduction into Parliament of three 
bills designed to end overloading and unseaworthiness by the enforcement 
of compulsory survey and load line.34 
3oFinal Report of the Royal Commission on Unseaworthy Ships (Cmnd. 1027), 
12'., 1874, 34: 1-19. (All citations of Parliamentary Papers in this thesis 
refer to the microcard version of the Papers. See, Great Britain, House 
of Commons. British Sessional Papers. New York: Readex Microprint, 1731-.) 
31
smith, pp. 230-231. 
3234 and 35 Viet., Chap. 110. 36 and 37 Viet., Chap. 85. 
33 PD, 3rd Series, 222 (1875): 125-138. 
34PD, 3rd Series, 204 (1871): 153; 214 (1873): 273-274; 218 (1874): 191. See 
also Howell, 2: 263-283; D. Masters, The Plimsoll Mark (London, 1955). Neville 
Upham, The Load Line, National Maritime Mlseum Monographs. No. 33 (London, 1978). 
A. C. Warner, "The Plimsoll Agitation: A Chapter in Nineteenth-Century Social 
History" (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard, 1960). This latter work was, unfortunately, 
not available to the author of this dissertation. 
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Faced with this opposition and the consequent likelihood of 
continued parliamentary obstruction to the Bill, and unable to sidetrack 
the measure because this would leave the way open for Plimsoll to bring 
in his rival bill,35 the Government introduced two amendments devised to 
pacify both opposition groups, the shipowners by withdrawing unlimited 
liability, the sailors' friends by allowing for voluntary observance of the 
load line. Compulsory load line and survey were again rejected because, 
as the President of the Board of Trade, Adderley, pointed out, such legisla-
tion "might supplement the necessary perils of the sea by the graver perils 
of Government protection still more treacherous and disastrous than the 
sea itself". 36 
Although these concessions served to soften opposition and increase 
support for the Bill sufficiently enough to allow it to pass second reading 
without division, 37 Plimsoll's supporters, amongst whom were a substantial 
group of Conservative M.P.s including Gorst, remained committed to the 
Derby Member's scheme for obligatory load line and survey. In debate 
during committee stage of the Bill, Garst urged the Government to adopt 
Plimsoll's proposals as a means of ridding the seas of unseaworthy vessels, 
thereby leaving a manageable number of ships to regulate resulting in safer 
conditions for the seamen. 38 
As the session advanced and the slow progress of the Bill brought 
it into competition for parliamentary time with the Agricultural Holdings 
35Smith, p. 233. 
36PD, 3rd Series, 223 (1875): 474a. 
37Ibid., 3rd Series, 223 (1875): 474a-573. 
38Ibid., 3rd Series, 225 (1875): 109-110. 
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measure, which the Prime Minister was eager to enact, the Government 
decided to defer the Merchant Shipping Bill. This action prompted Plimsoll 
to launch a scathing attack on the government from the floor of the Commons, 
which was followed by mounting agitation in his support from around the 
country. The Conservatives were accused of insensitivity for advancing 
the Agricultural Holdings Bill ahead of legislation for the protection of 
seamen. Alarmed by the intensity of the opposition to the Shipping Bill's 
deferment, the Tories elected to introduce a limited measure designed to 
reduce loss of life at sea pending a re-examination of the entire question 
in the following session.39 
The Unseaworthy Ships Bill, tabled in the Commons on July 28, 1875, 
strengthened the powers of the Board of Trade to detain unseaworthy ships 
and made provision for the intensification of survey, this inspection being 
allowed upon the request of twenty-five percent of the ship's crew, the 
legislation to remain in operation for one year.40 Once again the provisions 
of the Bill fell short of Plimsoll's demands and the consequent pressure 
from his supporters on both sides of the House for the adoption of a load 
line eventually obliged the Government to concede on this point, 41 although 
the exact position of the load line on the ship was to be decided by the 
individual owners. 42 This concession enabled the Government to pass the 
39 Masters, Chapter 17; Smith, pp. 235-236. 
40PD, 3rd Series, 226 (1875): 145-149. 
41Ibid., 3rd Series, 226 (1875): 379-431. Disraeli feared that defeat on 
the issue would involve grave political risk because, as he confided to Lady 
Bradford, "My position is difficult , .. if I were defeated in the House, I 
could not dissolve, for, in the present fever, I should probably get 
worsted". (Disraeli to Lady Bradford, 28 July, 1875, quoted in W.F. Monypenny 
and G. Buckle, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, 2 vols. (London, 1929), 2, p.725.) 
421:!:1, 3rd Series, 226 (1875): 575-588, 617-625. 
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emergency bill, but, as Disraeli admitted, not without difficulty: "We 
pulled through, but not triumphantly; had the Opposition had a leader 
adequate to the opportunity, we might have been much humiliated. As it 
was it needed much tact and vigilance to mitigate, or conceal, our 
concessionsn . 43 
During the parliamentary recess the Government worked to prepare 
a revised shipping bill to replace the temporary Unseaworthy Ships Act. 
Although ministers remained unwilling to accept Plimsoll's scheme, being, 
for example, resolved to retain the Act's provisions for individual choice 
in the placing of the load line, the furor which had accompanied the 
passing of the stop-gap measure had convinced them that shipping legislation 
could no longer be based exclusively upon the concept of "responsibility" 
but must include a substantial dose of govenment regulation.44 Consequently, 
in February 1876, the Government brought in two bills to amend the Merchant 
Shipping Acts, one to tackle the basic problem of marine insurance - most 
specifically, the over-valuation of ships for insurance purposes - the 
other to make permanent the provision of the temporary act.of 1875, whilst 
at the same time providing additional reforms including one to deter the 
dangerous practice of deck loading. 45 
Little progress was made with the marine insurance bill but the 
general Merchant Shipping Bill was subjected to prolonged and spirited 
43Disraeli to Lady Bradford, 3 August, 1875, quoted in Monypenny and Buckle, 
2, p. 727. 
44 Smith, pp. 238-239. 
45PD, 3rd Series, 227 (1876): 163-179. 
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46 debate. The absence from the Bill of provisions for compulsory survey 
and a verified load line led Plimsoll to denounce the measure and to 
. d h' d 'f h · · 47 Go intro uce is own amen ments to recti y t ese omissions. rst gave 
his full support to Plimsoll's amendment,48 and launched his own criticism 
of the proposed legislation. He was particularly critical of the Govern-
ment's failure to incorporate into the Bill measures to deal with the 
relations between seamen and their employers and he urged that they 
mitigate the severe penalties imposed upon seamen for breach of contract 
by bringing them under the provisions of the 1875 Labour Acts.49 In 
Committee, Gerst proposed an amendment to extend this protection to seamen 
but withdrew it when the Chancellor of the Exchequer indicated that the 
Government would itself introduce a clause pertaining to the question. 
Gerst promised, however, "that ... if the Government did not bring forward 
50 
such clauses, he would". Gorst's proposal secured the support of 
Opposition members such as Burt, Mundella, Macdonald and Forster but 
received no backing from the Conservative benches. 51 When the Government 
continued to disregard the issue, Garst moved the insertion of a clause 
46 PD, 3rd Series, 227 (1876): 163-186, 428-466; 228 (1876): 519-551, 627-687, 
884-912, 1147-1161, 1367-1377, 1580-1622, 1779-1809, 1879-1885, 1913-1949; 
229 (1876): 53-96, 208-235, 1054-1082, 1334-1337. 
47
rbid., 3rd Series, 228 (1876): 627-638. 
48
rbid., 3rd Series, 228 (1876): 660-662. 
49
rbid., 3rd Series, 227 (1876): 435-437; 228 (1876): 519-525; 229 (1876): 
221-222. 
50
rbid., 3rd Series, 228 (1876): 519-525, 539. 
51
rbid., 3rd Series, 228 (1876): 525-538. 
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to deal with breach of contract and its harsh penalties as applied to 
seamen but the Conservative administration again successfully deflected 
the challenge by claiming it lay outside the scope of the current Bill and 
by assuring the House that the question of the relation of seamen to the 
Employers and Workmen Act would certainly be dealt with in the following 
. 52 
session. 
Despite repeated attacks from its critics the measure survived 
debate, the Government's only important defeat occurring at the division 
on Plimsoll's amendment to abolish deck loading in winter, 53 and the Bill 
finally passed on May 26. 54 However, the Commons' decision on Plimsoll's 
amendment was reversed by the Upper House which, under ministerial 
direction, 55 replaced the clause with one permitting deck loading in the 
winter months under certain conditions. 56 Thereafter, at Northcote's 
request, the Lords kept back the Bill to ensure as brief an interval as 
possible between its passage there and its return to the Commons in order 
to reduce the time available for criticisms of the deck-loading and other 
57 
amendments carried out in the Upper Chamber. When the amended Bill was 
finally returned to the Commons, Gorst denounced the Government for 
utilizing the Lords for the purpose of substituting amendments devised by 
the Board of Trade officials for those effected by the Commons but he 
52PD, 3rd Series, 229 (1876): 221-227. 
53Ibid., 3rd Series, 228 (1876): 1590-1622, 1921-1943; 229 (1876): 1077-1079. 
54Ibid., 3rd Series, 229 (1876): 1334-1377. 
55Smith, p. 241. 
56 PD, 3rd Series, 230 (1876): 1132. 
57 Masters, p. 240; Northcote to Richmond, 1 July, 1876; Goodwood Papers, 
box 31, cited in Smith, p. 241. 
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declined to support a Plimsollite motion calling for rejection of the 
Bill, not wishing to "incur the responsibility of wrecking the whole Bill 
because he disapproved of the conduct of Her Majesty's Government in 
submitting these Amendments at the end of the Session. He thought it 
would be better to let the Bill pass under protest" 58 This-last-ditch 
attempt on the part of the Plimsollites to have the amended Bill rejected 
failed and the measure passed the Commons on August 12.59 
As the Disraeli Parliament wore on without the Conservatives 
having made any notable progress towards dealing with the reforms excluded 
from the 1876 Act, 60 Gorst publicly reproached the Government for failing 
to redeem their pledge to address the problem of breach of contract as it 
61 
related to merchant seamen. When a bill dealing with the question was 
62 finally brought before Parliament in 1878, he denounced the measure 
because the benefits of the Employer and Workmen Act were to apply to 
sailors only for the period between their making an engagement and their 
joining the ship, arguing that the Act should apply to seamen at sea as 
63 
well as on shore. 
58PD, 3rd Series, 231 (1876): 1172. 
59For the debate see ibid., 3rd Series, 231 (1876): 1162-1184. This legisla-
tion confirmed the owners' load line as established by the Unseaworthy 
Ships Act, a provision which fell short of Plimsoll's proposal for an 
officially fixed line. This weak provision remained in effect until the 
passage in 1890 of An Act to Amend the Merchant Shipping Acts relating to 
Load-line which included a clause establishing a verified load line, the 
line becoming known as the Plimsoll mark. (See Viet. 53 and 54, Chap. 9.) 
60The Maritime Contracts Bill of 1876 was re-introduced only to be withdrawn 
yet again, whilst pressure of parliamentary business prevented the introduction 
of a measure to deal with the relation of seamen to the Employers and Workmen 
Act (Smith, p. 278.) 
61PD 
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62Ibid., 3rd Series, 237 (1878): 304-307. 
63Ibid., 3rd Series, 237 (1878): 309-310, 609-610. 
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Unable to surmount the difficulties hindering passage of the bill, 
the Government was eventually obliged to postpone the measure but its 
replacement, prepared for presentation in 1879, was not brought forward 
during that year, 64 notwithstanding Gorst's continued agitation for 
G · 65 d f · 11 rnb d h d. 1 . f Ma h overnment action, an it ina y succu e tote isso ution o re 
1880. When the issue of breach of contract and sailors' discipline was 
taken up by the incoming Liberal Government, early in the first session of 
the new Gladstone Parliament, Gorst resumed his agitation to bring seamen 
within the provisions of the 1875 Labour Laws, 66 and had the satisfaction 
of seeing his long campaign for the extension achieve fulfillment in the 
Merchant Seamen (Payment of Wages and Rating) Act of 1880.67 
The Conservative Government's defeat in the General Election of 
1880 brought to a conclusion six years of repeated but none-too-successful 
attempts on their part to deal with the problems of the merchant service. 
The complexity of the issues involved, the pressures from vested interests 
and frequently bigoted and cautious civil servants, combined with the 
Government's own adherence to classical liberal doctrines of freedom and 
individualism, had produced shipping legislation which had done little to 
68 increase the seaman's safety or improve his general welfare. Although 
they required an extension of government interference, the measures demanded 
by Plimsoll and promoted by Gorst were essentially paternalistic involving 
the kind of government regulation already conceded in the fields of public 
64 Smith, p. 279. 
65 Pn, 3rd Series, 244 (1879): 297-298. 
66 rbid., 3rd Series, 252 (1880): 955-959; 253 (1880): 791-792, 798; 254 (1880): 
596-599. 
6743 and 44 Viet., Chap. 16. 
68Smith, p. 280. 
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health and factory legislation. Nevertheless, even this moderate advance 
in state intervention went far beyond what the majority of Conservatives 
were prepared to accept and Gorst's advocacy of these reforms placed him 
amongst the very tiny majority within the party willing to accept an 
expansion of government responsibility in socio-economic affairs. 
Another labour reform upon which Gorst diverged from the party's 
cautious position, and for which he agitated in the House, was that of 
employers' liability for injuries to workmen. Labour had for several 
years been endeavouring to procure legislation which would enable workmen 
to obtain adequate compensation from their employers for industrial 
injuries or death resulting from negligence. A Compensation Act had been 
called for by miners as early as 1863 and by the late 'seventies the demand 
for an Employers' Liability Act was the most important proposal on the 
agenda of the Trades Union Congress. Labour's main objective was the 
reform of the existing law of "common employment" which held that an 
employer was not liable to an employee for the injuries caused by the 
negligence of a fellow-worker, a rule felt to be particularly inequitable 
when the fellow-employee was a manager or foreman acting with authority 
69 invested in him by his employer. 
In 1876, Liberal M.P. Alexander Macdonald introduced a bill to 
abolish common employment but was persuaded by the Government to submit it 
to a Select Committee. The following year the Committee reported against 
the ending of common employment, prompting Macdonald, in 1878, to bring in 
70 
another bill designed to abrogate the law. The majority of Conservatives 
69 . Howell, 1: 226-227; 2: 303-304, 422-432; Henry Felling, A History of British 
Trade Unionism, 3rd ed. (1963. Pelican Paperback, 1976), p. 86; Smith, pp. 280-281. 
70
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remained firmly opposed to the measure but this did not deter Garst from 
rising to support the bill, the only Member to do so from the Government 
71 benches. After issuing a vague promise to introduce its own measure to 
deal with common employment, the Government spent almost twelve months 
attempting to devise a draft bill which would strike a balance between the 
demands of labour and the employers' preference for a measure relieving 
them entirely from liability for injuries incurred, except by themselves 
personally. A compromise bill was finally brought forward in March 1879 
but made little progress and eventually expired with the dissolution. 72 
Following the election the incoming Liberal administration 
assumed responsibility for the problem, introducing an Employers' Liability 
Bill as one of its first measures in the new Parliament. The Bill, which 
was identical in principle to that proposed by the Conservatives in 1879, 73 
met with sharp criticism in the Commons, leading the Government to promise 
its amendment in Committee. 74 Garst, however, attacked the measure as a 
71PD, 3rd Series, 239 (1878): 1053-1054. For entire debate see ibid., 
239 (1878): 1049-1071. 
72Smith, pp. 281-283. The compromise bill provided for the retention of 
the employer's liability to the general public but made him liable to his 
employees for the negligence of "servants in authority". 
73Howell, 2: 428-429; Felling, pp. 85-86. The measure extended the liability 
of the employer for injuries caused by defect in machinery, by negligence 
of a person in superintendence, or as a consequence of obedience to employers' 
rules or by-laws, but did not abolish common employment. 
74PD, 3rd Series, 252 (1880): 1092. 
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"dununy Bill •.• which the Government was hereafter at its leisure to 
fill up" and moved that debate on second reading be adjourned until "the 
Government might meet in Cabinet, and might be able to lay before the 
House some definite and decisive proposal on which the House might express 
an opinion" 75 No division was taken on second reading but the debate 
convinced the Ministers that the measure required revision, leading to a 
re-conunittal of the Bili. 76 
The re-conunitted Bill, which retained its compromise character, 
became the focus of a sustained attack by Gorst and his colleagues in the 
77 
newly-formed Fourth Party. This offensive was conducted not only with 
the intention of forcing the Government into expanding the measure beyond 
its designated limits for the benefit of the workers but, also, in the 
hope that it might effect within their own party a revival of Tory 
democracy, which it appeared to have abandoned following the election 
fiasco of 1880 in the belief that new Conservatism had spawned their defeat. 78 
Instead of assailing the Bill's provisions in defence of employers' rights, 
a line of attack which Liberal Ministers had anticipated would erupt from 
the Tory Opposition, the Fourth Party carried out their assault on the 
measure in support of working-class interests. In an effort to induce the 
75 PD, 3rd Series, 252 (1880): 1143-1145. 
76Ibid., 3rd Series, 252 (1880): 1282; 253 (1880): 1399-1423, 1752-1787. 
See also Winston S. Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchill, new ed. (London, 
1952), p. 116. 
77
see Churchill, pp. 116-120; H.E. Gerst, Fourth Party, Chap. 5, 
78 H.E. Gerst, Fourth Party, pp. 77-82. 
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Government to render the Bill more inclusive in its scope, they conducted 
a prolonged campaign of harassment against them in the House. Whenever 
the measure came up for debate in the Commons, the Fourth Party were in 
attendance. "There was not a single sitting from which they were absent, 
or a single clause which they did not •.. seek to amend". 79 
When the Government remained firmly opposed to the removal of the 
doctrine of common employment, Gerst urged them to accept amendments 
designed to modify its application in order to "put an end to those unhappy 
cases in which a man was killed, or injured, by the negligence of his 
fellow-servants, with whom he had no more to do than the man in the moon, 
but in which he was precluded for obtaining compensation because the man 
was, technically his fellow servant". SO He protested against the acceptance 
of a clause which limited to three years' compensation the maximum rate 
of damages for injuries sustained by an employee through the negligence 
of a fellow servant. Gerst objected to the provision because it applied 
exclusively to workmen and because, in his view, the restriction would 
prove particularly pernicious when administered in children's claims for 
in many cases the average earnings of a child over such a period would 
frequently be totally inadequate recompense for the injuries received. 81 
Gerst also attempted to have the measure broadened to cover the 
many categories of workers excluded from the provisions of the Bill, the 
79
churchill, p. 117. For Gorst's participation in the debates see PD, 3rd 
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consequence, he claimed, of their having "no votes". 82 He sought to obtain 
a re-committal of the Bill because, as introduced, it was restricted to 
manual workers, "domestic servants, clerks, time-keepers, watchmen and 
other persons not actually engaged in manual labour, though associated 
with manual labourers, being thrown over as a sop to employers of labour". 
Their exclusion, he alleged, "arose from the fact of their not being 
sufficiently powerful to induce the Government to include them in the 
Bill". He proposed an amendment to extend the Bill to workmen in the 
nation's dock-yards and arsenals. He asserted that since the Government, 
under the Merchant Shipping Act, "was liable to pay compensation to a 
powerful and wealthy shipowner" for injuries sustained as a result of the 
negligence of Crown officials, they should be equally responsible to dock 
workers for damages sustained in common employment. Hence, if the 
Government excluded these workers from the Bill, "they would establish a 
flagrant instance of applying one principle to the rich and another 
principle to the poor. If the Dockyard labourer had been as powerful in 
that House as the shipowner he would have received consideration", declared 
83 Garst. 
However, the efforts of Garst and his fellow Tory democrats to 
render the measure more comprehensive and equitable were largely ignored 
by the Government and only in 1897 were their proposals finally translated 
into legislation by the Workmen's Compensation Act of that year.84 
82PD, 3rd Series, 255 (1880): 519. 
831bid., 3rd Series, 255 (1880): 1478-1482. 
8460 and 61 Viet., Chap. 37. 
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Although the merchant shipping measures and employers' liability 
had together provided frequent opportunities for Gorst to exercise his 
reforming tendencies during the Disraeli Parliament of 1874-1880, other 
labour issues had commanded his support in the House during those years. 
One of his earliest efforts to improve labour conditions was made on 
behalf of the dockyard workers in his constituency of Chatham. He appealed 
to the Government to discontinue its inequitable hiring, promotion, and 
wage policies among dockyard employees, which he reported to be a source 
85 
of considerable dissatisfaction among them. Later, during debate on the 
Factories and Workshops Bill, he supported a Liberal Member's amendment 
86 designed to guard against the exploitation of children in workshops. 
In the winter of 1878-79, when the depression was causing great hardships 
among both the industrial working class and agricultural labourers and the 
Government's commitment to laissez-faire principles apparently precluded 
the adoption of measures to stimulate the economy and reduce unemployment, 
Gorst was amongst a handful of Tories who urged the administration to 
intervene to relieve the situation. He exhorted Northcote to postpone debt 
extinction so as to evade having to increase the income tax and, consequently, 
87 
withdraw investment funds. 
Thereafter, the Gladstone Parliament of 1880-1885 provided little 
opportunity for Gorst to prosecute social reform issues from the Opposition 
benches beyond the agitation over Employers' Liability and Merchant Shipping 
85PD, 3rd Series, 226 (1875): 499-500. 
861bid., 3rd Series, 238 (1878): 319. 
87Ibid., 3rd Series, 239 (1878): 1239-1242, cited in Smith, p. 305. 
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Bills, conducted during the early months of the new Liberal administration. 
Afterwards, ongoing crises in Irish and Imperial affairs, together with 
the Government's inadequate social policy formulation and co-ordination, 
resulted in a dearth of social reform legislation during Glad?tone's second 
ministry. 88 Thus, when, in the first session of 1884, the President of the 
Board of Trade, Joseph Chamberlain, introduced a Merchant Shipping Bill 
designed to render more effective the Act of 1876, Gorst iimnediately 
fastened upon the issue and, with the support of his Fourth Party colleagues, 
began a crusade in the House for its passage. 
When opposition from the shipping interests threatened progress 
of the Bili, 89 Gorst repeatedly pressed the Government to proceed with the 
90 measure. He urged that the seamen as well as the shipowners be given the 
opportunity to present their views on the proposals to Chamberlain. 91· He 
suggested to Chamberlain that the Government might expedite the passage of 
the proposed legislation by taking morning sittings92 but "Mr. Chamberlain 
rather sharply conveyed to him that he had better mind his own business 11 • 93 
88 See D.A. Hamer, Liberal Politics in the Age of Gladstone and Rosebery 
(Oxford, 1972), Chap. 4. 
89 Annual Register, 126 (1884), pp. 167-169; Joseph Chamberlain, A Political 
Memoir, ed. C.H.D. Howard (London, 1953), pp. 101-102. 
9oPD, 3rd Series, 285 (1884): 1354; 286 (1884): 312; 287 (1884): 143, 746. 
91Ibid., 3rd Series, 286 (1884): 1166. 
92 Gladstone Papers, B.L., Add. MS. 44126, f.15, Gorst to Chamberlain, 
8 March, 1884. 
93 
"Speech of Lord Randolph Churchill at Birmingham", The Times, 16 April, 
1884, p. 7. 
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When the Government finally proceeded with second reading, Gorst chastised 
them for showing "a very culpable remissness in not pressing this measure 
on the House of Commons at a much earlier period" given the growing evidence 
of loss of life at sea, as reported by their own Minister at the Board of 
Trade. He accused them, further, of weakening the provisions of the original 
Bill in favour of the shipowners, the outcome of "extraordinary negotiations" 
conducted between "the authorities and the Board of Trade, assisted by the 
Solicitor General and the shipowners who had seats in the House, and many 
94 
who had not". However, despite Gorst's pleas to Chamberlain that he 
"address himself to the Bill with the earnest and serious intention of 
passing it into law this Session11 , 95 the debate on second reading was 
adjourned never to be resumed, the Bill being withdrawn on July 7. 
Chamberlain claimed pressure of public business forced its abandonment96 
"but it was obvious that the hostility it had produced among a large section 
of the habitual supporters of the Government rendered it expedient to 
withdraw the measure11 • 97 
Notwithstanding the lack of opportunities to promote social 
reform in the Commons, resulting from Parliament's concentration upon Irish 
and Imperial affairs, together with the demands made upon him by his second 
term of office as Principal Agent and his involvement in the National Union 
controversy beginning in 1883,98 one cause which he continued to pursue 
94PD 
_, 3rd Series, 288 (1884): 774-782. 
95Ibid., 3rd Series, 288 (1884): 782. 
96
rbid., 3rd Series, 290 (1884): 348-367. 
97Annual Register, 126 (1884), p. 169. 
98 See pp. 74-90 above. 
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throughout the Conservatives' Opposition years of 1880-1885 was that of 
improving the working conditions of employees in the State dockyards. 99 
Consequently, early in January 1887, Gerst was able to inform his 
constituents in Chatham that "Representations which he had from time to time 
made in Parliament and deputations to the Secretary of the Admiralty on his 
visits to the dockyards had induced the Government to enter carefully into 
the question of reserved pay, with the view of adjusting many of the points 
in the relations of the Government and their dockyard employes" (sic) 
and to take steps to remove other grievances. 100 
Because of the pertinacity with which Gerst pursued Tory democratic 
interests in Parliament, along with the independence he had displayed in 
executing his duties as Principal Agent and his involvement in the National 
Union controversy, by 1885 the Conservative hierarchy had come to regard 
him with unconcealed mistrust. Thereafter, Gorst's tenure as Solicitor-
General in Salisbury's short-lived first ministry served to strengthen the 
leaderships doubts concerning his reliability as a "party man", the 
consequence of his posture during the debates on the Maamtrasna murders. 
In 1882, in Maamtrasna, County Galway, an Irish family had been 
brutally murdered and three Irishmen had subsequently been executed for the 
crime and five others sentenced to penal servitude for life for their part 
in the murders. Later, doubts arose concerning the validity of the verdict 
and it was alleged that the prosecution had intimidated a witness in order 
99 PD, 3rd Series, 253 (1880): 1045-1047; 273 (1882): 460-464; 281 (1883): 
1608-1611; 286 (1884): 862-863; 290 (1884): 1144-1149; 294 (1885): 251; 
298 (1885): 1299; 306 (1886): 1323-1339. 
lOOTh T. e~, 14 January, 1887, p. 8. 
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to obtain the death sentence for an innocent man, but an inquiry conducted 
by Lord Spencer, Liberal Lord Lieutenant, upheld the justice of the verdict. 
During a Commons debate on the question in 1884, the majority of Conservatives 
had rejected an Irish motion of non-confidence in Lord Spencer but Gorst, 
along with Wolff and Churchill, had voted in the minority with the Irish 
Nationalists. When the Salisbury Government assumed office in 1885, 
Parnell moved a resolution impugning Lord Spencer's administration and 
demanding a review of the case by the new ministry. The Cabinet decided 
against a review and agreed to reject Parnell's motion. In the debate, 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hicks-Beach, duly opposed the resolution on 
behalf of the Government. However, he then went on to state that the 
present Lord Lieutenant, Lord Carnarvon, would be willing to consider any 
request for a judicial review presented on behalf of the presumably wronged 
defendants. From the Opposition Front Bench, Sir William Harcourt opposed 
Parnell's motion, supported by loud cheering from the Tory benches, and 
the Ulster Conservatives were vehement in their denunciation of the 
concession offered by Hicks-Beach.lOl 
Gorst, now Solicitor-General, succeeded in inflaming not only 
his party but also the Queen by openly attacking Lord Spencer's handling 
of the question and by referring to his Ulster colleagues who opposed 
Hicks-Beach's proposal as "reactionary Ulster Members". 102 In his speech 
Gorst not only threw over the Cabinet's decision but expressed his opinions 
101
churchill, pp. 335-337; A. Hardinge, Life of the Fourth Earl of 
Carnarvon, 3 vols. (London, 1925), 3: 167-170. 
102PD, 3rd Series, 299 (1885): 1120-1125. 
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as though these represented ministerial opinion. 103 Lord Salisbury 
described Gorst's conduct as "quite indefensible" 104 and told the Queen he 
had "read with great regret the speech of the Solicitor-General" and assured 
her Gorst would be reprimanded. 105 According to Lord Cranbrook, even 
Churchill disavowed Gorst's actions. 106 
The Maamtrasna affair doomed Gorst's chances for re-appointment 
to the Solicitor-Generalship following the Tory election victory of 1886, 
which followed upon the Gladstone Government's defeat on the Home Rule Bill. 
Lord Salisbury later acknowledged to Gorst, "I was unable to recommend you 
for the post of Solicitor-General again, because at a very critical time, 
as Solicitor-General, you used publicly to the Ulster supporters of the 
ff . l ., 107 Government very o ensive anguage .... However, Salisbury did offer 
Gorst a Judgeship, perhaps as a device to remove his troublesome presence 
from the Commons, but Gorst declined, intimating that his duty to his 
constituents precluded his resignation from Parliament at that time. 108 
Having been informed by Salisbury that his decision as to Gorst's future 
103 tta d. 170 r inge, p. . 
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105The Lett~rs of Queen Victoria, ed. George E. Buckle, 2nd Series, 3 vols. 
(London, 1928), 3, p. 688. 
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appointment would depend upon Churchill's recommendations, 109 Gerst 
requested Lord Randolph, "for old friendship's sake", to intercede with 
the Prime Minister on his behalf: " .•. a word from you will resolve Lord 
Salisbury's doubts and secure me the position to which your influence 
originally promoted me I am sure you will not at a crisis like this 
fail an old comrade and sincere friend of your earlier career11 • 110 
Gorst's confidence in his former ally proved somewhat misplaced. 
Apparently Churchill no longer felt obliged to promote Gerst despite the 
risks taken earlier by the latter in supporting Churchill's bid for the 
party leadership. Churchill responded to Gorst's appeal by complaining to 
Salisbury that Gorst was "too impractical for anything. He ought to jump 
at a Judgeship 11 • 111 However, he subsequently suggested that Gorst be 
appointed Education Minister, provided this did not create difficulties 
in the placing of other candidates for Government office. 112 The situation 
was apparently complicated by Henry Chaplin 1 s 113 refusal to accept the 
Presidency of the Local Government Board. In order to avoid the formation 
of a coalition between two disgruntled former Government officers, Gerst 
and Chaplin, 114 which Salisbury's secretary, Manners, warned the Prime 
M• • II id b • h" th" II 115 b d" • inister wou ea very misc ievous ing, a su or inate position was 
found for Gerst. 
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Thus, Garst was appointed Under-Secretary of State for India, 
"a much less lucrative and important post" than that of Solicitor-General 116 
and one "which was hardly adequate to his Parliamentary repute". 117 
Although his relegation to a minor post was no doubt a sourc~ of considerable 
chagrin for Gorst, "he showed entire forebearance and good humour, not 
allowing any expression of vexation or disappointment to escape him. And 
so he buckled down to his work at the India Office". 118 The department's 
permanent under-secretary described Garst as "one of the very ablest men" 
in the party who, while at his post "was very industrious, and worked very 
1 h 11 119 ong ours •.•. Even more vivid testimony to Gorst's diligence is 
provided by the contemporary observations of one of his parliamentary 
colleagues: 
Gorst soon ... evinced a remarkable aptitude for getting up any Indian 
case, great or small, which had to be presented in the House of Commons, 
and some of them were great indeed. He showed skill in parrying the 
blows and fencing the questions that proceed from the regular Opposition 
which is springing up in the House in reference to everything Indian. 
And, certainly, as representative of the India Office in the Commons, he 
116 Arthur Godley (Lord Kilbracken), Reminiscences of Lord Kilbracken 
(London, 1931), p. 186. 
117Richard Temple, Letters and Character Sketches from the House of Commons, 
ed. R.C. Temple (London, 1912), p. 465. 
118Ibid., p. 465. 
119Kilbracken, p. 186. 
discharged his considerable functions right well. Indeed, on many 
occasions he made speeches so effective as materialll to influence 
division when Indian interests have been threatened. 20 
129. 
the 
By the time of his appointment to the India Office in 1886, 
Gorst's parliamentary agitation for social legislation during the previous 
decade had established him as one of the Conservatives' foremost reform 
advocates. However, despite what his party colleagues may have feared, 
Gorst's reforming instincts at this period remained essentially paterna-
listic rather than collectivist or socialist. His continuing adherence to 
Tory paternalism was aptly demonstrated in one of his parliamentary speeches 
delivered at the close of the 'eighties. In June of 1889, during the 
committee stage of the Cruelty to Children (Prevention)Bill, the Attorney-
General, Sir Richard Webster, moved an amendment exempting children 
performing in a place licensed for public entertainments, from the 
121 prohibition against the employment of children under ten years of age. 
i20 Temple, pp. 465-466. The India Office's permanent under-secretary, Arthur 
Godley (later Lord Kilbracken) claimed that Gorst was given great freedom 
to manoever in the department because his "hardly concealed contempt" for 
his superior, Lord Cross, intimidated the latter causing him to allow Gorst 
to do "pretty much as he liked", in order to preserve peace between them. 
(See Kilbracken, p. 186.) However, this assessment of the relationship 
between Gorst and Cross can, perhaps, be questioned in light of the sentiments 
expressed by Gorst to Cross following the former's appointment as Under-
Secretary. Wrote Gorst to Cross, "I had no idea when we talked last Saturday 
at the Carlton that I was to begin Official life under such a friend as you 
have always been to me". (Cross Papers, Add. MS. 51275, Gorst to Cross, 
4 August, 1886, quoted in Mitchell, p. 289, emphasis added.) The description 
of the acrimonious relations which Godley purports to have existed between 
Cross and Gorst would perhaps be more accurately applied to the situation 
prevailing between Cross and Randolph Churchill. During the heyday of the 
Fourth Party in the early 'eighties, Churchill's aversion to Cross had run 
very deep, frequently provoking him to public scorn of the latter. This 
aversion remained very much in evidence at the time of Salisbury's second 
ministry. (See Mitchell, p. 285; pp. 288-289.) 
121PD, 3rd Series, 337 (1889): 806-807, 
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After a lively debate the amendment was rejected by a majority of 49. 122 
However, on the Bill being reported to the House for consideration as 
amended, the Member for Stockport, L.J. Jennings, proposed an amendment 
almost identical to that of Webster's, but limited to theatres and excluding 
acrobatic and gymnastic performances. Jennings claimed that "the clause as 
it stands was adopted somewhat suddenly by the Committee" and under a mis-
conception of the facts. The Bill, he stated, "is a Bill for the prevention 
of cruelty to children, but it has never been alleged either out of doors 
or in this House, that any cruelty to children has been practised in 
theatres". 123 
In the ensuing debate, which was conducted across party lines, 
opponents of the amendment protested the relaxing of the prohibition against 
the employment of children under ten; they argued that children engaged in 
theatrical performances laboured under severe educational disadvantages 
and painted a vivid picture of the evil influences exerted by the stage 
upon young children. For their part, supporters of the measure denied 
that children employed in theatres were physically, educationally, and 
morally deprived. They quoted evidence, derived from inquiries into such 
employment, to illustrate that the work itself was neither uncongenial nor 
excessively strenuous, that facilities for training and educating children 
were adequate, and that children who began their theatrical training at an 
early age developed a business-like approach to their occupation and were 
less likely to drift into an immoral life than those who entered the theatre 
122PD, 3rd Series, 337 (1889): 806-820. 
123
rbid., 3rd Series, 338 (1889): 6. 
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in their late teens. They pointed out, moreover, that theatrical children 
were usually drawn from the poorest backgrounds and, thus, employment in 
the theatres, which provided them with the opportunity to develop habits 
of cleanliness and order as well as much-needed remuneration, should not 
be denied them. On the contrary, declared Jennings, "anything which takes 
them, even for a time, from their misery and degradation should be welcomed 
as an alleviation of the hardships of their lot 11 • 124 
Gorst was drawn into the debate in response to the arguments of 
the Member for Cirencester, A.B. Winterbotham. The latter, who protested 
against the exemption proposed, based his opposition largely on moral 
considerations: 
I am not afraid of being told that I am in favour of grandmotherly 
legislation when I advocate the protection of these children of tender 
years from being brought up to this profession by special relaxation of the 
law. What becomes of them? They grow up as ballet girls, and what becomes 
of ballet girls? - I am sorry to say - that the majority of these poor 
girls go on the streets; .. it is as a Christian I am going to vote; it 
is in the cause of 'these little ones' so dear to Christ that we plead 
for today ... it is because I believe. the moral and spiritual welfare of 
these dear little children of 6, 7 and 8 years old is involved that I am 
going to vote against the Amendment.125 
Inherent in Winterbotham's statements was the intimation that the 
poor were incapable of exercising suitable parental discretion in the matter 
of their offspring's employment on account of their intrinsic moral turpitude, 
an attitude compatible with Victorian society's widely-held assumption that 
126 poverty was the outcome of individual weakness of character, and, thus, 
124PD, 3rd Series, 338 (1889): 12. 
125
rbid., 3rd Series, 338 (1889): 25-28. 
126Michael Rose, The Relief of Poverty, 1834-1914 (London, 1972), pp. 7-8. 
132. 
it was the duty of the state to act in loco parentis. Winterbotham's 
posture so infuriated Garst, he rose to object to the farmer's "affectation 
of moral superiority" in dealing with the amendment and to protest his 
assumption that "he and those who agree with him .•. have a right to tell 
parents how their children should be brought up and to exercise through 
this House in a vicarious way the duties which in reality belong to the 
parents themselves", In his view, opponents of the amendment had been 
unable to substantiate their claims as to cruelties practised in the theatres 
on the degenerative effects of theatrical life on young children and, thus, 
he asserted, "no case has been made out for State interference of this 
character with the usual employment of children of the poor ... ". On the 
contrary argued Garst, such interference, "in the name of Christianity and 
benevolence", would increase rather than lessen the hardships suffered by 
the poor by depriving them of the financial assistance derived from their 
children's temporary employment during the winter months. "There are 
hundreds and thousands of children in the Metropolis whose employment in 
this way helps to lighten the struggles of their parents with cold and 
hunger and all the other difficulties which beset the lives of the poorer 
classes", alleged Garst, "and therefore it would be an act of tyranny .•• 
to shut the door to such employment, and determine that these children 
shall be deprived of the opportunity of assisting their parents in obtaining 
their daily bread". Consequently, Garst urged - "upon the doctrine that 
the hon. and learned Gentleman is disposed to sneer at" - that the State 
leave the responsibility of parents untouched unless a clear case for 
interference could be made out. 127 Although, as the Times conceded, "there 
127PD, 3rd Series, 338 (1889): 28-31, 
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was manifestly a great deal to be said on either side" of the question, 128 
the amendment was rejected by 188 to 134. 129 
Although while pursuing his reform campaign in the House Gorst 
had pressed successive governments to adopt a more positive role in the 
formulation of social policy, his response to Jennings' amendment shows 
that his concept of that role continued to be influenced by Tory paternalism. 
Though he eschewed the dogmatic non-interventionist principles of orthodox 
laissez-faire ideology, arguing that it was the government's duty to 
mitigate social and industrial misery through remedial legislation, it was 
the removal of the worst abuses of the current socio-economic system -
rather than radical changes in its direction - which Gorst was advocating 
in the 'seventies and 'eighties. However, shortly thereafter, his conception 
of the government's role in socio-economic affairs was to undergo modification as 
a consequence of his exposure to Continental thinking on social legislation. 
In 1890, Salisbury appointed Gorst Plenipotentiary at the 
International Labour Conference to be held in Berlin during that month. 130 
As Prime Minister of a Conservative Government, Salisbury no doubt felt it 
128The Times, 11 July, 1889, p. 9. 
129 PD, 3rd Series, 338 (1889): 38. During the Bill's passage through the 
Lords, the prohibitory clause was amended to allow a court of summary 
jurisdiction permission to sanction employment of children over seven in 
theatres once the court was satisfied that provision had been made to 
secure the health and solicitous care of the children. (Ibid., 3rd Series, 
339 [1889]: 273-302.) 
130PP, 1890, 81: 539. Salisbury to Gorst, 13 March, 1890. 
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imperative that he include in the British delegation not only experienced 
representatives of the British Labour Movement but, also, a prominent 
member of his own administration who was known to be an active proponent 
of working-class interests, as a measure of the Government's~good faith 
at a time when labour questions were assuming unprecedented importance 
both in Britain and abroad. 131 Thus, it is likely that these considerations 
prompted Salisbury's selection of Gerst to the British delegation to the 
Conference. However, it is also likely that Salisbury was later to regret 
this choice for it transpired that Gorst's attendance at the Conference 
not only reinforced his commitment to Tory democracy but rendered him 
more than ever determined to seek further advances in social legislation 
on behalf of the working classes, a goal which would once again bring him 
into conflict with the Tory leadership and es.trange him even further from 
the party. 
l3lFor the situation in Britain see Bentley B. Gilbert, The Evolution of 
National Insurance in Great Britain {London, 1966), Chap. l; H.M. Lynd, 
England in the Eighteen Eighties (Oxford, 194-5), pp. 237-298; Donald Read, 
England 1868-1914 {London, 1979), pp. 323-335. 
CHAPrER IV 
THE WORKINGMEN' S ADVOCATE 
The International Labour Conference held in Berlin during March 
1890 had been convened by the Emperor of Germany, Wilhelm II, in response 
to the growing militancy of European labour movements. He intended to bring 
together representatives of "all the Governments who evince the same interest 
in the Labour question ... for the purpose of further discussing it in detail" 
with a view to reaching mutual agreement upon possible measures to satisfy 
1 
workers' demands. The extent to which Wilhelm's concern over rising working-
class agitation was shared by other European governments was perhaps reflected 
in their strong participation in the Conference; delegates from fourteen nations 
assembled together in Berlin for the opening meeting March 15. 2 However, 
according to Gorst, the British Government's decision to attend the meeting 
was prompted to some extent by economic considerations: 
There was -- an idea prevalent among manufacturers in this country that 
·they were handicapped in their competition with foreigners by the benevolent 
provisions of our laws, and that if foreign states could be persuaded to 
enact like protection for their people it would be beneficial to British 
industry. This opinion, although no doubt erroneous, may have had something 
to do with the readiness of the Government, which was falling more and more 
under capitalist influence, to take part in the Conference.3 
1correspondence respecting the Proposed Labour Conference at Berlin (Cmnd. 
5914), RR, 1890, 81: 531. 
2The countries participating were: Germany, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, 
Spain, France, Great Britain, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Sweden, Norway and Switzerland. (See Further Correspondence respecting the 
International Labour Conference at Berlin (Cmnd. 6042), PP, 1890, 81: 545.) 
3J.E. Gorst, "Introduction" to Frances E. Greville, Countess of Warwick, 
A Nation's Youth. Physical Deterioration: Its Causes and Some Remedies 
(London, 1906), p. X. 
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The Government's optimism with regard to possible reciprocal social legisla-
tion arising out of the Conference had no doubt been kindled by the 
pronouncements in Wilhelm's decrees inaugurating the gathering in which he 
stated his desire to extend factory legislation in accordance with workers' 
wishes, and by the proposed programme of subjects to be discussed at the 
Conference which included the regulation of labour in mines, Sunday labour, 
and the working conditions of children, youths and females, 4 ·matters which 
had already been subject to legislation in Britain. 
Although eagerness to enhance its own trade position vis a vis its 
foreign competitors, at a time of relative economic stagnation for British 
industry5 apparently played a role in the British decision to participate 
in the Conference, late nineteenth century political developments - which 
required that governments display at the very least concern for working 
class interests - no doubt contributed to Salisbury's willingness to send a 
British contingent to Berlin. From the eighteen eighties politicians were 
faced with the reality of the growing political power of an increasingly 
organized and enfranchised working class. The enfranchisement of urban 
workers in 1867, and of agricultural labourers in 1884, increased the 
political influence of the masses at the expense of "men of property", 
bringing parliamentary democracy one step closer. At the same time, economic 
4correspondence respecting the Proposed Labour Conference at Berlin (Cmnd. 
5914), PP, 1890, 81: 534. 
5 See, Francois Crouzet, The Victorian Economy, trans. Anthony Foster (New 
York, 1982), Chap. 12. S.B. Saul, The Myth of the Great Depression, 
1873-1896 (London, 1969), pp. 36-52. 
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and political developments within the labour movement indicated that the 
working classes were learning the value of class solidarity in their struggle 
for social and economic advancement. By 1890 the Trades Union Congress, 
first formed in 1868, had achieved a membership of close to one-and-a-half 
million6 and in the wake of the 1889 Dock Strike large numbers of unskilled, 
and formerly unorganized workers, were incorporated into the trade-union 
movement via the so-called "new unionism"- 7 
The organization of labour as an economic interest group began 
to be duplicated also in the political sphere. A resurgence of British 
socialism during the eighteen eighties re-established the British socialist 
movement, which had been in abeyance since the decline of Chartism in the 
eighteen fifties. By the end of the decade the new wave of socialist activity 
had succeeded in establishing several new socialist societies, most notably 
the Social Democratic Federation8 and the Fabian Society. 9 Thus, by the 
final decades of the nineteenth century, working class political power, 
whether expressed through socialist societies or the organized Labour 
movement, appeared·to pose a potentially dangerous threat to the ruling elite, 
causing politicians to adopt a more sympathetic attitude towards workers' 
interests. Although neither the Conservatives nor the Liberals were coerced 
into introducing social legislation as a result of massive working-class 
6 B.C. Roberts, The Trades Union Congress (London, 1958), Appendix 2, p. 379. 
7Henry Felling, A History of British Trade Unionism, 3rd ed. (Pelican ed. 
1976), Chap. 16. Hereafter referred to as Felling, British Trade Unionism. 
See also, Keith Burgess, The Challenge of Labour: Shaping British Society, 
1850-1930 (London, 1980), pp.64-72. 
8see: Eric Hobsbawm, "Hyndman and the S. D. F", in Labouring Men (Weidenfeld 
Goldback ed., London, 1968), pp. 231-238. Chuschichi Tsuzuki, R.H. Hyndman and 
British Socialism (London, 1964). 
9see: A.M. McBriar, Fabian Socialism and English Politics, 1884-1918 (London, 1962) 
Stanley Pierson, "The Fabians", in Marxism and the Origins of British Socialism 
(Ithaca, 1973), pp. 106-139. 
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pressure or the fear of revolution10 - though the bogey of socialism remained 
to haunt both parties throughout the Edwardian years - both contrived to 
implement specific legislation as a means of obtaining tactical advantage 
over rival parties. With the establishment of the popular vote, neither 
party was prepared to be outbid in auctions on what a carefully ordered State 
could obtain for its citizens. 11 
It was this form of expediency which produced the pragmatic 
collectivist welfare measures of Salisbury's second administration. 12 
Although he was not unsympathetic towards the plight of the poor, Salisbury 
was a reluctant reformer. He was a staunch upholder of Smilesian orthodoxy, 
believing that the aim of social legislation should be the promotion of self 
help; he had little faith in the "wholesale reformation of society through 
13 the operations of government 11 • However, in order to retain an elector al 
10
see: Jose Harris, Unemployment and Politics: A Study in English Social 
.Politics, 1886-1914 (Oxford, 1972), pp. 54-56. For a contrasting view of the 
effects of working-class activism on British social policy see: K.D. Brown, 
"Conflict in Early British Welfare Policy: The Case of the Unemployed Workmen 
Bill of 1905", in Journal of MJdern History, 43 (1971): 615-629. 
11
see, P .F. Clarke, Lancashire and the New Liberalism (Cambridge, 1971). 
Eric J. Evans, Social Policy 1830-1914: Individualism, Collectivism and the 
Origins of the Welfare State (London, 1978), p. 14. D.A. Hamer, Liberal 
Politics in the Age of Gladstone and Rosebery (Oxford, 1972), pp. 219-220. 
12The major reforms enacted were the Local Government Act of 1888; Housing of 
the Working-Classes Act (1890); an education measure, the Fee Grant Act of 
1891; and modest land reforms, the Allotments Act of 1887 and the Small-
holdings Act of 1892. See: Roy Douglas, Land People and Politics: A History 
of the Land Question in the United Kingdom, 1878-1952 (London, 1976), pp. 
184-185. E. Gauldie, Cruel Habitations: A History of Working-Class Housing, 
1780-1918 (London, 1974), pp. 293-294. H.M. Lynd, England in the Eighteen 
Eighties (Oxford, 1945), pp. 165-174. H.J Perkins, "Land Reform and Class 
Conflict in Victorian Britain" in The Victorians and Social Protest, eds. 
J. Butt and I.F. Clark (Newton Abbot, 1973), pp. 177-217. 
13Lord Salisbury on Politics, ed. Paul Smith (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 47-53. 
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edge over the Liberals, Salisbury, after 1886, was prepared to advance certain 
measures even when he was opposed to them in principle. 14 Thus, the handful 
of measures enacted between 1886-1892 were largely dictated by political 
necessity. 
It was probably with an eye to similar political advantage that 
Salisbury sanctioned his government's participation at the International 
Labour Conference. Thus, writing to Garst on the eve of his departure for 
Berlin, Salisbury noted that the Labour question was "one of deepest importance" 
and enjoined that "every proposal which promises an improvement in the 
condition of the factories and mines will naturally receive the most attentive 
consideration at your hands 11 However, at the same time, he instructed Garst 
not to support proposals which transgressed traditional British government 
social policy: " ... You are familiar with the efforts which have been made 
in this direction for two generations back by the Parliament of this country, 
and you will not be disposed to readily accept benevolent projects which 
travel beyond the well-considered limits within which the legislation in this 
country has uniformly confined its interference". He urged Garst to focus the 
attention of his fellow delegates "upon such plans and suggestions as may give 
a hope of benefitting the labouring man without interfering with the freedom 
of labour". 15 
14Paul Adelman, Gladstone, Disraeli and Later Victorian Politics (London, 1970), 
pp. 71-72. Robert Blake, The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill (London, 
1970, Fontana Paperback ed., London, 1976), pp. 161-162. Desire for party 
harmony was an additional factor prompting Salisbury's venture into social 
legislation. Following the entry of the Liberal Unionists into the Conservative 
Party, in 1886, he recognised that in order to retain their support some social 
reform measures would have to be enacted. At the same time, the demands of the 
reformist elements within the party itself had to be satisfied. 
15The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir J. Garst, 13 March, 1890, Further Corres-
pondence respecting the International Labour Conference at Berlin (Cmnd. 6042), 
PP, 1890, 81: 539-540. 
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However, Salisbury's directives cautioning Gorst against accepting 
imprudent resolutions was to prove largely redundant. Most of the proposals 
which emerged from the deliberations of the two-week Conference were already 
16 
covered by the British Factory Acts. Compared with the language of the 
1 d f h 1 · · h C f 
17 th d t. origina ecrees rom Wile m inaugurating t e on erence, e recommen a ions 
which evolved from its meetings were relatively modest. For example, the 
burning question of the limitation of the hours of adult male labour was 
reduced to the proposal that the duration of shifts in mines, where labour 
was considered to be injurious to health, be restricted by law or in accordance 
18 
with agreements made between employers and employed. As one skeptic 
afterwards observed, " ... philanthropic rhetoric, however sincere its inspira-
tion, could not possibly alter the hard facts of economic science, and ... 
the moment the delegates attempted to deal with the problem of how to mitigate 
the fury of industrial competition" they recognized "that to do so was the 
19 
very last thing they really wanted". 
In one area, however, that concerned with the protection afforded to 
children, certain resolutions were in advance of British legislation. To one 
such proposal, establishing 12 years as the minimum age at which children 
might be employed in industrial occupations, the British delegation, with 
Salisbury's endorsement, gave their full support. 20 However, a proposition 
16Final Protocol of the International Conference on Labour in Factories and 
Mines (Cmnd. 6042), PP, 1890, 81: 718-720. 
17 See, the Times, 6 February, 1890, p. 5. 
18Final Protocol of the 
and Mines (Cmnd. 6042), 
International Conference on Labour in Factories 
ff., 1890, 81: 718. 
19The Economist, 48 (April, 1890): 425-426. 
20Gorst to Salisbury, 19 March, 1890. Salisbury to Garst, 20 March, 1890. 
Further Correspondence respecting the International Labour Conference at 
Berlin (Cmnd. 6042), PP, 1890, 81: 548-549. 
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that children be required to complete their elementary education up to a 
prescribed standard before being allowed to work was firmly opposed by the 
British, such a proposal being incompatible with the maintenance of England's 
current "half-time" system. 21 Consequently, when the Swiss proposed that the 
Conference recommendations be enforced by international legislation, the 
British delegation spearheaded opposition to the motion22 and succeeded in 
obtaining adoption of a less drastic resolution, introduced by Germany, which 
was incorporated into the Final Protocol along with the following directive: 
"In case the Governments should give effect to the labours of the Conference, 
d 11 23 the following provisions are recomrnende .... Thus, the British delegation 
had succeeded in "reserving to the Parliament of Great Britain the right 
ultimately to pronounce on this important question" of labour in factories. 24 
Following the conclusion of the Conference the Times rather smugly 
observed that, because of Britain's relatively advanced state of factory 
legislation, any subsequent enactment of the Conference resolutions "would 
more affect the well-being of the working class on the Continent than in 
Great Britain". 25 However, the Government soon found themselves obliged to 
take action on several proposals, albeit reluctantly, as a result of Gorst's 
determination to see them advanced. 26 Moreover, the subsequent development of 
21 Ibid., pp. 550-551, p. 561. 
22 Ibid., p. 626. 
23 Ibid., pp. 620-621, p. 623, p. 720. 
24PD, 3rd Series, 354 (1891): 863. Speech of Sir John Garst. 
25The Times, 31 March, 1890, p. 5. 
26
see p. 154, pp. 158-159 below. 
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British social policy was to be affected, in the long term, as a result of 
the Conference's impact upon Garst personally. Participation in the Conference 
debates, where he was brought into contact with the proponents of the 
"practical socialism" of the Continent, made a deep and lasting impression 
on Garst. This exposure to European socialists' ideas and aspirations served 
to increase his awareness of the many areas of British social policy still 
requiring development in order that a material improvement in the conditions 
of the working classes might be effected and he returned to Britain determined 
to do his utmost to initiate programmes through which Britain might move into 
27 the vanguard of European social action for the benefit of the masses. 
An additional influence which no doubt served to strengthen Gorst's 
commitment to social reform at this period was the University Settlement 
movement with which he had become acquainted through his friendship with 
Canon and Mrs. Samuel Barnett, founders of the first settlement - Toynbee 
Hall. 28 Whilst his wife was visiting New Zealand in 1890, Garst made Toynbee 
Hall his home when Parliament was in session and there gained "a close insight 
into the life of a great industrial centre". 29 Daily contact with London's 
East-End slums, within which Toynbee Hall was situated, could not but increase 
Gorst's awareness of the realities of poverty and reinforce his determination 
to further working-class welfare, Thereafter he maintained his close association 
with the settlement, spending in residence uhere some portion of each week the 
27 Salisbury Papers, 64, Garst to Salisbury, 31 March, 1890. "Social Politics 
in England: An Interview with Sir John Garst", in Review of Reviews (New York), 
3 (April, 1891): 266-270. Hereafter referred to as "Social Politics in En_gland". 
28 For an account of the founding of Toynbee Hall see: S.A. and H.O. Barnett, 
"The Beginning of Toynbee Hall" in Towards Social Reform (New York, 1909), 
pp. 239-254. 
29 
H.O. Barnett, Canon Barnett: His Life u k d F · d 2 
--· ~ , wor an r1en s, vols. (London, 1918), 2, p.44. Hereafter referred to as H.O. Barnett, Canon Barnett. 
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the Commons was sitting, a practice he continued up to 1903, and he became 
an enthusiastic supporter of the Settlement movement in England and America.
30 
In addition to its philanthropic role, Toynbee Hall also functioned as a 
forum for debate on social problems and for ideological and philosophical 
interaction between resident and non-resident intellectuals of various 
political creeds, particularly Liberals and moderate Socialists. 31 Gorst's 
participation in these exchanges undoubtedly provided him with a wealth of 
ideas which he conceivably found valuable when formulating his own social 
1 . . 32 po icies. 
The stimulus to social action Gorst received from his attendance 
at the Berlin Conference and his contact with Toynbee Hall was reinforced by 
a growing conviction on his part that more positive government intervention 
was required in order to effect an improvement in the social condition of the 
33 people, a sentiment that was gaining increasing support by the final decade 
of the century. The development of this new attitude towards the role of the 
Btate was generated by the mounting social and economic problems with which 
Britain was afflicted after 1880. By this period, social and economic crises 
had begun to erode British confidence in laissez-faire, the principle which 
30rbid, pp. 44-50. See also: J.E. Gorst, "Settlements in England and America" 
[Address delivered to the University of Glasgow, November 2, 1894] in 
Universities and the Social Problem, ed. J.M. Knapp (London, 1895), pp. 3-29. 
J.A.R. Pimlott, Toynbee Hall: Fifty Years of Social Progress, 1884-1934 (London, 
1935), pp. 52-53. 
31see: K.S. Inglis, Churches and the Working Classes in Victorian England 
(London, 1963), pp. 163-164. Pimlott, pp. 51-71. 
32Henrietta Barnett observed that, when at Toynbee Hall, Gorst " ... hugely 
enjoyed the youthfulness of the men, and the go and stir of the place and ... 
rejoiced in being asked questions and in expounding his views, which did not 
exactly fall into party lines or bear recognised labels". [H.O. Barnett, Canon 
Barnett, pp. 47-48.] 
33,,s· 1.r John Gorst on the Labour Question", Chatham and Rochester News, 14 
February, 1891, p. 5. 
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governed that State's policy of minimal intervention in national life.34 l!,s 
confidence waned the simple assumptions which had buttressed the laissez-faire 
ideal began to be questioned and gradually came to be regarded as unacceptable. 
The view that poverty was the result of personal failing - the consequence of 
idleness or improvidence - and, thus, to be relieved only through charity 
or moral upgrading, gradually fell into disrepute largely as a result of the 
weight of evidence produced by social investigation.35 The first-hand 
studies of poverty conducted after 1870,36 particularly the work of Charles 
Booth, were instrumental in discrediting the idea that poverty was the outcome 
of moral failing and supplied the evidence from which a strong case for 
government assistance could be made. Furthermore, the nineteenth-century 
belief in the competitive ethic's ability to bring about automatic and ever-
34 See, Derek Fraser, The Evolution of the British Welfare State (London, 1973), 
Chap. 5. 
35 Fraser, Chap. 6. Michael Rose, The Relief of Poverty, 1834-1914 (London, 1972), 
pp. 13-13, 20-30. 
36 The scale of the problem of poverty was initially brought to light as a result 
of investigations conducted during the 'seventies by the Charity Organization 
Society. [See: Judith Fido, "The Charity Organization Society and Social Casework 
in London, 1869-1900", in Social Control in Nineteenth-Century Britain, ed. 
A.P. Donajgrodzki (London, 1977), pp. 207-230.] Thereafter, public attention was 
kept focussed upon the problem during the 'eighties by a succession of books and 
surveys. These publications included: Henry George, Progress and Poverty (London, 
1891); Andrew Mearns, The Bitter Cry of Outcast London. An Enquiry into the 
Condition of the Abject Poor (London, 1883); G.R. Sims, How the Poor Live and 
Horrible London (London, 1889); William Booth, In Darkest England and the Way Out 
(London, 1890); Charles Booth, "The Inhabitants of Tower Hamlets (School Board 
Division), Their Condition and Occupations", Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society, 50 (1887): 375-376. Charles Booth, The Life and Labour of the People 
of London, 17 vols., (London, 1889-1902): 1. Poverty. 
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increasing wealth and progress began to falter as prices fell, industry 
stagnated and profits dwindled during the "Great Depression" of the 'eighteen-
eighties and 'nineties.37 
The evaporation of the trust in the ability of laissez-faire to 
produce automatic economic progress and prosperity occasioned a re-assessment 
of the role of the State. The notion that governments should do no more than 
"hold the economic ring" was gradually being replaced by the view that State 
intervention in economic and social matters was desirable, even necessary, 
when conditions became sufficiently bad - as, for example, to mitigate the 
effects of poverty and employment during periods of grave economic uncertainty. 38 
Weight was given to these arguments by the pronouncements of intellectuals 
such as economist Alfred Marshall, who warned of the perils of unrestrained 
economic freedom, 39 and philosopher D.G. Ritchie, who spoke out against the 
d b 1 . f . 40 waste generate y aissez- aire. 
Motivated by these various influences, Gorst initiated his social 
reform campaign shortly after his return from Berlin. He began by urging that 
the State, in its capacity as a great employer of labour, should set an example 
to private industry by establishing ideal working conditions in its own dock-
yards, factories and workshops; the government must become the model employer 
of labour. In a memo to Conservative House leader W.H. Smith, in May 1890, 
Garst pressed the Tory administration to conduct an inquiry into labour 
conditions at the Royal Arsenals and dockyards, as a step towards creating 
37 Crouzet, Chap. 12. Saul, pp. 11-15, pp. 36-52. 
38 E. Evans, p. 13. 
39Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics, 8th ed. (London, 1890. London, 1959), 
Appendix A, pp. 621-622. 
40
n.G. Ritchie, The Principles of State Interference (London, 1891, Select 
Bibliographies Reprint Series, New York, 1969), pp. 49-50. 
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itself a model employer. He reiterated his request at the beginning of June 
but, despite the willingness of both Salisbury and Smith to consider a 
modified form of inquiry, no action was taken.41 This inaction on Gorst's 
proposal was chiefly the result of opposition from the permanent officials 
at the War Office and Admiralty, departments which employed the majority of 
workers, who counselled "Let sleeping dogs lie ... ; our workmen are perfectly 
contented - why should you stir them up with dreams of Utopian excellence11 • 42 
Consequently, the Conservative leadership, perceiving that little in the way 
of political advantage would be derived from Gorst's scheme, decided not to 
press for its adoption. A similar fate at first befell Gorst's simultaneous 
proposal for the establishment of a Royal Commission to inquire into the 
conditions of labour existing in the "most advanced nations of the world" for 
the purpose of ascertaining to what degree Britain's current labour conditions 
were capable of being improved.43 
Undaunted, Gorst now laid his proposals before the public. Speaking 
in North Shields early in October, he again urged that the State become a 
model employer, warning that the workers could utilize their power at the 
ballot box to obtain the Government's compliance in this matter, and observed 
that "the labour question would become, and had indeed become, a great and 
urgent question" .44 
41
salisbury Papers, 360, Gorst to Smith, 1 June, 1890. Ibid., 366, Smith to 
Salisbury, 2 June, 1890. 
42 Quoted in "Social Politics in England", p. 267. 
43 Ibid. 
44The Times, 6 October, 1890, p. 3. 
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The government's continuing inactivity on labour issues led Gorst 
to publicly announce his own programme of social reform in February, 1891. 
In an address to his constituents in Chatham he presented a general overview 
of his ideas for the improvement of the conditions of labour.45 Shortly 
afterwards he was interviewed by W.T. Stead, Radical editor of the Review of 
Reviews, and during the course of the meeting Gorst set forth a detailed scheme 
of reform measures designed to extend existing British social legislation to 
include measures already adopted by many Continental nations. A report of 
the meeting was subsequently published in the April edition of Review of 
Reviews and Worlds Work.46 
The programme outlined by Gorst early in 1891, and which he was 
constantly extending to include new areas he saw as requiring attention, was 
at the core of his campaign for social reform which occupied him to the end 
of his official career and beyond. Labour questions commanded a prominent 
place in Gorst 1 s programme. Amongst the reforms he saw as requiring immediate 
enactment was that of employers' liability, a measure to which he had given 
his attention in the 'seventies and 1 eighties.47 This was one area in which 
Gorst claimed England was far behind almost every other country in Europe. 
He condemned British employer liability laws as being only partial and 
inadequate provision against loss of wages arising from accidents and denounced 
the doctrine of 11 conunon employment11 as particularly abhorrent. He held up the 
4511 Sir John Gorst on the Labour Question", Chatham and Rochester News, 14 
February, 1891, p. 5, 
4611social Politics in England", pp. 267-270. The interview also appeared in the 
December 1891 issue of Review of Reviews (London). See: "Character Sketch: 
December. Sir John Gorst, Review of Reviews 3 (1891): 575-586. Hereafter referred 
to as 11 Character Sketch". 
47 See pp. 116 to 120 above. 
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Compulsory Accident Insurance law of the German Fropire - whereby under law 
every German worker was compulsorily insured against accident at the employer's 
48 
expense - as a measure Britain might well emulate. 
One other measure on which Gerst had urged government action during 
the previous two decades, that of the prevention of loss of life at sea, 49 
was included in his programme of 1891 as a reform ripe for legislation. Gerst 
sought the implementation of two recommendations contained in the Report of 
the Royal Commission on Loss of Life at Sea, published in 1887, on which he 
had served as a Commissioner. The first recommendation was that no shipowner 
be allowed to insure his vessel and freight at its full value and the second, 
that in the event of fatalities at sea a formal inquiry be held into the 
circumstances leading up to the disaster. Gerst asserted that implementation 
of these recommendations would go a long way towards reducing shipowners' 
negligence which, in his view, was the main underlying cause of loss of life 
50 
at sea. 
In Gorst's view, one of the most pressing problems requiring attention 
was that of industrial disputes between employers and workmen and he outlined 
several areas in which legislation might alleviate the situation. The current 
practice of settling disputes involving existing contracts between employer 
and workers, by resort to regular court, Gerst condemned as ineffective. He 
recommended as a solution the creation of non-criminal domestic tribunals, 
consisting of representatives of both parties, plus an impartial adjudicator 
such as a factory inspector or other appropriate government appointee, through 
48
"Social Politics in England", pp. 267-268. 
49 See pp. 107 to 115 above. 
5
°Final Report of the Royal Commission on Loss of Life at Sea (Cmnd. 5227), 
PP, 1887, 81: 29-31. 
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which negotiations could be conducted in the event of a disagreement between 
capital and labour. In Gorst's view, such a tribunal provided a better 
alternative to the then general practice of relying upon the decision of a 
judge "who in almost every case belongs to the class of employer, and cannot 
therefore be regarded as impartial and disinterested by the workmen". In 
the case of more serious disputes, such as a breakdown in new contract 
negotiations, Gorst felt the State should avoid direct interference and 
suggested Boards of Arbitration, formed by the churches, as a suitable 
procedure. However, in the event that these methods were not adopted, Gorst 
recommended the government establish a permanent College of Conciliation in 
each district of the nation, to which the disputants could appeal. No 
compulsion would be involved but Gorst believed that public opinion would 
constitute a powerful force directing the parties concerned to avail themselves 
51 
of the services of the College. 
One question of some urgency in Gorst's opinion was the need to 
1.egislate the postponement of child labour from the age of ten to twelve years. 
He pointed out that at the Berlin Conference the nations of Europe had agreed 
that twelve be the minimum age at which children should be allowed to work and, 
whereas many of those nations were moving to implement this recommendation, 
52 
nothing was being done in Britain to honour this pledge. 
With respect to the hours of adult male labour, Gorst believed that 
the only legislation required at present was that to secure the six day week. 
5111John Gorst on the Labour Question"• Chatham and Rochester News, 14 February, 
1891, p. 5. "Social Politics in England", p. 268. 
5211 Social Politics in England", p. 269. 
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Steps should be taken to strengthen the legal and administrative guarantees 
already in existence to ensure the worker one day's rest in seven. With 
regard to the statutory legal day of eight hours, however, Gorst's position 
was consistent with traditional nineteenth-century laissez-faire assumptions. 
He felt that this measure was incapable of curing all the evils under which 
society suffered. When limitations were established there was a strong 
tendency for every trade to work up to the limit. Furthermore, such legisla-
tion would be in opposition to the desires of many workers - those who feared 
it would lead to a reduction in their wages and those who currently worked 
less than eight hours and were apprehensive that such legislation would 
result in an extension, rather than a reduction, of their working day. Any 
attempt to establish a uniform legal limitation for all trades would be 
foolish at this time. However, Gorst urged the government to limit the hours 
of labour of its own employees in State industrial establishments, of railway 
workers, those engaged in unhealthy occupations, and also the natives toiling 
in the mills of India. 53 
In addition to legislation to alleviate adverse working conditions, 
Gorst advocated government action to extend technical education, to enable 
the worker to upgrade his practical skills. This was absolutely necessary, 
he asserted, if Britain hoped to make up the leeway existing between herself 
and many foreign nations in the area of industrial development. Whilst it 
was essential that the urban workers be educated to compete with their counter-
parts abroad, there was also a need for agricultural workers to undergo a 
similar upgrading. Moreover, it was in the national interest to improve the 
5311Sir John Gorst on the Labour Question", Chatham and Rochester News, 14 
February, 1891, p. 5. "Social Politics in England", pp. 269-270. 
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education of the future mothers of the nation. He urged the establishment 
of housewifery schools where girls could be thoroughly instructed in the 
54 domestic arts to equip them for their future maternal roles. 
Gorst concluded his outline of reforms requiring immediate legisla-
tion by importuning the government to create a Ministry of Labour to take 
care of the interests of the working classes. The current practice of placing 
labour questions under the aegis of several offices - the President of the 
Local Government Board having some, the Board of Trade others, and the Home 
Office still others - was an inefficient and inadequate system. Labour 
questions should be collected and placed under the jurisdiction of a competent 
55 Minister of Labour, asserted Gorst. 
Gorst's programme represented an amalgam of the ideas aired at 
Berlin and his own theories derived from a growing conviction of the need 
for increased State social action in the light of late-nineteenth-century 
social, economic and political developments and a genuine desire to alleviate 
the hardships of the working classes. In no way could his proposals be 
regarded as "socialistic", except perhaps by the more reactionary members of 
his own party. The measures Gorst advocated were mildly collectivist but 
they were designed to assure the continuation, not the destruction, of the 
capitalistic economy. From the beginning of his campaign he had emphasized 
that both national wealth and the progress of labour, depended upon the 
ability of employers and workers to establish a mutually-harmonious 
5411
social Politics in England", p. 269. 
5511 Sir John Gorst on the Labour Question", Chatham and Rochester News, 14 
February, 1891, p. 5. "Social Politics in England", p. 269. 
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k . 1 . h. 56 wor ing re ations ip. Gorst's programme was designed to help rectify the 
current socio-economic imbalance existing between capital and labour, in 
order that the latter might participate from a position of greater equality.57 
Gorst's advocacy of a more socially responsible form of capitalism 
reflected his recognition of the growing importance of social politics. 
Although he deplored the degeneration of the labour question to the level 
f · 1 · . 58 h f . 1 1 . . 59 d o partisan po itics, e was aware o its va ue as an e ection issue an 
concerned that any benefits from it go to the Tories rather than their opponents. 
He stressed that under the leadership of the "prudent and honourable gentlemen 
who formed the bulk of the Cons ti tutiona 1 party ... " the labour movement could 
prove beneficial to both the workers and the economy. Thus he expressed the 
hope that "the present Government would distinguish itself by legislation 
which would confer upon the working classes of the country a large measure 
of improvement such as, perhaps, no previous generation had witnessed11 .60 
In addition to those measures ripe for legislation, Gorst included 
-in his programme questions which he believed should be the subject of government 
inquiry. He urged that two Commissions be appointed immediately, one to inquire 
into the hours and conditions of labour, and the other to investigate the 
56 
The Times, 26 September, 1890, p. 4. 
57 Bentley B. Gilbert, "Sir John Eldon Gorst: Conservative Rebel", Historian, 18 
(1956): 154. Hereafter referred to as Gilbert, "Conservative Rebel". 
5811 Sir John Gorst on the Labour Question", Chatham and Rochester News, 14 
February, 1891, p. 5. The Times, 6 October, 1890, p. 3. 
5911Sir John Gorst on the Labour Question", Chatham and Rochester News, 14 
February, 1891, p. 5. 
60The Times, 22 January, 1891, p. 7. 
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subject of Poor-Law relief. Whilst not advocating a full-scale Connnission 
on the matter, Gorst also reconnnended that some form of inquiry be made into 
the unemployment question. With regard to Poor-Law relief, Gorst wanted the 
Connnission to examine ways in which it might be rendered more humane. He 
urged that greater consideration be given to the circumstances which had 
brought the recipients into pauperism and that they should be treated 
accordingly. Against the two extreme procedures of increased laxity of 
outdoor relief and the treatment of paupers without regard to their backgrounds 
and needs, Gorst advocated that relief be given according to a "broad general 
principle", namely, "that those who correspond to the fraudulent bankrupt 
be assigned to a quasi-penal treatment, while others who are worn-out 
veterans of industry should be regarded as pensioners of the State and treated 
apart". Thus, although he wished to retain a distinction between the 
"deserving" and "undeserving" poor, Gorst condemned to the latter category 
only those seeking doles under false pretences, all other indigent poor -
the unemployed, the sick, and the aged - he deemed worthy of assistance. 
Another aspect of the poor law system Gorst saw as requiring revision was 
the treatment of pauper children. Steps should be taken to end the economic 
exploitation of work-house children and he suggested that the remedy might 
lie in the replacing of institutional care with a carefully supervised, and 
more caring, boarding-out scheme. 61 
Gorst's programme received a cool reception from the Conservative 
government who were loathe to see labour questions given prominence with a 
general election on the horizon. However, any plans the government might 
have had for quietly ignoring the issues were shattered when, following 
6111 Social Politics in England", pp. 269-270. 
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submission of Gorst's scheme to the Liberal leaders by W.T. Stead, Radical 
John Morley indicated his willingness. to move a motion on the question of a 
Royal Commission on Labour, " .•. secure that he would receive in so doing 
the united support of the whole Liberal Party", a development which obliged 
62 the government to act. Faced, on the one hand, with a Liberal motion with 
which many Tories sympathized and would support in the House and, on the 
other, with the prospect of further agitation on the matter from Garst, the 
Cabinet decided to take the initiative and appoint a Royal Commission63 to 
"inquire into the questions affecting the relations between employer and 
employed; the combinations of employers and of employed; and the conditions 
of labour which have been raised during recent trade disputes in the United 
Kingdom", with Gorst as one of the Commissioners. 64 The Commission, which 
met for the first time on May 1, 1891, 65 remained in progress for three 
years, its final report being issued in June, 1894. 
6211Character Sketch", p. 585. 
63
rbid., p. 585. The Times, 24 February, 1891, p. 9. The Conservatives 
responded swiftly to the Liberal challenge. Gorst's initial call for a 
Commission came during his Chatham speech on February 14, 1891. His interview 
with Stead came shortly thereafter, followed by the circulation of Gorst's 
programme among the Opposition and the resulting intimation of Liberal action. 
On February 24, the Times reported that the Cabinet's decision preceded a 
speech by Randolph Churchill, in which he advocated the establishment of the 
Commission, which was delivered by him on February 20. Thus, the government's 
reaction was virtually immediate. The Times made no mention of Gorst's role 
in the Commission's appointment. 
64First Report of the Royal Commission on Labour (Cmnd. 6703), PP. 1892, 
34 : 1, p . V • , p . 3 . 
65The Times, 2 May, 1891, p. 7. 
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With the appointment of the Royal Commission on Labour Gorst 
had the satisfaction of obtaining implementation of one of his proposals 
a little over a year after the Berlin Conference and within days of the 
public pronouncement of his social programme. However, his success was 
to prove costly for his parliamentary career. The Conservative leadership 
were angered by Gorst's use of the Stead interview to obtain publicity for 
his proposals and by his subsequent strategy of employing Liberal support 
as a pressure tactic against his fellow Ministers. Then, towards the end 
of Spring, their animosity was further aroused when Gorst again violated 
party discipline on two separate occasions in the House, actions which, 
when combined with his presumptuousness in the Royal Commission incident, 
prompted the party leadership to deny him promotion to higher office 
within the Government. 
The first of these parliamentary indiscretions took place on 
June 16, 1891, during Commons debate on the Manipur incident. 66 Following 
disturbances arising out of a dispute among the ruling family of Manipur, 
and a resulting palace revolution, a British force had been sent to restore 
order but was routed and the government's representatives executed. In 
England a public outcry arose over the "disaster". The Times asserted 
that" ... a serious blow has been inflicted upon British prestige and 
67 influence" and demanded that the murder of the Crown's officials be avenged. 
An investigation of the affair revealed that mismanagement by the Indian 
government had precipitated the crisis. Although highly critical of the 
66 For an account of this incident see: Anthony Brett-James, "Disaster in 
Manipur: An Imperial Episode~ History Today 12 (1962), 48-55. 
67The Times, 10 April, 1891, p. 7. 
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conduct of the Viceroy, Lord Lansdowne, the Cabinet, under pressure from 
the Queen, agreed to defend his actions. Although he opposed this decision, 
Gerst, as Under-Secretary for India, was directed to express in the Connnons 
the government's confidence in Lansdowne. 
However, when the debate took place Gorst's long-standing 
resentment against colonial government ineptitude, first aroused during his 
service in New Zealand, rose to the surface and his defence of the Viceroy 
turned into a condemnation of the Indian Government. 68 The administration's 
intervention to remove a recalcitrant Manipur ruler was prompted by self-
interest, declared Gerst; it was engineered as a method of disposing of 
an able but independent man. "Governments have always hated and discouraged 
independence and original talent, and they have always loved and promoted 
docile and unpretending mediocrity. It is as old as Targuinius Superbus; 
and although in these modern times we do not lop or cut off heads of tall 
poppies, we take other and more merciful means 
_dangerous pre-eminence to a harmless condition 
of reducing any person of 
II 69 The similarity of 
the situation described by Gerst and his own position within the Conservative 
party could also have been construed by the leadership as public criticism 
of their treatment of him, providing an additional mark against him. 
The government were rescued in the debate by Secretary of War, 
Edward Stanhope, and back-bencher George Curzon, the latter asserting he 
had "never heard a more painful line of defence than that adopted by the 
68
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p. 585. Dennis J. Mitchell, "Richard Assheton Cross: A 
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69PD, 3rd Series, 354 (1891): 567. For complete debate see Ibid: 541-641. 
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right honourable gentleman on behalf of the Indian Government". 7° Cross 
attempted to mollify the Queen by attributing Gorst's behaviour to his 
recent poor health, reporting to her that while" ..• The speech was 
certainly most unpalatable to the House •.. ", the Under-Secretary "had been 
suffering much lately from the effects of influenza and gout". 71 
Following a hurried briefing on the details of the case from 
the India Office's Permanent Secretary, Godley, Stanhope now " took 
charge of the matter in the Commons and Garst had to take a back seat11 • 72 
73 In addition, he was subjected to a barrage of criticism for his stand, 
the dimensions and intensity of which surprised and pained him, as he later 
indicated to Salisbury: 
... I must express to you the deep sense I feel of the harshness with 
which I have been treated in reference to that matter .•. My speech I 
admit was a very bad one, but no-one was more astonished than I at the 
peculiar effect it produced, for which to this day I cannot wholly account. 
It might have been remembered in extenuation of my failure, that I was 
suffering from a disease singularly depressing to the nervous system; and 
in mitigation, that I had many times extricated the Government from 
difficult positions by successful speeches; but instead of this I seem 
to have been tried, condemned, and for aught I know sentenced, without an 
opportunity given me to defend myself. There are plenty of instances of 
a minister making a fiasco in debate: I doubt if there is one precedent 
of an old and faithful servant of the party being so savagely trampled 
upon for a single failure 11 .74 
Apparently Garst was not immediately aware of the furor his 
" very clever, cynical and almost brutal" speech75 on the Manipur incident 
70Ibid., 3rd Series, 354 (1891): 572, 624-631. 
71 George Buckle, Letters of Queen Victoria, Third Series, 3 vols. (London, 
1930), 2, p. 43. 
72Lord Kilbracken, The Reminiscences of Lord Kilbracken (London, 1931), p. 186. 
73Thomas Wodehous Legh, Baron Newton, Lord Lansdowne: A Biography (London, 
1929), pp. 88-89. 
74
salisbury Papers, 71, Garst to Salisbury, 15 September, 1891. 
75Sir Alfred Pease, Elections and Recollections (London, 1932), p. 285. 
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had caused in political circles, or perhaps chose to ignore it, for two 
days later he again diverged from the party line, this time on a labour 
issue. During debate on the Factories and .Workshops Bill, Opposition 
member Sidney Buxton proposed a clause raising the age of "half-timers" 
from ten years to eleven, a step he asserted the Government were obliged 
to take given their pledge on the issue at Berlin. 76 Rising in response 
to requests from both sides of the House for clarification of commitments 
made by Britain at the Conference, Gorst confirmed that Salisbury had 
sanctioned acceptance of the resolution calling for the raising of the 
age of child labour to twelve years and then went on to point out that 
Britain had declined to accept the proposal requiring completion of 
elementary education before a child commenced work, as this stipulation 
appeared to be inconsistent with the maintenance of the half-time system. 
He noted that with regard to implementation of the Conference resolutions, 
the Final Protocol contained "recommendations" for their adoption but no 
call for obligatory legislation. Thus, parliament had the right to 
1 . 1 h . d" · · 1 · · 77 egis ate or not on t e question accor ing to its inc inations. 
However, Gorst went on to stress that among the European delegations 
generally, the British half-time system had been condemned as possibly 
" .•• a very good makeshift 40 years ago, when it was instituted, but ••• 
not a method of education coming up to the requirements of these more 
enlightened days". He then went on to observe that "All Members of the House 
have been boys. Let them ask themselves whether they could have performed 
their school work satisfactorily .•. when they were between 10 and 11 years 
76 PD, 3rd Series, 354 (1891): 803-815. 
77
"f12., 3rd Series, 354 (1891): 859-863. 
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old if they had to begin a day by spending six hours in a cotton factory" 
and concluded his speech with an appeal on behalf of the proposed amendment: 
"So far as our labours at Berlin were concerned, however deeply the country 
may be under a moral obligation not to go back from those philanthropic 
sentiments which, when they were useful to us, we professed at Berlin, 
Parliament tonight is perfectly free to come to that conclusion which will 
be for the interest of the people of this country. I trust that the vote 
of the House of Commons tonight will be such as will promote that interest11 • 78 
Government opposition to the clause, outlined by Home Secretary, 
Mathews, was based partly upon what the administration claimed was over-
whelming unacceptance of the measure on the part of operatives around the 
country and partly upon its conviction that "no argument had been advanced 
to justify so serious an interference with large and vital interests 11 • 79 
However, the majority of Members apparently shared Liberal John Morley's 
assessment that the Government had been placed in an "unparalleled position" 
by Gorst's speech for in the subsequent division the amendment carried 
202 - 186. 8° Consequently, the Government were obliged to give way on the 
issue and, after prolonged discussion, the amended bill passed third reading 
81 the following day. Thus, as W.T. Stead observed shortly afterwards, the 
Tory Government "for the second time this year" was "overruled by a colleague 
[Garst] to whom Lord Salisbury had not even yet conceded Cabinet rank". 82 
78Ibid. 
79 Ibid., 3rd Series, 354 (1891): 865-866, 867-872. 
80
rbid., 3rd Series, 354 (1891): 863, 877. 
81Ibid., 3rd Series, 354 (1891): 981. For entire debate see Ibid.: 907-981. 
82 
"Character Sketch", p. 585. 
160. 
This humiliation succeeded in alienating Gerst still further from the Tory 
hierarchy, particularly as they interpreted his actions as the result of 
personal pique, a "bucking over the traces" prompted by his continued 
exclusion from the Cabinet. 83 
Gorst's repeated flaunting of party discipline to the detriment 
of the Government, during the 1891 parliamentary session, became a powerful 
influence operating against him when, in the closing months of the Salisbury 
Parliament, the death of Post-Master General, H.C. Raikes, necessitated the 
selection of replacements for both his government office and his Cambridge 
University seat in Parliament. Gerst felt he ought to be offered first 
refusal for both vacancies. As he pointed out to Salisbury, the openings 
provided the Conservative leadership with the opportunity to honour the 
many unfulfilled promises of promotion made to him over the years and also 
to recompense him for having refused a "safe seat for life" at Preston, at 
their request, earlier in his career. 84 
Salisbury acknowledged that Gerst was one of the two candidates 
whom he considered to have the strongest claim to promotion to Raikes' 
former position85 but he nevertheless accepted "every excuse for not raising 
to high office the tetchy and aggrieved, but able, articulate and progressive" 
83 Baron Newton, p. 89. 
84salisbury Papers, 66, Gerst to Salisbury, 28 August, 1891. Ibid. 67, 
Gerst to Salisbury, 4 September, 1891. 
85B.L. Add. MS. 49689, f.118. Salisbury to Balfour, 25 August, 1891. The 
other forerunner was E. Ashmead Bartlett, M.P., a Civil Lord of the Admiralty, 
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Under-Secretary for India.86 Objections to Gorst's advancement were 
numerous. After considering the relative merits of the various aspirants 
to the Post-Master Generalship Balfour reluctantly concluded that circum-
stances appeared to dictate that the offer be made either to Gorst or 
W.L. Jackson, the current Financial Secretary to the Treasury, but he 
opposed the appointment of Gorst because of "the insecurity of his seat, 
and his disloyalty to the party". 87 He told Gorst quite bluntly that the 
marginal nature of his seat at Chatham made his proposed change to the "safe" 
one at Cambridge quite "impossible11 , 88 and he indulged in some behind-the-
89 
scenes intriguing to have the Cambridge nomination witheld from Gorst. 
W.R. Smith also felt that the Government was obliged to advance Gorst to 
Raikes' former post but was adamant that Gorst should contest his current 
constituency in the by-election necessitated by his promotion, otherwise 
"we ... should throw Chatham away". 9° Chancellor of the Exchequor Goschen' s 
misgivings regarding Gorst hinged upon different considerations. In view 
of the current unrest among government employees, particularly postal workers, 
he thought it imprudent to give Gorst the Post Office, given his attitudes 
towards labour issues: "He has the ability, but he is rather deeply pledged 
86Donald Southgate, "From Disraeli to Law", in The Conservatives: A History 
from their Origins to 1965, ed. Lord Butler (London, 1977), p. 223. 
87
salisbury Papers, 327, Balfour to Salisbury, 27 August, 1891. 
88Cited in Viscount Chilston, W.R. Smith (London, 1965), p. 355. 
89 Hambledon Papers, PS16/85, Balfour to Smith, 9 September, 1891. Salisbury 
Papers, 329, Balfour to Salisbury, 31 August, 1891. 
90
salisbury Papers, 626, Smith to Salisbury, 29 August, 1891. 
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to take the side of wage earners on every possible occasion11 • 91 
However, it was Gorst's penchant for independent action - what 
Balfour termed his "disloyalty" - particularly concerning labour questions, 
which eventually tipped the scales against him, for ultimately the 
Conservative leadership decided that Gorst's independence outweighed his 
many positive qualities. Although Smith continued to press Salisbury to 
make Gorst Post-Master General, "notwithstanding all that has passed ••. ", 
he acknowledged that Gorst's indiscipline of the previous session could be 
regarded as sufficient reason for passing him over. 92 Meanwhile, Gorst 
got wind of the movement, inaugurated by Balfour, to block his candidature 
at Cambridge and at once shot off a letter to Salisbury expressing, in 
forceful terms, his displeasure at the interference and intimating that 
if he was barred from contesting the Cambridge University seat he would not 
93 run at Chatham. Thus, Gorst once again displayed the temerity which was 
already a source of displeasure to the party leadership. 
In responding, Salisbury denied having made any personal representa-
tion to the Cambridge Senate with regard to their selection of a candidate 
and disclaimed any similar interference by his governmental colleagues, 
91salisbury Papers, Goschen to Salisbury, 25 August, 1891, quoted in 
J.P. Cornford, "The Parliamentary Foundations of the Hotel Cecil", in Ideas 
and Institutions of Victorian Britain: Essavs in honour of George Kitson Clark, 
ed. Robert Robson (London, 1967), p. 297. See also: Donald Southgate, "The 
Salisbury Era 1881-1902", in The Conservative Leadership 1832-1932, ed. 
Donald Southgate (London, 1974), p. 136. Despite his apprehensions, Goschen 
still thought that if Jackson refused the position" .•• Gorst should have the 
post, notwithstanding his drawbacks. Ridley would be better, but it is 
difficult to pass Gorst over •.. ". [Goschen to Akers-Douglas, September 5, 
1891, quoted in Viscount Chilston, Chief Whip: The Life and Times of Aretas 
Akers-Douglas (London, 1961), p. 195.] 
92salisbury Papers, 629, Smith to Salisbury, 3 September, 1891. 
93 Ibid., 67, Gorst to Salisbury, 4 September, 1891. 
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suggesting that any such intervention was likely the work of Gorst's 
"enemies among the partisans of the Government", an enmity prompted by his 
repeated indiscipline: "You claim a much wider freedom in the expression 
of your independent opinions than is customary among members of the 
Government under our system: and you have in consequence embarrassed us 
considerably more than once during the past year. No serious evil resulted 
from it ultimately but it gave rise to a good deal of angry comment in the 
party at the time; and I should not be surprised if there were many who 
viewed your candidature with apprehension, as doubting how far you could 
be relied upon in difficulties". Salisbury went on to elucidate in a very 
candid, though kindly, manner how Gorst's want of party loyalty had worked 
to the detriment of his official career and urged him to consider the 
extent to which his independent attitudes were proving a barrier to his 
advancement: 
I entertain - as everyone must do - the very highest estimate of your 
abilities; and I have seen with great sorrow the impediments you have 
thrown in your way .... You complain that you have not got on to the 
extent your abilities justified you in expecting. In order to secure 
the general support and confidence of a political party something is more 
necessary than ability - and that is the general confidence that the party 
can rely upon you to stand by them at a pinch .•. I only express the fear, 
which what I heard in the Session suggested to me •.. that your action on 
two or three occasions has seriously qualified the confidence which your 
great powers should otherwise inspire .... I wish you would think 
dispassionately how far the independent attitude you assume is likely to 
contribute to your wishes as to your own career, on occasions on which 
you have reason to look for the confidence of the party".94 
Gorst was disposed to accept Salisbury's advice in the spirit in 
which it was apparently offered, but was not disposed to concede that his 
stand on labour issues jeopardized his position in the party, claiming 
94Ibid., 69, Salisbury to Gorst, 7 September, 1891. 
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that dissatisfaction with his performance emanated solely from certain 
of the leaders, the product of their personal animosity towards him, and 
he refused to compromise his principles in order to achieve promotion: 
Upon this labour question, I have not at all lost the confidence of the 
Conservative party either in the House of Commons or the country. But I 
fear many of your colleagues are wholly out of touch with their party and 
with public opinion upon the subject. Nor am I unwilling to act cordially 
with members of the Cabinet; it is some of them who from foolish jealousy 
will not act with me ..• But I care a great deal more about the question 
than I do about offices and seats, and if my political leaders leave me 
without sympathy or advice I am compelled to proceed by my own poor light 
in the best way I can".95 
Gorst's reply clearly indicated his determination to continue 
his pursuit of Tory democracy despite the opposition of the leadership and, 
consequently, doomed any chance he might have had of becoming Post-Master 
General. Although Salisbury agreed with him that labour questions were of 
greater import than "offices and seats", the Tory leader continued to 
emphasize that "those who are acting together in the Government must have 
regard to each other's opinions on this and other questions 1196 and, following 
97 these exchanges, offered the Post Office to W. L. Jackson. In defending 
his passing over of Gorst to Smith, Salisbury referred the latter to Gorst's 
letter, admonishing him to "read the enclosed. You told me to exhort him 
- you will see the result of my parental efforts •... You will admit that 
it may be dangerous to 'endorse' him to the extent which such a promotion 
would imply; also dangerous to put him in a position where he would be able 
95
rbid., 70, Gorst to Salisbury, 10 September, 1891. 
96
rbid., 68, Salisbury to Gorst, 21 September, 1891. 
97 B.L. Add. MS. 49689, ff. 120-123, Salisbury to Balfour, September 1, 1891. 
When Jackson declined the position, Salisbury offered it to Undersecretary 
for Foreign Affairs, Sir James Fergusson, who accepted. 
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to try so many hazardous labour theories 11 98 When explaining his 
decision to Balfour, Salisbury reiterated these fears, noting Gorst's 
" ... claims of independence in respect to labour questions were so 
vehemently expressed, that I feel it would be quite impossible to put him 
at the head of a department where the labour question is constantly cropping 
up and where he would have frequent opportunities for driving us into 
a corner .•. 11 • 99 Smith concurred with Salisbury's decision to shelve Gorst, 
observing that "it would have been madness to 'endorse' his independent 
attitude by promotion. It is a great pity - a clever man who has completely 
thrown himself away". lOO 
Meanwhile, Balfour's efforts to deny Gorst the Cambridge 
candidature apparently proved successful. According to Gorst, at the 
request of the Conservative party the University nominating conunittee 
declined to issue the necessary invitation to him and, thus, his hopes for 
101 
a "safe" seat were, albeit temporarily, once again destroyed. 
Shortly after his rejection by Salisbury, Gorst's proclivity 
towards independent action, which had cost him the Post-Master Generalship, 
almost precipitated his dismissal from the Government. Following his 
appointment as Labour Commissioner in Spring 1891, Gorst had diligently 
98 Hambledon Papers, PS 16/87, Salisbury to Smith, 15 September, 1891. 
99 B.L. Add. MS. 49689, ff. 120-123, Salisbury to Balfour, 19 September, 1891. 
lOOSalisbury Papers, 635, Smith to Salisbury, 17 September, 1891. 
lOlibid., 72, Gorst to Salisbury, 29 September, 1891. 
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attended the Commission's meetings 102 and his desire to familiarize 
himself with all aspects of labour problems, particularly the circumstances 
of rural labourers, led him to devote the parliamentary recess of 1891 to 
a private informal inquiry into these conditions in various parts of Britain. 103 
Whilst visiting a Christian Brothers' school in Cork, Ireland, Garst observed 
that the Government's position on State aid to Irish education appeared to 
be "inconsistent" and he advocated an extension of grants to include Roman 
C h 1. . . . 104 at o ic institutions. Gorst's pronouncements infuriated Balfour, 
currently Irish Secretary, who complained to Salisbury that it was impossible 
to tolerate "a member of the Government going to Ireland and committing 
himself to opinions on details of Irish Administration without consulting 
me, and in opposition to my views", and intimated that Garst must be 
disciplined. 105 
Salisbury, whilst acknowledging that Garst had played Balfour "a 
very dirty trick", was disinclined to censure its perpetrator, believing 
there was little to be gained by such action in this instance: "Two of the 
ordinary objects of punishments cannot be aimed at in this case - reformation 
of the offender and a warning to others like him. There is no chance of 
reforming the offender: and there are no others like him in the Government". 106· 
102 
"Character Sketch", p. 585. 
lOJThe Times, 19 September, 1891, p. 6. Ibid., 21 September, 1891, p. 7. 
104The Times, 21 September, 1891, p. 7. See also: Glasgow Herald, 21 September, 
1891 [Cutting from the Herald enclosed with letter from Balfour to Salisbury, 
21 September, 1891. B.L. Add. MS. 49689, ff. 124-125.] 
105 B.L. Add. MS. 49689, ff. 124-125, Balfour to Salisbury, 21 September, 1891. 
106Ibid., 49689, ff. 128-131, Salisbury to Balfour, 24 September, 1891. 
16 7. 
Balfour agreed that to reprimand Gorst would be futile but thought that 
Gorst's latest indiscretion, coming on the heels of the three committed 
during the 1891 Session, showed conclusively "that he is treacherous by 
temper and by calculation" and thus he urged Salisbury to take the opportunity 
presented by Gorst' s latest escapade to "turn him out", in order to forestall 
the possibility of continued indiscipline on his part during the next Tory 
administration of which he "must necessarily be a part". lO? Salisbury, 
however, counselled against Gorst's dismissal, diplomatically pointing out 
to Balfour that the incident, "though large in your eyes ••. would seem 
small in the eyes of the party" and, thus, any action taken against Gorst 
at this time would rebound to his, rather than the leadership's, advantage. 
"Gorst would be thought to be ill-treated: and the vague discontent which 
exists in the party - and which is necessarily at its worst in the last 
year of Parliament - would crystallize around him. He is more powerless 
for evil where he is, than if he were sent below the gangway". Salisbury 
believed a more opportune time for Gorst's removal would occur at the 
formation of a new Conservative administration. At such a time "the 
exclusion of Gorst would not furnish the same ground of complaint as his 
dismissal would supply now. I am anxious that if he goes, he should go in 
such a manner as to carry with him the minimum of influence. I think he 
is knocking himself to pieces". 108 
107salisbury Papers, 334, Balfour to Salisbury, 28 September, 1891. Balfour 
didn't feel that Gorst's meddling in Irish affairs would, of itself, cause 
the Government any problems: "I shall, if necessary, publicly throw him over: 
a certain amount of trouble will be given in the House of Commons: his 
utterances will be used in debate against us: and that will be all". [Ibid.] 
108 Balfour Papers. B.L. Add. MS. 46989, ff. 135-136, Salisbury to Balfour, 
1 October, 1891. 
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Thus, for the time being, Gorst was allowed to remain at the 
India Office but, shortly thereafter, he presented the leadership with a 
further dilemma when it became necessary to re-shuffle government members 
following the death of W.R. Smith in October, 1891. The ensuing changes 
saw Balfour succeed Smith as leader of the House of Commons and W.L. Jackson 
take over Balfour's former post at the Irish Office, leaving vacant Jackson's 
position of Financial Secretary to the Treasury. The selection of a 
successor to Jackson proved a none-too-easy task. As Goschen pointed out 
to Salisbury, what was required was a man with wide-ranging qualifications 
- an aptitude for business and the facility to work harmoniously with civil 
servants, essential for his official duties, and at the same time possessed 
of sufficient tact or parliamentary stature to successfully conduct 
government business in the House. 109 
Notwithstanding what the leadership perceived to be his many 
handicaps, Gorst emerged as the most suitable candidate for the position. 
After appraising the likely contenders, Goschen adjudged Gorst to be the 
forerunner, despite the risks involved in appointing him, and he informed 
Salisbury, "I would take Gorst for a strong man who I understand has not 
got on badly with the India people, and who has the dexterity, if not the 
tact, in the House. I know of many objections. I might have a great deal 
of trouble with him: yet he would be less dangerous than at the Post Office". llO 
Moreover, the necessity of finding the most competent man available for the 
109Goschen to Salisbury, 22 October, 1891. Salisbury MSS., quoted in 
J. Cornford, "The Parliamentary Foundations of the Hotel Cecil", in Ideas 
and Institutions of Victorian Britain, ed. R. Robson (London, 1967), pp. 268-311. 
llOibid., pp. 301-302. 
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Secretaryship was apparently sufficient to negate the antagonism which, 
but a few weeks earlier, had prompted Balfour's attempt to oust Garst, for 
he now advised Salisbury not to be concerned "that I shall find him difficult 
to get on with if you make him Secretary to the Treasury. He knows nothing 
about my views of his Irish and Indian escapades: and the man himself ... 
dangerous as I think him, I have always been able personally to get on with". 111 
For Salisbury, the attraction in transferring Garst to the Treasury seemingly 
derived from his belief that the position would provide the latter with 
fewer opportunities to embarrass the Government. As he observed to the Queen, 
the appointment " ... will have the advantage of removing Sir John Garst from 
the India Office, where as he showed last summer, he had considerable power 
of doing harm. 112 He can scarcely do any harm at the Treasury". 
Thus, In November 1891, Garst was relieved of his duties as Under-
Secretary for India and given the nominally more important position of 
Financial Secretary to the Treasury. 113 In certain quarters the appointment 
was viewed as a positive step towards social reform; the Annual Register 
speculated that Gorst's promotion indicated the intention of the Ministry 
to make some efforts towards solving social problems. 114 Whilst such 
considerations were far removed from the administration's minds, Gorst's 
transfer did coincide with a further expansion of his own social programme. 
In a series of speeches delivered during November and December, 1891, 
111Balfour to Salisbury, 2 Nov., 1891. Salisbury MSS. quoted in Cornford, p. 302. 
112salisbury to Queen Victoria, 5 Nov., 1891, quoted in Buckle, 2: 78. 
113The Times, 7 November, 1891, p. 5. 
114 Annua 1 Register, 133 ( 1891): 185. 
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Gorst added to his earlier proposals for the extension of existing social 
legislation new measures entailing direct, though limited, State provision 
of services for the benefit of the working classes, indicating his increasing 
willingness to sanction an expansion of government interference in national 
life. 
Speaking at Halifax en November 10, Gorst urged the implementation 
of a comprehensive scheme of compulsory State insurance of workers against 
illness, accident, or the inability to work on account of sickness or old 
age. He placed particular emphasis upon the desirability of "making some 
115 
worthier and better provision" for the aged, a topic which had been 
under serious consideration since the eighteen-seventies 116 but which had 
so far failed to commend itself to British governments because it appeared 
to promise little in the way of political profit. Gorst advocated that 
current inadequate provision for the old in the form of outdoor relief be 
replaced by a scheme consisting of compulsory deductions from the wages of 
young men, to establish an annuity fund which would be used to finance a 
pension in later life. To the worker's contribution there should be added 
a small subvention from the State to compensate the recipient for his 
117 
abandonment of the right to be maintained by the poor law. 
115The Times, 11 November, 1891, p. 7. 
116
see: D. Collins, "The Introduction of Old Age Pensions in Great Britain", 
Historical Journal 8 (1965): 246-259. Bentley B. Gilbert, The Evolution of 
National Insurance in Great Britain (London, 1966), Chap. 4. Hereafter 
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117The Times, 11 November, 1891, p. 7. Gorst's proposals for a contributory 
annuity plan were akin to those devised and published by Canon William Blackley 
in 1878, whilst his advocacy of a state subsidy was inspired by his admiration 
for the German social insurance scheme, inaugurated in 1889, which contained 
similar provisions [See, Gilbert, Conservative Rebel, p. 156.] 
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Thus, Gorst became one of the first front-bench voices to be 
raised on behalf of old-age pension~ Joseph Chamberlain being the only other 
prominent politician to have publicly espoused their introduction at this 
period. 118 However, unlike Chamberlain, who seems to have been motivated 
by the desire to be associated with what he perceived to be an inevitable 
reform - combined with an eagerness to forestall possible Liberal pension 
119 legislation in the near future, Gorst was genuinely concerned to improve 
the lot of the working-classes, as was evinced by his willingness to risk 
his political career in pursuit of their advancement. At the same time, 
however, the potential force of rising working-class political influence 
provided him with an additional stimulus to action. Thus, after stressing 
the State's responsibility towards the aged poor, he went on to warn of 
the alternative schemes in the making "for improving the position of the 
labouring classes by means of violent and fantastical changes" and expressed 
the hope that the necessary social modifications "would not be forced on 
society from the outside" but would be "allowed to grow up by the natural 
120 development of events". 
118
chamberlain first announced his conversion to pensions in April 1891 and 
in November of that year he outlined his proposals for a voluntary contributory 
plan which incorporated a state subsidy to encourage worker participation 
[See: The Times, 22 April, 1891, p. 10. Ibid., 19 November, 1891, p. 7. 
Gilbert, National Insurance, pp. 180-181.] Two prominent non-parliamentary 
reformers who were also at this time agitating for the introduction of old 
age pensions were Samuel Barnett and Charles Booth. [See: S.A. Barnett 
"Practicable Socialism", Nineteenth Century 13 (April, 1883): 642-668. 
Charles Booth, "Enumeration.and Classification of Paupers, and State Pensions 
for the Aged", Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 54 (1891): 600-643. 
Charles Booth, Pensions and the Aged Poor (London, 1889).] 
119Gilbert, National Insurance, p. 180. 
120The Times, 11 November, 1891, p. 7. 
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In subsequent speeches delivered in early December, Garst 
reiterated his ideas for social insurance schemes and urged that females 
as well as males participate in an old age pension scheme. In addition, 
he advocated action be taken to relieve urban unemployment and suggested 
as a solution to the problems created by this situation the re-migration 
of redundant town labour to the countryside. 121 
Thereafter, although his official duties as Financial Secretary 
kept Garst in almost continuous attendance in the House during the final 
session of the Salisbury Parliament, he nevertheless succeeded in keeping 
his reform programme before the nation through the media of public speeches 
and the press, one such address being delivered from a platform shared 
with Socialist, Tom Mann. 122 
However, this intensification of Gorst's drive for social 
improvement came during the waning months of the Salisbury administration, 
a time unpropitious to the development of social legislation. The Conservative 
-leadership's reluctance to enact reforms on the eve of an election was 
demonstrated by Salisbury's reaction to Gorst's proposals for a new employers' 
liability bill early in 1892. In a memorandum to the Prime Minister, Gorst 
urged the adoption of a measure to terminate the practice of "contracting 
out" by employers, a step also being promoted by Chamberlain. Salisbury's 
initial response was not unfavourable. He intimated to Balfour that he had 
121The Times, 8 December, 1891, p. 6. Ibid., 10 December, 1891, p. 13. 
122The Times, 9 May, 1892, p. 7. Ibid., 21 May, 1892, p. 11. Ibid., 
l June, 1892, p. 9. 
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123 
"no objection to Gorst' s scheme". However, by March he had arrived at 
the conclusion that the adoption of this measure would prove detrimental 
at the polls: "Treating this purely as a question of electoral architecture 
- I think you would lose more by the wrath of the employers than you would 
gain by the gratitude of the men", he told Goschen. "If both of these 
two parties were from the outset in an impartial frame of mind towards us 
- the favour of the workmen might be the best investment of the two. But 
the favour of the employers if we do not adopt Gorst's suggestion is much 
more to be counted on than the favour of the men if we do. Gorst's proposed 
investment would therefore be rash". 124 
In the 1892 general election Gorst campaigned on a social reform 
platform, focusing attention upon the need for the new parliament to give 
its immediate attention to social issues and asserting that "If supported 
by a majority of the new House of Commons there is no obstacle to hinder 
the Unionist Government from dealing with them without delay11 • 125 However, 
this majority failed to materialize, the Liberals triumphing at the polls. 
Although the Conservatives went down to defeat, Gorst successfully contested 
the Cambridge University seat, having finally been offered the candidature 
126 
upon the retirement of Sir George Stokes. Thus, the Liberal victory 
123 
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dispatched Gorst once again to the opposition benches and, on this 
occasion, to a Gladstone Parliament which proved even more ineffective than 
its Tory predecessor in the area of social reform. 
During the interval of Liberal rule between 1892 and 1895, the 
Radical party made little effort to adopt policies beneficial to the working 
classes. Partly because of deficiencies of leadership, partly as a result 
of party sectionalism, emphasis was placed upon traditional issues:-
Ireland, local option, local government and disestablishment in Wales and 
Scotland. During Gladstone's ministry these issues remained paramount. 
Following his resignation in 1894, his successors in the leadership, 
Harcourt, Rosebery and Morley, were disunited and ineffectual, further 
reducing the impetus to reform. The development of social legislation was 
further retarded by traditionalism within the rank and file of the party. 
The departure of the Liberal Unionists in 1886 allowed non-conformists and 
their supporters greater influence in matters of party policy. The strength 
of this traditional element in party circles resulted in the acceleration 
of campaigns against the Lords, the Church, and the brewers at the expense 
of social reform. This trend was reinforced by the consolidation of power 
and leadership in the provincial party organizations in the hands of non-
conformist employers, who often rigidly adhered to the laissez-faire ideal 
and abhorred trade unionism. Consequently, "the dogmas of Gladstonianism 
at the top were reinforced by the dogmas of Dissent and Big Business at the 
bottom of the party: for both the Liberal needle was stuck at about 187011 • 127 
127 Adelman, pp. 50-56. See also, H.V. Erny, Liberals, Radicals and Social 
Politics 1892-1914 (Cambridge, 1973), pp. 54-68, and Hamer, Chap. 8. 
R.R. James, The British Revolution: British Politics, 1880-1939, Vol. 1, 
From Gladstone to Asquith 1880-1914 (London, 1976), pp. 135-156. 
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However, Gorst did not wait for the Liberals' lack of initiative 
on social legislation to develop before moving to the attack; he began 
immediately to agitate in and out of Parliament for measures to improve 
the conditions of the people. The problem he first pressed the Government 
to consider was the burning social question of the hour, unemployment. The 
grave economic climate of the 'eighties and the spate of poverty studies 
conducted during these years had, by the early 'nineties, produced the 
realization that unemployment was a chronic problem of the British economy 
rather than a temporary aberration or a self-inflicted condition of the 
"work-shy", as was commonly held during the nineteenth century. Formerly 
seen as a problem of poor-law administrators and philanthropists, unemployment 
thereafter became the concern of politicians, "efficiency experts", and 
leaders of the labour movement. The cyclical depression of 1884-1887 was 
more protracted and involved a wider range of occupations than those 
experienced in the 'sixties and 'seventies, giving rise to profound alarm 
throughout the country - stimulated to a substantial degree by concern over 
the potential threat to the social fabric posed by throngs of unemployed, 
respectable and "debased", within the cities. Conditions were particularly 
bad in London and the severity of the unemployment situation in that city 
precipitated a series of riots among the unemployed during the winters of 
1886 and 1887, which thrust the employment problem to the forefront of 
political life. In an effort to erase the distress temporarily, the 
Conservative government took steps to "tide over" at least some of the 
workers with a scheme of public works. In March 1886, the President of the 
Local Government Board, Chamberlain, issued a circular to local authorities 
urging them to undertake necessary public works during periods of depression 
176. 
and to co-operate with poor-law guardians in making available short-term, 
128 
non-pauperizing employment for the deserving workless. Finally, under 
pressure of unusual economic depression the government was willing to 
concede that there existed certain categories among the needy, for example, 
the normally hard-working, for whom the deterrent and humiliating poor law 
was simply not appropriate. 129 The Chamberlain circular was issued on 
five further occasions between 1886 and 1893 and, although as a solution 
to the problem it was virtually a complete failure, 130 unemployment became 
and remained an object of public concern. 
The onset of a new period of depression, which lasted from 
1892 to 1895, precipitated a renewal of agitation for an expansion of public 
responsibility for the relief of the unemployed which included a campaign 
in the Commons in support of increased government intervention in this 
Lll process. In this campaign, Gerst was an active participant. Eight days 
after the commencement of the opening session of the new Parliament, in 
February 1893, Gerst rose during debate on the Queen's speech to support 
Independent Labour member, Keir Hardie's motion criticizing the government 
for failing to include the problem of industrial depression in its proposed 
legislation and to urge them to move quickly to enact effective measures to 
alleviate unemployment. With the exception of Home Rule, to which he 
128Ma . B Th urice ruce, e 
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129 Fraser, p. 131. 
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130 See: Bruce, pp. 183-184. Harris, pp. 76-79. 
131Harris, pp. 79-90. 
1972), 
Stedman-
177. 
acknowledged the Liberals were cormnitted to give first consideration, Gerst 
argued that no other question deserved the urgent and critical attention of 
Parliament and the government more than the plight of the unemployed. The 
current number of workless in urban centres, he concluded, "is a discredit 
to our civilisation, a standing danger to the maintenance of order, and a 
• 1 • 1 • 1 • 1 • II 132 socia evi ... requiring prompt egis ation . 
Gerst actively promoted local authority work schemes for the 
relief of unemployment, as an alternative to the humiliating and ineffective 
provision of outdoor relief through stone-yard labour. He rebuked the 
Government for refusing Hardie 1 s request for a reinstatement of old statutes 
empowering Boards of Guardians to acquire land for the purpose of providing 
133 gainful labour for the unemployed. Instead of hindering such experiments 
by local authorities the government "should afford them every facility that 
could be afforded consistently with the law". He cited the Salvation Army 
farm colony at Hadleigh as being one.example of a successful experiment of 
the type being proposed by East London guardians and urged the Liberal 
administration to allow those authorities to conduct similar schemes, " .•. 
which would certainly be productive of instruction and might guide them in 
134 the direction to which this great social problem might be solved". Gerst 
also proposed the introduction of the eight-hour day in government naval 
135 
establishments as a mechanism for reducing unemployment, a technique the 
1321'.!1., 4th Series, 8 (1893): 754-758. 
133For Hardie's demands see Ibid., 4th Series, 14 (1893): 807-808, 1143-1144. 
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socialists and trade unionists advocated the State extend to several branches 
of ind us try. 136 
For the relief of the great army of unemployed casual labour 
inhabiting the cities of the nation, amongst whom starvation - and suicide 
to escape the condition was increasing, Garst pressed for irrnnediate interven-
tion of the Central Government and Parliament. This task, he claimed, was 
beyond the capabilities of local authorities. This class of unemployables 
resulted directly from uncontrolled migration from the countryside to the 
urban centres, asserted Garst, and the solution to the problem rested with 
some form of State scheme for re-settling excess casual labour upon the 
land. A system of labour registries might also contribute towards this 
dispersal of the urban unemployed but, in order to be effective, they ought 
to be under the aegis of a Labour Department clearing house, a mode of 
supervision Garst pressed the Government to establish. 137 
When, in 1895, following agitation for action on unemployment by 
138 
o·rganizations for the out-of-work and the Independent Labour Party, the 
Government appointed a Select Committee of the House of Corrnnons to examine 
the powers of local authorities and the extent of distress arising from 
unemployment, Garst condemned the exercise as a delaying tactic adopted by 
the Government "because they did not know what to do" with the problem of 
unemployment and "had no policy to declare with regard to it". He feared 
that the inquiry would serve to delay remedial measures and suggested that 
136Ha . rr1.s, pp. 58-67. 
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the unemployment situation would be better served by the Government acting 
"to instruct their permanent advisors in such matters to prepare some plan 
for dealing with the subject11 • 139 
Gorst's agitation for the application of the eight-hour day in 
government naval establishments also formed part of his ongoing campaign to 
have the State establish itself as a model employer of labour, which he 
resumed from the opposition benches following the 1892 election. Early in 
March, during Committee of Supply on the navy estimates, Gorst moved 
"That .•• no person should in Her Majesty's naval establishments be engaged 
at wages insufficient for a proper maintenance; and that the conditions of 
Labour as regards hours, wages, insurance against accidents, provision for 
old age, & etc., should be such as to afford an example to private employers 
throughout the country11 • 140 In his accompanying speech he outlined the 
deficiencies in labour conditions currently existing in the Royal Naval 
yards and emphasized the relative ease of removing them. Unlike private 
industries, government establishments were not hidebound by the necessity 
of reaping profits and they had no foreign competitors challenging their 
markets; moreover, the necessary changes required no new legislation but 
only changes in administrative procedures which could begin immediately. 
His motion provided his fellow Members in the House with the opportunity 
to redeem their election pledges to reform and elevate the condition of the 
people, asserted Gorst, and he urged it be accepted and, thereafter, its 
provisions be extended to all government establishments employing labour, 
139PD, 4th Series, 30 (1895): 209-210, 250-252. 
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such as the War Office, Post Office, and the Board of Works. 141 
Although Gladstone opposed any statutory limitation of the adult 
working day, by this date a considerable number of Liberal M.P.'s supported 
· . d · 142 h S f W C b 11 143 its intro uction, amongst t em ecretary or ar, amp e -Bannerman, 
and the new initiative on the question, launched by the Opposition's 
strongest supporter of labour reforms, Gorst, apparently convinced the 
Liberal government to act in order to pre-empt future Conservative legislation. 144 
Thus, following Campbell-Bannerman's acceptance of the proposal on behalf 
of the Government, Gorst's motion was adopted without division. 145 However, 
Gorst recognized that Government acceptance of his resolution did not 
automatically guarantee its implementation and, consequently, during the 
Spring and Summer of 1893 he continued to press the Liberal administration 
146 to honour its pledge and shortly thereafter had the satisfaction of seeing 
his efforts bear fruit. 
On June 8, in response to Gorst's request for information regarding 
Government progress towards implementation of the March 6 resolution, 
Campbell-Bannerman informed the House that "those under minimum wages of 
labourers as determined by the Government" would receive an immediate increase. 147 
141Ibid., 4th Series, 9 (1893): 1109-1124. 
142Ha . rris, pp. 69-70. 
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However, the minimum figure eventually arrived at by the Ministry failed 
to satisfy Gorst who doubted it was sufficient for maintenance and considered 
1. t h . t . f . 148 open tote 1mpu ation o sweating. Six months later, approximately 
one year after Parliament carried Gorst's resolution, a Liberal member moved 
adoption of a similar motion advocating payment of trade-union rates of 
wages in Royal Dockyards and other naval establishments 149 which the Civil 
150 Lord of the Admiralty indicated the Government would accept. 
Gorst's proposal for the reduction of working hours met with 
considerably more success. In Autumn of 1893 the Government introduced the 
eight-hour day into one section of the Woolwich Arsenai, 151 and extended 
the scheme to all its ordinance factories and arsenals at the beginning of 
1894. 152 Thereafter Gorst agitated to have the measure brought in at the 
Royal DockyardJSind two months later the Government decided to take this 
154 
step. In 1895 the measure was applied to several branches of the General 
Post Office. 155 
Meanwhile, however, efforts by Gorst to obtain the statutory 
eight-hour day for one category of railway workers proved fruitless. Early 
in 1893, President of the Local Government Board, Mundella, brought in a bill 
148Ibid., 4th Series, 16 (1893): 1399-1403. 
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designed to regulate the hours of railway men. Under the provisions of the 
bill, the Board of Trade could order a railway company whose hours were 
considered "excessive" to submit a revised time schedule which brought them 
within "reasonable limits 11 • 156 Because it failed to attach a definite 
figure to hours limitation, Gerst denounced the measure as a sham and 
asserted that' if passed as it stood, it would prove to be a "dead letter" 
and that "the hours of no railway servant in the kingdom will be reduced by 
its operation". Consequently, he introduced a new clause specifying maximum 
hours to be worked:- "Hours exceeding eight for signalmen and ten for other 
servants to be deemed prima facie excessive". Gerst claimed that State 
intervention in the hours of adult labour was justified in this case because 
railway workers functioned as servants of the public and, as such, could 
be subjected to the same hours-regulation as dockyard and public service 
employees; more importantly, State interference was required to ensure 
adequate protection against accidents for the travelling public~57 
The amendment came under immediate attack from the spokesmen of 
the railway interests, Liberal industrialist Sir Joseph Pease and Conservative 
Sir James Fergusson, who objected to any parliamentary limitation of hours 
or interference with freedom of contract, claiming that hours limitation 
ought to be at the discretion of the Board of Trade not the House of Commons 
- sentiments echoed by Mundella who warned the House against being "led away 
by the specious arguments of the right hon. Member for Cambridge University11 • 158 
156
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The majority of Members heeded his advice; Gorst's amendment was defeated 
257-71, 159 and the bill subsequently underwent further emasculation in the 
Lo d 160 rs. 
The parliamentary session of 1893 also found Gorst once again at 
the forefront of agitation for an improved Employers' Liability Act. 161 In 
February the Liberal government introduced a bill which extended the employers' 
liability to include those injuries to a workman caused by the negligence of 
any person in the service of the workman's employer - thereby abolishing the 
defence of "common employment" - and prohibited any contracting out of the 
measure's provisions by means of private schemes. 162 However, if the employer 
were able to prove that the workman's own negligence contributed to the 
accident producing the injuries "then it would not be fair, and the law would 
not allow, that the master should be held liable11 • 163 
The measure came under attack from the Unionists. Chamberlain 
argued that it provided no compensation for those numerous injuries and fatal 
accidents not attributable to negligence on anyone's part but resulting from 
"acts of God". Thus he moved an amendment stating that no legislation 
relating to employers I liability "will be final or satisfactory which does 
not provide compensation to workmen for all injuries sustained in the ordinary 
course of their employment, and not caused by their own acts or default11 • 164 
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Gorst supported Chamberlain's call for a more comprehensive measure, citing 
statistics derived from the operation of the German insurance laws to 
illustrate that only 27% of the accidents occurring to workers in the course 
of their employment would be covered by the proposed bill. Thus he pressed 
the Government to adopt Chamberlain's amendment. "The principle advocated 
is that any person who carries on a dangerous trade or industry for the 
purpose of production of any article roust, in the first instance, regard the 
cost of life and labour necessarily sacrificed in the course of the employment 
165 
as part of the cost of production", declared Garst. He also expressed 
amazement that the Government proposed to exempt its own employees from the 
operation of the bill and urged that this omission be rectified, a step 
Asquith then indicated the Government would consider taking. 166 
Although Chamberlain's proposal won the support of some Conservatives 
and Liberal Unionists, 167 it was rejected by the Government. Asquith declared 
the amendment a ploy on Chamberlain's part to destroy the Bill by introducing 
into it a totally new principle - that of industrial insurance, 168 a concept 
Chamberlain had been actively promoting169 and one which Garst had advocated 
170 in his 1891 social programme. Asquith rejected such a scheme of insurance 
on the ground that it provided "no security and no incentive for the exercise 
of care on the part of the employer and because it involved "an amount of 
165
rbid., 4th Series, 11 (1893): 1206-1210. 
166
rbid., 4th Series, 11 (1893): 1209-1210; 12 (1893): 218-219. 
167
rbid., 4th Series, 10 (1893): 1053-1059; 1066; 1590; 11 (1893): 1182. 
Speeches of W.R. Bousefield, A.B. Forwood, H. Seton-Karr, and C.B. Stuart-
Wortley. 
168
rbid., 4th Series, 8 (1893): 1956-1957. 
169 See Joseph Chamberlain, "The Labour Question", Nineteenth Century, 32 (1892), 
pp. 677-710. See also the Times, 22 February, 1893, p. 10; 18 May, 1893, p. 11. 
170S ee, "Social Politics in England", pp. 267-268. 
185. 
official interference upon the part of the State ..• that I do not think 
either the employers or workmen of this country could be readily brought to 
171 tolerate". Trade union and labour representatives in the Commons also 
repudiated Chamberlain's proposal stating that "as the T,U.C: had not made 
a demand that all accidents should be met by a common insurance fund, they 
172 
could not approve the amendment", and they echoed Asquith's claim that 
Chamberlain was merely attempting to "strangle the Bill". 173 Consequently, 
Chamberlain, having successfully publicized his own alternative to the 
Government's measure, but not wishing to sabotage its passage, withdrew his 
174 175 
amendment. The Bill eventually passed the Commons but it was later 
destroyed by the Lords' repeated efforts to insert a "contracting out" 
clause, 176 leading to Gladstone's dropping of the measure in February, 1894. 177 
This wrecking by the Upper Chamber of one of the few pieces of Liberal social 
legislation to emerge from the Commons during the current Parliament confirmed 
Gorst's fears that the increasing obstructionist tactics of the Conservative-
dominated Lords 178 would prove detrimental to the cause of Tory Democracy. 
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Thus he cautioned Salisbury: 
The loss of the Employers' Liability Bill, as a result of the H. of Lords 
insisting on their amendments will inflict a very heavy blow upon your 
working-class supporters. I do not doubt that this point has been 
properly brought under your notice, and fully considered by you. But 
having just returned from a political visit to the West Riding and the 
industrial corner of Cheshire, where I heard much to confirm the opinion 
I had previously formed9 I feel impelled to add my testimony to that of others on this point.17 
Undaunted by the Government's obduracy, Gorst now chanelled his 
energies into efforts to alleviate one of the most distressing problems of 
the Poor Law system, the mistreatment of children in the Metropolitan pauper 
schools. Following a series of incidents in certain of these institutions, 
in which neglect had resulted in injuries, permanent disabilities, or death 
to numerous children, 180 Gorst brought the issue to the attention of 
Parliament through his judicious questioning in the House of the new 
181 President of the Local Government Board, Shaw-Lefevre. He urged that a 
Commission or Committee of the House be appointed to inquire into the organiza-
tion of pauper schools and to consider the feasibility of alternative care 
th d f h "ld 182 me o s or pauper c i ren. Shortly afterwards he pressed home his point 
by participating in a "monster deputation" to Shaw-Lefevre which demanded 
the establishment of an investigation, along the lines suggested by Gorst, 
during which he presented a speech" .•• clear, incisive, from the standpoint 
183 
of a Parliamentary veteran, and a tender father •.. ". This representation 
succeeded in obtaining the appointment of a Departmental Committee to inquire 
into Poor Law schools, upon which Garst and Henrietta Barnett were offered 
179
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Gorst also drew the attention of the CoIIllllons to the abuse of child 
labour by some Poor Law authorities, claiming that many pauper children 
were employed in excess of ten hours daily. 185 Child labour had remained 
a burning issue for Gorst ever since his return from the Berlin Conference. 
Just two weeks earlier he had made an unsuccessful attempt to have inserted 
into the Factories and Workshops Bill a clause raising the minimum age for 
child labour to 12 years, as pledged by Britain at Berlin. 186 
Meanwhile, the Government's continuing neglect of social issues 
led Garst to launch a public criticism of the Liberal administration in the 
periodical press, which he combined with a further airing of his own solutions 
187 to current social problems. The dearth of social legislation during the 
Government's current tenure of office Gorst blamed upon the Liberals' pre-
occupation with constitutional questions and upon their affluent members' 
lack of sympathy for the condition of the poor: "It is impossible for 
capitalists, as a class, to prefer the interests of the workers to their 
188 
own", he declared. Gorst proceeded to examine critically the various 
reform measures upon which the Liberals had failed to make any real progress 
- the settlement of trade disputes, reduction of the hours of labour, relief 
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of unemployment, employers' liability, and the raising of the minimum age 
for child labour. For each of these _questions he offered his own reform 
proposals, which were in essence those outlined in his 1891 schemes and 
which he had promoted in the House during the current Parliament. 189 
Gorst conceded, however, that while current political attitudes 
continued to dominate Parliament there was little chance that such social 
legislation as he proposed would be enacted. Once a party had succeeded 
in duping the workers into voting for them, by professing devotion to 
social issues, the politicians' "zeal for the interests of labour is 
choked by cares for other matters more important to their ascendancy in 
Parliament" and reform was put aside. Only when the working class realized 
its potential at the polls would the situation be remedied, asserted Gorst. 
The workers' political power," .•. if they knew how to use it, would be 
irresistible: they could confer the government upon whomsoever they would". 
At the present time, however, the workers' ignorance of where their best 
interests lay prevented their emergence as a powerful political force, and, 
consequently, politicians felt no compulsion to legislate on social issues, 
he declared. "The public enthusiasm is wanting which, in our Constitution, 
is requisite to turn a project into law, and this want is not likely to be 
supplied until education has made the workers far better judges of their 
own interests and necessities 11 • 190 
Gorst believed that the University Settlement Movement constituted 
one influential agency for the education of the workers: 
189Ibid., pp. 210-217. 
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The prevalent political sentiment of such people is apathy ... and they 
receive promises of amelioration, which philanthropists and politicians 
make them, often from interested motives, with scornful incredulity. 
They have a dull sense of being treated by society with injustice, and 
a dull rancour against the rich and leisured classes for not inventing 
some plan by which their condition might be improved. But they have no 
plan for themselves; they have no leaders whom they trust; they have 
no revolutionary projects to carry out, either by violence or by their 
legitimate votes .•• They will furnish no force for social or political 
change unless they are first aroused 11 .191 
This arousal could be stimulated by the bringing together, in the settlement 
environment, of university graduates and the workers: 
There is the latent interest and the latent power in the masses; there is 
the latent knowledge and the latent ability in the men and women of 
culture. Make friends and associates of the two parties, and the problems 
which are insoluble to each alone become determinable by the two combined. 
The social questions of the day can be calmly and scientifically examined; 
the facts of the case can be accurately ascertained; the measures to be 
taken arrived at in accordance with common sense and the general interests 
of society; and the keen interest which an instructed and elightened 
people would have in their own amelioration would supply the irresistible 
force necessary to carry such measures into speedy execution".192 
Moreover, Garst asserted, the graduates could ably fill the 
void in working-class leadership resulting from the failure of the trade-
unionists to assume this role because of their inability to comprehend the 
needs of their unorganized brethren. The graduates could supply an 
acceptable alternative to those "designing persons" bent upon stirring up 
the poor to "revolutionary outbreaks". If the people had wise counsellors 
whom they trusted the trade unionists would gladly accept their co-operation, 
and take their views into consideration, and the selfish agitators would 
probably disappear. Such a position University men and women settled amongst 
191J.E. Garst, "Settlements in England and America", pp. 13-14. 
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h h f . . II 193 t e poor ave every prospect o attaining 
By the late Spring of 1895 a general election appeared innninent, 
prompting Gorst to issue another progrannne of social reform which he 
d . 1 . d f C . d . . . 194 presente as a potentia gui e or a new onservative a ministration. 
The progrannne ran essentially along the same lines as his previously 
published schemes, containing proposals to deal with unemployment, Poor 
Law reform, and provision for the young, the sick, and the aged. Gorst 
also included measures for the handling of labour disputes and for the 
amendment of the employers' liability law which he had earlier included 
in his minority report appended to the Final Report of the Royal Connnission 
on Labour. 195 The majority of Commission members having shrunk from 
supporting statutory measures for the settlement of industrial disputes 
and for the increasing of employers' liability for accidents, 196 Gorst 
declined to sign the majority report, choosing instead to issue his own 
reconnnendations separately. Gorst now reiterated his minority report 
proposals calling for the establishment of Boards of Conciliation and 
Arbitration and for a new Employers' Liability Bill to provide a worker 
with compensation for all accidents suffered in the course of his employment 
- save those resulting from his own misconduct. 197 
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Gerst asserted that a victorious Tory party would possess one 
"innnense and obvious advantage" over its Liberal rivals: "Pledged to no 
political changes, they can devote the whole of their Parliamentary time 
and the entire energy of their administration to the framing, discussing, 
and passing of measures which directly affect the well-being of the people: 
they will not be obliged to put off reform by Royal Connnissions, Select 
Connnittees, and Sham bills". 198 
Whilst Gorst's progrannne was undergoing publication, the 
Conservatives were provided with the opportunity to fulfill his predictions 
with regard to their social policy. On June 21, 1895, the Liberal Government 
was unexpectedly defeated on a vote to censure the Secretary for War, 
Campbell-Bannerman, over an alleged shortage of cordite for the armed forces, 
leading to the resignation of Rosebery and the formation of a new Conservative 
administration. 
198Ibid., p. 3. 
CHAPTER V 
VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL 1895-1902 
The formation of Salisbury's third ministry was completed with 
unaccustomed swiftness, despite the complications created by the need to 
include Liberal Unionists. Although their inclusion gave rise to some 
dissatisfaction among Conservative aspirants denied office, Salisbury 
experienced no unsurmountable problems in forming his Unionist coalition 
Government which brought five former Liberals into the Cabinet. 1 The 
paucity of competent candidates for Ministerial positions obliged Salisbury 
to overlook Gorst's "disloyalty" once again and find a place for him in 
the new Administration as Vice-President of the Committee of Council on 
Education. 2 According to Sir Almeric FitzRoy, then official private 
secretary to the newly-appointed Lord President of the Council, the Duke 
of Devonshire, Gorst's appointment to the politically sensitive area of 
education had been made "in the belief that his ingenuity might assist the 
1Peter Marsh, The Discipline of Popular Government: Lord Salisbury's Domestic 
Statecraft, ,1881-1902 (Hassocks, Sussex, 1978), pp. 241-245. Robert Taylor, 
Lord Salisbury (London, 1975), pp. 152-158. The Liberal-Unionist Cabinet 
appointments were:- the Duke of Devonshire, Lord President of the Council; 
Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs; the Marquess 
of Lansdowne, Secretary of State for War; George J. Coschen, First Lord of 
the Admiralty; and Lord James of Hereford, Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancashire. 
2 J.P. Cornford, "The Parliamentary Foundations of the Hotel Cecil", in Ideas 
and Institutions of Victorian Britain", ed. Robert Robson (London, 1967), 
p. 302. The Office was more commonly referred to as Vice-President of the 
Council or, alternatively, as the Minister of Education. As incumbent, Gorst 
was effectively head of the Education Department and spokesman for the 
Government in matters of education policy, in the Commons. 
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Government to square the educational circle". 3 In making his offer of the 
Vice-Presidency to Gorst, Salisbury indicated that the position would offer 
the former considerable scope for his talents: "the office .•. is one 
which I think you would find interesting, and in which you would have an 
opportunity of performing valuable work •.. The questions connected with 
education are difficult but urgent; and your powers would have full 
4 
employment in solving the various problems it presents". Although, as 
President of the Council, Devonshire was to be the official head of the 
Education Department, Salisbury anticipated that the Duke's simultaneous 
position as chairman of the Committee of Public Defence would keep him 
fully occupied and intended the daily work of the Department to be under 
Gorst' s supervision. As he told Garst, "Your nominal chief is the Duke 
of Devonshire: but you would enjoy an independence more than usually 
complete, as his hands will be full with other matters". 5 However, despite 
the apparent importance Salisbury attached to the Vice-Presidential post, 
it was to be a non-Cabinet appointment, a decision Salisbury justified to 
Gorst by claiming it was necessitated by the complexities involved in 
constructing a coalition Ministry. 6 This denial of Cabinet rank to Gorst, 
following many years of what he justifiably considered valuable service to 
3Quoted in B.H. Holland, The Life of Spencer Compton, Eighth Duke of 
Devonshire, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (London, 1911), 2, p. 273. 
4
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the party, was undoubtedly a blow to him, and his disappointment is 
reflected in his curt letter of acceptance to Salisbury: "I will accept 
the Office to which you have designated me, and I will do my best to fulfil 
the important duties which it involves". 7 
Gorst's appointment was given qualified approval by educationists. 
They regretted the selection of an individual relatively inexperienced in 
educational matters, interpreting this as an indication of the politicians' 
continuing inability to form "a proper conception of the importance of 
8 
education as a factor of national prosperity and greatness". However, 
they were prepared to acknowledge Gorst's potential: 
If we must have an untried man we might have gone further than Sir John 
Gorst and fared much worse. His intellectual eminence is as unquestionable 
as his sympathy with the poor. The part which he played in the Berlin 
Conference is well remembered, and we shall look to him first to raise the 
age for half-time employment, and then to abolish the baneful system 
altogether ••. ". 9 
The Westminster Review was less restrained, declaring that the choice of 
Gorst for Vice-President "has given hearty satisfaction to practical 
educationists. His ripe experience and wide sympathies will be invaluable 
..• " in the administration of the Education Department and it expressed 
confidence that "the appointment of so honest and able a statesman as Sir 
John Gorst" would guarantee the continuation of his Liberal predecessor, 
Acland's, policy of progress and thorough efficiency11 . 10 
7
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When Salisbury accepted the Queen's invitation to form a new 
Government, in June, he had made an early election a condition of his 
11 
acceptance and dissolution duly took place in early July. The ensuing 
contest produced a resounding victory for the Unionist Government. The 
Liberals and their Irish Nationalist allies elected only 177 and 82 
respectively, while the Conservatives' total of 340 and the Liberal Unionists 
tally of 71 gave the Government a commanding majority of 152. 12 At 
13 Cambridge University Gerst and his fellow-Tory, Jebb, were returned unopposed. 
Parliament reassembled August 12, only to recess three weeks later, giving 
Gorst a period in which to acquaint himself with the "difficult and urgent" 
education questions to which Salisbury had referred. Parliament would not 
reassemble for the new Session until the New Year. 
There were three major educational problems awaiting resolution 
when the Unionists returned to power in 1895. Firstly, there was an urgent 
need to modify the existing dual system of elementary education, provided 
by the board and voluntary schools, in order that the national standard 
might be raised; secondly, public education beyond the elementary, as yet 
undefined, required organization; and thirdly, the administrative chaos 
existent throughout the entire system demanded rectification. 
At this period, elementary education was provided through board 
and voluntary - chiefly Anglican - schools. This dual system had been 
created by the 1870 Elementary Education Act. Prior to this legislation, 
11 Marsh, p. 242. 
12nonald Read, England 1868-1914 (London, 1979), p. 356. 
13
cambridge Chronicle, 19 July, 1895, p. 4. 
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elementary education for the masses had been furnished almost exclusively 
by the voluntary schools, first established at the beginning of the nine-
teenth century and fostered, after 1833, by State grants. By 1870 they 
had evolved into a network which sparsely covered the country. The 1870 
Act instituted for the first time State-provided and State-maintained 
elementary schools, the "board" schools, which were designed to fill the 
gaps left by the voluntary system. Provided and run by elected boards, 
these schools were established in areas where need for them existed and 
were financed partly by local rate-payers and partly by the State. As 
prescribed by the Cowper-Temple clause of the 1870 Act, denominational 
religious teaching was prohibited in the schools, and every pupil had the 
right to withdraw from religious instruction classes on grounds of 
conscience. The board schools were intended to supplement, not supplant, 
the voluntary schools, which continued to receive grants under the Act. 
However, this dual system was neither co-ordinated as a whole, 
nor connected with the existing, mainly private, secondary schools. 
Although nowhere in the 1870 Act was it specifically stated, the dual 
system was designed to serve the labouring classes, the classes above them 
customarily receiving their education in fee-paying private schools. In 
keeping with the popular nineteenth-century assumption that the State 
should neither involve itself in, nor allot public funds for, higher 
education, the 1870 measure made no provision for secondary schools. 
Consequently, secondary education remained the province of the universities, 
public schools, and endowed grammar schools and thus continued to be 
primarily the prerogative of the middle and upper classes, who were able to 
pay for the privilege of receiving it. Hence, after 1870, the two branches 
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of education, elementary and secondary, continued to operate separately, 
serving to reinforce the class distinctions already dividing English 
. 14 
society. 
By the 1890s, a series of developments occurring within the 
educational system, combined with increasing administrative disorder, 
made reorganization of the educational structure seem imperative. The 
rapidly-developing board school network now posed a serious threat to the 
voluntary system. While many of the rural board schools had proved 
inefficient, their urban counterparts generally possessed better buildings 
and equipment and better teachers than the voluntary schools. The latter 
institutions, which received no rate aid and subsisted on a combination 
of government grants, voluntary subscriptions, and fees, were increasingly 
unable to compete with their rate-maintained rivals. 15 
Moreover, by this period, elementary education had progressed 
far beyond the limits envisioned by the 1870 Act. That measure had 
stipulated that the education provided in the public elementary schools 
must be chiefly "elementary" in nature, that is, consisting primarily of 
instruction in the three basic subjects of reading, writing and arithmetic. 
A pupil's performance was measured according to his ability in these areas 
and his progress was measured in "standards". However, some children 
14 W.H.G. Armytage, Four Hundred Years of English Education, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 
1970), Chaps. 5-7. Marjorie Cruickshank, Church and State in English Education 
(London, 1964), Chaps. 1 and 2. A.M. Kazamias, Politics, Society and Secondary 
Education in England (Philadelphia, 1966), pp. 36-48. John Lawson and Harold 
Silver, A Social History of Education in England (London, 1973), pp. 267-324. 
Mary Sturt, The Education of the People: A history of primary education in 
England and Wales in the nineteenth century (London, 1967), pp. 383-392. 
15
cruickshank, pp. 38-56. 
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succeeded in completing the standards in a shorter period than that assigned, 
leading boards to provide "higher grade" schools for them in which a variety 
of subjects were taught in addition to the ·three R's. Because these schools 
classified their pupils by elementary school standards, and defined their 
principal educational work as "elementary", they continued to be eligible 
for grants from the Education Department, despite the fact these schools 
were supplying essentially "secondary''education. Although the Education 
Department possessed no mandate for the organization of education other 
than elementary, the undetermined status of higher grade schools, the 
absence of a central policy for the education they provided, and the 
Department's desire to retain control of them, created a situation in which 
the schools were allowed to continue expanding despite their dubious 
legality. In fact, the Department encouraged this development. Since, 
unlike the grammar schools, the higher grade schools were not constrained 
by a classically-biased curriculum, they were able to offer technological-
oriented subjects and, in a time of rising foreign competition, this was 
seen as supplying a felt need. In addition, higher grade pupils were the 
academic elite of the elementary system's working-class population, the 
most capable of which succeeded in obtaining scholarships to training 
11 . . 16 co ege or university. 
A comparable situation had also developed within the system of 
evening continuation schools. Established originally to provide a basic 
16
olive Banks, Parity and Prestige in English Secondary Education (London, 
1955), pp. 13-19. Eric Eaglesham, From School Board to Local Authority 
(London, 1956), pp. 29-40. Hereafter referred to as Eaglesham, Local 
Authority. Eric Eaglesham, The Foundations of Twentieth-Century Education 
in England (London, 1967. Reprinted. Old Woking, Sussex, 1972), pp. 10-14. 
Hereafter referred to as Eaglesham, Twentieth Century Education. 
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elementary education to illiterates beyond school age, the evening schools 
were, by 1895, providing mainly secondary-type schooling to youths and 
adults, the introduction of compulsory education in 1880 having gradually 
reduced the need to supply elementary instruction to adults. By inter-
17 preting liberally the provisions of the Education Code (1890) Act, the 
school boards had succeeded in expanding their evening school curriculum 
to include a wide range of educational subjects, particularly commercial 
and technical, as well as recreational courses, which they provided at 
public expense although they had no authorization to expend the rates for 
any education other than elementary. This expansion of higher grade and 
evening school education beyond their legally-prescribed limits resulted 
in part from the Education Department's failure to devise a co-ordinated 
policy to meet the changing conditions which developed after the passage 
of the 1870 Act, serving to confuse Department officials as to what was, 
and was not, acceptable under the various Codes. Moreover, in a period 
when the need for a comprehensive national system of education was becoming 
increasingly apparent, the higher grade schools were gaining wide political 
and public approval, leading Department officials to tolerate, even 
encourage, this development of unauthorized "secondary" education. 18 
The Education Department's ventures into non-elementary education 
brought it into competition with the other central educational agencies in 
17By this Act the Education Department intended only to release the schools 
from the necessity of making the three R's the principal part of their work, 
while remaining eligible for Government grants and rate aid by giving 
instruction in a combination of elementary subjects prescribed in the new 
1890 Department Code [See, Eaglesham, Local Authority, p. 57.J 
18 Ib 1.· d . , 29 45 53 58 pp. - ' pp. - . 
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in the field, the Science and Art Department and the Charity Commissioners. 
The Science and Art Department, an off-shoot of the Board of Trade, regulated 
the spending on secondary education of monies allotted for science, art or 
technical instruction. The Charity Commissioners distributed legacies, 
gifts and endowments for purposes of education. Although the funds they 
controlled were not dispensed exclusively to secondary schools, the 
Commissioners had provided, through their disbursements, a secondary school 
form of education to over 75,000 children by 1895 and so were effectively a 
secondary education department. Thus, by this date, all three bodies -
the Education and Science and Art Departments and the Charity Commissioners 
- were functioning as agencies of secondary education, although none of 
them were established for that purpose. As their respective spheres of 
responsibility had not been clearly defined, the result was administrative 
overlap, confusion and conflict. 19 
By the time of Gorst's appointment to the Education Department 
the educational situation had reached crisis point. The impoverished 
voluntary schools could no longer compete with the rate-aided board schools. 20 
Lacking the financial resources necessary to maintain the ever-rising 
standards imposed by the Education Department, many were transferring their 
buildings to the school boards while those that remained in operation were 
19 Eaglesham, Twentieth-Century Education, pp. 21-28. For a detailed examina-
tion of the development of the Education and Science and Art Departments 
and the Charity Commissioners, see A.S. Bishop, The Rise of a Central 
Authority for English Education (Cambridge, 1971). 
20
rn 1895, the voluntary schools' per pupil income averaged,,/1.95 compared 
with ~2.5 for the board schools. [Nigel Middleton and Sophia Weitzman, 
A Place for Everyone: A History of State Education From the End of the 18th 
Century to the 1970s (London, 1976), p. 91.] 
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offering a standard of education increasingly inferior to that provided 
by the urban board schools. 21 ilB the voluntary schools were now educating 
nearly 60 percent of the elementary school population, 2,445,812 as 
22 
compared with 1,879,218 in the board schools, the future standard of 
national literacy demanded that voluntary school education be improved. 
Until the difficulties associated with the dual system of elementary 
education were solved, no efficient national system of elementary or 
secondary education could be established. At the same time, the school 
boards were facing mounting opposition. Churchmen alleged that the 
religious education provided by the board schools was simplified to such a 
degree that it favoured the Nonconformist point of view, rendering the 
schools virtually secularist institutions which fostered unbelief; in the 
large towns the urban ratepayers accused the boards of unjustifiable 
23 
extravagance. 
The Government was under intense pressure to rationalize "other 
than elementary" education. The agitation was not confined to educational 
reformers. Demands were being made by the "respectable" members of the 
working class for secondary places for their children and, as many of these 
citizens were now enfranchised, their needs could not be ignored. Calls 
21
cruickshank, pp. 61-62. 
22PD, 4th Series, 39 (1896): 526. Gorst's speech introducing the 1896 
Education Bill. 
23 Eaglesham, Twentieth Century Education, pp. 3-5. The term Churchmen is 
used as an all-embracing term for Anglicans plus Roman Catholics. Non-
conformist refers to members of any denomination dissenting from the 
teachings of the Anglican Church, other than Roman Catholics. 
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for improved secondary education were being made by industrialists who 
were finding themselves obliged to import German technicians because of 
the lack of competent Englishmen for the jobs. The increasing economic 
challenge by England's foreign competitors, particularly Germany, was 
prompting educators, social reformers, politicians and thinkers to press 
for expanded opportunities in secondary and technical education. 24 The 
various demands were reinforced by the Royal Commission on Secondary Educa-
tion. Reporting in November 1895, the Commission condemned the patchwork 
nature of secondary education, together with its accompanying administrative 
confusion and overlapping of functions, and recommended it be placed under 
central supervision. They proposed this take the form of a central 
authority under a Minister of Education who would assume the relevant 
functions, formerly exercised by the Education Department, the Science and 
Art Department, and the Charity Commissioners, and the setting up of local 
education authorities in county and county boroughs empowered to expend 
the rates and State grants, under the supervision of the central authority. 25 
The return of the Conservatives to power in the summer of 1895 
provided a political climate more favourable to voluntary-school interests. 
The Tory party, being by tradition the supporters of the Established Church, 
were naturally sympathetic towards the voluntary schools, the majority of 
which were Church of England institutions. Salisbury, himself a staunch 
24K . azam1.as, pp. 107-111. Middleton and Weitzman, pp. 91-93. 
25Report of the Royal Commission on Secondary Education (Cmnd. 7862), 
PP, 1895, 43: 257, 268-270. (This Commission is more commonly known as the 
"Bryce Commission", after its chairman James Bryce. In this dissertation 
the two titles are used interchangeably.) 
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Anglican, deplored the growing incidence of voluntary-school collapse and 
26 
supersession by board schools. He disliked the existing nature of the 
dual system, preferring an arrangement "which would enable each man to pay 
h • f h h" f h" 1• • II 
27 is rates or t e teac ing o is own re igion. Just one week prior to 
the return to power of the Unionist Government he had told the supporters 
of Anglican education that all measures designed to "strengthen the 
voluntary schools and swell the resources on which they rest", must be 
1 d . d th . · 1 
28 
emp oye in or er to guarantee eir surviva . 
However, there were as Salisbury acknowledged, "enormous pratical 
difficulties" associated with the adoption of any plan to relieve the 
29 
voluntary schools. Nonconformists and their Liberal supporters were 
opposed to any further provision from the public purse which would serve 
to maintain voluntary-school education. In many localities, particularly 
in the countryside, the absence of a board school obliged Nonconformists 
to send their children to the local Anglican school, where they were 
exposed to alien doctrinal beliefs, and thus they hoped for the eventual 
supplanting of the voluntary schools by the board system. In addition, 
26The Times, 21 November, 1895, p. 4. 
27 Ibid., 22 March, 1895, p. 5. 
28Ibid, 13 June, 1895, p. 12. The Anglicans' clamour for increased public 
support had reached a crescendo by 1895, culminating in the presentation 
of a memorial to Salisbury by a deputation of clergy, led by the Archbishop 
of Canterbury, on 20 November. In this memorial were outlined the measures 
the Churchmen hoped to see included in the forthcoming Education Bill. 
[See, the Times, 16 November, 1895, p. 6. Ibid., 21 November, p. 4.] 
29 Ibid., 22 March, 1895, p. 5. 
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among the voluntarists there was a lack of consensus over the type of 
financial relief required. The Roman Catholics were committed to rate 
aid but many Churchmen feared that stipulations regulating any such aid 
might undermine their administrative and religious hold upon the Anglican 
schools, particularly under a Liberal Government. 3° Consequently, the 
Government had to construct an aid scheme which would supply the voluntary 
schools with additional financial help without imperilling their independent 
existence and which would also garner sufficient political support to 
withstand the anticipated Liberal and Nonconformist opposition. 
The responsibility for devising a suitable scheme now rested 
with Gerst and during the parliamentary recess of 1895-1896 he worked to 
formulate an acceptable plan. Early in December 1895, he forwarded to 
Balfour a "first rough sketch of some clauses of an Education Bil1 11 • 31 
This scheme constituted an audacious, comprehensive plan to transfer control 
of elementary and secondary education to a new county authority. Under 
the plan, county and county borough councils were to supervise all schools 
in their areas and superintend all funding, including monies previously 
32 distributed by the various government departments. This would allow for 
the development of secondary education under a single authority, as recom-
mended by the Bryce Commission, and also provide a channel through which 
30cruickshank, pp. 55-63. For the Nonconformist position on the voluntary 
schools, see D.W. Bebbington, The Nonconformist Conscience: Chapel and 
Politics, 1870-1914 (London, 1982), pp. 125-139. 
31 Balfour Papers, B.L. Add. MSS. 49791. f.7. Gerst to Balfour, 6 December, 1895. 
Ibid., f.23, "Sketch of Education Measure". 
32
rbid., f. 23, "Sketch of Education Measure". 
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rate aid might be extended to the voluntary schools. Apparently in keeping 
33 
with a suggestion made earlier by Balfour, Garst reluctantly included in 
his scheme a rider making grants subject to conditions to be established 
b h h · 34 h. h h d t ·1 b d y t e new county aut or1ty, a step w 1c t reatene to cur a1 oar -
school expenditure. 
Gorst's proposals received a cool reception from Balfour as they 
ran counter to the policy decisions on the Bill made earlier by the Cabinet 
Committee on Education, to which Garst was witness. This show of independence 
on Gorst's part prompted an exasperated Balfour to complain to Salisbury 
that the draft was "quite unsatisfactory, and it is certainly not framed 
along the lines laid down by the Committee", but he nevertheless suggested 
that Gorst's proposals be incorporated into a draft Bill.35 However, Garst, 
anticipating Balfour's suggestion, had by this time already initiated this 
process. On December 2, Michael Sadler, Director of the Office of Special 
Enquiries and a Bryce Commission member, had been recalled from vacation 
for consultations on the proposed Bill and by the twelfth of that month 
was engaged in drafting that portion of the measure pertaining to secondary 
education. 36 Thus, although it had met with considerably less than outright 
approval, Gorst's scheme had nonetheless survived the Conservative leadership's 
initial scrutiny intact. 
33Ibid., f.7. Garst to Balfour, 6 December, 1895. Ibid., ff.127-128. 
Salisbury to Balfour, 10 December, 1895. 
34
rbid., f.23, clause 4. 
35 Balfour Papers, B.L. Add. MSS. 49690. ff.123-124. Balfour to Salisbury, 
6 December, 1895. 
36Michael Sadleir, Michael Ernest Sadler (London, 1949), pp. 143-144. 
206. 
However, a subsequent appraisal by the leading Liberal Unionist 
within the coalition Government, Joseph Chamberlain, was to prove more 
damaging. Despite his Radical and Nonconformist background Chamberlain 
recognized the Conservatives' need to honour their election pledges to 
their denominationalist supporters, as well as the necessity of upgrading 
voluntary schools in the interests of national education. Consequently 
he was disposed to sanction an increase of State aid to these institutions, 
37 provided denominational instruction continued to be self-supported. As 
Gorst's proposals provided for the granting of rate aid to the denominational 
schools, and the restriction of future school board expenditure, they were 
vehemently opposed by Chamberlain: 
... They are the very maddest proposals I have seen in the course of my 
life. They would absolutely break down, in the interests of the Church 
and the Roman Catholics, the so-called Compromise of 1870 ••• 
For myself I have fully recognized the necessity of making great concessions 
to the feelings of my present allies ... I am ready to make such provisions 
as may be absolutely necessary to prevent the extinction of Voluntary 
Schools. But I could not hold up my head for a day after I had consented 
to such a Bill as is now suggested .•• 38 
After detailing his objections to Gorst's proposals he warned the Cabinet 
of the probable political repercussions should they accept the measure, 
37
st. Aldwyn Papers, Chamberlain to Hicks-Beach, 20 July, 1895, cited in 
Marsh, p. 250. J.L. Garvin and J. Amery, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, 
6 vols. (London, 1932-1969), vol. 3, Empire and World Policy 1895-1900, 
p. 152. In this dissertation the term "denominational schools" refers to 
the Anglican and Roman Catholic schools and is used interchangeably with 
the term "voluntary schools". Similarly, the term "denominationalist" 
denotes the supporters of denominational education, as provided by the 
voluntary schools, as does the term "voluntarist". 
38
chamberlain to the Duke of Devonshire, 15 December, 1895. Quoted in 
Garvin, 3, p. 153. 
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stressing that "the mere introduction of such a Bill as proposed would do 
more to re-unite a solid Liberal opposition, and to shatter the Unionist 
39 
majority than could possibly be accomplished by any other means whatsoever". 
The Government could not ignore the views of Chamerlain and his 
supporters. With the decline of Home Rule, there were indications that the 
Unionist alliance was in danger of collapsing and dissent among the extreme 
40 factions of both parties had become more apparent. Moreover, prior to 
the 1895 election Chamberlain had warned that if the Conservatives wished 
to preserve the alliance, deference to Liberal-Unionist opinions would have 
to be maintained. "There is no room for further concession, and they will 
find it bad economy to haggle over the terms of the bargain11 • 41 Hence, in 
order to conserve the union, the Government chose to defer to Chamberlain 
42 
and withold direct rate aid to voluntary schools. 
Notwithstanding this concession, there remained much in Gorst's 
draft to which Chamberlain was opposed, while the proposal empowering the 
new authority to establish rate-aided schools in rural districts had been 
given an unfavourable reception by everyone in the Cabinet. 43 Consequently, 
39 Balfour Papers, B.L. Add. MSS. 49773, f.86. Memorandum on Draft Scheme 
for an Education Bill, J. Chamberlain, 16 December, 1895. 
40 Holland, 2, pp. 266-269. Marsh, pp. 235-241. 
41
chamberlain to the Duke of Devonshire, 19 April, 1895, quoted in Holland, p. 268. 
42Garvin, p. 153. In reaching this decision, the Government were no doubt also 
influenced by the fact that a substantial number of their Anglican supporters 
remained opposed to accepting rate aid out of fear that conditions governing 
~t might threaten the independence of their schools (see Cruickshank, pp. 60-61). 
43 Balfour Papers, B.L. Add. MSS. 49791. ff.9-10. Memorandum by J.E. Gorst, 
21 December, 1895. 
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Garst inunediately framed an expanded version of his draft and submitted it, 
in memorandum form, to the Cabinet in defence of his proposals. In it he 
stressed the necessity for consolidating educational administration at the 
local level. The proposed county authorities were required, not only to 
secure the co-ordination and development of secondary education and assist 
necessitous schools, but also to advance elementary education. By organizing 
teachers and providing centres for their training, these authorities could 
effectively reduce the disparity existing between rural and urban schools, 
to the betterment of national education. Garst emphasized that in the 
majority of county and county boroughs no radical departure in organization 
was required as the new authority could be developed out of the existing 
education conunittees which had been created to dispense monies accruing 
from the Local Taxation Act of 1890.44 Moreover, if, as he suggested, the 
proposed authority was made a conunittee of the county council or municipal 
corporation, no additional election would be required. Garst acknowledged 
that conflicts could possibly emerge between the new authorities and the 
established school boards jealous of their prerogatives and, thus, he 
stressed that the former would have to refrain from interfering with the 
latter's functions in order to ensure the smooth working of the system. He 
suggested that co-operation between the two bodies could be fostered through 
the establishment of joint conunittees which would "co-ordinate the work of 
44Ibid., f .9. These funds were conunonly termed the "whisky money". In 
1890, in an effort to promote temperance, a Bill was introduced which proposed 
increasing the duties on spirits, and allotting a portion of the resultant 
money towards the purchase of publicans' licences as a means of eliminating 
redundant public houses. This compensation provision was sternly opposed 
in the Conunons and, after prolonged debate, the Government agreed to allow 
the "whisky money" to be given to the County Councils to be used, at their 
discretion, on technical education. 
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each11 • 45 
Gorst defended his proposals authorizing the new authorities to 
distribute the Government grants on the grounds of both efficiency and 
economy. The local authority would be in a far better position to assess, 
and respond to, the needs of their areas than the Education Department, 
while simultaneously serving as a watch-dog against over-expenditure of 
Imperial funds by the schools. Its vigilance would also provide the best 
insurance against misuse of the proposed special grant to necessitous 
schools, a local-level authority having "the means of ascertaining the 
true circumstances of each case, and a strong desire to husband its 
resources ... for the really necessitous cases". 46 However, he expressed 
opposition, as had Chamberlain, to the proposed limitation on board-school 
expenditure, arguing that such a proposal would prove politically catastrophic. 
Any move aimed at lowering the quality of board-school education "would 
raise a storm of indignation which even the present Government would be 
powerless to resist", while any attempt to reduce or limit teachers 1 
salaries would arouse the opposition of the entire profession, "which is 
capable of developing an electioneering force which would be most formidable 
at the polls JI 47 
In order to facilitate the passage of the Bill, Gorst urged that 
it be rendered more palatable to the Liberals through the adoption of his 
proposal delegating to the new authorities control of higher education in 
45Ibid., f.9. 
46Ibid., f.9. 
47Ibid., f.9. 
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their areas, a step which would serve to obviate the current overlapping 
and disorder in the secondary field. This provision, he argued, would 
also serve to surmount opposition to the granting of increased aid to 
voluntary schools; "Many Radicals, for the sake of getting a new authority 
which would stop the further growth of confusion, would swallow the proposal 
to confer upon the new authority the function of distributing additional 
State aid to Voluntary Schools" •48 
Although, unlike Chamberlain, he had no desire to retain the 
Cowper-Temple provision, in order to protect the Bill from what the former 
predicted would be "an outburst of Parliamentary indignation" against any 
attempt to repeal the clause, Gorst indicated his willingness to forego 
its revocation "until public opinion was better educated on the subject". 
However, he urged the Cabinet to retain his proposal allowing the new 
authority to become the school board in county districts because of the 
urgent need to improve the efficiency of the rural schools. He believed 
that the failure of the current system in this regard strengthened his 
case for establishing the county councils as the new education authorities: 
The methods of the Act of 1870, which have succeeded admirably in the towns, 
have failed miserably in the country. If the County Councils had existed 
in 1870, I believe the Government of the day would have taken the county 
and not the parish as its educational unit; and if rural education is to 
be, I will not say improved but even maintained at its present low level, 
some reform is necessary". 49 
Having presented his case, Gorst now drafted his proposals into 
a formalized "Scheme for an Education Bill" which included his controversial 
48Ibid., f.9. 
49 Ibid., f.10. 
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proposals providing for county education authorities, special aid to 
necessitous schools, the repeal of the Cowper-Temple clause, restrictions 
upon the further creation of school boards in country districts, and the 
50 limitation of school board rates as requested by Balfour. 
The scope of Gorst's measure produced some concern within the 
Education Department. Sadler felt certain that "if the Cabinet doesn't 
1 . t th H f C · 11 d · · 11 5 l a ter 1 > e . o . w1 rouse tremen ous opposition. However, the 
Cabinet, evidently recognizing that given existing political realities, 
Gorst's measure constituted a logical and practical solution to current 
educational problems, decided to defer to their Education Minister and 
accept a majority of his proposals. The major point of contention appears 
to have been his proposal giving additional financial aid to all necessitous 
schools, board as well as voluntary. Despite repeated appeals 52 from Gorst, 
the Ministers opted to reject this provision in favour of special grants to 
voluntary schools, a decision apparently prompted by a desire to avoid 
53 
alienating their voluntarist supporters. Thereupon, Gorst turned to 
Chamberlain for support and he, being determined to protect the interests 
of the school boards, succeeded in having the clause reinstated. 54 
50 Balfour Papers, B.L. Add. MSS. 49791. ff.14-20. Gorst to Balfour, February, 
1896, "Scheme for an Education Bill". 
51
sadleir, p. 147. 
52 Balfour Papers, B.L. Add. MSS. 49791. ff.11-13. Memorandum by Sir John Gorst, 
12 February, 1896. Ibid., f.21. Gorst to Balfour, February, 1896. 
53 Barnett Papers, F/BAR/139. S.A. Barnett to F.G. Barnett, 7 March, 1896. 
·
54Ibid., F/BAR/140. S.A. Barnett to F.G. Barnett, 14 March, 1896. 
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Notwithstanding the Government's lingering doubts over the Bill, 55 
the measure was now drafted in its final form for presentation in the 
Commons at the end of March. The Bill's principal clauses were in accordance 
with Garst' s scheme. 56 Each county and county borough council was to 
appoint a new committee, which was to be the chief education authority in 
the district. It was empowered to administer all grants formerly distributed 
by the Education and the Science and Art Departments but according to 
conditions determined by the respective Departments and within financial 
limitations prescribed by the Bill - measures designed to ensure a degree 
of Government control over expenditures. The authority might also utilize 
the "Whisky Money". 57 
In rural districts currently without school boards, the local 
authority was to become the authority for elementary education, with the 
58 power to levy rates for its support. Elsewhere, the authority might 
replace a defaulting school board or assume responsibility for any school 
a board wished to relinquish. 59 
The authority was accorded the rating-powers previously conferred 
upon the county councils by the Technical Instruction Act of 188960 and 
55Ibid., F/BAR/141. S.A. Barnett to F.G. Barnett, 28 March, 1896. 
56Bill to make further provision for Education in England and Wales (Bill 172), 
IT, 1896, 1: 541-559. 
57Ibid., pp. 543-545. Clauses 1-3. 
58Ib'd., 544 Cl 2 ~ p. • ause . 
59Ibid., pp. 548-549. Clauses 6-9. 
60This Act authorized the county and county borough councils, established the 
previous year, to spend up to the product of a penny rate on technical and 
manual instruction. 
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empowered to aid, develop, and supervise secondary education in its district. 
In addition, the Education Department might transfer to the authorities 
any school or department maintained by a school board which, "in the opinion 
61 
of the Education Department, is other than elementary". These provisions 
constituted a threat to the school boards' higher grade work and implied a 
possible future absorption of the boards by the local authorites. The danger 
was underscored by the inclusion in the Bill of a clause enacting that the 
school board rate be limited to that currently levied, 62 effectively 
restricting any future expansion of school board education. 
Necessitous board and voluntary schools were to receive a special 
aid grant of 4s per child, per year, to be applied in the first instance to 
improving teaching staffs and thereafter to upgrading facilities. Payment 
was to be witheld by the authority from any school which misused the grant, 
and the recipient schools were to be subject to audit. 63 By these stipulations 
Garst secured a measure of public control over State aid to voluntary schools, 
as was demanded by the Nonconformists. 
Despite Chamberlain's opposition to such a measure, a clause 
(Clause 27) was included permitting, if parents requested it, separate 
denominational religious teaching in both board and voluntary schools, in 
contradiction of the Cowper-Temple provision. 64 Two further clauses prescribed 
reforms dear to Gorst's heart; the raising of the minimum age at which a child 
61Ibid., p. 550. Clause 12. 
62Ibid., pp. 555-556. Clause 26. 
63Ibid., pp. 547-548. Clauses 4-5. 
64Ibid., p. 556. Clause 27. 
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might leave school to twelve years, per the commitment made at Berlin, and 
provision for placing pauper schools under the control of the local education 
authority. 65 
As Canon Barnett observed, Gorst's Bill contrived to overcome 
66 
"every obstacle inhibiting educational progress". The appointment of county 
education authorities was a move towards the establishment of a uniform, 
decentralized administrative system designed to develop and co-ordinate 
education in accordance with local needs. The special-aid grant to necessitous 
schools was devised to raise the calibre of English education by providing 
for the levelling-up of these schools to the board-school standard of 
efficiency, this process to be further accelerated by the eradication of 
unnecessary school-board competition through the restriction of their 
excessive spending. Through Clause 27 it aimed to eliminate from the educa-
tional arena the conflicts generated by the religious issue. Politically, 
the Bill sought to fulfill the Conservatives' election pledges to its 
denominational supporters, to conciliate the Opposition by organizing 
secondary education and providing for supplementary religious instruction 
to relieve Nonconformists in rural areas, and to court the rate-paying 
electorate by tightening public control over educational expenditures. 
Garst introduced his Bill in the Commons on March 3lst. 67 He 
began with a lengthy preamble in which he outlined "the difficulties in 
65Ibid., p. 554. Clauses 21 and 24. For Gorst's campaign for reform of the 
pauper schools, see pp. 322-328 below. 
66 Barnett Papers, F/BAR/135. S.A. Barnett to F.G. Barnett, 1 February, 1896. 
67!'.12, 4th Series, 39 (1896): 526-544. 
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68 
education which the wisdom of Parliament will have to meet", thereby 
focusing Members' attention upon the deficiencies his measure proposed to 
eliminate - a strategy designed to garner maximum support for the Bill. 
He dwelt at length upon the voluntary schools' problem and concluded by 
emphasizing that because a large proportion of English children attended 
these schools the future of national education demanded that their 
financial and educational deficiencies be removed, as must those of the 
inefficient rural board schools. He stressed the need to check the existing 
administrative confusion in Secondary Education, created by a multiplicity 
of local and central authorities simultaneously distributing money and 
duplicating each others' work. The conclusions of the Secondary School 
Commissioners' on this point had provided the Government with "the justifica-
tion •.• for bringing in the Measure which they are going to ask the House 
to adopt". He outlined the evils inherent in the current system of 
concentrating educational administration under the Central Department, 
thereby implying decentralization was crucial to the future well-being of 
69 
the national educational system. 
Gorst now turned to the Bill itself, presenting it as essentially 
a scheme for effecting the much-needed decentralization. He stressed that 
his proposals were "not novel" having been recommended by various nineteenth-
century Commissions, including the recent Bryce Report. Thereafter he moved 
swiftly through the remaining provisions elaborating only upon the final 
proposal permitting denominational teaching in board schools, which he 
68Ibid: 526. 
69 Ibid: 526-534, 537-538. 
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described as "a sincere attempt •.• to introduce a system of perfect 
religious toleration", and he concluded with an appeal to Members to 
"co-operate together to make this (Bill) a real step in advance in the 
education of the country11 •70 
Gerst resumed his seat to the accompaniment of loud cheering. 
However, as one parliamentary observer noted, this demonstration "was a 
tribute to the man, not a note of approval for the Bill", 71 and the Opposition's 
hostility to the proposals was immediately manifested by a succession of 
Liberal speakers. Gorst's predecessor as Vice-President, A.H.D. Acland, 
denounced the decentralizing provisions as constituting an excessive 
curtailment of the Central Government's authority and influence. 72 Y.H. 
Yoxall, general secretary of the National Union of Teachers and a Bryce 
Commissioner, deplored the absence of proposals to establish "a satisfactory 
comprehensive central education authority", as recommended by the Secondary 
Education Commission, and he attacked what he perceived to be the Bill's 
studied attempt to weaken the school boards, entrench the voluntary schools 
in a "non-voluntary condition" and disturb the religious compromise established 
73 by the 1870 Act. Yoxall's criticisms presaged the direction of subsequent 
Opposition censure of the measure, his judgments being reiterated by numerous 
Liberal Members. 74 
70Ibid: 538-544. 
7111 Essence of Parliament", Punch, llO (1896): 179. 
72PD, 4th Series, 39 (1896): 548. 
73 Ibid: 564-570. 
74 See, for example, the speeches of James Bryce and F.A. Channing. Ibid: 
571-575, 575-578. 
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Despite the initial objections raised by the Opposition, the 
Government were optimistic the measure would pass eventually. As Balfour 
informed the Queen, the Bill's complex and controversial provisions would 
preclude "an easy passage through its various Parliamentary stages. Never-
theless, the first of these stages has been got through as successfully as 
the most sanguine supporters of the Government had dared to hope, which, so 
75 far, is of good augury for the future". 
However, this optimism was rapidly proven misplaced. In the wake 
of first reading the various opposition forces organized against the measure. 
At numerous gatherings in England and Wales, Nonconformists attacked the 
proposals, echoing the criticisms expressed by the Liberals in the House. 76 
Their objections to the Bill were aptly summarized in the "manifesto" 
issued by the London Nonconformist Council: 
The Bill practically involves the destruction of the present educational 
system and substitutes a measure which is retrograde in principle and 
destructive of popular control ••. It damages the existing School Board 
system by subjecting them to the control of unsuitable bodies .•• It 
makes increased grants of public money to sectarian schools without 
requiring the continuence of existing voluntary contributions •.• It 
will foment sectarian strife and bitterness in every county by 
encouraging a system of distinctive religious education which will be 
worked in the interests of sacerdotal superstitions 11 .77 
The Opposition publicized its position on the Bill in an effort to mobilize 
national feeling against it. Acting in the interest of the Nonconformists, 
Liberal associations convened meetings and passed resolutions condemning the 
75 Balfour to Queen Victoria, March 31, 1896, quoted in G.E. Buckle, Letters 
of Queen Victoria, 3rd series, 3 vols. (London, 1926: 1930-1932), 3, p. 28. 
76
see for example, the Times, 9 April, 1896, p. 7; 10 April, 1896, p.8; 
11 April, 1896, p.8; 15 April, 1896, p.10; 16 April, 1896, p.12; 17 April, 1896, 
p.11; 18 April, 1896, p.10; 25 April, 1896, p.9; 30 April, 1896, p.11. For 
Nonconformist agitation against the Bill, see J.E. Munson, "A Study of Non-
conformity in Edwardian England as Revealed by the passive resistance movement 
against the 1902 Education Act" (D.Phil. dissertation, Oxford University, 1973), 
pp. 71-78. 
77The Times, 18 April, 1896, p.10. 
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measure; 78 M.P's took to the public platform, frequently in concert with 
79 Free Churchmen, to decry the Unionists' proposals and to urge that the Bill 
be "energetically opposed on the second reading". 80 Urban school boards 
d h . . d b . . h · 1 81 proteste t eir proJecte su mission tote town counci s. The Brighton 
School Board voiced the objections of many of its counterparts around the 
country when it denounced the provisions subjugating school board expenditures 
to the supervision and control of the new authorities and the granting to 
them of the means to appropriate existing board schools and prevent the 
82 
establishment of new ones. The non-county boroughs, determined not to 
relinquish their authority to the new county education committees, demanded 
that the powers and duties accorded the county boroughs by the Bill be 
83 
conferred upon municipal corporations generally. The National Union of 
Teachers approved of the proposed single authority for all education but 
insisted its members be "directly elected by the parochial electors ad hoc" 
h h b . d f h ·1 
84 
rat er tan eing rawn rom t e county counci s. Fearing the effects of 
tightened expenditures, the Union opposed rate limitation and it denounced 
Clause 27 "as likely to cause controversy without effecting much change 11 • 85 
78 See the Times, 9 April, 1896, p.7; 15 April, 1896, p.10; 16 April, 1896, p.12; 
17 April, 1896, p.11; 30 April, 1896, p.11. 
79rbid., 10 April, 1896, p.8; 16 April, 1896, p.12; 30 April, 1896, p.11. 
80
rbid., 3 April, 1896, p .8. 
81 A.S.T. Griffith-Boscawen, Fourteen Years in Parliament (London, 1907), p.101. 
82The Times, 30 April, 1896, p.11. See also E. Lyulph Stanley, "The New 
Education Bill", Contemporary Review, 69 (1896): 741-760. Stanley was then 
Vice-chairman of the London School Board. 
83The Times, 17 April, 1896, p.11. Ibid., 25 April, 1896, p.9. 
84
rbid., 8 April, 1896, p.5. 
85
rbid., 3 April, 1896, p.8. 
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The denominationalists were not entirely satisfied. The Anglicans in general 
supported decentralization, albeit with reservations, 86 but criticised the 
. d . d 87 S 11 d f d. . d 88 1 ai grant as ina equate. ome ca e or irect rate ai, an appea 
supported by Lord Cranborne in the House. 89 Roman Catholics gave the measure 
their approval but urged that voluntary schools be placed upon equal footing 
with board schools with regard to "maintenance11 • 90 
Opposition even emerged within the Unionist party itself. Some 
Nonconformist Unionists openly condemned the Bill as detrimental to national 
education and warned that if the Government pressed forward with the measure 
"the country would witness another split11 • 91 Others voiced their opposition 
to Chamberlain, 92 who was himself placed in a very difficult situation by 
the Bill. When a Radical, he had agitated for a universal system of 
compulsory, free, and unsectarian education financed out of the rates and 
subject to public control. He had opposed the public funding of voluntary 
schools and the "permissive sectarianism" provided by the 1870 Act. His 
switch to the Unionist Party in 1886 had apparently not diminished his support 
86
rbid., 30 April, 1896, p.11. The Convocation of Canterbury approved decen-
tralization but urged the Bill be amended to make the appointment of non-council 
members to the new education committees compulsory rather than optional. 
87Ibid., 11 April, 1896, p.8; 16 April, 1896, p.12; 25 April, 1896, p.9; 
29 April, 1896, p.12. 
88
rbid., 17 April, 1896, p.11. 
89PD, 4th series, 40 (1896): 633-636. 
90The ~, 9 April, 1896, p.7; 24 April, 1896, p.12. 
91
rbid., 25 April, 1896, p.12. 
92
rbid., 16 April, 1896, p.12. 
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for board schools nor his commitment to Nonconformist interests. 93 
Nevertheless, having earlier indicated to Gorst that he would support the 
measure,
94 following its introduction into Parliament he upheld it publicly. 
His justification for preserving the voluntary schools was two-fold: 
"practical politics" precluded the abolition of a system supported by a 
majority of parents and, more importantly, the prohibitive cost to ratepayers 
of replacing them with board schools ruled out that alternative; and he 
95 
maintained that the Bill left the Cowper-Temple clause untouched. 
96 Although, on this occasion, "bold dexterity carried his argument", he 
prudently avoided participating in debate on the measure. 97 
Chamberlain's acquiescence and the Government's comfortable 
majority in the House no doubt contributed to the apparent assurance with 
which Gorst approached the next stage of the Bill. In moving for second 
reading on May 5 he sanguinely observed: "The facts which I have stated on 
First Reading have never been contradicted, and the inferences drawn from 
those facts have never been controverted, so that we may start on the 
further discussion of the Measure upon common grounds 11 , 98 an evaluation 
93
cruickshank, pp. 15-16, pp. 40-46. Peter Fraser, Joseph Chamberlain 
(London, 1966), pp. 5-15, 17-20. Garvin, 3, pp. 152-153. Richard Jay, Joseph 
Chamberlain (Oxford, 1981), pp. 11-19. 
94 Barnett Papers, F/BAR/141. S.A. Barnett to F.G. Barnett, 29 February, 1896. 
For Chamberlain's change of position on the continuation of the voluntary 
schools see L.O. Ward, "Joseph Chamberlain and the Denominational Schools 
Question", Journal of Educational Administration and History, 2 (1973): 21-24. 
95Public Record Office (hereafter referred to as PRO), Ed.24/13a/4. Extracts 
from Mr. Chamberlain's speech at Birmingham Town Hall, May 1, 1896. 
96Garvin, 3, p. 154. 
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chamberlain offered only brief comments on the Bill during its long passage 
through the House. See, PD, 4th series, 40 (1896): 585; 41 (1896): 862, 1590. 
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which even the pro-Government Times termed too liberal and over-optimistic.99 
Notwithstanding this display of confidence, his subsequent address was 
"studiously uncontentious and conciliatory",lOO an approach doubtless prompted 
by the preceding clamour from opposition factions and the knowledge that the 
Liberals had already prepared amendments to the Bill. 
Gerst dealt in turn with the various objections to the measure, 
giving particular attention to the most contentious proposals - the 
decentralizing, financial, and religious provisions. He dismissed as 
redundant the demands for a central authority, claiming that the existing 
Committee of Council could adequately fulfill this role, having jurisdiction 
over the Education and Science and Art Departments which it could "mould and 
combine at will".lOl This was a debatable argument given the current state 
of administrative chaos. He defended the proposed special aid grant to 
voluntary and necessitous board schools by presenting it as the most viable 
solution to the problems they presented. Faced with the acknowledged evils 
of the present system, Parliament could choose one of three options: it 
could accede to the continued inadequacy of a major portion of the nation's 
elementary schools, or sanction State financing of the entire cost of 
education, or provide special aid to necessitous schools from Imperial funds. 
Recognizing that the bulk of the Members and the general public preferred 
the latter course of action, he endeavoured to capture support for his 
decentralizing measures by presenting the new county authority as an 
99The Times, 6 May, 1896; p.11. 
lOOibid. 
lOlPD, 4th series, 40 (1896): 557. 
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indispensable part of the proposed aid scheme. He asserted that if 
Parliament accepted the special aid provision they would, of necessity, 
have to approve the creation of local education authorities: 
It is impossible for a central department to discriminate between school 
and school, or to make a selection of those which really require aid. 
That can be done only by a local authority which has the means of 
ascertaining the circumstances of each school; and no central department 
can secure that the grant should be applied really to increase the 
efficiency of the schools ... You cannot do that without having a para-
mount authority which will hold the balance between the Boards and the 
managers of the Voluntary schools - an authority which will take a calm 
and dispassionate view of the general educational needs of the district, 
which will distribute this special aid grant as far as it will go ••. 102 
Gorst denied that the proposed authorities were designed to directly undermine 
the school boards, stressing that under decentralization they would remain 
unchanged save for requiring local authority sanction to increase their 
maintenance expenditure. 103 However, his denial could not disguise the 
fact that the new authorities constituted an indirect threat to the boards' 
autonomy. As Liberal H.H. Asquith subsequently pointed out, once established 
the education committees would possess an educational and financial control 
h b d ff · · 1 · t th · f · 104 overt e oars su icient to great y restric eir unctions. Gorst 
rejected the claims that Clause 27 subjected the board to clerical control, 
asserting that, on the contrary, the provision would introduce greater 
"religious freedom and toleration" into the system by securing the right of 
parental choice. He pointed out that currently this right was frequently 
denied. In single school districts some children were obliged to submit 
to religious teaching which was contrary to their beliefs, or go without 
l02Ibid: 559-561. 
l03Ibid: 561-562. 
l04Ibid: 579-582. 
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religious instruction altogether. Thus, Clause 27 provided the most 
equitable solution to this difficulty. 105 Despite the moderateness of his 
delivery, Gorst's remarks reflected his frustration with his opponents' 
continued exploitation of the so-called "religious difficulty", which he 
considered an artificial and politically-contrived issue bearing little 
resemblance to actual conditions in the schools. 106 
Following Gorst's motion for second reading, the Opposition 
resumed their onslaught on the Bill, relentlessly prosecuting the issues 
. d d . 1 · d b 107 raise uring ear ier e ates. Yet, despite the vehement hositility of 
the Liberals, the Bill was overwhelmingly endorsed at this stage, passing 
second reading with a majority of 267, 108 the Irish Nationalists having 
thrown their support behind the measure on behalf of the English Catholic 
109 
schools. However, thereafter the Bill met with ever-increasing 
difficulties. Commencement of the Committee stage was delayed by the 
Whitsuntide recess, thereby adding a time factor to the Bill's various 
problems, raising the fear that the few weeks remaining in the current 
session would prove insufficient for the passage of so large and contentious 
a measure. With the onset of debate the Bill's prospects were further 
diminished by an intensification of Liberal obstructionism and Unionist 
l05Ibid: 564-566. 
106111t was a happy thing that this religious difficulty was little heard of 
in the schools themselves, and gave little trouble to the teachers, but it 
was a great deal heard of in Parliament and in public discussion, and it gave 
a great deal of trouble to those who had to legislate upon the subject" 
[Sir John Gorst on National Education", the Times, 21 December, 1895, p.11.] 
See also PD, 4th series, 39 (1896): 566-567. 
107 see for example the speeches of R.H. Asquith, F.A. Channing, J.H. Yoxall, 
and J. Bryce, !'.Q, 4th series, 40 (1896): 567-595, 595-603, 657-667, 688-705. 
l08Ibid: 1252-1258. 
109 See the speeches of John Dillon and T.P. O'Connor, Ibid: 1216-1224, 1214. 
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110 Members' own protracted speeches. Then, only hours into Committee, the 
Conservatives themselves launched a chain of events which was ultimately to 
seal the Bill's fate. Party backbencher, Albert Rollit, who was also 
Chairman of the Association of Municipal Corporations, moved an amendment to 
compel all boroughs and not just county boroughs to appoint education 
committees. This move was rejected by Gorst chiefly because, as he pointed 
out, it would result in a proliferation of local authorities to the point 
111 
where viability of devolution would be endangered. Just then Balfour 
entered the House, having missed the exchange between Rollit and Gorst, and 
112 proceeded to accept the amendment for boroughs of 20,000 and above. 
This action, in addition to opening the door to an avalanche of amendments, 
served to heighten the uncertainty surrounding the measure, and "the House 
adjourned in bewilderment11 • 113 
Balfour now advocated that the Bill be hung up and Parliament be 
adjourned - not prorogued - in August until early January, when debate could 
resume on the Bill. Then, hopefully, it could be enacted before March when 
the exigencies of Supply would oblige the Government to begin a new Session. 
However, this plan would not prevent the Opposition from resuming their 
destructionist tactics, resistance the Government was powerless to curtail, 
llOGriffith-Boscawen, p. 103. 
111!:Q, 4th series, 41 (1896): 896-902. Rollit's amendment had been formulated 
in response to pressure from many non-county boroughs who were opposed to 
being subjected to the county councils (see Ibid, 4th series, 40 (1896): 
1229). 
112
rbid., 4th series, 41 (1896): 902-907. 
113Griffith-Boscawen, p. 104. 
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Balfour having already announced that the Bill would not be closured by 
compartments. 114 Despite its incongruity, Balfour's proposition was 
115 accepted. However, following a further week of discussion, at the end of 
which only two lines - fourteen words - had been carried and ·i,238 amendments 
116 
remained on the Paper, Lord George Hamilton, Secretary of State for India, 
urged Salisbury "to withdraw our Bill, remodel it and under new and more 
favourable conditions reintroduce it •.. Our men are disheartened, and 
divided, and unless we in a very short time cut the rope of the noose round 
117 
our necks we shall be strangled". Hamilton's assessment of the most 
suitable course to be followed came to be shared by the remainder of the 
Ministers in the Commons. 
118 However, Salisbury, together with the Queen, 
opposed the plan, fearing that such action would weaken the Government's 
credibility as an energetic and unified Parliamentary force in what was the 
first full session of the new Parliament. Despite Salisbury's urgings that 
it stay with the Bill, the Cabinet in the Commons decided to drop the measure119 
114
.fQ, 4th series, 41 (1896): 1079-1080. 
115Griffith-Boscawen, p. 105. 
116
.fQ, 4th series, 41 (1896): 1572-1574. 
117s 1· b a is ury 
in Marsh, p. 
Papers, Lord George Hamilton to Salisbury, 19 June, 1896, quoted 
253. 
118Queen Victoria to Salisbury, 19 June, 1896, in Buckle, 3rd series, 3, pp. 
52-53. Queen Victoria to Salisbury, 20 June, 1896, Ibid., p. 54. 
119 Salisbury to Queen Victoria, 22 June, 1896, cited in Ibid., p. 54. No 
record appears to exist indicating exactly how Gerst was informed of the 
decision. There is no hard evidence to substantiate the oft-quoted report 
that the Cabinet delegated the Duke of Devonshire to perform the task, 
whereupon he simply went to Gerst and stated baldly, "Gerst your damn Bill's 
dead". [See, for example, B.M. Allen, Sir Robert Morant (London, 1934), 
p. 109. Hereafter referred to as Allen, Robert Morant. Armytage, p. 180. 
Bishop, p. 136. L. Grier, Achievement in Education: The Work of Michael 
Ernest Sadler, 1885-1935 (London, 1952), p. 62. Holland, 2, p. 272, nl.] 
Gerst himself maintained there was no truth to the story but added that 
"he couldn't recall anything truer or more characteristic of the Duke". 
[H.E. Gerst, Much of Life is Laughter (London, 1936), p. 125.] 
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and its abandonment was announced in the House by Balfour on June 22, at 
which time he intimated the Government would replace it next session with a 
120 
smaller measure designed to aid the voluntary schools. 
Save for Salisbury, the Queen, 121 and Gorst, who was "in great 
straits" over the action, 122 few mourned the loss of the Bill. 123 The Webbs, 
who had hoped to get it amended to their satisfaction, termed its failure 
"discreditable11 • 124 Opponents, however, were jubilant. Sir William Harcourt 
125 
"sounded a long note of triumph in the House"; the Reverend Hugh Price 
Hughes, editor of the Methodist Times, exulted that a "proud government" had 
been humbled "when it truckled to Clericalism and Popery'', 126 while Liberal 
H.J. Wilson observed that his party "were in great spirits and the Tories 
hardly pretended to be sorry11 • 127 
Various explanations were subsequently offered for the Bill's 
failure. Parliamentary Observer Henry Lucy cited Balfour's ineptitude, 128 
an assessment with which Balfour's neice later concurred. 129 Balfour himself 
120Pn, 4th series, 41 (1896): 1572-1581. 
121Queen Victoria to Salisbury, 23 June, 1896, cited in Buckle, 3rd series, 
2, p. 56. 
122Quoted in Sadleir, p. 148. 
123
criffith-Boscawen, p. 106. 
124Beatrice Webb, Our Partnership, ed. B. Drake and M.I. Cole (London, 1948), 
pp. 132-133. 
125
criffith-Boscawen, p. 106. 
126Quoted in Munson, p. 77. 
127H.J. Wilson to Gertrude Wilson, 24 June, 1896. Wilson MSS. M.D.2605-6. 
Quoted in Ibid., p. 78. 
128Henry Lucy, Diary of a Unionist Parliament, 1895-1900 (Bristol, 1901), p.100. 
Hereafter referred to as Lucy, Unionist Parliament. 
129 B.E.C. Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour, First Earl of Balfour, 2 vols. 
(London, 1936), 1, p. 245. 
227. 
asserted that Opposition obstructionism destroyed the measure, 130 a view 
shared by Conservative M.P. Arthur Griffith-Boscawen. 131 Liberal Sir William 
Harcourt claimed that the Bill "perished not from any factious opposition 
but from its inherent imperfections 11 • 132 Gorst apparently believed that a 
combination of Balfour's behaviour and the Cabinet's machinations, 133 plus 
antagonism of the school boards 134 and the bungling of Keckewich\35 the 
Secretary to the Education Department, destroyed the measure. 
There was, in fact, a degree of accuracy in all of these judgments. 
Although Liberal obstructionism was frequently based upon fallacious 
136 arguments, their criticisms were in certain cases justified because of 
130PD, 4th series, 41 (1896): 1572-1581. 
131Griffith-Boscawen, p. 106. 
132PD, 4th series, 41 (1896): 1584. 
133Following Balfour's acceptance of the Rollit amendment and the Cabinet's 
subsequent decision to put aside the Bill until January, Gorst observed, 
somewhat bitterly, that "even when dealing with Education Bills, political 
considerations have often as great a force as educational ••• ", hence the 
deference to the non-county boroughs on the issue, despite his objections 
[see, Ibid: 1109]. 
134shortly after the withdrawal of his Bill, Gorst told Keckewich that a 
concession requested by the National Association of School Boards might be 
included in a future Education Bill, as "A provision of this kind might be 
a useful sop to the School Boards and mitigate some of their hositility to 
the next Bill". [PRO, Ed .11/32. Gorst to Keckewich, 3 July, 1896.] 
135c.W. Keckewich, The Education Department and After (London, 1920), p. 102. 
136one such case was the Liberal claim that the county councils were unfit 
to assume the responsibilities accorded them in the Bill because of their 
inexperience in educational matters. (See for example the speeches of James 
Bryce and Mark Oldroyd, PD, 4th series, 39 (1896): 574. Ibid., 40 (1896): 
1191-1194.] However, in the first few years of fulfilling their functions 
under the Technical Instruction Acts, the county councils had displayed a 
remarkable level of competence, a fact attested to by the Bryce Commission. 
[See the speeches of Henry Hobhouse, Sir Francis Powell, and Sir Albert Rollit, 
Ibid., 4th series, 40 (1896): 791-793, 615-620, 680-688]. 
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inadequacies inherent in the Bill. Gorst's attempt to decentralize the 
education system's administrative framework was a perceptive response to 
his own conviction of a felt need and to current public opinion, newly 
137 
strengthened by the Bryce Report, which favoured similar ch~nges. 
However, though the principles underlying the measure were sound, the 
138 
mechanisms chosen to effect the necessary reforms were faulty • The 
decentralizing provisions left central administration relatively unchanged. 
Although the creation of local level education committees would relieve the 
Education and Science and Art Departments of some of their bureaucratic 
responsibilities, the Charity Commissioners were left untouched to continue 
their involvement in the educational process in conflict with the new 
authorities. Thus the administrative muddle would have been only partially 
modified. 139 Gorst's claim that the Committee of Council could effectively 
function as a central authority by moulding and combining the Education and 
Science and Art Departments, while allowing the Charity Commissioners to 
140 
continue operating in accordance with current procedures, was not supported 
by past experience. Thus, Gorst's misplaced confidence in the Committee's 
abilities constituted an error of judgment on his part which weakened his 
scheme and, thereby, detracted from the Bill's credibility. It is possible 
that Garst' s misjudgment derived from his unfamiliarity with the "machinery 
137Kazam1.·as, 71 91 p. ' p. • 
138J R D. 1 II h •. 1.gg e, Te 
435-448. Diggle was 
Education Bill, 1896", National Review, 27 (1896): 
then Vice-Chairman of the London School Board. 
139see f!!., 4th series, 40 (1896): 690-692. Speech of James Bryce. See 
also Diggle, pp. 436-438. 
140f!!., 4th series, 40 (1896): 557-558. 
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of national education", as Beatrice Webb surmised, 141 a deficiency which no 
doubt could have been corrected by the judicious intervention of the 
Education Department's permanent officials but evidently was not. This was 
perhaps recognized by Gorst, following the Bill's demise, which 1rould account 
for his according Keckewich partial blame for the measure's failure. 142 
A more critical impediment to the satisfactory functioning of 
Gorst's devolution scheme, if implemented, was the retention of the school 
boards alongside the new education committees. This duplication would not 
only increase overlap, but, in addition, the committees' unavoidable 
infringement of the boards' rights would produce a friction which would 
intensify rather than remove administrative confusion. 143 Abolition of 
the school boards would have resolved the problem but, as Gorst evidently 
recognized, for various reasons this was not an available option at this 
time. Despite the confusion created by the dual system, officialdom was 
reluctant to recommend the change, apparently regarding it as logistically 
too radical a solution to the difficulty. For example, the Bryce Commission 
141B. Webb, pp. 133-134. 
14211He (Gorst) attributed to me, rightly or wrongly (I forget which but it 
matters little) the framing of the groundwork of the Bill ••• which, in his 
opinion, eventually led to its withdrawal" [Keckewich, p. 102]. As Keckewich 
was an avid promoter of the school boards it may be that he consciously 
refrained from pointing out the deficiencies in the decentralizing proposals, 
in which case Gorst's criticisms were not without justification. 
143PD, 4th series, 40 (1896): 762, 1087. Speeches of Sir Charles Dilke and 
Sir James Woodhouse. See also, Armytage, p. 180. Cruickshank, p. 65. 
Elie Halevy, Imperialism and the Rise of Labour, 2nd ed. trans. E.I. Watkins 
(London, 1951), p. 192. 
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felt that, despite their inefficiency in rural areas, the boards were too 
firmly entrenched in secondary education to be summarily dismantled. 144 
Moreover, abolition was politically inexpedient. By the 'nineties the 
success of the urban school boards had garnered for them such strong 
support from the Liberals and the working classes that their arbitrary 
removal would have arrayed a formidable electoral force against the 
Go h h . h h f 11 . d 145 Mo · 1 vernment, at reat w ic t ey u y appreciate . st important y, 
perhaps, the need to preserve the Unionist coalition precluded the 
suppression of the boards. Any action in this direction would have been 
resisted by Chamberlain and his Liberal-Unionist supporters, thereby creating 
a disunity with the potential to split the alliance - a risk the Government 
146 
were not prepared to take. Given these circumstances, Gorst's decision 
to retain the school boards was justifiable. 
The proposed special aid grant was an additional weak point in the 
Bill. AB many of the Government's own supporters argued, the provision of 
4s per head was insufficient to allow voluntary schools to reach parity with 
the board schools and would have merely postponed but not prevented their 
144 
"The ground of Secondary Education is, if the metaphor may be permitted, 
already almost all covered with buildings so substantial that the loss to 
be incurred in clearing it for the erection of a new and symmetrical pile 
cannot be contemplated". [Bryce Report, Vol. I, p. 1, quoted in P.L.P. 
Clarke, "The Education Act of 1902" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
London, 1964), p. 17.] 
145Kazamias, p. 93. See also the speech of Tory Ernest Gray, PD, 4th series, 
40 (1896): 804. Gray observed that the abolition of the school boards and 
the establishment of one single county authority "for the express purpose 
of education was an ideal, but he was afraid that any responsible Government 
would find the realisation of such an ideal beyond the range of practical 
politics". 
146 Armytage, p. 180. Halevy, p. 192. 
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1 . d 1· 147 u timate ec ine. Moreover, the grant provided no permanent solution to 
the voluntarists fiscal problems, such aid being vulnerable to the vagaries 
of party politics. For, as one Opposition member noted, the continued 
inadequacies of the voluntary schools, following implementation of the 
provision, "would strengthen the temptation of the next Government to step 
in and mercifully give the system its coup-de-grace". 148 The Liberals 1 
chief objection to the grant - that there would be insufficient popular 
control over the voluntarists' expenditure of public funds, 149 was 
150 
unjustified because, as Viscount Cranborne amongst others pointed out, 
h B. 11 . d . . f . 1 · h 1 151 t e i containe provisions or precise y Just sue contra • 
Clause 27, providing for denominational teaching in board schools, 
added to the Bill's defectiveness by prompting the most formidable obstruc-
tionism against its passage by Liberals and Nonconformists determined to 
protect the religious independence of those institutions. The clause's 
retention, despite Chamberlain's warning of its potential for arousing 
147
see for example the speeches of Unionist M.P's, PD, 4th series, 40 (1896): 
603-606, 611, 616-617, 633-635, 770-771, 807-811, 1028-1029, 1040-1050, 1097. 
148
rbid., 40 (1896): 659. AB Garst later pointed out, to achieve this end 
the Liberals could simply "cut off supplies in the House of Commons, and 
render impossible the distribution of any exceptional grant". [J.E. Garst, 
"Prospects of Education in England", North American Review, 163 (1896): 
427-437. Hereafter referred to as Garst, "Prospects of Education". 
149 See for example PD, 4th series, 39 (1896): 558, 565-568; 40 (1896): 600, 
622-624, 1083, 1156. 
150
rbid., 4th series, 40 (1896): 635-636, 1097-1098. 
151Bill to make further provision for Education in England and Wales (Bill 172), 
PP, 1896, 1: 541-559, Section 4, Clause 5. 
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"parliamentary agitation" and Gorst' s willingness to eliminate it, 152 was 
apparently sanctioned because of Salisbury's commitment to such reform in 
d f f An 1 . . 153 e ence o g ican interests. He had previously expressed to Churchmen 
his concern regarding the Nonconformist character of much board-school 
religious instruction, 154 and late in November 1895 he had assured the 
Anglican bishops that "from a point of view of religious liberty we desire, 
so far as we can do it, to assist the voluntary schools in their trouble 
tt 155 However, in defence of the Government it must be noted that in 
pursuing their parliamentary opposition the school board supporters were 
guilty of a great deal of cant which owed very little to mass opinion. The 
bulk of the working classes, whose children occupied the majority of places 
in board-school classrooms, were, through ignorance or indifference, largely 
unconcerned with the possible threat to religious liberty which the 
156 Opposition claimed Clause 27 represented. This suggests that the school-
board supporters' vehement parliamentary opposition to Clause 27, which 
effectively impeded the Bill's progress, was orchestrated to defend a narrow 
self interest. 
152 Balfour Papers, Add. MSS. 49791, f.10. Memorandum from J.E. Gorst, 
21 December, 1895. 
153
see Salisbury's speech to Nonconformist deputation, November, 1895, 
reported in the School Guardian, 30 November, 1895. Cited in Marsh, p. 251. 
154
see for example the Times, 22 March, 1895, p. 5. Ibid., 13 June, 1895, 
p. 12. 
155Ib'd., 21 N mb 1895 4 ~ ove er, , p. . 
156 For an analysis of working-class reaction to this issue see J.S. Hurt, 
Elementary Schooling and the Working Classes 1860-1918 (London, 1979), 
pp. 172-178. 
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Despite its various weaknesses the Bill was not without potential. 
As Clarke has observed, "in its most important aspects it anticipated the 
1902 Act", 157 and the Vice-Chairman of the London School Board, Joseph 
Diggle, believed that, with suitable amendments at the Committee stage, it 
158 
could have been turned into a viable measure. That the Bill was with-
drawn before it had its chance in Committee was not primarily the result 
of Liberal obstructionism, as Balfour claimed. It was, rather, the 
outcome of the Government's own strategy. Given the Unionists' overwhelming 
parliamentary majority they could have carried the measure despite Liberal 
resistance, a fact Opposition members conceded. 159 Thus, Justice described 
the Unionist cave-in as "oneof the most remarkable in modern political 
history". 160 Evidently, the reason the Government did not bring its 
majority to bear, and so save the Bill, was because there was insufficient 
161 
support for the measure amongst the Unionists themselves. While many 
damned it with faint praise, 162 others openly opposed the measure: some, as 
has been noted, denounced the aid grant as inadequate, while others rejected 
the secular control to be exercised by the local authorities over the 
voluntary schools and the Metropolitan Conservatives feared that the London 
School Board, which they controlled, would be subjected to a London County 
C . 1 d . d b . d R d · 1 
163 
ounci ominate y Progressives an a ica s. Moreover, Chamberlain 
157 Clarke, p. 383. 
158J. Diggle, "The Education Bill 1896", National Review, 27 (1896), 435-448. 
159PD, 4th series, 40 (1896): 594. Speech of R.H. Asquith. See also the speech 
of Liberal Mark Oldroyd, Ibid., 41 (1896): 1604. 
160Quoted in Brian Simon, Education and the Labour Movement 1870-1920 (London, 
1965), p. 161. Justice was the journal of the Social Democratic Federation. 
161PD, 4th series, 41 (1896): 1584-1585, 1599. Speeches of Liberals Sir William 
Harcourt and Mr. Henry Labouchere. 
162Ibid., 40 (1896): 1205. Speech of T.P. O'Connor. 
163Griffith-Boscawen, p. 102. Marsh, p. 252. 
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told the Duke of Devonshire "there was no real enthusiasm for the Bill" 
amongst Liberal Unionist Churchmen. 164 Consequently, in order to avoid 
internal division, the Government chose to s·acrifice the Bill. 165 
Thus, it would appear that Balfour's acceptance of Rollit's 
amendment, which triggered off the developments leading to the measure's 
abandonment, was a calculated manoeuvre designed to subvert the Bill. Hence, 
Balfour's action was not taken out of "ignorance and rooted unconcern" for 
h . . l . d 166 t e measure, as one critic c aime . Rather, it was the logical extension 
of his realization that the combination of apathy and antagonism towards 
the Bill, present within his own party, precluded the maintenance of a 
determined parliamentary struggle for its passage. Having reached this 
conclusion he then convinced the Cabinet, but not Salisbury, of the wisdom 
of his plan to drop the Bill, a decision which Gorst, being outside this 
circle, could do little to influence. 
Considering the attention Gorst had given to the Bill since the 
Autumn of 1895, it is not surprising that he "took umbrage" at its failure, 167 
particularly the manner in which it was withdrawn. Even Lady Randolph 
Churchill, who had "no pity" for Gorst, could appreciate that "it must be 
galling to have brought in a Bill of your own creation and to have Balfour 
164Balfour Papers, 49669, ff.84-111, Joseph Chamberlain et al., "The 
Education Bill 1896", quoted in Munson, p. 78. 
165 see "The First Failure", the Spectator, 76 (June 27, 1896): 908. 
166 J "Th T. . Macnamara, e 
See also Lucy, Unionist 
167Keckewich, p. 102. 
Education Bill", Nineteenth Century, 49 (1896): 998. 
Parliament, p. 100. Dugdale, I, p. 245. 
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h 1 b . t" 168 take it out of your ands and not even consu t you a out i • However, 
it appears that, this humiliation apart, the Bill's loss was not totally 
unwelcome to Garst. According to his confidant, W.T. Stead, Garst did not 
particularly regret "the failure of the attempt to subordinate the interests 
of education to the demands of clericalism11 • 169 This seems to indicate that, 
upon reflection, Garst had come to appreciate more fully the extent to which 
his proposals had been manipulated by the Government, particularly Balfour, 
and the Church, to accommodate more completely their own interests, 170 a 
perversion he believed had been compounded by the ineptitude of the 
Education Department officials. 171 However, he was evidently consoled by 
the belief that, should public opinion demand a new Bill, he would have the 
opportunity to make a new beginning. 172 
In an effort to stimulate such a demand, and ensure the Government 
responded to it, Garst now worked to keep educational issues in the public 
173 
eye. During the parliamentary recess of Autumn 1896, he used the 
periodical press to arouse public opinion through his ideas, in an attempt 
to force the hand of the Unionist leaders, "and compel them, however 
168R.S. Churchill, Winston S. Churchill, Companion Vol. 2 to Vol. 2, p. 728. 
Lady Randolph Churchill to Winston S. Churchill, quoted in N.D. Daglish, 
"The Educational Work of Sir John Garst" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Durham, 1974), p. 223. 
16911 Progress of the World", Review of Reviews, 14 (July, 1896), p. 6. Garst 
may have communicated his displeasure at this interference to Stead even prior 
to the measure's withdrawal. R.G. Gretton claimed that the Liberals "shrewdly 
suspected that Sir John Garst, though officially responsible for it (the Bill) 
had no great love for it as a whole". (R.G. Gretton, A Modern History of the 
English People, 1880-1910, 2 vols. (London, 1913), 1, p. 395.) 
170Daglish, p. 225 
171Grier, pp. 58-62. Keckewich, p. 102. 
172 Barnett Papers, F/BAR/143, S.A. Barnett to F.G. Barnett, 11 July, 1896. 
173see The Times, 10 August, 1896, p.10. Ibid., 18 September, 1896, p.10. 
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reluctant they may be, to face the duty of educating our people". 174 In 
an article entitled "Prospects of Edu7ation in F.ngland", published in the 
" . " . 175 October 1896 issue of the North American Review, Garst castigated his 
fellow politicians for allowing "party spirit" to delay educational reform 
at a time when such reform was imperative if England was to regain her 
industrial supremacy which had been lost to her foreign competitors. 
Despite this urgent need England's statesmen "will postpone reform 
176 indefinitely ••• to secure a party advantage thereby", he declared. 
He then outlined the directions reform must take if England was 
to achieve educational parity with her European rivals. In so doing, Garst 
returned to the principles which had underlined his original proposals for 
the 1896 Bill. The inefficient voluntary schools must be up-graded to board 
school level in order to raise the national standard of elementary education, 
to provide a firmer base upon which to build technical education. Thus, 
the voluntary schools must be given additional financial assistance, preferably 
rate-aid, as any Imperial subvention was liable to withdrawal by a subsequent 
hostile government. Rate-payer sanction of such rate-aid could be obtained, 
he intimated, by permitting local authorities to negotiate with voluntary-
school managers for a measure of control over their expenditures, in exchange 
for such assistance - his experiences with the 1896 Bill evidently having 
convinced him that only under such conditions would the Opposition approve 
rate assistance to the denominationalists. The quality of rural education 
17411 England I s Need of Education: Two Manifesto es by Sir John Garst", Review 
of Reviews, 14 (1896): 428-430. 
-
175
see footnote 148. 
176 Garst, "Prospects of Education", p. 227. 
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must also be improved, as the instruction presently offered to the nation's 
future agricultural workers was inferior to that provided the children of 
the European peasantry, which explained the supremacy of foreign agriculture 
and the current agricultural depression in England, he argued. Thus, the 
inefficient rural board schools must also receive additional financial aid. 
M>reover, their organization, along with that of the rural voluntary schools, 
must undergo rationalization because "No improvement in education is 
possible in rural districts until voluntary schools are grouped by some 
system of federation •.• and some educational authority is provided which 
is more fit to manage than the village board", these reforms allowing for 
. d 1 . f d . 1 ffi . 177 Go . ffi . improve panning ore ucationa e ciency. vernment ine ciency 
constituted a further obstacle to educational progress. Funding for 
secondary education was channelled through a variety of competing, unco-
ordinated agencies, which produced an overlapping of functions - resulting 
in waste of money and effort. It was essential that reforms be effected 
immediately in order to introduce the needed coherence and coordination 
into the system. To this end, a paramount education authority should be 
established in every district and given sole responsibility for dispensing 
public funds. Moreover, "That district should be the county, because that 
is already the area of the Technical Instruction Acts 11 • 178 Gorst concluded 
by warning that if future attempts to legislate for educational progress 
"were thwarted for the sake of party victory, and if the difficulties which 
had been pointed out are to be made greater still by the infusion of 
sectarian and religious animosity, it is very improbable that a system of 
education can be established which will enable the workers of England to 
compete on fair terms with their foreign rivals" .179 
177 Ibid., P• 434. 
178Ibid., p. 437. 
179Ibid. 
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Gorst's admonitions reflected his awareness of the importance of 
national education to Britain's industrial and agricultural future, a 
significance he had emphasized even prior to his appointment to the Committee 
of Council, 180 and his frustration that the necessary reforms should be 
impeded by the self interest of partisan politicians. However, the majority 
of his party chieftains lacked the vision which motivated Gorst's concern 
and their attitudes towards educational reform continued to be shaped 
primarily by political considerations. Thus, following the failure of the 
1896 Bill, the Government were reluctant to attempt once again a reorganiza-
. f h d · 181 d b G d h d . d tion o tee ucation system, as urge y orst, an t ey turne instea 
to a piece-meal approach to reform. 
In September 1896, on Devonshire's instructions, Education 
Department officials began preparing a new, "more limited" Education Bill. 182 
Also, a committee was established, under Gorst's chairmanship, ostensibly 
to scrutinize the Science and Art Department's funding methods but in 
actuality to examine ways by which supervision of secondary education could 
be transferred from the school boards to the education committees of the 
county councils, as proposed in the failed Bill. 183 It is probable that 
this subterfuge originated with Gorst. 184 Although the minute establishing 
180
see "Social Politics in England: An interview with Sir John Gorst", 
Review of Reviews, 3 (1891): 266-270. Hereafter referred to as "Social Politics". 
181 Halevy, p. 192. Sturt, p. 404. 
182 S 1 · b 233 D h S a is ury Papers, , evons ire to alisbury, 13 September, 1896. 
183Allen, Robert M>rant, pp. 113-114. 
184Daglish, p. 263. 
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185 
. 1 i 1 t e onunittee was written y evons ire, it was a most certa n y at 
Garst I s instigation, for, according to Keckewich, Devonshire was not an 
innovatory President. 186 
However, Garst was not to have charge of the new Education Bill. 
Although Balfour had been "widely blamed" for the failure of the 1896 
187 measure, he succeeded in convincing the Cabinet that the fiasco was 
primarily the product of Gorst's ineptitude188 and that, given the Vice-
President I s "want of dexterity as a parliamentary pilot11189 he, Balfour, 
ought to manage the Bill. 190 The Government's decision to by-pass Garst, 
which apparently was not finalized until after November 7, 191 may have been 
clinched by his renewed public agitation on behalf of devolution and rate-
aid to voluntary schools which he launched in the November 1896 issue of 
185Report of the Conunittee appointed to inquire into the Distribution of the 
Science and Art Grants (Cmnd. 8417), PP, 1897, 33: 421. 
186Keckewich, p. 93. Keckewich claimed that Devonshire "never initiated any 
change, and was quite content to ••• avoid the more laborious work of 
providing for the future". Canon Barnett apparently also believed the 
Conunittee resulted from intrigue on the part of Garst. Barnett told his 
brother, Garst "has got a strong conunittee to overhaul South Kensington ••• 
I fear he is playing with edged tools". [Barnett Papers, F/BAR/152, S.A. 
Barnett to F.G. Barnett, 24 October, 1896. The "South Kensington" referred 
to is the Science and Art Department. It derived this designation from its 
geographical location in South London.] 
187sidney H. Zebel, Balfour: A Political Biography (Cambridge, 1973), p. 86. 
188salisbury Papers, 233, Devonshire to Salisbury, 13 September, 1896. See 
also, Griffith-Boscawen, p. 115. "To many independent members this appeared 
a rather severe judgment, many being of the opinion that if the First Lord 
had allowed Sir John to manage his Bill in his own way things would have 
fared better ••. 11 
189Griffith-Boscawen, p. 115. 
190 Balfour Papers, B.L. Add. MSS. 49769, f.112, Devonshire to Balfour, 7 November, 
1896. Salisbury Papers, 233, Devonshire to Salisbury, 13 September, 1896. 
191 Balfour Papers, B.L. Add. MSS. 49769, f.112. Devonshire to Balfour, 7 November, 
1896. Wrote Devonshire, "I think I had better take the opportunity of telling him 
(Garst) that you will take charge of the Bill, and that he will not be held 
responsible for its deficiencies". 
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N. h C 192 ineteent entuTy. In it he outlined how several previous governments 
had made unsuccessful attempts to establish local education authorities 
empowered to assist voluntary schools out of the rates, illustrating "how 
ignorant of the past these party politicians were who brought against ••• 
193 the Bill of 1896 the accusation of novelty". He reiterated his earlier 
arguments justifying devolution and rate-aid to the denominationalists, 
now emphasizing that in exchange for increased public funding of their 
schools their managers must be prepared to accept increased public control: 
"Managers must submit to such conditions as ratepayers may properly require 
for securing the efficiency of secular education in their schools 11 • 194 
As this was a condition demanded by the Liberals and their Nonconformist 
allies, Gorst's argument could be interpreted as a concession to the 
Opposition. In actuality, Gorst was displaying a prescience which was to 
be proved correct. He recognized that rate-aid represented the only funding 
sufficient to upgrade the voluntary schools to board school level and thus, 
195 
must of necessity, come to be accepted. 
However, Gorst's recommendations were largely ignored by his 
Government colleagues. Following the withdrawal of the 1896 Bill, Chamberlain 
ascertained that the Nonconformist Unionists were now willing to sanction 
additional State assistance to the voluntary schools, but would reject any 
attempts to provide them with rate aid or to introduce denominational 
religious instruction into the board schools. He also learned that any 
192 J.E. Gorst, "The Voluntary Schools", Nineteenth Century, 40 (1896): 699-710. 
Hereafter referred to as Gorst, "Voluntary Schools". 
193Ibid., p. 699. 
194Ibid., p. 710. 
195D 1· h ag l.S , p. 244. 
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proposals which threatened these schools, or altered the way education was 
administered at the local level, would alienate his supporters from the 
196 Government. Thus Chamberlain concluded that the new Bill should be 
restricted to relieving necessitous voluntary and board schools out of 
Imperial funds, but, unlike Gorst, he urged that the grant be distributed 
by the Education Department rather than the local authority. 197 
Salisbury, not wishing to repeat the fiasco of the previous Session, 
determined that the new Bill should eschew reorganization and concentrate 
198 
upon easing the voluntary schools' financial problems. Balfour also 
proposed that financial relief be given solely to the voluntary schools, 199 
but he did accept some of Gorst's proposals. 
. . "d h d . . 1 · 200 giving rate ai tote enominationa ists. 
He was prepared to consider 
In addition, his genuine 
desire to raise the standard of voluntary school education201 prompted him 
to support Gorst's proposed "system of federation" for these institutions, 
196 Memorandum by John Boraston, 22 October, 1896, on the Education Bill of 
1896, Balfour Papers, B.L. Add. MSS. 49769. Cited in Marsh, p. 271. 
197salisbury Papers, 235, Chamberlain to Salisbury, 11 November, 1896. 
198salisbury preferred, however, that the additional aid be applied strictly 
to denominational instruction, apparently because he believed that, otherwise, 
the "educationists" in the schools would squander the funds upon secular 
education: "if you let him (the educationist) such according to his will, he 
will soon have swallowed up the slender increase of sustenance you are now 
tendering to the voluntary schools. So long as you leave him to determine 
what improvements shall be exacted, you are giving no relief at all to the 
voluntary schools 11 [Salisbury to Balfour, 20 November, 1896, Balfour 
Papers, B.L. Add. MSS. 49690. Quoted in Marsh, p. 272.] 
199 salisbury Papers, 234, Draft by A.J. Balfour on Education Question, 
9 November, 1896. 
200P.R.O. Cab. 37/43, Memorandum for the Cabinet from A.J. Balfour, 8 
November, 1896. Cited in Marsh, p. 272. 
201The T-i~e·s·, 4 February, 1896, p. 7. 
242. 
in the belief that it offered a suitable means of achieving the necessary 
upgrading by providing the organizational machinery for improving voluntary 
202 
school management. Thus Balfour's draft for the new Education Bill 
contained provisions for establishing voluntary school associations on the 
Gorst model. It did not, however, include a rate-aid clause, the Cabinet 
evidently having vetoed that proposal. Instead it made provision for a 
special aid grant to the voluntary schools to be distributed by the 
Education Department in conjunction with the new associations, 203 not 
through a local education authority, nor to the poor board schools, as Gorst 
continued to advocate. 204 The draft also retained from the 1896 Bill two 
other provisions aimed at easing the denominationalists' financial burden: 
the abolition of the 17s-6d per child limit on Government grants to voluntary 
schools, and the exemption of their buildings from rating. 205 
As these proposals exceeded what Chamberlain and Salisbury wanted 
they provoked prolonged and contentious debate in Cabinet, particularly 
between Balfour and Chamberlain who were in "considerable disagreement as 
206 to both principles and procedure". The proposal to create voluntary 
school associations proved a particularly divisive issue. Chamberlain was 
suspicious of their ecclesiastical character, while Salisbury was alarmed by 
the potential for control given to the educationists in such organizations. 207 
202salisbury Papers, 236, Cabinet Memorandum by A.J. Balfour, 16 November, 1896. 
203Ibid. 
204The Times, 13 November, 1896, p. 4. 
205salisbury Papers, 236, Cabinet Memorandum by A.J. Balfour, 16 November, 1896. 
206G . arvin, p. 154. Marsh, p. 272. 
207Marsh, p. 272. Salisbury's fear was prompted by Balfour's provision that 
allowed the combined associations to select delegates to "advise the Department 
as to the distribution of grants between the schools of the Association" [see, 
Salisbury Papers, 236, Cabinet Memorandum by A.J. Balfour, 16 November, 1896.] 
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Under pressure from these two Ministers, the Cabinet voted 10 to 8 to modify 
208 Balfour's proposals, and the finalized Bill, which was eventually intro-
209 duced into the House on 4 February, 1897, represented a compromise between 
the opposing viewpoints. It gave an additional grant of 5s per child to 
voluntary schools, granted them rate-exemption for their property, and 
abolished the 17s. 6d. limit, but provided for only an emasculated version 
of the Balfour/Garst scheme for voluntary school federation. 210 
There is no evidence to suggest that Grost participated directly 
in the Bill's preparation and his behaviour during debates implies the 
contrary. He rose only to respond to an Opposition member's taunt that Garst 
"rather agreed with the criticisms of the Bill than with the arguments in 
f . II 211 support o it . However, rather than expressing his own views he delivered 
a brief speech assessing the measure from the perspective of a member of 
Committee of Council, thereby emphasizing his exclusion from the framing of 
the Bill - a fact that Balfour had already signalled when he and not Garst 
introduced the measure in the House. 212 Garst noted that the Committee 
"do not question whether it is desirable or undesirable that the Voluntary 
Schools should exist" but, given that fifty percent of the nation's children 
attended them, were duty bound "to accept with gratitude any legislation 
which Parliament may pass to make these schools efficient". 213 In reply to 
208Note by Chamberlain, 2 December, 1896. Chamberlain Papers, JC5/5/25. 
Cited in Marsh, p. 272. 
209 PD, 4th series, 45 (1897): 1415. The measure, being a money bill, was first 
introduced to a Committee of the Whole House in the form of a resolution. See 
Ibid: 926-936, 944. 
210ibid: 1415. 
211Ibid., 4th series, 46 (1897): 474. Speech of F. Lockwood. 
212Annual Register, 1897, p. 29. 
213RQ, 4th series, 46 (1897): 482-483. 
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Opposition Members' expressed scepticism with regard to the ultimate 
recipients of the grant, he gave assurances that the Committee would see 
that it went to the schools and was not diverted into relieving subscribers. 
Gorst did, however, adopt a more approbatory stance with regard to the 
school associations, observing that they could ensure that the truly 
necessitous schools received the grant while also serving to improve 
214 
voluntary school management. 
Although his speech contained nothing derogatory, Gorst 1 s "subtle 
modulation of the voice investing innocent syllables with barbed point11 , 215 
quite clearly indicated his dissatisfaction with his colleagues on the 
Treasury Bench and his distaste for the Bill, which excluded most of the 
reforms he had been advocating. The significance of Gorst's approach was 
not lost on the Opposition, Campbell-Bannerman observing that the Government 
would derive little satisfaction from Gorst's remarks. 216 Not surprisingly, 
Gorst's speech was received in complete silence by the Tory Front Bench. 
However, his behaviour subsequently drew a scathing attack from H.H. Asquith, 
who termed Gorst's taciturnity "a grave Parliamentary scandal", 217 a somewhat 
harsh judgment considering his dissociation from the Bill had been imposed 
from above - a fact of which Parliament, including Asquith, were fully 
cognizent. 218 
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Despite determined opposition from the Liberals and Nonconformists, 
the Bill passed second reading 355-150, thirty eight Irish Nationalists 
219 
voting with the Government. In order to limit Opposition obstructionism, 
and so ensure the measure's passage in time to provide the voluntary schools 
with financial relief in the current year, Balfour applied closure in 
C . 220 ommi.ttee. Consequently, this stage was concluded on March 18th, and the 
221 Bill passed Third Reading on March 25th. 
Although "surprise was generally expressed that he was willing to 
retain office after such a slight", 222 Garst appears to have accepted the 
Government's shunning of him with equanimity. According to Beatrice Webb, 
Garst considered the relatively modest Voluntary School Bill a humiliation 
for Devonshire rather than for himself because at Cabinet level, where the 
final decisions on the measure had been taken, the Ministers had ridden 
223 
roughshod over the Duke's opposition to the proposals. He may also have 
been solaced by the knowledge that the measure contained, albeit in a 
diluted form, his federation of voluntary schools and by the fact he was 
219PD, 4th series, 46 (1897): 607-612. 
220
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currently making some progress towards implementing another of his proposals, 
the empowering of county and county borough councils with the responsibility 
for administering secondary education. Following some twenty two meetings, 
Gorst's Committee created to devise a non-legislative method of accomplishing 
224 this step, produced its report which proposed this change be implemented 
immediately. The Committee recommended that this be accomplished through 
the insertion into the Science and Art Directory for 1897 of an appropriate 
clause allowing county or county boroughs to become the authority for 
Science and Art in their districts by obtaining recognition from the Depart-
ment at South Kensington. 225 This step was duly taken by the Science and 
Art Department, the proposal becoming Clause 7 of its Directory. Under 
this regulation county and county boroughs were permitted to administer 
secondary education in their areas through their existing Technical 
Instruction Committees. 226 Although school boards retained their right to 
provide higher-level education, schools and classes coming into operation 
after the regulation came into force would usually be eligible for grants 
only if working in cooperation with the county authority. 227 Thus, although 
Clause 7 appeared innocuous on the surface, in reality it was the first in 
a series of administrative steps designed to undermine the advanced work 
carried out by the school boards in preparation for a future rationalization 
of educational administration in which they would have no part. As Lyulph 
224 Seep. 238 above 
225 Report of the Committee appointed to inquire into the Distribution of the 
Science and Art Grants (Cmnd. 8417), PP, 1897, 33: 426-427. 
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Stanley observed some three years later when this process was well underway, 
"Sir John Gerst .•. openly makes the boast that as he failed by legislation 
to supersede School Boards by county councils, he will do administratively 
what he cannot do by law11 • 228 
Having successfully obtained the objective for which his Committee 
had been formed, Gerst now concentrated his efforts upon obtaining passage 
of the Government's new educational measure, the Necessitous Board Schools' 
Bill. When the Voluntary Schools' Bill had been before the House in 
February the Government had resisted Opposition pressure to have the 
measure's provisions extended to necessitous board schools but had promised 
that a Bill to relieve these institutions would be introduced "at as early 
a date as possible 11 • 229 Evidently the Government entertained some doubts 
230 
as to the advisability of entrusting the new measure to Gerst, but they 
eventually relented and he was given the responsibility for introducing and 
piloting it through the Commons - his performance apparently constantly 
231 
monitored by his Treasury Bench colleagues. The resolution authorizing 
the increased grant to be given by the Elementary Education Act (1870) 
Amendment Bill was introduced by Gerst in the Commons on April 5. 232 
228E. L. Stanley, "Higher Elementary Schools", Contemporary Review, 78 (1900), 
p. 645. 
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The measure proposed to make available supplemental grants to boards in 
poor districts where the local authority's rate-income was insufficient to 
adequately meet its portion of the board-school costs, which it shared 
with the State. Gorst estimated that 555 out of 769 school boards would be 
/J 
assisted from the total new grant of,;1'110,602 to be distributed under the 
. . 233 
new prov1.s 1.ons. 
Although Opposition members denounced the proposed aid as totally 
inadequate, 234 they did not obstruct the measure because to do so would have 
been inexpedient, as Acland acknowledged, since "it was perfectly obvious 
thatci110,ooo was better than nothing, they must not vote against the 
clause". 235 Consequently, the Bill passed third reading on May 20th. 236 
Though the measure was doubtless produced in response to the Opposition's 
persistent demands, the principle upon which it was based originated with 
Gorst, appearing first in his 1895 proposals and in his ill-fated 1896 Bill. 
Thus, even though his contribution to the drafting stage of the Board 
Schools Bill appears to have been limited to an unsuccessful attempt to 
provide more flexible funding, 237 Gorst deserves some of the credit for the 
educational benefits provided by this legislation which became the Elementary 
Education Act, 1897. 238 
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The passage of the Voluntary and Board Schools Bills eased the 
inunediate educational crisis facing the Government but, as Gerst reminded 
them in the House, the critical problems of overlap and waste of effort in 
secondary education still awaited resolution. Moreover: 
every year which passes over our heads without a proper reorganisation of 
our system of higher education above the elementary, not only makes the 
problem more complicated and more difficult of solution, but raises up 
a crop of opposition to any kind of reform that may be proposed, which 
may make either legislation or administrative reform impossible11 .239 
However, Gorst's warnings elicited little response from either side of the 
House. The prevailing mood of Parliament was unpropitious for the 
furtherance of additional educational reforms, both Government and Opposition 
240 having succumbed to lethargy. Following a bout of intra-party 
dissention over the Workmen's Compensation Bill, 241 the Government were 
disinclined to embark upon further domestic legislation242 and, in any case, 
they were becoming increasingly preoccupied with foreign and Imperial 
affairs, particularly Britain's relations with Germany and the deteriorating 
situation in South Africa. 243 The Liberals, enfeebled by ineffective 
leadership, weakened organization and internal indiscipline, were incapable 
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of galvanizing the Unionists into action. 244 
The Government's indifference only served to increase Gorst's 
determination to effect reforms and he now utilized the parliamentary recess 
of 1897 to campaign for improvements in the educational system, particularly 
the raising of secondary education standards through a rationalization of 
its organization. In a series of speeches delivered during November and 
December, Gorst emphasized that this rationalization was required in order 
to provide a system in which the English work force could acquire the skills 
comparable to those received by its European rivals, thereby enabling the 
nation to meet the ever-increasing industrial competition from the Continent 
and the United States. 245 Parliament's current apathy towards social issues 
prompted him to urge that the people initiate reform at the local level 
through their county councils. They could use for this purpose existing 
funds such as the "Whisky Money" and they could also co-operate with the 
246 Science and Art Department. This latter option had of course been 
facilitated by the recent implementation of the Clause 7 revisions to that 
Department's Directory. Gorst stressed, however, that the reform of higher 
education was meaningless unless accompanied by improvements in elementary 
244P. Adelman, Gladstone, Disraeli and Later Victorian Politics (London, 1970), 
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education, which were necessary to produce pupils capable of benefitting 
from post-elementary instruction. Raising the school-leaving age was 
essential to achieving this condition but this was effectively blocked by 
the self-interest of the ruling party. The Government would not act because 
its members belonged to a class "that was not concerned with the necessity 
or desirability of higher education for the people. They hold the opinion 
that there were certain functions which had to be performed in the modern 
life of civilised communities which were best performed by people who were 
ignorant 11 • 247 
Evidently, Gorst's criticisms were prompted not only by his 
exasperation with the Unionists' attitudes towards education but, also, by 
frustration arising from his continued exclusion from policy formation, 
for the Government were currently preparing a measure to reorganize the 
central authority for education without consulting him on the issue. 248 
Gorst's resentment was clearly visible in his speeches. He observed that 
his subordinate position in the Government obliged him to withold his 
personal opinions in the House, rendering him merely the Education Department's 
"mouthpiece" in debate. Thus, he "had to defend the measures and the policy 
of the Government, but ... had no voice in determining what those measures 
d 1 h ld b II 249 an that po icy sou e . He described his office as "a bit of a sham" 
because he exercised far less influence on education than was popularly 
believed. He was "more like the figurehead of a ship which turned into any 
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channel into which the steersman was pleased to direct it". 250 Although 
apparently delivered in a bantering tone, judging by the laughter they 
elicited, Gorst's comments reflected his annoyance with the Administration's 
persistent disregard for his position. 
Gorst's agitation for reform and criticism of the Government 
continued, in and out of the House, following the resumption of Parliament 
in February 1898. In a speech given February 7 at Cambridge, he intimated 
that progess in higher education was being inhibited by Ministerial inter-
ference in the operations of the Education Department. The future success 
of technical education depended upon Department officials being "left to 
themselves" to co-operate with county councils in the promotion of such 
education, he declared. 251 The following month he told a deputation from 
the Women's Industrial Council that their mutual objective to raise the 
compulsory school-leaving age was unlikely to be achieved under the current 
Administration. To obtain such legislation would require the acquiescence 
of the Government's landowning supporters around the country and experience 
had shown that they would oppose any increase of education to "those whom 
they look upon as their future labourers". 252 During an April 19 Commons' 
debate on a Lloyd-George resolution calling for additional school boards and 
more non-sectarian teacher-training, 253 Gorst censured Parliament and 
particularly the Government, for indulging in irrelevant religious contro-
versies at the expense of critical educational problems. Given that the 
250Ibid., 21 December, 1897, p.11. 
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Unionists' comprehensive scheme for educational reform had been rejected 
by Parliament, it was essential that the Government proceed with individual 
measures, in accordance with a settled policy, with priority being given 
to the most urgent issues. "The idea is to get more children into the 
existing schools, to get them there in a condition to receive instruction, 
and to keep them there until a later age". 254 Thus, existing problems such 
as irregular attendance, insanitary buildings, and underfed children 
incapable of benefiting from instruction, required immediate resolution. 
As long as these difficulties remained unresolved "you cannot compete in 
technical or commercial education with your Continental rivals. Your 
higher schools will languish for lack of a sufficient supply of scholars 
properly grounded in the elements, and your labour and your money will be, 
255 
to a great extent, thrown away". 
Gorst's insinuations regarding the Government's lack of initiative 
on educational reform doubtless increased their animosity towards him, 
particularly as his call for action from the Treasury Bench was acclaimed 
by Liberal Members. His speech was punctuated by "Opposition Cheers" and 
"Opposition laughter" and Sir William Harcourt was moved to observe that 
Gorst was "a reforming educationist at heart and if we can only strike off 
his arms those fetters which restrain his true inclinations we might get 
something for the advantage of this country11 • 256 
254Ibid: 499. 
255Ibid: 500 
256rbid: 504. See also the speech of Liberal Earnest Gray, Ibid: 505. 
254. 
Gorst's statements of April 19 were, however, but an overture to 
a more detailed expose of the state of national education which he gave in 
257 the Commons on June 17. It was given in the presence of both Balfour 
and Chamberlain, who had remained in an almost empty House apparently in 
an effort to discourage Gerst from making any further censorious pro-
258 
nouncements. However, their attendance did not inhibit Gerst. The 
failure of his 1896 Bill, and his subsequent exclusion from the Government's 
educational policy formation, had evidently convinced him that as Vice-
President he could do little to achieve educational reform and, thus, his 
only chance for obtaining legislation lay in his ability to rally public 
259 
opinion behind the necessary but unpopular reforms which he advocated. 
Thus, his speech, delivered with "amazing and embarrassing candour11 , 260 
provided a critical assessment of the deficiencies afflicting national 
education. His arguments were essentially the ones presented in his previous 
speeches but they were now reinforced with indisputable facts and figures 
taken from official sources. 
Using the report of the Education Department's Chief Inspector 
to substantiate his claim, Gerst alleged that terminating elementary 
education at age eleven years produced children unable to cope intellectually 
with higher instruction, thereby obliging the secondary and continuation 
257Ibid., 4th series, 59 (1898): 587-605. 
258 Lucy, Unionist Parliament, pp. 238-239. " the situation suggested 
the case of a child, known to be subjected to ungovernable paroxysms of 
naughtiness, sent out to take a constitional under the supervision, not of 
one able-bodied nurse, but of two". 
259
naglish, p. 308. Bentley B. Gilbert, "Sir John Eldon Gerst: Conservative 
Rebel", Historian, 18 (1956): 160. 
260The Times, 18 June, 1898, p.11. 
255. 
schools to provide basic education rather than the advanced technical and 
commercial work for which they were intended. Until this situation was 
redeemed it was pointless to talk of England competing in technical 
education with her foreign rivals. Educational inefficiency was being 
further eroded by pupil absenteeism and by the condition of many of those in 
attendance who, because of malnutrition or fatigue brought on by "half-time" 
work, were unable to benefit from the instruction given. Garst asserted 
that irregular attendance in some rural areas was chiefly the consequence 
of landowners' employing children for casual labour, an allegation he 
supported with evidence from the reports of school inspectors. This 
testimony was "suspiciously irritating to the country party", who 
constituted the bulk of the Government support, and who, having caught the 
drift of Gorst's speech "now clustered in momentarily increasing numbers 
below the gangway". 261 
Garst then proceeded to offend the urban Tories by demonstrating 
how the staffing of urban voluntary schools with untrained and pupil 
teachers produced a poorer quality of instruction and lower academic 
standards in these schools than in their board-school counterparts. This 
inferiority extended even to Bible teaching, he claimed. Garst noted that 
he could have suppressed the facts but "What a traitor I would be to my 
Church if knowing the danger I were too cowardly to give a warning of it 
by telling the truth11 • 262 However, he did hasten to exonerate the voluntary 
261 Lucy, Unionist Parliament, p. 240. 
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school managers from the blame for these deficiencies, asserting that they 
resulted from a paucity of funds, which the aid-grant enacted the previous 
year had done little to alleviate. The voluntary-school economic and 
educational difficulties could be overcome, he insisted, through the 
provision of rate aid under local control. 
Gorst reiterated his oft-repeated statements concerning the 
inefficient state of rural education, during which he succeeded in directing 
further criticisms against the county Tories. Quoting from yet another 
inspector's report, he showed that whilst the inefficiency of rural education 
stemmed partly from the labourers' ignorance of the value of education, 
which translated into early school leaving for rural children, the lower 
educational standards among the rural population were also the product of 
the landowners' negative attitudes towards schooling. "They associate 
agricultural depression and low rents with compulsory education, and they 
grudge to pay for that teaching which deprives them of servants and 
furnishes their labourers with wings to fly from the parish". 263 The remedy 
for rural educational inefficiency lay in improved local organization and 
supervision, he claimed, specifically that which could be provided by 
replacing rural boards of guardians with county council education committees, 
as proposed in his 1896 Bill. 
Gorst concluded by warning that the benefits which England derived 
from her Empire and free-trade policies would be squandered in the future 
if the nation's workers were too ignorant and ill-trained to compete with 
their foreign counterparts. However, the required system of secondary 
263 Ibid: 600. 
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education must be built upon a foundation of sound elementary education and, 
thus, reform "must begin with the elementary schools, otherwise the technical 
institutions and the commercial colleges will fail for lack of properly 
prepared boys and girls on which to operate11 • 264 
Gorst's statements, particularly those on voluntary-school 
inefficiency, drew down upon his head the wrath of Government supporters 
who did not appreciate the fact that his criticisms were prompted by a 
desire to stimulate Government action on educational reform. Evidently, 
their anger was rooted in the knowledge that his revelations were basically 
accurate and, thus, uncontradictable. As Lucy observed, "It was because 
it was all so incontestably true that it was fatally damaging". 265 Being, 
thus, unable to convincingly dismiss Gorst's allegations as conjecture, 
Government supporters were obliged to attack his speech on other grounds. 
Lord Cranborne criticized him for enumerating problems without offering 
· bl 1 t· 266 d . Go t' f t f t "bl suita e sou ions, espite rs s requen re erences o possi e 
remedies during the course of his speech. This criticism was repeated by 
U . . M P' H Hobh d C A C . 26 7 d h d b h T. nionist . s enry ouse an .. ripps, an ec oe y t e imes, 
which also accused Gorst of disloyalty, suggested his behaviour was prompted 
by frustration with his current minor role in policy formation, 268 and 
269 intimated he should be removed from the Education Department. The attack 
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was subsequently continued in the Lords by the Archbishop of Canterbury, who 
accused Gorst of overstepping his authority in impugning the voluntary 
schools and demanded that the President of the Committee of Council, 
"explain in some satisfactory manner" this behaviour on the part of his 
subordinate. 270 In responding, Devonshire displayed considerably more 
tolerance of Gorst's actions than his parliamentary colleagues, perhaps 
271 because he appreciated the sincerity which had prompted them. He 
attempted to conciliate the county Tories offended by Gorst's observations 
on the landowners' reactionary stance on education with an expression of 
regret that such an assertation had been made by an Education Department 
official, and with a personal affirmation of the landowners' contributions 
to rural education. 272 However, he devoted the remainder of his speech 
to defending Gorst's pronouncements in his April 19 speech and during the 
June 17 debate on the Education Estimates. Gorst's observations represented 
not an attack on the voluntary schools but, rather, an expression of concern 
by one "anxious - sincerely anxious - to increase the efficiency of both 
Board and Voluntary Schools, and of one who is deeply impressed by the 
difficulties under which elementary education suffers " 273 He 
emphasized that Gorst's revelations regarding voluntary school efficiency 
had been made in the hopes of promoting their alleviation but that the 
270PD, 4th series, 61 (1898): 631-634. 
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bluntness of his delivery had apparently served to obscure this intention, 
creating consternation amongst the denominationalists. He assured the 
House that Gorst's views on the voluntary schools had never biased his 
administration of that system. 
Gorst now halted briefly his public agitation and gave his 
attention to a measure currently being devised within the Education 
274 Department which was designed to enact several minor amendments to 
existing Elementary Education Acts. This so-called "Omnibus Bil111275 
contained two proposals to promote an increase in elementary school 
attendance and allow for the raising of the school-leaving age, reforms 
for which Gorst had been agitating. It also included a provision permitting 
boards of guardians to defray the cost of the education received in public 
elementary schools by poor law children, 276 thus facilitating the attendance 
of such children in the schools, a step recommended by the Poor Law Schools 
Committee in their 1896 Report upon which Gorst had had a strong influence. 277 
Thus, these proposals would appear to bear the imprint of Gorst's reforming 
hand, but, beyond this, his role in the Bill's formulation seems to have 
been restricted to that of fulfilling his official function of intermediary 
274 Halevy, 5, p. 193. 
275P.R.O. Ed. 31/18/1. Keckewich to Gorst, 25 May, 1898. 
276 Ibid. 
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278 between the Cabinet and the Education Department. AB the measure's 
provisions were relatively uncontentious, 279 its acceptance by the various 
Departments concerned was virtually automatic, 280 and the final draft was 
submitted for Cabinet approval on July 21. 281 Although the majority of 
the Ministers apparently raised no objections to the Bill, 282 Balfour 
opposed its introduction because this "would be contrary to a pledge which 
he had given in the House ••. 11 • 283 Consequently, the measure was effectively 
shelved and by March 1899, with no action having been taken in the interim, 
Garst believed the Bill dead. 284 
With the Government's educational legislation thus at a standstill, 
it is not surprising that Garst welcomed the opportunity to support Liberal 
M.P. W.S. Robson's Private Members' Bill, which proposed to raise the 
school-leaving age from eleven to twelve years, particularly as it was, as 
Robson noted, "nothing more than a clause taken from the 1896 Bil111 • 285 
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Gorst gave the Bill his unqualified approval, noting that its adoption 
"would improve the education of the country" and adding that the nation 
should regard it as a point of honour to fulfil the pledge given at the 
286 Berlin Conference and so far unredeemed. Perhaps because the Bill 
served to highlight the Government's inaction on education, Gorst's 
287 treasury bench colleagues were unenthusiastic about the measure, leading 
him to caution Salisbury that Unionist opposition to its passage would be 
politically unwise. There was a strong desire for such a measure among 
"all classes of the Electors" and, thus, "It would be most disastrous to 
our prospects at the next Election, if the defeat of the Bill can be 
288 
attributed to our apathy by our opponents". Gorst's warning was 
apparently taken to heart by the Government for the Bill survived its 
passage through both Houses and was subsequently enacted as the Elementary 
Education School Attendance Act (1893) Amendment Act, 1899. 289 
With Parliament currently focussing on Education, Gorst took the 
opportunity to press the Government for action on the languishing Omnibus 
Bill, but though Cabinet "raised no objections to the measure 11 , 290 it was 
not brought forward in the 1899 session. During the parliamentary recess 
of Autumn and Winter of 1899-1900, Gorst successfully resisted attempts to 
286 Ibid: 972. 
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291 
emasculate the measure and after Parliament reassembled in February 1900 
he pressed for its introduction. 292 On this occasion he succeeded, the 
Bill being presented in the Commons by Gorst on March 26. 293 It subsequently 
enjoyed a smooth passage through the Commons, emerging from Committee 
"without amendment of any kind ••• 11294 and passing third reading on July 
295 31, thereby marking one more enactment of a provision from Gorst's 
1896 Bill. 296 
By permitting Gorst only a nominal say in the formulation of this 
minor measure, the Government once again underscored their determination 
to limit his direct influence on official policy. They had not, however, 
succeeded in restricting his reform agitation, for while the measure was 
shelved he had worked assiduously to keep the issues of school attendance 
and child-employment before the public eye. From various platforms around 
the country he had denounced the current situation in which close to a 
million children remained outside the system and considerable numbers of 
those who attended were unfit to learn " ••. owing to their employment out 
of school hours for extravagantly long periods at ridiculously low wages 11 • 297 
291Ibid., ·H. Pooley to Keckewich, 13 December, 1899. Ibid., Gorst to 
Keckewich, 16 December, 1899. Ibid. Ed. 31/18/25, H.W. Orange to H.M. 
Lindsell, 4 January, 1900. Ibid., Gorst to Keckewich, 14 January, 1900. 
292Ibid., Ed. 31/18/25, Gorst to Devonshire, 8 February, 1900. 
293PD, 4th series, 81 (1900): 334. 
294Ibid., 4th series, 87 (1900): 202. 
295Ibid., 202. 
296see, 63 and 64 Viet. Ch. 53. An Act to amend the Elementary Education 
Acts, 1890-1893 (Elementary Education Act, 1900). 
297The Times, 29 October, 1898, p.9. Gorst's speech at Liverpool. See 
also his speeches at Sheffield, Cambridge and Bradford, Ibid., 28 October, 
1898, p.8; 12 December, 1898, p.16; 12 January, 1899, p.8. 
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When the 1899 parliamentary session began he spoke out even more forcefully 
on these issues during the debate on Supply. Armed with statistics drawn 
from a recent Parliamentary Return, he painted a lurid picture of the 
prevalence of child employment and the condition of wage-earning children. 298 
The Return, with supplementary additions, revealed that 145,000 so-called 
full-time pupils were actively engaged in some form of remunerative employment, 
a figure which was only partially representative of the actual numbers of 
children employed. Many children worked long hours for meagre wages:-
six-year olds turned hose for 20 hours per week for 6d; tiny girls seamed 
hose for 16 hours per week for ld. Some children laboured excessive hours:-
2,390 worked between 41 and 50 hours per week, while 793 worked in excess 
of 50 hours weekly. Using the figures supplied by the Return, Gorst 
calculated the average earnings of these children as approximately ls per 
299 
child, per week. Thus, as Lucy observed, had Garst occupied the 
Opposition benches "he would naturally and reasonably have concluded by 
moving a note of censure on the Ministry which permitted such inequities 
to survive" but, being a member of the current Administration, he was 
obliged to forego this step and, instead, terminated his speech by 
disclaiming any personal responsibility for the situation he had outlined.300 
His function as Vice-President, he pointed out, was officially defined as 
assisting the President of the Committee of Council and acting under his 
298Pn, 4th series, 70 (1899): 830-841. 
299 Ibid: 833-839. 
300 Lucy, Unionist Parliament, p. 285. 
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direction, a role he had "endeavoured to the best of my ability to 
perform "since his appointment to the office. 301 
Ironically, it was not Gorst's revelations pertaining to irregular 
attendance and wage-earning children that drew parliamentary-fire, as he 
had intended, but his declaration of unaccountability as Vice-President. 302 
Although there was some willingness to acknowledge that he was restricted 
by the limitations of his office, he was rebuked for not insisting upon 
303 
"those reforms his Department thought necessary", and there were 
suggestions that he should resign from "an office for which he shows his 
contempt ..• 11304 . Thus, Gorst's speech had largely the effect of reducing 
temporarily his credibility in the House, 305 at a time when his position 
on the Front Bench was a significant weapon in his fight for educational 
reform. 
Undaunted, Gorst now again utilized the periodical press to place 
the question of wage-earning children before the public eye. His article306 
was in essence a reiteration of the issues of attendance and child labour 
which he had raised in the Supply debate and in his public and parliamentary 
speeches of the preceding months. He repeated, albeit in less-detailed 
form, the statistics from the Parliamentary Return on attendance to exemplify 
301
~, 4th series, 70 (1898): 841. 
302
see for example the speeches of A. Birrell, J. Bryce, and H. Campbell-
Bannerman, Ibid: 846-848, 869-875, 911-914. 
303Ibid: 848. Speech of A. Birrell. 
304Ibid: 913. Speech of H. Campbell-Bannerman. 
305n 1· h 363 ag LS , p. • 
306 J.E. Gorst, "School Children as Wage-Earners", Nineteenth Century, 
46 (1899): 8-17. 
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the appalling labour conditions to which the wage-earning children were 
b d ' ' Go d II ' 1 'l" 307 su jecte, a situation rst terme a great socia evi . Gorst 
acknowledged that under prevailing social conditions a total ban on the 
employment of children was impossible but argued that the excesses of the 
system could be effectively reduced through the adoption of strieter methods 
of regulation to prevent "the immense injury to the children which long 
hours combined with attendance at school must cause11 • 308 He suggested, 
however, that such regulation remain, in the first instance, the responsi-
bility of the parents and only when they abused this right should the State 
intervene to protect the children. Gorst urged that the powers of restraint 
be placed in the hands of local authorities rather than the central 
government because the former "could in the main be trusted to make such 
regulations as would be suitable to the particular circumstances" in their 
309 areas. Gorst's remarks reflected not only his belief in the greater 
efficacy of local as opposed to central government, but also the continuing 
cautiousness of his attitude towards collectivism, evidence that traces of 
Tory-democratic paternalism still exercised an influence upon his reformism. 
However, he displayed no such reticence with regard to the State's obliga-
tion towards under-nourished children. If the improvident parent guilty 
of this form of neglect were subjected to the full force of the law, "there 
would be less economic danger in giving breakfast at public expense to 
307Ibid: 11-15. 
308Ibid: p. 15. 
309
rbid. 
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h " ld h · b h · had no bread to g1.·ve" •
310 
c 1. ren w o were starving ecause t e1.r parents 
Thus Gorst became the first prominent politician to publicly advocate 
government responsibility for child feeding, 311 an advocacy he was later 
to develop into a full-scale campaign for State-supported school meals. 312 
Although his article drew attention to the appalling conditions 
he sought to alleviate, once again Gorst's efforts failed to stimulate 
Government action. However, though his public agitation of 1898-1899 
prompted no immediate legislative response, during the same period he 
succeeded in making steady progress towards the achievement of his goal to 
establish county and county borough councils as the paramount authorities 
for education at the local level. The first step in this process, the 
implementation of Clause 7 of the Art and Science Directory, 313 had met 
. h f bl · h . 314 b h d b · d wit some avoura e response int e counties, ut a een resiste 
by many school boards, especially in large towns, who were opposed to 
subordinating themselves to county authorities. 315 Although throughout 
1898 Gorst continued to urge the councils and the school boards to co-operate 
in implementing Clause 7, in order to provide a co-ordinated scheme for 
310Ibid,, p. 17. 
311the Social Democratic Federation had called for State provision of school 
meals for elementary school children as early as the nineteen-eighties. 
[See, M.E. Bulkley, The Feeding of School Children (London, 1914), p.26.] 
However, as that group lacked political credibility their demands received 
little public attention. 
312see Ch. 6 & 7 below. 
313
see pp. 245-247 above. 
314PD, 4th series, 59 (1898): 576. Gorst's reply to question put by Tory 
M.P., E. Flower. 
315 Allen, Robert Morant, p.115. B.M. Allen, William Garnett: A Memoir 
(Cambridge, 1933), pp. 69-70. Hereafter referred to as Allen, William 
Garnett. Halevy, 5, p. 195. 
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secondary education in their areas, 316 he meanwhile accused the latter of 
deliberately blocking operation of the provision.317 He sought, thereby, 
to generate hostility towards the boards and public support for the concept 
of county education authorities. He emphasized that it was the county 
councils, and not the boards, which had been empowered by Parliament to 
provide post-elementary education318 and noted that, despite this, many of 
the larger boards had "established higher grade Board schools, which are 
the real secondary schools in the great towns thus taking the law into 
their own hands". 319 This was a reference to the doubtful legality of the 
school boards' provision of higher education which was shortly to form the 
spearhead of Gorst's assault against them. By the close of 1898, the 
continuing failure of the boards to co-operate on Clause 7 prompted Garst 
to intensify his criticism of their behaviour to the point where he was 
now advocating that the councils alone should constitute the foundation 
of any new local education committees, 320 a concept which was henceforth, 
under his tutelage, to command increasing influence in Education Department 
policy.321 
316 see PD, 4th series, 64 (1898): 362. The Times, 29 October, 1898, p.9. 
Ibid., 18 November, 1898, p.10; 30 November, 1898, p.7. 
317 See for example, PD, 4th series, 64 (1898): 360. The Times, 29 October, 
1898, p. 9. 
318The Times, 29 October, 1898, p.9. 
319PD, 4th series, 59 (1898): 605. 
320The Times, 12 December, 1898, p.16. 
321Hal 5 197 evy, ' p. . 
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Then, late in December, the opportunity arose for Gerst to 
further advance his plan to secure the position of the councils at the 
expense of the school boards. The London County Council decided, despite 
the objections of the London School Board, to apply to the Science and 
Art Department for recognition as the authority for secondary education 
in London under the Clause 7 regulation. The Board, recognizing that this 
would impede their future expansion in the field, immediately appealed 
against the application to the Science and Art Department and requested 
an opportunity to present a case for their own recognition. Their request 
was granted and the inquiry duly took place on February 1, 1899, with Gerst 
322 in attendance. 
The Board representatives argued that they and not the Council 
were the superior local education authority and they opposed the latter's 
application on the ground that it would severely retard their own work. 
They claimed that the Code Act of 1890 had empowered them to provide 
instruction up to any level and they warned that if the Council's application 
was accepted the Board would deliberately open new schools and classes to 
compete with those of the Council, thereby aggravating the current problem 
323 
of overlap. Alarmed by the Board's assertion of the right to educate 
324 pupils up to any standard, and vexed by their attempts to block the County 
322Allen, William Garnett, pp. 70-80. 
323
rbid., p. 85. William Garnett, A Retrospect. How the County Council 
became the Local Education Authority for London on 1st May, 1904. Reprinted 
from the Educational Record, April 1929, cited in Eaglesham, Local Authority, 
pp. 113-114. 
324Allen, Robert Morant, p. 132. 
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Council's application, 325 Garst convinced the Science and Art Department 
to decide in favour of the Councii. 326 
However, as Garst realized, this decision did not invalidate the 
Board's claim to legally provide education up to any stage, which, if 
left unchallenged, would result in the continuance of their advanced work 
at the expense of the programmes offered by the County Council, 327 and 
also interfere with his plan to establish county councils as the authorities 
for secondary education. Consequently, he now sought to contest the 
legality of the Board's claim. There was ample evidence available to 
support Gorst's efforts in this direction. Instances of school boards' 
illegally providing higher education out of the rates were to be found in 
328 329 the Bryce Commission Report and in Education Department documents, 
the most damaging data appearing in a report prepared by Robert Morant, 
Assistant to the Director of the Education Department's Office of Special 
Enquiries. 33° Consequently, Garst, with the aid of William Garnett and 
325 Barnett Papers, F/BAR/138, S.A. Barnett to F.G. Barnett, 5 February, 1898. 
326Allen, William Garnett, p. 89. 
327Ibid., p. 86. 
328see Eaglesham, Local Authority, pp. 40-41. 
329 see Gorst's speech at Paddington, the Times, 18 November, 1897, p.7. See 
also Allen, Robert Morant, pp. 117-118. 
330 Special Reports on Educational Subjects Vol. 3 (Cmnd. 8988), PP, 1898, 25: 
1-82. The National Organization of Education of all grades as practised in 
Switzerland. The information pertaining to board school illegalities was 
distributed in data within the report (see p.58, pp. 60-61, pp. 18-81. App. F.). 
Educational historians have frequently asserted that Morant's report initiated 
the chain of events which led up to the challenge of the London School Board 
expenditures in court. (See for example, Allen, Robert Morant, pp. 117-131, p.143. 
Grier, pp. 72-74. G.A.N. Lowndes, The Silent Social Revolution: An Account of 
the Expansion of Public Education in England and Wales, 1895-1935 (London, 1937), 
pp. 76-78.) However, as Daglish has noted, this analysis fails to take into 
account Gorst's agitation against school-board illegalities, which he had been 
conducting during the two years prior to the publication of Morant's report, the 
result being that the latter's role in the attack on the boards "has been magni-
fied with the advantage provided by hindsight of his later career, as well as 
general ignorance about Gorst's". (Daglish, p. 341.) 
270. 
M.P. Edward Bond, 331 arranged that Francis Black, headmaster of Camden 
332 School of Art, in his capacity as ratepayer, should contest the London 
School Board's expenditures on higher education before the district auditor, 
333 T.B. Cockerton. Black in turn retained solicitor F.W. Hales to assist 
him in the challenge and together they compiled from the Board's registers 
and accounts damaging evidence that its schools were fraudulently providing 
higher education out of the rates. 334 Gorst also ensured the public would 
be acquainted with the School Board's activities by arranging to have 
questions put in Parliament on the issue.335 
331 Garnett was then Secretary of the London County Council Technical 
Education Board and Bond was its Chairman. 
332As the Camden School was a ratepaying corporation Black was eligible to 
make the challenge. 
333 Eaglesham has asserted that Gorst was the sole instigator of the 
Cockerton case (see, Eaglesham, Local Authority, pp. 113-121). However, 
this assertion is questioned by Tony Taylor who has effectively argued 
that William Garnett played a key role in devising the strategy of a 
legal challenge to the London School Board's interpretation of the Code 
Act of 1890, a claim made earlier by Garnett himself. (See, Tony Taylor, 
"The Cockerton Case Revised: London Politics and Education, 1898-1901", 
British Journal of Educational Studies, 30 (1982): 329-348. Allen, 
William Garnett, pp. 87-88.) 
334All en, 
114-115. 
William Garnett, pp. 91-92. Eaglesham, Local Authority, pp. 
335
Allen, William Garnett, p. 89·. See, PD, 4th series, 66 (1899): 
1091, 1445-1446. 
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Black and Hales presented their case before Cockerton in a series of 
meetings during April and May, 1899 and, in a decision given in June, the 
auditor disallowed the Board's expenditure on science and art schools and 
classes, but sanctioned their provision of evening classes. Not surprisingly, 
the Board refused to accept the decision and eventually resolved to appeal 
it in High Court. 336 
Pending the appeal, Gorst turned his attention to more pressing 
educational matters, the most immediate being legislation to reorganize 
the central authority for education. As this step was "an almost indispen-
sable preliminary to the establishment of satisfactory local authorities" 
f d d · 337 h Go h d d B" 11 h" h or secon ary e ucation, t e vernment a prepare a i w ic 
provided for the merging of the Education and Science and Art Departments 
into a single department, headed by a Board of Education, which .ould also 
assume the functions of the Charity Commissioners and be charged with "the 
superintendence of matters relating to education in England and Wales 11 • 338 
Although it appears Gorst was given no role in the Bill's preparation, 339 
336Allen, William Garnett, pp. 91-93. Eaglesham, Local Authority, p. 120. 
The challenge to the Board's evening school expenditures had been made 
independently by Hales, as a ratepayer. Thereafter he made an unsuccessful 
appeal against this decision but when the arguments against the Board's 
provision of Evening Continuation Schools were subsequently endorsed by 
the decisions in the main case he did not pursue his separate case further. 
(See Eaglesham, Local Authority, pp. 128-129.) 
337 P.R.O. Ed. 24/8. Memorandum by the Lord President for the Cabinet, 
28 January, 1898. 
338PD, 4th series, 63 (1898): 666. 
339The Bill seems to have been drafted by Devonshire in collaboration with 
officials of the various Departments concerned. See P.R.O. Ed. 24/8, 
Memorandum by the Lord President to the Cabinet, 28 January, 1898. Bishop, 
pp. 259-262. 
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he was assigned to pilot it through the Connnons. This was doubtless 
because, like the Omnibus Bill, it was uncontentious, 340 its basic concept 
having the approval of both parties,341 and thus assured of parliamentary 
support. The most significant effect arising out of Gorst's association 
with the measure was his decision to second Robert Morant as his temporary 
personal assistant to advise him on the complexities of the Bill while it 
was under debate in the House. 342 This appointment set Morant upon a path 
from which he was able to exert ever-increasing influence upon the 
evolution of the nation's education system. 343 
Gorst introduced the Bill into the Connnons on June 26, 1899. 
Because, as he noted, its proposals were familiar to Members, having been 
debated previously in the Lords and out of Parliament, his outlining of them 
was perfunctory and the subsequent debate brief. 344 Although there was 
some Opposition criticism of the measure's failure to reorganize at the 
local levei, 345 the general feeling of the House was perhaps best sunnned 
up by Liberal James Bryce who expressed satisfaction at the Government's 
provision of "an organized authority to deal with secondary education11 • 346 
This feeling was subsequently translated into support for the Bill, which 
340see the speech of J. Bryce, PD, 4th series, 73 (1899): 630. 
341
speech of Liberal F.A. Channing, Ibid: 617. 
342 Allen, Robert Morant, p. 135. 
343see Eaglesham, Twentieth-Century Education, pp. 41-43. 
344RQ, 4th series, 73 (1899): 612-690. 
345
rbid: 617-618. Speech of F.A. Channing. 
346Ibid: 638. 
273. 
347 
successfully completed its passage through Parliament by August 1. 
With the establishment of the Board of Education the Committee 
of Council became defunct and, along with it, the position of Vice-President. 
However, a clause in the Act provided that the current office-holder, Garst, 
should retain his title and position until his retirement or promotion, 
while the current Administration remained in power. 348 Not surprisingly, 
Garst found the prospect of remaining in such a situation of impotency 
intolerable. He wrote to Salisbury expressing his dissatisfaction at 
having to remain in an "ornamental sinecure office" and requesting he be 
moved to "a position in which I can at least suppose myself to be of some 
use to the public service" 349 However, Garst also, somewhat tactlessly, 
reminded his leader that it was upon his request that he, Garst, had 
350 
relinquished his legal career, in 1886, to serve the Government, a 
faux pas not conducive to disposing Salisbury to accede to Gorst's appeal. 
Moreover, this situation was not helped by Salisbury's reception, at that 
point, of a letter from a group of Tory back-benchers complaining of a 
speech made by Garst in which, they claimed, he had denounced squires and 
farmers as "the greatest enemies of education in the countryside11 • 351 
As this was, according to Salisbury, but the latest in a series of 
denunciations by Tory M.P' s of Garst' s attitude towards "the Government's 
347The Bill passed second reading the same day and third reading August 1. 
See Ibid: 690-691. Ibid., 4th series, 75 (1899): 1130. It reached the 
statute books as the Board of Education Act, 1899. See 62 and 63 Viet. Ch. 33. 
348see 62 and 63 Viet. Chap. 33, Clause 1, Sect. 3. 
349S 1· b a is ury Papers, 83, Garst to Salisbury, 2 August, 1899. 
350ibid. 
351Ibid., 84, A.F. Jeffreys et al. to Salisbury, 4 August, 1899. 
274. 
supporters and measures", Salisbury felt he could not offer Garst another 
position, "without associating myself with your peculiar line of conduct". 
352 
Thus, he declined to offer Gerst another post. Gorst's subsequent 
attempt to deny any lapses into disloyalty on his part353 failed to affect 
Salisbury's decision, 354 but with characteristic asperity Garst determined 
to have the final word which included a dig at the leadership's social 
exclusiveness. He declared his presumed anti-Government posture to be a 
fabrication of the press, particularly the Times, adding that "Unfortunately 
for me, few of the leading members of the party know me personally, so that 
in my case, there is little chance of the false character being modified 
and corrected by the true one11 • 355 
Given what Garst regarded as the injustice of the accusations 
against him, 356 Salisbury's refusal must have been difficult to accept. 
However, he evidently resolved not to allow the unsatisfactory position in 
which he was obliged to remain to interfere with his campaign for reform. 
This he indicated by resuming his struggle with the school boards, 
immediately following the passage of the Board of Education Bill. When, 
during Commons debate on August 4, one of the London School Board's members, 
M.P. E. Flower, indicated that the Board would appeal the Cockerton 
decision, 357 Gerst set about ensuring it would be upheld. By applying 
3521bid., 85, Salisbury to Garst, 9 August, 1899. 
353Ibid., 86, Gerst to Salisbury, 25 September, 1899. 
354Ibid., 87, Salisbury to Gerst, 27 September, 1899. 
355Ibid., 88, Gerst to Salisbury, 30 September, 1899. 
356Gorst's claim to having been misrepresented was not without foundation. 
For example, in making their complaint to Salisbury, the Tory back-benchers 
quoted Gorst's remarks out of context. See Gorst's speech at Dunmow, the Times, 
29 July, 1899, p .10. 
357PD, 4th series, 75 (1899): 1505-1506. 
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sustained pressure, he succeeded in convincing a reluctant Local Government 
Board to prosecute the case against the School Board. 358 Then, while 
awaiting resolution of the contest, he engineered two additional admini-
strative steps designed to curtail the advanced work of the school boards, 
these being taken to ensure restriction would be achieved should the 
Cockerton decision be overturned. In preparing these measures he was now 
able to draw upon the expertise of Morant, who had assumed the position of 
private secretary to Garst following the resignation of the incumbent in 
November, 1900. 359 
The first of these steps was taken in March 1900 in the form of 
a new Education Code. 360 This measure was devised to improve elementary 
education by making changes to the current funding system under which 
grants were made for individual subjects, a method which provided "a 
strong inducement to managers and masters to turn a school into a machine 
for earning the largest possible grant irrespective of the educational 
interests ct the children11 • 361 The new Code replaced the piecemeal grants 
with a block grant. Curriculum changes were also effected providing for a 
362 
central core of requisite subjects and a variety of subsidiary ones. 
It was hoped that these changes would secure greater financial stability 
358 Eaglesham, p. 120. The Local Gorvernment Board's reluctance sprang from 
the fact it had no direct interest in the audit case and wished to avoid 
appearing antagonistic towards school boards generally. 
359Allen, Robert Morant, pp. 138-140. 
360 Report of the Board of Education, 1899-1900 (Cmnd. 328), PP, 1900, 19: 10-11. 
361PD, 4th series, 82 (1900): 599-600. Speech of R.C. Jebb. 
362 Cmnd. 328, pt. 1, pp. 9-10; pp. 10-11. 
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for the schools, greater freedom in the classification of pupils, a more 
liberal curriculum, and make more suitable provision for the special 
circumstances of a wide variety of schools, particularly the rural. 
Although th: Government acknowledged that under the new provisions some 
progressive school boards would be obliged to relinquish the higher 
subjects they were currently teaching, they emphasized that most board 
and voluntary schools would receive increased grants, enabling them to 
raise their educational level. Thus, they argued that "the general 
standard of efficiency in our primary system, as a whole, will be 
363 
unquestionably raised by the block grant", Although the measure met 
with some opposition, most notably from the Progressives on the London 
364 365 School Board, the Code was welcomed by many board-school supporters, 
one such, J .H. Yoxall, rising in the House to "rejoice and approve of it" 
366 
and to congratulate Gorst upon his effecting of the reform. 
Gorst's second and more controversial reform was introduced the 
following month as the Higher Elementary School Minute of April 6th, 367 
which outlined the requirements which the boards would, henceforth, have 
to meet in order to qualify for grants applicable to higher day school 
education. The regulations embodied in the Minute were derived from a 
363R]2, 4th series, 82 (1900): 599, Speech of R.C. Jebb. 
364see, The Times, 30 March, 1900, p.15. Ibid., 8 May, 1900, p.14. 
365
rbid., 30 March, 1900, p .15. 
366PD, 4th series, 82 (1900): 610. 
367Minute of the Board of Education, April 6, 1900, Establishing Higher 
Elementary Schools (Cmnd. 127), PP, 1900, 64: 959-963. 
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d db Go f d 1 . 368 memoran um prepare y rst our ays ear ier. In it Gerst proposed 
the establishment of a new category of school, a Higher Elementary School, 
to be created from the reorganization of the two elements of the existing 
Higher Grade Schools, public elementary and school of science into one 
institution. These new schools would be funded in accordance with the 
block-grant principle of the new Education Code of 1900, thus eliminating 
current overlap in higher elementary school financing, providing a saving 
to the Treasury of approximately ,.,/6,872 over the previous year's 
expenditures. 369 Gerst thus presented the scheme ostensibly as one of 
fiscal cost reduction, a stratagem designed to appeal to a Cabinet faced 
with the increasing military expenditures incurred by the South African 
u 370 
war. However, he stressed the saving was dependent upon strict 
adherence to certain conditions, which he then outlined, in which resided 
the true purpose of the proposed reform - the curtailment of the school 
boards higher educational work. 371 
The conditions were so devised as to ensure that only a minority 
372 
of schools could meet them. In order for a board to establish a Higher 
Elementary School it must first "be recognized by the Board of Education as 
'necessary', i.e., actually required by the circumstances of the district". 
368P.R.O. Ed. 24/39, 2 April, 1900. Scheme for New Grants under the Code 
to Higher Elementary Schools: To take the Place of the Present Grants from 
South Kensington and Whitehall. 
369Ibid., p. 4, Sections 13-15. 
370Daglish, p. 405. 
371 Eaglesham, Local Authority, pp. 51-52. 
372 Eaglesham, Twentieth Century Education, p. 33. 
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The school must provide a full four-year programme with a curriculum based 
upon that of the "School of Science" course in the South Kensington 
Directory. Children up to, but not beyond, age 15 were to be admitted and 
they must have reached the requisite standard of attainment to be able to 
profit from the course. The school must not, however, attract middle-class 
children normally destined for a grammar-school education and, in order to 
guard against the development of competition between the Higher Elementary 
Schools and the recognized secondary schools, the former's curriculum was 
b k . l d 373 to e ept strict y non-secon ary. 
Gorst's proposals apparently received immediate approval from 
both the Treasury and the Cabinet for they were quickly drafted into the 
Higher Elementary School Minute for publication as a Parliamentary paper 
on April 6th. 374 With the exception of the pupil age restriction, on the 
surface the Minute appeared beneficent. 375 It seemingly provided the 
376 higher grade schools with the means to acquire legal status. It 
evidently ensured the establishment of a system of intermediate and technical 
schools under the school boards and, through the block grant, provided 
more efficient funding. In addition, it "cleared the way for a rational 
and uniform policy for these higher schools, which had for so long suffered 
from duality of central administration", 377 a reform which Gorst had 
373P.R.O. Ed. 24/39, pp. 4-5, Section 16. 
374P.R.O. Ed. 24/39/c. Gorst to Keckewich, 2 April, 1900. Ibid., Keckewich 
to Gorst, 4 April, 1900. The Times, 10 April, 1900. p.15. 
375Eaglesham, Local Authority, p.51. 
376 See Gorst's speech during Commons debate on the Minute, PD, 4th series, 
82 (1900): 690-691. 
377 Eaglesham, Local Authority, p. 51. 
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stressed in his memorandum. 378 Consequently, the Minute met with substantial 
379 
approval from both sides of the House. There were some, however, who 
appeared to anticipate the direction the Board of Education would take in 
implementing the measure. Tory Albert Rollit and Liberal Alfred Hutton 
voiced dissatisfaction with the rigid nature of the Minute and expressed 
the hope that Garst would "make some few concessions when putting it into 
operation" 380 
Garst, however, knowing that the Minute's effectiveness depended 
upon its conditions being strictly observed, determined that no relaxation 
of the requirements would be permitted. Thus, he convinced Devonshire to 
deny London School Board requests for an easing of the regulations381 and 
for recognition of 79 of their higher grade schools as Higher Elementary 
Schools under the Minute. 382 Garst justified his position on the issue to 
Devonshire by asserting that the Board was proposing to establish "a type 
of school differing entirely" from the one outlined in the Minute and he 
urged that the Board be informed that the commercial-type schools they 
proposed were ineligible under the measure, 383 to which Devonshire 
acquiesced. 384 Despite pressure from some Board of Education officials, 
notably Keckewich, for greater flexibility in implementing the Minute, 385 
378P.R.O. Ed. 24/39, p.8, Section 23. 
379RQ, 4th series, 82 (1900): 608-609, 611. Speeches of H. Hobhouse and 
Y. H. Yoxall. 
380Ibid: 626, 660. 
381P.R.O. Ed. 14/102. Garst to Devonshire, 14 May, 1900. 
382Ibid., London School Board to Secretary, Board of Education, 29 June, 1900. 
Ibid., Gorst's marginal notes on the Board's letter. 
383
rbid., Garst to Devonshire, 24 July, 1900. 
384 Eaglesham, Local Authority, p. 150. 
385 P.R.O. Ed. 24/40. Keckewich to Garst and Devonshire, 22 July, 1900. 
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Gorst succeeded in gaining Devonshire's support for a continuence of the 
strict policy he had established386 and, consequently his interpretation of 
the Minute's provisions were the ones subsequently followed by the Board 
of Education. 
The success of Gorst's policy is reflected in the numbers of 
Higher Elementary Schools established during the first year of the Minute's 
operation: out of 190 applications for recognition made to the Board of 
387 Education only two had been approved. Consequently, by November 1900, 
because of his success in acquiring Board of Education adherence to his 
strict policy on the Minute, Gorst had already succeeded in curtailing the 
school boards' higher educational work before the first court decision was 
handed down in the Cockerton case. Thus, this decision was in effect 
complementary to Gorst's plan to truncate the boards, rather than the lynch-
pin of his campaign. 388 
At this point the future of Gorst's entire reform campaign was 
called into question by Salisbury's decision to go to the country for 
affirmation of the Government's policy in the Boer War. Fortunately for 
Gorst, the Unionists were returned to power in this "Khaki election" of 
October 1900 with a majority of 134,389 Gorst again securing his Cambridge 
390 
seat unopposed. However, as before and notwithstanding a Government re-
386Ibid., Gorst to Devonshire, 26 July, 1900. 
Devonshire, 6 August, 1900. Ibid., Devonshire 
Ibid., Gorst to Devonshire, November, 1900 (no 
387PD, 4th series, 89 (1901): 481-482. Gorst's 
J.H. Yoxall. 
388 Eaglesham, Local Authority, p. 151. 
389The Times, 17 October, 1900, p.4. 
390
cambridge Chronicle, 5 October, 1900, p.4. 
Ibid., Minute by Duke of 
to Gorst, 20 November, 1900. 
date). 
reply to question by 
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shuffle, he was not given a place in the Cabinet, a slight he had 
anticipated but nonetheless found mortifying. 391 As on previous occasions, 
Gorst's response to rejection was a redoubling of his efforts to secure the 
reforms he sought, doubtless spurred on by a determination to triumph over 
the ignominious situation in which the Government appeared resolved to 
retain him. Following his return from the hustings, Gorst prepared a 
scheme to effect a sweeping rationalization of administration at the local 
level and presented it for incorporation into the forthcoming Education 
Bill,392 with which the Government intended to create local authorities 
for education. 393 Gorst proposed that these authorities conform to the 
pattern already established in local government administration, namely, 
"single areas with single governing bodies which exercise all functions 
within their district". Accordingly, he advocated the county and county 
boroughs be constituted the education authorities for "all purposes" in 
their districts; that they assume the powers of the school boards, in order 
to obviate the overlap which would otherwise result if the boards were 
allowed to operate alongside the new authorities; and that they be authorized 
to delegate their authority to bodies of local managers, as was prescribed 
by Clause 10 of the 1896 Bill. He also recommended that the new authorities 
391 H.W. Lucy, Nearing Jordan (London, 1916), p. 251. 
392 P.R.O. Ed. 24/29/lla. Memorandum by J.E. Gorst (November? 1900). Ibid., 
Further Memorandum by J.E. Gorst on present situation (November? 1900). 
393This measure had been promised by the Government when replying to 
Opposition criticism of the Board of Education Bill's failure to deal with 
overlap at the local level. See, PD, 4th series, 73 (1899): 621-622. 
Speech of R.C. Jebb. 
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394 be empowered to.aid voluntary schools out of the rates. Garst justified 
his plan for the assimulation of the boards by the new authorities by 
warning of the danger posed to the new administrative system by the boards 
if they were allowed to continue in existence. "This Authority will find 
itself in nearly every County Borough confronted by an Elementary 
Authority possessed of unlimited resources, which has already successfully 
invaded the sphere of secondary Education, and which in the meanwhile will 
have made every effort it can to extend its operations". Given the boards 
unlimited power to rate, this work was likely to continue as the Board of 
Education's only weapon of defence, the withholding of funding for 
buildings, was easily overcome by the boards through their ability to obtain 
loans secured on the elementary school rate. Consequently, the new educa-
tion authorities would prove to be "little more than a feeble competition 
with the School Board, unless some method is adopted for putting a stop 
to rivalry, overlapping, and consequent waste of public resources 11 • 395 
Garst formulated his proposals into a draft Education Bill and 
396 forwarded it to Devonshire on November 13, with a covering letter, in 
394 P.R.O. Ed. 24/29/lla. Memorandum by J.E. Garst (November? 1900). By 
1900, the financial benefits acquired by the voluntary schools in 1897 had 
been almost completely exhausted and these institutions were now once 
again faced with the prospect of extinction. (See Cruickshank, pp. 70-71.) 
395P.R.O. Ed. 24/29/lla. Further Memorandum by J.E. Garst on the present 
situation (November? 1900), pp. 1-3. 
396 P.R.O. Ed. 24/29. Definite Proposals by J.E. Garst for a Bill. See also 
Appendix A. 
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h . h h . 1 d h · · f h" h 397 w ic e recapitu ate t e main points o is sc eme. However, the 
odds were against it being accepted. Devonshire felt the county councils 
should be consulted to discover if they were prepared to take the responsi-
bilities proposed in Gorst's plan, "as in the face of strong opposition 
the proposals would meet with from many quarters, they would have little 
chance of being accepted unless the County Councils could be reckoned 
on11 • 398 When, accordingly, Gorst conferred with Sir John Hibbert, former 
President of the County Councils' Association, regarding the councils' 
399 likely response to the proposals, the latter replied that he thought 
the plan workable but believed "the difficulties of carrying such a scheme 
through Parliament will be so great, that I doubt the wisdom of making 
the Secondary Education Bill in any way dependent upon the suggested 
400 transfer". There was also evidence that Gorst's proposal for rate aid 
to voluntary schools would meet with some opposition from the most conservative 
sections of the Anglican Church.401 Then, on December 20, the judgment was 
handed down in the Cockerton case which helped to lessen the threat of 
competitition between the boards and the proposed new authority by drastically 
397Ibid., Ed. 24/29/llb. Gorst to Devonshire, 13 November, 1900. This letter 
is dated 13 December, 1900. However, in his reply Devonshire clearly states 
he is considering proposals submitted by Gorst on 13 November, 1900. (See, 
Ibid., Ed. 24/29/llc. Memorandum by Duke of Devonshire on Gorst's two 
proposals, 6 December, 1900.) The discrepancy is evidently the result of 
a typographical error. 
398Ibid., Ed. 24/29/llc. Memorandum by Duke of Devonshire on Gorst's two 
proposals, 6 December, 1900. 
399Ibid., Ed. 24/29/10. Gorst to Sir J. Hibbert, 14 December, 1900. 
4ooibid., Ed. 24/29/llb. Sir J. Hibbert to Gorst, 21 December, 1900. 
401Ibid., Ed. 24/15/57. G. Arthur Jones to Gorst, 4 January, 1901. Ibid., 
Gorst to Jones, 10 January, 1901. 
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limiting the former's ability to expend the rates on non-elementary 
education. This doubtless served to weaken, in the Cabinet's eyes, the 
rationale propounded by Gerst for legislating a comprehensive reorganization 
scheme at this time. 
The judgment gave legal confirmation to the auditor's earlier 
decision. The Justices ruled that the education given by the London School 
Board, under the Art and Science Directory, in day and evening schools was 
illegal, that the Board's authority under the Education Acts was confined 
to giving instruction out of the rates to children only, and that the 
Board's powers did not extend to providing evening school education to 
adults. This ruling signalled the beginning of the end for the Board's 
evening continuation schools and effectively restricted the greater part 
of their higher grade work, thus reinforcing the administrative actions 
already implemented by Gorst since 1897, although the judgment was 
temporarily held in abeyance by the Board's decision to challenge the ruling 
in the Court of Appeai.402 
The Government's concern for the possible political consequences 
of adopting Gorst's Bill was reflected in Balfour's response to its pro-
visions. He found them alarming, "not because they are defective but 
because they are too complete. I fear a repetition of our parliamentary 
experience in 1 96!11403 An indication of the direction in which the 
Cabinet's attitude on the question was crystallizing emerged in early March 
402Allen, William Garnett, pp. 94-96. 
403 salisbury Papers, Balfour to Salisbury, 5 January, 1901. 
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in Gorst's Commons speech outlining the Government's future educational 
policy. Gorst announced that a Bill would be introduced to effect "the 
creation of Secondary Education Authorities", empowered to supply public 
instruction in non-elementary education, but then added the qualification 
that should Parliament conclude there ought to be one authority for all 
education there was a possibility the Bill could be amended in this 
d . . d . d b 404 irection uring e ate. Having thus delivered the Government's 
official line, Gorst proceeded to state his own position with regard to 
the proposed authority. There would be no efficient national education 
system, he declared, "until we make up our mind what is to be the authority, 
until we have one authority, and until schools of every kind of every grade 
are placed under that one authority". Only then would overlap and 
405 
organization chaos be removed. 
While the proposed Education Bill was being moulded into its 
final form, Gorst negotiated one more administrative limitation upon the 
school-boards' sphere of operation. The Cockerton decision of December 1900 
had ruled that the London School Board's, and thus, all boards', expenditures 
of rates on adult education was illegal. This placed the future of large 
numbers of evening schools in jeopardy as many of them were maintained out 
of the school-board rate. Consequently, the Government was faced with the 
404PD, 4th series, 90 (1901): 610. This statement had been authorized by 
Devonshire in advance of the debate. "The Duke thinks it would do no 
harm to hint at the possibility of creating one authority for all education: 
but it would have to be done, more or less, as if it was the V.P's own 
suggestion and the Government should not, of course, be committed in any 
way". (P.R.O. Ed. 24/14/63. R. Walrond to R.L. Morant, 5 March, 1901.) 
4o5PD, 4th series, 90 (1901): 613. 
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necessity of making provision for the continuance of these schools and 
Garst seized upon the opportunity to effect a reorganization of the evening 
school system which strengthened the powers of the central and county 
education authorities at the expense of the school boards. 
The incentive for Gorst's action was provided by Robert Morant 
who, following the handing down of the Cockerton judgment, produced a 
memorandum in which he examined the entire evening school situation and 
submitted proposals aimed at solving the current difficulties.406 Morant 
outlined how, in the process of their development, the evening schools had 
become de facto secondary schools which the Government, by undisguised 
pretence, had continued to treat as elementary institutions in order that 
they might remain under the jurisdiction of the school boards and the 
Education Department's Whitehall (elementary) branch. This expedient had 
restricted evening school development by ensuring the boards' institutions 
were restrained by the requirements of the elementary day school code, 
while simultaneously hindering the county councils efforts to establish 
evening school education as they were empowered to expend the rates only 
for technical education. This system had also produced wasteful competition 
at the local level and confusion and want of co-ordination within the central 
400 departments. He urged that the Government remedy these ills by rationalizing 
406P.R.O. Ed. 24/39. The Organisation of Evening Schools. Eaglesham claims 
this memorandum was written in March 1901 but Daglish effectively argues 
that it was produced in late December, 1900, in response to the Cockerton 
decision. (See Daglish, p. 482, n.3, p. 483. Eaglesham, Local Authority, 
p. 158.) 
407P.R.O. Ed. 24/39. The Organisation of Evening Schools, Section I. 
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the system, this to be effected by placing all evening schools and classes 
under one central authority, by creating one set of regulations for all 
evening school education, and by replacing separate subject financing with 
a single grant system. He advocated that at the local level the county 
and county borough councils be constituted the education authority. He 
suggested, as a means of obviating political objections to the scheme, 
that the boards be permitted to act as the designated agents of the local 
h . . d" 1 d . t . h 1 408 aut ority in expen ing e ementary e ucation ra es on evening sc oo s. 
As Morant's ideas were consistent with Gorst's aims for evening 
school administration, 409 as well as his general policy for rationalization 
at the local level, he now decided to use them to reorganize secondary 
education while simultaneously applying one more curb to the boards' higher 
educational work. He pointed out to Devonshire that, if the Cockerton 
decision was upheld in the Court of Queen's Bench, the boards would be 
debarred from expending rates on education for pupils over sixteen and for 
instruction not within the Evening Continuation Schools Code. As a solution 
to the difficulties Gorst proposed the creation of a new Code for Evening 
Schools "by which they would cease to be public Elementary schools and 
become frankly what they really are Secondary Schools ... 11 ; and to include 
a clause in the proposed Bill empowering the new secondary authorities to 
designate school boards their agents for the administration of evening 
schools and permitting them, in this capacity, to maintain these institutions 
410 
out of the rates. 
408Ibid., Section III. 
409 Eaglesham, Local Authority, p. 158. 
410P.R.O. Ed. 24/83. Gorst to Devonshire, 15 March, 1901. 
Devonshire gave his approval for the preparation of such a 
411 
measure and when, two weeks later, the Court of Appeal upheld the 
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Cockerton decision, increasing the necessity for taking some such action 
412 
as proposed by Gorst, he, Morant and Sir William Abney, began to draw 
up the new scheme of regulations, which they completed by the end of 
A ·1 413 pri • Gorst urged that the scheme be used to end the overlap in the 
central administration of evening school education by transferring its 
management to the Board of Education's branch at South Kensington.414 
The proposed regulations were so devised as to ensure that hereafter 
evening schools would provide essentially post-elementary education to 
adult pupils.415 As school boards were prohibited by the Cockerton judgment 
from supplying such education out of the rates to adult pupils, this meant 
that boards wishing to operate such schools would be obliged to become 
agents of their local secondary education authority. A clause permitting 
this delegation of powers had been included in the Education Bill introduced 
into Parliament on May 7th, along with one enabling Technical Education 
4~ Committees to finance all evening school work. 
411
rbid., Devonshire to Gerst, 16 March, 1901. 
412The head of the Board of Education's South Kensington division. 
413P.R.O. Ed. 24/83. Memorandum on the new Scheme of Regulations For Evening 
Schools and Classes under the Board of Education. Ibid., Ed. 24/83/29. 
W.R. Abney to Morant, 3 May, 1901. 
414
rbid., Ed. 24/83/B18. Gerst to Devonshire, 8 May, 1901. 
415
rbid., Ed. 24/83. Memorandum on the new Scheme of Regulations For Evening 
Schools and Classes under the Board of Education, paras. 8-9. 
416 Ibid., para. 11. 
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Devonshire approved the scheme and its proposals were formulated 
into a draft Minute of 20 clauses for the regulation of non-elementary 
evening school education.417 To this draft Morant subsequently added a 
further clause specifying the conditions under which the school boards 
might operate an evening school as a public elementary school.418 Although 
this clause appeared to grant the boards a degree of independence, in 
actuality its financial and age restrictions effectively reduced the boards' 
current level of independent activity in the field. Thus the Minute 
provided the mechanisms for overcoming the Cockerton difficulty while also 
ensuring that, hereafter, the final responsibility for the organization of 
evening school education resided with the county authorities, The Minute 
· d J 1 3rd.419 b · · 1 · h d · h was issue on u y , ut its imp ementation a to wait upon t e 
successful passage of the Education Bill currently before the House. 
This Bill had been introduced by Garst on May 7, at which time 
he had requested leave "to establish in every part of England and Wales a 
local Education Authority which is intended to supervise education of 
k • d II 420 1 h ld' h • f h • every in .•. , apparent y era ing t e presentation o a compre ensive 
421 
measure along the lines he had already advocated. However, as his 
417Ibid., Ed. 24/83. Minute Establishing Regulations for Evening Schools 
and Classes. 
418 rbid., Ed. 24/39. Additional article to be added to the New Regulations 
for Evening Schools. (This clause had been added in response to a suggestion 
by Devonshire that there be included in the Minute some further clarification 
of the future permissible limit of the school boards evening school work 
within the framework prescribed by the Cockerton judgment. See, Ibid., Ed. 
24/83, R. Walrond to Morant, 20 May, 1901.) 
419The Times, 21 July, 1901, p.7. 
420PD 
_, 4th series, 93 (1901): 970. 
421S ee PP· 281-283 above. 
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subsequent outlining of the provisions revealed, the Cabinet had balked 
at taking this contentious step. The Bill proposed to establish conunittees 
of the county and county borough councils as local authorities for education. 
The authorities would derive their funds from the "whisky money" and from 
the levying of a special 2d rate. However, these funds were to be applied 
to secondary education only, the school boards thereby being permitted to 
422 
continue as the authorities for the elementary schools. The boards 
would also be allowed to continue operating the "Cockerton" schools 
threatened with closure by the court's decision, but only as agents of the 
h . . 423 new county aut orities. 
The Bill was in substance the proposals of Gorst's 1896 measure 
pertaining to non-elementary education and, when combined with the educa-
tional reforms implemented during the intervening years, represented the 
fulfillment of the basic aims of his original Bill. However, because of 
the Cabinet's diffidence, this 1901 version also duplicated its precursor's 
failure to abolish the school boards, thereby again preventing complete 
rationalization of the education system. The Bill's inability to effect 
unity of educational administration was seized upon by the Opposition and 
424 
made the focus of its attack on the measure. Moreover, Gorst's opening 
statement that the new local authorities would hopefully come to control 
and supervise all schools425 was accurately perceived by the Liberals as 
422
.EQ., 4th series, 93 (1901): 978. 
423 Ibid: 985. 
424 See for example the speeches of Bryce, Macnamara and Yoxall, Ibid: 
988, 994-998, 1001. 
425 Ibid: 970. 
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signalling the eventual abolition of the school boards,426 serving to 
intensify Liberal opposition to the measure. In addition to the 
resistance it met with from the Opposition benches, the Bill also had to 
contend with an over-burdened parliamentary timetable. The Session was 
already half over when the Bill was introduced and, following the 
Whitsuntide recess of May 5-June 10, Parliament still had to deal with 
Finance and Army Bills in addition to Education, while simultaneously 
coping with the overriding demands of the Boer War.427 
Consequently, the Bill was crowded out and was dropped on June 
27. 428 This necessitated the enactment of some form of temporary legislation 
to legalise the "Cockerton schools" pending the introduction of a permanent 
Bill to replace the one abandoned. Consequently, a small Cabinet Committee 
was formed, comprising Devonshire, Balfour, Gerst, W.H. Long, President of 
the Local Government Board, and Morant, to shape an appropriate measure. 
The Committee duly framed a one-clause Bill, 429 along the lines proposed 
earlier by Gorst, 430 which was introduced into Parliament on July 2. 431 
At first glance it appeared to be a straightforward measure to 
resolve the Cockerton difficulties. Its stated purpose was, to enable 
426Griffith-Boscawen, p. 201. 
427 Allen, Robert Morant, pp. 147-148. Griffith-Boscawen, pp. 200-201. 
4281:Q, 4th series, 96 (1901): 218. 
429P.R.O. Ed. 24/14/14. Successive Stages of the Education Bill. 
430
rbid., Ed. 24/ 138. 
431PD, 4th series, 96 (1901): 609-611. 
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"local authorities to empower school boards temporarily to carry on certain 
schools, and for sanctioning certain school board expenses 11 • 432 It 
conferred on the local authorities the right to sanction school board 
expenditure out of the rates on secondary education, for one year. However, 
in so doing it subordinated the boards to the county and county borough 
councils, in the area of post-elementary education, and it established the 
principle of a superior local authority for education, this being the 
councils.433 Consequently, the Bill met with determined opposition from 
the school board supporters on the Liberal benches, particularly as it had 
been brought in under the ten minute rule.434 Gorst effectively refuted 
the Opposition's claims that the Cockerton judgment, and the resulting 
Bill, would cripple the boards' higher grade schools, but was obliged to 
acknowledge that their evening schools would be severely affected. However, 
he claimed that this was less devastating than it appeared to be at first 
sight because the general quality of education in the boards' evening 
schools was inferior to that given in the secondary schools and, thus, some 
"might be closed with great advantage to the public education of the country". 435 
Spurred on no doubt by the knowledge that the Government possessed both the 
determination and the parliamentary strength to assure the Bill's passage, 
Garst then added to his already critical remarks a scathing commentary on 
436 the boards themselves. Although, as one Unionist observed, his comments 
432Ibid: 609. 
433 Ibid., 4th series, 97 (1901): 1358-1364. Speech of A.J. Balfour. 
434 See for example the speech of James Bryce, Ibid., 4th series, 96 (1901): 
611-612. 
435 Ibid., 4th series, 96 (1901): 1170-1184. 
436 Ibid: 1180. 
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contained more than a kernel of truth, "they were unwise", for they "lashed 
Radical 'Educationalists' like Dr. Macnamara, Mr. Bryce, and Mr. George 
White into fury", provoking them into heated response and, thereby, 
437 prolonging debate on the measure. However, the Opposition's obstructionist 
tactics could delay, but not prevent, the Bill's passage, which was eventually 
achieved at the end of third reading on July 20. 438 
Immediately following the division, the House debated the Evening 
School Minute of July 3,439 the restrictive provisions of which might now 
be implemented through the associated clause in the newly-passed Bill. 
Having failed to halt the enactment of the Cockerton Bill the Opposition 
now directed its resentment against the Minute but, as in the previous 
debate, Unionist strength again ensured a victory in the subsequent 
division, 440 thereby marking the attainment of one more step towards the 
completion of Gorst's rationalization scheme. 
As the Cockerton Act was only a stop-gap measure, following its 
passage the Government were obliged to turn their attention to the prepara-
tion of legislation to provide a more permanent solution to current 
educational difficulties. Consequently,the Cabinet Committee consisting of 
Devonshire, Balfour, Long and Gerst, which had drafted the Cockerton Bill, 
now reassembled to consider the proposed new measure.441 The basis for 
their discussion was a memorandum prepared, one week earlier, by Morant at 
437Griffith-Boscawen, p.202. 
438PD, 4th series, 98 (1901): 625. The Bill was enacted as the Education Act, 
1901. See, Edw. VII I. Ch. II (also referred to as the Cockerton Act). 
439RQ., 4th series, 98 (1901): 625-674. 
440Ibid: 6 74. 
441 P.R.O. Ed. 24/14/14. Successive Stages of the Education Bill. 
294. 
the request of the Committee.442 In this memorandum Morant had focused 
upon the problems associated with the two potential Bills the Government 
might devise, one for secondary education only, the other a comprehensive 
measure dealing with both secondary and elementary education. 443 Although 
the memorandum presented a lucid analysis of the multiple problems the 
proposed Bill must address, it fell short of constituting a definite plan 
for immediate Government action, indicating that Morant's ideas were still 
444 in process of formation at this stage. 
The Cabinet Committee's discussion of the memorandum was 
similarly irresolute, being "in the nature of a rambling preliminary 
conversation without much in the way of definite conclusions 11 • 445 A great 
deal of the debate revolved around the perennial thorny issue of rate aid 
to voluntary schools. Gorst proposed the establishment of two sets of 
schools under the borough councils, one (the former board schools) rate-
supported and subject to the Cowper-Temple Clause, the other rate-aided, 
in accordance with terms agreed on between the council and the voluntary 
school managers, and free of the Cowper-Temple restrictions. It was noted, 
however, that Chamberlain would oppose repeal of the Clause, prompting 
Balfour to suggest that Gorst's two-fold system be revised to a dual scheme 
of (a) rate-aided schools and (b) rate-supported schools subject to Clause 
27 of the 1896 Bill.446 
442Allen, Robert Morant, pp. 150-151. 
443Ibid., 24/14/13a. Some questions to be considered before drafting E.ducation 
Bill for 1902. 
444 E.J.R. Eaglesham, "Planning the Education Bill of 1902", British Journal of 
Educational Studies, 9 (1960): 3-24. Hereafter referred to as Eaglesham, 
"Education Bill of 190211 • 
445P.R.O. E.d. 24/16/81. Sir C. Ilbert to R. Walrond, 17 August, 1901. 
446 Ibid., E.d. 24/16/79f. Notes by R.L. Morant (on discussions preceding formula-
tion of the 1902 Act), 8 August, 1901. 
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At Balfour's request, Garst prepared a draft Bill "to focus 
discussion on the important points at issue 11 • 447 Gorst's draft, "the 
448 1902 Bill in embryo", provided for the establishment of a single local 
education authority in every county and county borough to be responsible 
for both elementary and secondary education, as proposed in the Education 
Bill of 1901 withdrawn in June. The authorities were permitted to levy 
an unlimitable rate and empowered to expend it on all types of education 
- elementary and secondary, including evening and voluntary schools. The 
non-county boroughs and urban districts might continue to levy a penny 
rate under the Technical Instruction Acts and were granted the additional 
' 
right to raise a further rate for the provision of evening and elementary 
education, including aid to voluntary schools. This was an attempt to 
overcome the obstacle of the minor local authorities, referred to as the 
"Rollit difficulty", which had helped to wreck the 1896 Bill. The draft 
authorized the Board of Education to vest in the councils, by means of a 
Provisional Order, the powers of the school boards, under any one of the 
following circumstances:- (1) an application of the council itself; 
(2) the existence of conditions under which a school board would otherwise 
be set up; (3) the school board being in default - a provision designed 
to further undermine the boards. The measure would also repeal the 
C T 1 . . 1 . . . h 1 449 owper- emp e provision, rep acing it wit a new cause. 
447 rbid., Ed. 24/14/14. Successive Stages of the Education Bill. 
448 Eagles ham, "Education Bill of 1902", p. 4. 
449 P.R.O. Ed. 24/15/64c. Memorandum on First Draft of Education Bill, 1902. 
J.E. Garst, 19 August, 1901. The Cowper-Temple replacement clause was not 
defined in the memorandum. 
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Although the draft retained the rationalization principle of one 
paramount local authority for education proposed in Gorst's previous 
measures, it also duplicated the weaknesses of his 1896 and withdrawn 1901 
Bill, namely, the inability to deal effectively with the school board 
problem and the "Rollit" difficulty. Even Gorst was obliged to acknowledge 
that "Under this Bill a potential double authority would still exist in 
non-County Boroughs and Urban Districts. The possibility of overlapping 
is not excluded, and I see no way it can be. With common sense and mutual 
forbearance, however, a modus vivendi might be established" .450 Thus the 
measure possessed the potential for arousing the opposition of the 
supporters of the boards and the minor local authorities.451 Despite these 
flaws, Devonshire found the measure "thoroughly comprehensive and to raise 
most of the points which we shall have to decide" •452 
Morant, meanwhile, had been endeavouring to ingratiate himself 
with Balfour, in an effort to gain acceptance for his own proposals for the 
measure. He had ascertained that Balfour was the Minister upon whom final 
responsibility for shaping and piloting the Bill must devolve, given that 
Gorst's behaviour in recent educational debates had convinced the Government 
he was not "a suitable man to lead a big Parliamentary fight 11 • 453 At 
Morant's request, Dr, Talbot, Bishop of Rochester, arranged a meeting with 
450Ibid., p. 2. 
451Daglish, p. 541. 
452 Balfour Papers, B.L. Add. MS. 49769, ff.195-196, Devonshire to Balfour, 
25 August, 1901. 
453 Allen, Robert Morant, p. 154. See also, Sadleir, pp, 181-182. 
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Balfour, at which Morant succeeded in impressing the Cabinet Minister with 
hl.·s .d 454 1. eas. 
After perusing Gorst's draft, Balfour discussed the whole question 
of the measure with Salisbury,455 who asked that a finalized Bill be 
completed in time for the next Cabinet meeting on November 5. Balfour 
thereupon instructed Devonshire to have three alternative Bills prepared, 
one involving secondary education only, one embracing both elementary and 
secondary, and one dealing primarily with secondary but containing provision 
for the repeal of the Cowper-Temple clause, the Bills to serve as a basis 
f f d . . 456 or uture 1.scuss1.on. Devonshire duly requested Gorst to have the Bills 
drawn up, although, apparently with reluctance, for he considered Gorst's 
draft a satisfactory measure.457 Gorst, however, "viewed with consternation" 
Balfour's proposed number one and number two Bills, not only because of his 
commitment to the single authority concept but also because of these 
measures' potential for arousing parliamentary opposition. He warned Balfour, 
"The introduction of a mere Secondary Education Bill next year will evoke a 
storm of indignation from both friends and foes, and will probably profoundly 
damage the reputation of the Government", while the religious provision in 
the number three Bill "is of no practical importance" and should be eschewed 
save "to establish some great principle or ..• to please our own party" •458 
454Allen, Robert Morant, pp. 154-156. Dugdale, pp. 320-321. 
455Allen, Robert Morant, p. 157. 
456 P.R.O. Ed. 24/16/79a. Balfour to Devonshire, 28 August, 1901. 
457 Ibid., Ed. 24/16/79b. Devonshire to Gorst, 2 September, 1901. 
458rbid., Ed. 24/16/79c. Gorst to Devonshire, 9 September, 1901. 
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After further discussion, Devonshire, Gorst and M:>rant concluded 
that the abolition of the school boards might be required in order to 
facilitate the granting of rate aid to voluhtary schools, it being thought 
"inexpedient for the County Council to subsidise Voluntary Schools in 
459 
competition perhaps with Board Schools in a Board School area". 
Devonshire instructed M:>rant to report details of the discussion to 
Balfour460 but Morant had already privately arranged for such a meeting, 
for the purpose of "talking out the things which seem always 'left at a 
loose end' after the confabulations between Gorst and the Duke 11 • 461 Thus, 
while ostensibly briefing Balfour on the progress of the Bill, Morant used 
the meeting to urge the former to assume control of the Bill next session, 
and to impress Balfour once again with his command of the complexities 
f h d . l . 462 o tee ucationa question. Following this discussion, Morant relayed 
Balfour's views to Devonshire and Gorst, including his request for a further 
463 draft Bill, which Gorst duly completed by October 16. 
This October 16 Bill was subsequently re-drafted by Parliamentary 
Counsel, Sir Courtney Ilbert, essentially in accordance with Gorst's 
suggestions, to ensure "the right language necessary to carry out the 
459Ibid., Ed. 24/14/14. Successive Stages of the Education Bill. 
Ed. 24/14/15. Duke of Devonshire's notes on the Education Bill. 
Devonshire to Morant, 1 October, 1901. 
460Ibid., Ed. 24/14/15. Devonshire to M:>rant, 29 September, 1901. 
461 Balfour Papers, B.L. Add. MS. 49787, ff.22, M:>rant to Balfour, 
19 September, 1901. 
462Allen, Robert Morant, pp. 158-159. 
463P.R.O. Ed. 24/14/14. Successive Stages of the Education Bill. 
Ibid., 
Ibid., 
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464 
various proposals". Devonshire also had drawn up, albeit reluctantly, 
two additional draft Bills dealing 
requested earlier by Salisbury and 
solely with secondary education, as 
~5 Balfour, his reluctance here clearly 
indicating his continuing preference for the fundamental concepts contained 
466 in Gorst•s measure. By this time, however, Garst was experiencing 
qualms with regard to the abolition of the large school boards, believing 
such a step "would constitute a formidable, and I think unnecessary obstacle 
to the acceptance of our Bill". Consequently, he recommended that compulsory 
abolition be limited, initially, to school boards in districts having 
populations of less than 10,000, an action he thought would arouse little 
opposition because the ineffectiveness of these boards was generally 
recognized. Provision could be made for the gradual abolition of all 
other boards by reverting to "our original plan of transferring their powers, 
464
rbid., Ed. 24/16/95. (Keckewich?/Morant?) to Ilbert, 21 October, 1901. 
Two revisions were effected. (1) Two alternative clauses were prepared 
for Gorst's Clause 8, the provision pertaining to the compulsory delegation 
of educational powers to the minor local authorities. One clause was to 
follow Gorst's original, the other to restrict the delegation to non-county 
boroughs of 10,000 or above with the lesser urban districts to be absorbed 
by the county authority. (2) An alternative to Gorst's provision determining 
conditions for rate aid to voluntary schools was formulated "requiring the 
Council to pay all maintenance expenses of the School; but it is not to be 
saddled with any reference to religious instruction". (Ibid.) 
465Ibid. 
466D 1· h 553 ag is , p. • 
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August 19 draft. 
Some Unionist ministers were also experiencing doubts about the 
measure. When, on November 5, the Cabinet met to consider the Bill it 
very quickly came under attack. Although efforts by some members to 
restrict it to secondary education only were thwarted, a majority of the 
Cabinet, led by Chamberlain, succeeded in obtaining rejection of the 
468 provision giving rate aid to voluntary schools. Chamberlain's 
objections were based on political considerations, namely, that such a 
provision would alienate the Radical Unionists.469 Those who supported 
467P.R.O. Ed. 24/16/99. Garst to Devonshire, 23 October, 1901. Eaglesham has 
opined that it was Gorst's hesitancy at this stage which eventually led to 
his being relieved of responsibility for the 1902 Bill (Eaglesham, "Education 
Bill of 1902", p .5). However, while his doubts might have contributed to 
the Government's decision, there were far more important factors leading the 
Government towards this decision. As has been seen, the fiasco associated 
with the 1896 Bill had led to his being subsequently entrusted with only 
minor measures in the House. The Government's lack of faith in his ability 
to effectively carry educational reforms through Parliament had been 
increased, thereafter, by his ill-advised parliamentary outbursts, particu-
larly those directed against sections of his own party and the influential 
London School Board (Allen, Robert Morant, p. 154). A further factor 
operating in Gorst's exclusion was the parallel ascendancy of Robert Morant. 
As Eaglesham himself has observed, Morant's successful bid to capture 
Balfour's support, and their resulting alliance, assured that M:Jrant became 
"the decisive force" in the future development of the Bill (Eaglesham, 
Twentieth Century Education, pp. 41-42). Moreover, as Daglish has effectively 
argued, although Garst may have entertained some doubts as to the political 
advisability of the planned measure, he remained committed to its fundamental 
concept of one paramount local education authority (Daglish, pp. 548-549). 
468A. FitzRoy, Memoirs, 2 vols. (London, 1923), !, p. 63. 
469 
"If you were to promote a Bill giving Rate aid to denominational schools, 
I think you would lose Birmingham and the Birmingham influence, whatever 
that may be worth to the Unionist Party". (Chamberlain to the Earl of 
Selborne, 7 November, 1901. Quoted in J. Amery, The Life of Joseph 
Chamberlain, vol. 4, At the Height of His Power, 1901-1903 (London, 1951), 
p. 482.) 
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him were apparently motivated by a desire to avoid the rate increase 
. d b h . . 470 necessitate y sue a provision. Consequently, a decision was made 
to appoint a Cabinet Committee to draft a Bill comprising both secondary 
and elementary education, but devoid of a clause granting rate aid to 
471 
voluntary schools. 
However, Church leaders and their supporters were now beginning 
to press for a comprehensive and permanent solution of the voluntary schools' 
difficulties in the form of rate aid, but granted by parliamentary legisla-
tion rather than "local option", the latter alternative being one which 
472 Balfour was known to favour. Representations in support of such a 
473 
solution were made to Morant and Salisbury by the Bishop of Rochester, 
and to Balfour by Lord Hugh Cecil.474 Then, in November, the Archdeacon 
of Birmingham, E.A. Coventry, forwarded to Garst a copy of resolutions 
agreed to at a November 2 Conference of Church educationists, which 
included recommendations urging the Government to pass, next Session, a 
comprehensive measure dealing with both secondary and primary education 
and granting rate aid to the voluntary schools, in exchange for which the 
latter would be prepared to cede some measure of public controi.475 
47
°FitzRoy, I, p. 63. 
471 Amery, 4, p. 482. Allen, Robert Morant, p. 161. 
472 Allen, Robert Morant, p. 162. Cruickshank, p. 77. Eaglesham, 
"Education Bill of 1902", p. 11. 
473Allen, Robert Morant, pp. 162-163. 
474 Eaglesham, "Education Bill of 1902", p. 17. 
475 P.R.O. Ed. 24/17/111. Resolutions agreed to at a Conference of Represen-
tatives of the Manchester Dioscesan Board of Education, the Birmingham 
Archidiaconal Council of Education, and Leeds Church Day School Association. 
Ibid., E.A. Coventry to Gorst, 2 November, 1901. 
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By early December, Devonshire too was becoming convinced that "Whatever 
may be the difficulties or objections to Rate aid for the Voluntary 
S h 1 B' ll , h . 11 476 coos ••• we cannot pass a i wit out it .•.• Gorst now conveyed 
to Devonshire his own admonitions regarding the weakness of a Bill which 
failed to empower the new authorities to assist voluntary schools out of 
the rates. Without these powers they would be unable to raise up the 
schools to the required level of efficiency and this failure to assist what 
amounted to more than fifty percent of the children under their jurisdiction 
would be politically hazardous. Such a Bill would "not find favour with 
that increasing number of people who see our deficiencies in Elementary 
Education and desire to have them remedied, nor with the County and 
Municipal Councils who are accepting these new powers in order to make all 
schools in their areas efficient". 477 No doubt motivated by Gorst's 
arguments, and despite Chamberlain's reluctance, Devonshire now advocated 
to Balfour that they propose inclusion of rate aid in the Bill, to the 
Cabinet, even though its acceptance would probably mean either dropping 
the Bill or breaking up the Government. If they failed, he believed they 
"had better adopt(?) the Secondary Bill and leave Elementary Education 
alone" . 478 Balfour, fearing that the division of opinion within the 
Cabinet, on the question of rate aid, would provoke a crisis within the 
479 Government, sought to neutralize the danger by sending H:>rant to win 
476Devonshire to Chamberlain, 3 December, 1901. Quoted in Amery, 4, p. 482. 
477 
Balfour Papers, B.L. Add. MS. 49769, ff.199-200. Gorst to Devonshire, 
5 December, 1901. 
478 
Balfour Papers, B.L. Add. MS. 49769, ff.201-202, Devonshire to Balfour, 
6 December, 1901. 
479F· R I 66 itz oy, , p. . 
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480 
over Chamberlain on the issue, but without success. Thus, at the next 
Cabinet meeting opponents of a comprehensive measure, led by Chamberlain 
and Salisbury, obtained rejection of the proposed Bill in favour of one 
limited to secondary education, "though with a view to being ready for 
emergencies, a second Bill dealing with Elementary Education is to be 
prepared, but not mentioned in the King's Speech". 481 Upon reflection, 
however, Chamberlain concluded that eventually party interest would dictate 
the adoption of a comprehensive measure, which he must accept or resign. 
As the latter action would cast him into the political wilderness, the 
time for reconciliation with the Liberals being long past, the most 
profitable course of action appeared to be the acceptance of the proposed 
Bill but with modifications designed to render it more palatable to his 
482 
supporters. Thus he now indicated he might be willing to concede the 
principle of one paramount local authority for all education and, albeit 
480 Although Morant succeeded in showing Chamberlain that his counter-
proposal to rate aid, additional Exchequer grants, was impractical because 
of the costs of the Boer War, he was unable to completely convince him of 
the necessity of even optional rate aid (See, Amery, 4, pp. 483-484. 
Dugdale, pp. 155-159. Eaglesham, "Education Bill of 1902", p. 19. 
FitzRoy, I, p. 67.). Bernard Allen's claim that Morant did effect a 
conversion of Chamberlain to rate aid, at this meeting, appears to be 
refuted by the evidence of Amery and FitzRoy. (For Allen's claim, see his 
Robert Morant, pp. 166-169.) 
481FitzRoy, I, pp. 67-68. 
482 Amery, 4, pp. 486-487. 
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reluctantly, the repeal of the Cowper-Temple clause, in exchange for a 
provision making rate aid subject to "local option•; 483 a concession 
designed "to draw the sting of Nonconformist criticism11 • 484 
Salisbury, however, continued to oppose the one authority plan 
485 
and rate aid to voluntary schools. Nevertheless, Balfour was by now 
firmly committed to the one authority scheme, and rate aid, arguing that 
the retention of the board schools alongside the new county authorities 
would increase the administrative overlap they were attempting to 
eliminate. 486 He acknowledged that such a Bill as he was advocating was 
politically hazardous for the Government but he, nevertheless, would refuse 
to be personally responsible for a lesser measure, "and if his colleagues 
were disposed to prefer the parliamentary conduct of Sir John Gorst, they 
will know what to expect 11 • 487 
Balfour herewith firmly indicated his determination to attain 
his objectives. His resolve was born partly of a wish to aid the voluntary 
488 schools, but also from a desire to effect a major legislative achievement 
to serve as a Conservative legacy following what he anticipated would be 
483chamberlain to Devonshire, 14 December, 1901. Cited in Ibid., p. 487. 
484Ibid., p. 487. 
485 Memorandum by Lord Salisbury circulated to the Cabinet, 17 December, 1901. 
Cited in Amery, 4, p. 485. See also Marsh, p. 316. 
486A.J. Balfour, Cabinet Memorandum, 17 December, 1901. Cited in B.E.C. 
Dugdale, "Arthur James Balfour and Robert llirant", Quarterly Review, 260 
(1933), pp. 152-168. 
487F· R I 69 itz oy, , p. . 
488
zebel, p. 119. 
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the party's departure from office at the next election.489 His threat to 
dissociate himself from the measure stiffened the Government's resolve to 
continue their isolation of Garst and to entrust to Balfour the task of 
piloting the Bill through the House, for as he confided to his sister, 
Lady Rayleigh, the Cabinet had determined "they would not have Garst at 
any price11 • 490 Thus, "the faithful servant was dismissed for his 
uncertainties of temper at a critical stage" of the Bill's development,491 
the Cabinet adding insult to injury by deliberately concealing this change 
492 from Garst. Thereafter, while Balfour took control of political 
manoeverings within the Government, major responsibility for the drafting 
493 process was assumed by Morant. 
To Balfour's pressure upon the Cabinet was added that of the 
party Whips. They urged the espousal of a one authority measure, as 
proposed by Garst, warning that it would be politically inexpedient "to 
ignore the feeling of the great bulk of the party in favour of rate aid to 
t_he voluntary schools, for the sake of removing the scruples of a few 
Radical Unionists in the Midlands 11 • 494 By this time Morant had also 
489 Marsh, p. 316. 
490Lady Rayleigh's Diary and Recollections, 21 January, 1902. Quoted in 
Max Egremont, Balfour: The Life of Arthur James Balfour (London, 1980), p.150. 
491Lowndes, p. 92. 
492Fi"tzRoy, I, p. 72. A- late J 20 1902 F"t R d" "" as anuary , , 1 z oy was recor ing 
that while the drafting of the measure continued, Garst, meanwhile, "is kept 
in ignorance that he is not to have charge of the Bill". 
493 Eaglesham, "Education Bill of 1902", p. 5. For an analysis of Balfour's 
and Morant's contributions to the development of the Bill following Gorst's 
deposition, see Ibid., pp. 11-16. Allen, Robert Morant, pp. 169-171. 
494FitzRoy, I, p. 72. 
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become firmly convinced that the answer to all the difficulties attendant 
on the Bill resided in a radical solution of the voluntary school problem, 
namely, "complete rate maintenance11 • 495 After tentatively suggesting this 
496 
course in December, 1901, two days after Gorst's advocacy of it to 
Devonshire,497 Morant now prepared a memorandum recommending the adoption 
of a measure establishing one authority for secondary and elementary 
education, provision for compulsory rate aid to voluntary schools, and 
retention of the Cowper-Temple clause. However, these proposals remained 
498 too radical to gain full Cabinet support, and their wrangling continued 
through February and into March,499 apparently with such animosity that 
500 Gerst despaired of the Bill ever reaching the House. By mid-March, 
however, a compromise was achieved: Salisbury and Chamberlain agreed to a 
one authority measure and rate aid and Balfour and Devonshire accommodated 
by making the latter provision subject to local option, "the price that had 
to be paid for securing the support of Chamberlain11 • 501 A decision was 
taken to introduce the Bill into the House on March 24th and Balfour 
succeeded in obtaining the Cabinet's pledge that in the event that the 
measure survived second reading Parliament would remain in Session until 
the Bill was passed. He was now to take charge of it, the attendant shunting 
of his Vice-President being facilitated by the latter's temporary absence 
495 Eagles ham, "Education Bill of 1902", p. 11. 
496R.L. Morant to A.J. Balfour, 7 December, 1901. Cited in B.C. Dugdale, 
"Arthur James Balfour and Robert Morant", pp. 154-155. 
497 Balfour Papers, 
5 December, 1901. 
B.L. Add. MS. 49769, ff.199-200. Gerst to Devonshire, 
See also, p.302 above. 
498Eaglesham,, "Education Bill of 190211 , pp. 11-16. 
499FitzRoy, I, pp. 73-74, pp. 80-81. 
500 Barnett Papers, F/BAJ.1./259, S.A. Barnett to F.G. Barnett, 22 February, 1902. 
501Allen, Robert Morant, p. 171. See also, Amery, 4, pp. 488-489. 
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from his official duties, "a timely attack of influenza having withdrawn 
G . b . 11 502 orst into o scurity • 
Although not officially in charge of the Bill during its passage 
through Parliament, Gorst frequently rose to defend the measure. The 
central theme of the Bill was the concentration, in one local authority, 
of direct responsibility for all types of education, a step first proposed 
by Gorst shortly after his assumption of the Vice-Presidential office in 
1895, 503 and one which he had constantly proposed in the intervening years. 
Thus the current measure's successful enactment would mark the fulfillment 
of the goal for which he had so assiduously worked since arriving at the 
Education Department. Consequently, following a denunciation of the 
measure's provisions by James Bryce, 504 Gorst argued effectively505 for 
acceptance of the centralizing proposal, emphasizing the resulting admini-
strative benefits and the increased efficiency of both elementary and 
secondary education. 506 He defended the Government's decision to make the 
county and county borough councils, rather than the school boards, the 
paramount education authority. He asserted that the non-universality of 
the boards, their incompetence in rural areas, their lack of statutory 
authority beyond the elementary level - as a result of the Cockerton 
decision - and the lesser democratic nature of their constitution, 
502 FitzRoy, I, p. 81. 
503Balfour Papers, B.L. Add. MS. 49791, f.7. Gorst to Balfour, 6 December, 1895. 
504PD, 4th series, 107 (1902): 638-662. 
505H.W. Lucy, "Essence of Parliament", Punch, 122 (May 14, 1902), p. 247. 
As Lucy observed, "Gorst' s speech commanded attention by its mastery of 
educational intricacies, its lucid arrangement, its cogent reasoning". 
506PD, 4th series, 107 (1902): 663-665, 671-675. 
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disqualified them as candidates for the new authority. Moreover, it was 
essential that the new authority be a popularly elected. body possessing 
sole control of local finance, a requirement the councils but not the 
boards could fulfill. 507 
Despite the Liberals' fierce opposition to the Bill, particularly 
508 the provision granting rate aid to voluntary schools, the measure passed 
second reading on May 8 with a majority of 237. 509 The Bill entered 
Committee stage on June 2, and from then until early July Gorst repeatedly 
supported it in debate510 and was also called upon to clarify technicalities 
pertaining to the measure. 511 At this point an unrelated event, Salisbury's 
departure from office, had an effect upon both the Bill and Gorst. At 
the beginning of July, Salisbury quietly began arranging for his retirement 
on July 11, a step originally planned for June but delayed by the sudden 
illness of the King. Salisbury's impending departure from the Government 
prompted Balfour to assert his influence upon the Education Bill, 
Chamberlain's temporary indisposition and absence from Parliament serving 
to facilitate Balfour's actions. During debate on July 9, he permitted a 
free vote on Hobhouse' s amendment to remove the "Local Option" clause from 
the Bill. Without the clause it would be compulsory for county and county 
507Ibid., pp. 667-669. 
508For a detailed analysis of the Opposition's campaign against the Bill 
see Munson, Chap. 5. 
509 Pn, 4th series, 107 (1902): 1214. 
510Ibid., 4th series, 108 (1902): 1192, 1194. Ibid., 4th series, 109 (1902): 
887, 902, 1471, 1472-1475, 1547, 1578, 1579, 1581. Ibid., 4th series, 110 
(1902): 318, 320, 441-442, 487, 1005, 1102. 
511Ibid., 4th series, 108 (1902): 1307. Ibid., 4th series, 110 (1902): 
396, 397, 398, 435, 545, 998, 1000, 1005, 1021, 1035, 1036, 1126, 1153, 1173. 
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borough councils to assume full responsibility for elementary education, 
including the provision of rate aid to voluntary schools. Believing 
loyalty to Church interests would prompt the Conservative Members to 
support the clause's deletion, Balfour openly argued against its retention. 512 
His confidence subsequently proved justified, the clause being rejected 
271 to 102.513 
Two days later Salisbury submitted his resignation to the King 
and Balfour succeeded him as Prime Minister. In the resulting reconstruction 
of the Government, Devonshire relinquished his educational office to Lord 
Londonderry, who became the first President of the Board of Education, and 
Gorst found himself replaced by Sir William Anson, who became Parliamentary 
Secretary to Londonderry, the position of Vice-President being dissolved 
under the provisions of the 1899 Board of Education Act. Thus Balfour 
used the opportunity presented by Salisbury's resignation to finally 
514 dispatch Gorst from the Government. He apparently attempted to dislodge 
512Marsh, pp. 318-320. 
513PD, 4th series, 110 (1902): 1240-1243. 
514Gorst's parliamentary colleague Griffith-Boscawen reported Gorst's 
departure as a straightforward "retirement" from office, an assessment subse-
quently repeated by Morant's biographer, Bernard Allen (Allen, Robert Morant, 
p. 182. Griffith-Boscawen, p. 242). However, there is evidence to support 
the above claim that Gorst was in fact dismissed from the Government. He 
did not formally resign until August 5 (Sandars Papers, Bodleian Library, MS. 
Eng. Hist: C:737, ff.16-20. Gorst to Balfour, 5 August, 1902). This was over 
three weeks after Salisbury's resignation and a scant four days before the 
ministerial appointments were finalized (FitzRoy, I, p. 97). This would seem 
to indicate Gorst's desire to remain in office. Moreover, in that month 
Balfour's secretary, Sandars, wrote upon a communication to, or from, Devonshire, 
the inscription "Letter as to the removal of Gorst (Sandars Papers, Bodleian 
Library, MS. Eng. Hist. C:737. D24:ix:34. Emphasis added). In addition, 
Gorst's son recorded in his diary that his father's resignation essentially 
resulted from his "being, in fact, politely told to go" (Sir Eldon Gorst, 
"Autobiographical Notes", II, p. 85. Quoted in Daglish, p. 570). 
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Gorst from the House as well, by offering him the Governorship of the Isle 
f Ma 515 o n. However, as acceptance would have entailed retirement from 
Parliament, Gerst "declined to walk into that particular parlour11 , 516 
and thus the Unionists were faced with the prospect of his continued, and 
perhaps even more critical, presence upon the Commons back-benches. 
Consequently, when the opportunity arose, Balfour made one further attempt 
to reduce Gorst's potential for parliamentary activism. At the time of 
his resignation from office, Gorst applied to Balfour for a pension, 517 
"from a fund established for the benefit of ex-ministers whose private 
circumstances make such assistance desirable11 • 518 Balfour, while 
acknowledging that Grost qualified for such a stipend, bluntly told him 
"it would seem absurd to recommend him for a Pension, if he meant to use 
his liberty seriously to embarrass the Government", and he asked Gorst to 
indicate his intentions in this regard. Gorst assured Balfour that although 
he had some reservations concerning the Bill, he would not vote for any 
amendment that might kill the measure, adding that "this was symbolic of 
his personal attitude" towards the Government. 519 Although Balfour 
1 f d Go I 1 h • f 
520 h • d 1 apparent y oun rst s response ess tan satis actory, e evi ent y 
decided to give him the benefit of the doubt for he subsequently granted 
him a life pension of ~1,200 annually. 521 
515H.W. Lucy, The Balfourian Parliament 1900-1905 (London, 1906), p.202. 
Hereafter referred to as Lucy, Balfourian Parliament. 
516 Lucy, Nearing Jordan, p. 250. 
517 Balfour Papers, B.L. Add. MS. 49791, ff.36-37. Note of a Conversation with 
Sir J. Gorst on Thursday, August 7, 1902. 
518 Lucy, Balfourian Parliament, p. 202. 
519 Balfour Papers, B.L. Add. MS. 49791, ff.36-37. Note of a Conversation with 
Sir J. Gorst on Thursday, August 7, 1902. 
5200n September 15, Balfour was still deliberating on what action to take 
with regard to Gorst's pension (FitzRoy, I, p. 106). 
521Lucy, Balfourian Parliament, p. 202. 
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When debate on the Committee stage of the Bill resumed, Gorst 
522 did honour his pledge to Balfour, rising only to defend the measure, 
1 ·f d . . . . · 523 b h · 1 · or to c ari ya ministrative points at issue, e aviour a so consistent 
with his desire to see the Bill enacted. Meanwhile, the Opposition 
continued its obstructionist tactics in the Commons, disputing the Bill 
line by line and introducing so many amendments that progress on the 
measure was reduced almost to a standstill. Outside the House, Nonconformist 
agitation against the Bill reached a crescendo in a series of huge protest 
demonstrations. Thus, in late October, Balfour reached the conclusion 
that some concessions to the Nonconformist interest would have to be made 
to facilitate the Bill's passage. He instructed Unionist M.P. Kenyon-
Slaney to move an amendment transferring control of religious instruction 
in voluntary schools from the clergy to the entire body of managers, which 
was to comprise a substantial elective element. He presented the amendment 
as an effective method for protecting the schools from the excesses of 
ritualistic clergymen and, despite firm resistance from some of the 
Unionists, it was carried by a large majority. Although opposition to the 
measure continued, the chief difficulty now faced by the Government was 
lack of time and, consequently, during the final stages of the Bill, Balfour 
was obliged to apply guillotine procedures to effect its passage, The 
522PD, 4th series, 113 (1902): 707, 847-849. Ibid., 4th series, 114 (1902): 
199-201, 324, 325, 1054, 1061, 1315, 1316, 1317. Ibid., 4th series, 115 
(1902): 55, 425-429, 555. 
523Ibid., 4th series, 113 (1902): 180, 260, 960, 1007, 1133, 1245. Ibid., 
4th series, 114 (1902): 27, 1045, 1410, 1411, 1427. Ibid., 4th series, 
115 (1902): 393. 
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victorious division was eventually achieved on December 3 and the Bill 
received Royal Assent on December 18.524 
Thus was placed on the statute book the Education Act of 1902 
which "made possible the whole future development of Education" in 
Britain, its provisions remaining substantially in force until the Butler 
Education Act of 1944.525 To its supporters it constituted "a great 
national reform", 526 a view which eventually came to be shared by many of 
its Liberal opponents. Speaking in the Commons in 1913, Liberal Minister 
of Education, J.A. Pease acknowledged that "Many of us have thought that 
there were serious defects in the Act of 1902, but no one who compares the 
position of today with what it was ten years ago can deny that a very great 
advance has been made in the education of the country11 •527 Commenting, 
in 1926, upon this educational legislation, Halevy observed that "Regarded 
from the distance of a quarter of a century it seems no small achievement11528 
and as the century draws to a close historians still extol the benefits of 
the measure: "The 1902 Education Act can now be seen as ••• a legislative 
action_ of far-reaching effects, and a substantial step forward in the 
provision of national State education". 529 Even present-day critics of the 
524 Allen, ~R=o=b=er==t_Mo:=r=a=no=.t, pp. 192-197. 
I, pp. 112-113. Marsh, pp. 318-319. 
Ch. 42. 
525
sturt, pp. 417-418. 
Cruickshank, pp. 83-85. FitzRoy, 
For the Act's provisions see 2 Edw. 7, 
526RQ, 4th series, 115 (1902}: 1080. Speech of Sir Richard Jebb. 
527Ibid., 5th series, 55 (1913): 1909. See also Ibid., 4th series, 178 (1907): 90. 
Speech of A.G.C. Harvey. The Times, 26 March, 1913, p.9. Lord Haldane's speech 
at Weston-Super-Mare. 
528 Halevy, 5, p. 204. 
529R.R. James, p. 206. See also, Banks, p. 1. Cruickshank, p. 85. Evans, 
p. 71. Kazamias, p. 330. 
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Act concede that the statute, "whatever its defects, created an educational 
system which worked", 530 and that its "unity of administration, finance 
and control made for a uniformity of progress not made possible before11 • 531 
Following the passage of the 1902 Education Bill, Balfour's 
secretary, J.S. Sandars wrote, "All the official help that the Prime 
Minister could obtain was from Morant. Morant was excellent and his 
industry phenomenal. Thring the draughtsman did good work. The Act as we 
know it was the product of these three brains, while the carriage of it 
through the House of Commons was the sole work of A.J.B. 11 • 532 A leading 
Church dignitary sent Balfour "heartiest congratulations upon the achievement 
of your innnense task", while Cardinal Vaughan extended to Morant "most 
hearty thanks for all you have done for us - for the tact and determination 
by which you have brought about the impossible". 533 These assessments, 
crediting to Balfour and Morant the successful enactment of the 1902 measure, 
have subsequently been echoed by numerous historians. With the e~ception 
of Eaglesham, who attributes to Gorst partial responsibility for the framing 
of the Bili, 534 historical accounts of the evolution of the 1902 Act 
535 generally ignore Gorst's contributions to its development. This oversight 
530Eaglesham, Local Authority, p. 141. 
531Middleton and Weitzman, p. 114. 
532
sandars Papers, Bodleian Library, MS. Eng. Hist. C: 771: 324. 
533Quoted in Allen, Robert Morant, p. 197. 
534 Eaglesham, "Education Bill of 1902", pp. 3-5. See also, Zebel, p. 118. 
Zebel notes that Gorst proposed a plan for educational centralization, but 
asserts it was inspired by the Fabians. 
535see for example, Armytage, p. 186. Cruickshank, 
Evans, The Development and Structure of the English 
1975), p. 65. Middleton and Weitzman, pp. 111-112. 
pp. 77-79, p. 85. Keith 
Educational System {London, 
Simon, p. 218, p. 220. 
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might result in part from the historians' over-reliance upon the observa-
tions of contemporaries, such as FitzRoy, Morant, and Sandars, whose close 
relationship with the key Government figures engaged in producing this 
legislation no doubt added a ring of authenticity to their pronouncements. 
FitzRoy's observations evoke a picture of Morant as the behind-the-scenes 
536 factotum; Morant, himself, actively promoted the view of Gorst as a 
negligent by-stander in the events leading up to the Bill's enactment, 
describing him as "cynical and careless, having given up even the semblance 
of any interest in the office" of Vice-Pres ident;537 and Sandars' comments, 
quoted above, deny Gorst even a minor part in the Bill's creation. The 
fact that Gorst had resigned his office of Vice-President just as the Bill 
entered the Committee stage, thus relinquishing any official connection 
with its subsequent passage, may have helped to give credence to the view 
538 
of Gorst as a non-participant in its development. 
Undoubtedly, the measure's successful passage through the Commons 
was primarily the result of Balfour's determination and skill in debate, 
Gorst's participation in this process contributing little to the Bill's 
progress. However, Gorst's involvement in the framing of the measure, as 
outlined above, reveals that he played a key role in the creation of the 
1902 Act. Moreover, the final form in which the measure was enacted also 
reflects the extent of his contribution to the legislation. The central 
536FitzRoy, I, p. 74. "In the meantime the indefatigable Morant flies from 
one Cabinet Minister to another and receives the frankest confessions from 
them all .•• ". 
537B. Webb, Our Partnership, p. 239. Morant apparently also told Beatrice 
Webb that he had been "exclusively engaged by the Cabinet Committee to draft 
this present Bill •.. Both Keckewich and Gorst have been absolutely ignored. 
Neither the one nor the other saw the Bill before it was printed". (Ibid., p. 240) 
538Daglish, pp. 574-575. 
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principle underlying the Act, the establishment of a new administrative 
framework at the local level, had constituted the main theme of Gorst's 
centralization proposals since he became Vice-President of the Council 
in 1895. It had appeared in his first tentative scheme for an education 
bill in December 1895; 539 it was the fundamental principle of his 1896 
Education Bi11; 540 the concept underlay Clause 7 of the Art and Science 
Department Directory for 1897,541 which he devised, and was the pivotal 
provision of his proposed 1901 (No. 1) Bill.542 Although the 19.02 Act's 
clauses prescribing local reorganization were modified versions of Gorst's 
original draft proposals, the principle of a single paramount local 
education authority for all education was retained. According to 
Keckewich, Garst was "mainly responsible" for this retention, 543 a claim 
the evidence given above would appear to support. Moreover, as Gilbert 
has noted, it was Gorst 1 s constant advocacy of the "one authority" system, 
during his years in office, which served to create a climate of opinion 
favourable to its acceptance by 1902.544 
It is interesting to note that a major retrospective criticism 
of the Act's centralizing provisions echoes the sentiments expressed by 
Garst during the Bill's passage. Educational historians assert that the 
measure's establishment of non-county boroughs and larger urban districts 
539 . Balfour Papers, B.L. Add. MS. 49791, f.7. Garst to Balfour, 6 December, 1895. 
Ibid., f.23, Gorst's Sketch of Education Measure. 
54oBill to make further provision for Education in England and Wales (Bill 172), 
Rf., 1896, 1: 541-559. 
541 See pp. 246-247 above. 
542 P.R.O. Ed. 24/29. Definite Proposals by J.E. Garst for a Bill. 
543Keckewich, p. 105. 
544Gilbert, "Conservative Rebel", p. 160. 
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as education authorities for their areas created an administrative dichotomy 
between these bodies and the county education authorities which resulted 
in a weakening of the system in the counties which continues to plague 
545 
educational administration in the final quarter of the twentieth century. 
This concession to the minor urban authorities was the only provision 
against which Garst spoke in debate. He regarded the proposal as "a 
departure from the principle of the Bill" and, conscious of the potential 
difficulties the step entailed, expressed the hope that this digression 
546 would "not be attended by any evil consequences" in the future. 
The relative ease with which the Government were able to enact 
the abolition of the school boards owed much to the preparatory work under-
taken by Garst. The provisions of Clause 7 of the 1897 Art and Science 
Directory, the Higher Elementary School Minute of 1900, and, most importantly 
the Cockerton Act of 1901, all devised by Garst· to effect the subordination 
of the school boards to the county authorities with respect to non-elementary 
545Keith Evans has argued that once the concession of partial educational 
autonomy to the minor urban authorities had been entrenched by the 1902 
Act it subsequently became difficult to rescind the privilege. Consequently, 
when the "elementary only" authorities were dissolved by the 1944 Act, 
there emerged "divisional executives and excepted districts which continued 
to confuse and dilute the power of the County local education authorities". 
Moreover, "the fact that the 1902 Act sanctified the right of the urban 
locality to influence directly its own development has more recently made 
for difficulties in the formulation of policy for major government reform 
as it affects education". See also, Middleton and Weitzman, pp. 221-225, 
pp. 289-292. 
546PD, 4th series, 107 (1902): 666. 
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education, so successfully established in advance the principle of the 
1902 Act as to weaken the Opposition's case for the retention of the 
547 boards. 
The Act's extension of rate aid to voluntary schools and its 
concommitant, increased public control of the secular aspects of the 
548 
education they provided, had been prescribed by Gorst as early as 1896. 
Thereafter, as has been noted above, he repeatedly asserted that only 
through the application of rate aid could the voluntary schools be 
effectively incorporated into the State system and rendered more efficient. 
It was these crucial aspects of the rate-aid provision, and the retarding 
effect upon local educational administration its absence from the Bill 
would produce, that Gorst outlined to Devonshire in December, 1901, just 
prior to Morant's presentation of a similar argument to Balfour, an argument 
which Eaglesham considers the key element in the measure's successful 
549 enactment. As with the one authority concept, Keckewich credits Gorst 
with securing the inclusion of the rate-aid provision in the Bilt.550 
Given the evidence cited above, the oft-repeated assessment of 
Morant as the chief architect of the 1902 Education Bilt551 would appear 
547 Eaglesham, Local Authority, pp. 141-142. See also Appendix B. 
548Gorst, "The Voluntary Schools", pp. 709-710. 
549 Eagles ham, "Education Bill of 190211 , p. 11. 
55
°Keckewich, p. 105. 
551see for example, Allen, Robert Morant, pp. 145-171. Cruickshank, pp. 78-79. 
Eric Evans, Social policy 1830-1914: Individualism, collectivism and the 
origins of the Welfare State (London, 1978), p. 238. K. Evans, p. 65. 
Bentley B. Gilbert, The Evolution of National Insurance in Great Britain 
(London, 1966), p. 134. Middleton and Weitzman, p. 111. 
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to require revision in order to do justice to Gorst's contributions to 
the measure. While Morant's role in the development of the Bill was 
considerable, he might be more aptly described as the expert weaver who 
gathered together the warp and weft prepared by Gorst and wove them into 
a complex and serviceable educational fabric. 
The 1902 Act marked the fulfillment of Gorst's long campaign 
for educational improvement. Following its enactment, he once again 
turned his attention to the many social evils still awaiting reform. One 
of the most pressing problems with which Gorst was concerned was the 
failure of public authorities to adequately provide for the welfare of 
the poorer children in society. Relieved of his duties in the Education 
Department, Gorst now devoted the remainder of his parliamentary career 
to agitating for social reform, particularly for the improvement of 
conditions for underprivileged children and especially those unable to 
benefit from education because of under-nourishment. 
Sir John Eldon Gorst. c. 1905. 
CHAPTER VI 
"THE CHILDREN'S VALIANT CHAMPION" 
Concern for the welfare of the nation's underprivileged children 
had been a constant, if underlying, theme of Gorst's social reform activity 
since the early days of his parliamentary career. Although the demands and 
constraints of political and government office had largely restricted his 
time and energies to other areas of reform, he had continued to press, 
albeit intermittently, for the amelioration of the excessively harsh 
conditions to which many of society's poorer children were subjected. During 
debate on the 1878 Factories and Workshops Bill he had pressed for adoption 
of an amendment requiring employers in workshops as well as factories to 
obtain certificates of medical fitness for children under 16, in order to 
ensure that children "not be sent by their parents to places for which they 
are unfit" . 1 He had urged rejection of a compensation clause in the 1880 
Employers' Liability Bill because he believed its provisions would be 
particularly harsh when applied in children's claims. 2 Gorst's 1891 social 
programme had urged the adoption of legislation postponing child labour 
from 10 to 12 years, an end to economic exploitation of pauper children, 
and the replacement of their inhumane, institutional care with the boarding-
1PD, 3rd series, 238 (1878): 319. 
2Ibid., 3rd series, 255 (1880): 388-389. See also p. 119 above. 
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3 
out system. Also in 1891 he had been instrumental in obtaining acceptance 
of an amendment to the Factory Bill raising the age of "half-timers" from 
4 10 to 11 years. Thereafter he had maintained his efforts to have the 
minimum age for child labour raised to 12 years, 5 in accordance with the 
pledge given at the Berlin Conference, and in 1895 he had made an 
unsuccessful bid to have a clause containing this provision inserted in 
6 the Factory Bill of that year. Gorst's endeavours at Berlin and his 
subsequent attempts to implement the pledges made there to relieve the 
conditions of child drudges, together with his stand on their behalf 
during debates on the 1895 Factory Bill, had prompted one contemporary to 
describe him as the "childrens' valiant champion ... (who) has demonstrated 
his determination to strive his utmost for their physical, moral, and 
intellectual welfare". 7 Following his appointment as Education Minister, 
Garst had incorporated into his ill-fated Education Bill of 1896 a clause 
raising the school-leaving age to 12 years. 8 Following failure of that 
311 social Politics in England: An Interview with Sir John Garst", Review 
of Reviews (New York), 3 (April 1891), pp. 266-270. Hereafter referred to 
as "Social Politics in England". See also "Character Sketch. December. 
Sir John Garst", Review of Reviews, 3 (1891), pp. 575-586. Hereafter 
referred to as "Character Sketch". See also p. 149 and p. 153 above. 
4 PD, 3rd series, 354 (1891): 859-863. See also "Character Sketch", p. 585, 
and pp. 158-159 of this dissertation. 
5 . See J.E. Garst, "English Workmen and their Political Friends", North 
American Review, 159 (1894), pp. 207-217. The Times, 4 May, 1894, p.4. 
6PD, 4th series, 31 (1895): 181-183. 
7J.J. Davies, "The New Minister of Education and His Work", Westminster 
Review, 144 (1895), pp. 332-336. 
8 A Bill to make further provision for Education in England and Wales, 
PP, 1896, 1: 54-559, Sect. II: 544, Clause 21. 
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9 
measure he had continued to agitate for the age reform and had succeeded 
in having a similar clause included in the Omnibus Bill of 1898. 10 When 
that Bill had been temporarily shelved, he had played a key role in 
obtaining passage of the Elementary Education (School Attendance) Act 
1893 (Amendment) 1899 which implemented the age provision he had been 
seeking. 11 
Garst had been particularly active in the promotion of improved 
care for pauper children. His 1891 and 1895 social programmes had 
advocated reforms in Poor Law relief, particularly as it applied to 
children, 12 and during 1894 he had spearheaded a successful campaign for 
the establishment of a Departmental Committee to inquire into conditions 
13 in London pauper schools. As a member of that Committee he had 
subsequently given close to two years diligent labour to fulfilling its 
mandate. Between November 1894, when the Committee first met, and the 
publication of its Report in April 1896, he had participated in regular 
meetings, attended numerous hearings, and inspected a variety of institutions 
catering for pauper children. As one of his colleagues, Henrietta Barnett 
later recalled, during the period the Committee met: 
9 See for example, PD, 4th series, 56 (1898): 499-500. Ibid., 4th series, 
59 (1898): 590-596. The Times, 22 March, 1897, p.4. Ibid., 19 November, 
1897, p.7; 24 December, 1897, p.4; 3 March, 1898, p.8; 29 October, 1898, 
p .9. 
10 P.R.O. Ed. 31/18/1. G.W. Keckewich to Garst, 25 May, 1898. 
11 See pp. 260-261 above. 
12J .E. Garst, "The Conservative Programme of Social Reform", Nineteenth 
Century, 38 (1895), pp. 3-16. Hereafter referred to as· Garst, "Conservative 
Programme". "Social Politics in England", p. 270. 
13 See pp. 186-187 above. 
"We sat fifty times, saw seventy three witnesses, and asked 17,566 
questions. Each member inspected schools, when and where he deemed 
well .•. Sir John Gorst came to stay in Toynbee Hall every Monday. 
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On Tuesdays the Committee sat at Westminster, usually for five hours. 
On Wednesdays Sir John and I inspected all day ••• and on Fridays the 
Committee again put in five or six hours' work".14 
Echoing the criticisms made earlier by Gorst, 15 the Committee's three 
16 volume Report constituted a stinging indictment of the Metropolitan 
17 District School system's "barrack" schools. These institutions, which 
frequently housed between 800 and 1500 children, were revealed to be 
nurseries of disease and ignorance. Evidence gathered by the Committee 
disclosed that among children herded together in these establishments 
physical, mental and moral development was unfavourably affected. The 
health of the children was generally deplorable, opthalmia and ringworm 
being rife. 18 The aggregation of children into these large schools, with 
their regimented programmes and sterile environments, turned their 
inhabitants into mechanistic individuals devoid of any sense of personal 
14H.O. Barnett, Canon Barnett: His Life, Work and Friends (London, 1918), 
p. 293. Herafter referred to as H.O. Barnett, Canon Barnett. 
15see Gorst, "Conservative Programme", p. 13. 
16Report of the Poor Law Schools Committee (Cmnd. 8027), fl'., 1896, 43: 
1-1418. The Committee's conclusions and recommendations were contained in 
the 187 page first volume which was supplemented by volume two, consisting_ 
of 849 pages of evidence, and volume three comprised of 400 pages of 
Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence. 
17The Metropolitan District School system had been instituted in 1884 when 
Parliament empowered the Central Poor Law Authority to assemble combinations 
of London unions for the purpose of establishing schools separate from 
workhouse association. [See Elizabeth S. Lidgett, "Poor Law Children and 
the Departmental Committee", Contemporary Review, 71 (1897), pp. 205-220.] 
18 Report of the Poor Law Schools Committee. Vol. 1 (Cmnd. 8027), PP, 1896, 
43: 16-22. 
"b"l" 19 responsi i 1.ty. 
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The instruction given in these schools was both 
deficient in quality and meagre in quantity when compared to that received 
by children in ordinary elementary schools. 20 The children were routinely 
engaged in un-educational, domestic tasks, designed to dull rather than 
develop the faculties, which provided little vocational training. 
Consequently, many children departed the schools quite unfitted to make 
their way in life. 21 The Connnittee had thus concluded that, given 
existing circumstances, there were "serious dangers" in maintaining the 
current system of barrack schools: rrunder such conditions there are, as 
we have shown, insufficient means of encouraging mental activity, the 
development of what is best in individual character, and aspiration after 
better things; at the same time many of the conditions of the children's 
22 life are proved to be unfavourable to heal th". 
Additional impact had been given to these conclusions by a 
23 
memorandum prepared by Gorst, at the Committee's request, recounting the 
circumstances surrounding three tragic incidents in the barrack schools 
which had prompted Gorst's agitation for the creation of the inquiry in 
19 R~Qort of the Poor Law Schools Corrnnittee. Vol. 2i Minutes of Evidence 
(Cmnd. 8032), PP, 1896, 43: 628, para. 11352-11353. Evidence of Miss B. 
Hall. 
ZO!bid., 1 (Crnnd. 8027), PP, 1896, 43: 50-51. 
21Ibid., 2 (Cmnd. 8032), PP, 1896, 43: 52-57, para. 166-205. 
22Ibid., 1 (Crnnd. 8027), PP, 1896, 43: 176-177. 
23Ibid., 1 (Crnnd. 8027), RR, 1896, 43: 182-184. Appendix A. 
3~. 
1894. 24 His memorandum, compiled from Local Government Board papers, was 
a brief but poignant testimonial to the deficiencies of the large pauper 
schools. In the case of the fire at Forest Gate schools, Gerst reported 
how 26 boys who died perished as a result of an official's incompetence. 
He outlined how, in the poisoning incident, the children were fed fly-
blown meat followed later by a meal of soup consisting "chiefly of 
officer's waste, and very little fresh meat", and how, thereupon, 148 
became violently ill and two subsequently died of ptomaine poisoning. He 
related that at a coroner's inquest into the tragedy a verdict of 
accidental death was returned and the jury recorded their confidence in the 
school's superintendent. In the third episode, for which an infant's 
attendant had been sentenced to five years penal servitude for abusing 
the children under her care, Gerst recounted how to all her cruel actions 
her fellow officers, including the matron and superintendent, had turned 
a blind eye, she being convicted only following an inquiry by the local 
25 Government Board. 
Not surprisingly, given the evidence they had accumulated, the 
Committee had recommended the abandonment of the barrack school system, 
urging that no more schools of this type be built or enlarged and that the 
numbers of children in the existing institutions be reduced. They had 
24 Seep. 186 above. The incidents were a fatal fire at one Forest Gate 
school in 1889; the accidental poisoning of children at another Forest Gate 
institution in 1893; and the cruelties perpetrated at Brentwood Schools in 
1894. [Report of the Poor Law Schools Committee, Vol. 1 (Cmnd. 8027), PP, 
1896, 43: 182-184.] 
25 Ibid., 1 (Cmnd. 8027), PP, 1896, 43: 182-184. 
326. 
advocated that, where possible, the majority of the pauper children be 
given non-institutional care through the boarding-out system - either in 
cottage homes or foster or scattered homes - "where the varying surroundings 
and interests are more favourable to the development of character, and 
approximate more nearly the conditions of ordinary life". 26 These solutions 
27 
were akin to those advocated previously by Garst, suggesting the possi-
bility that his influence shaped their recommendations. In order to 
facilitate implementation of their suggestions, the Committee had advocated 
the creation of a Central Metropolitan Authority "which shall have control 
and supervision of all London institutions for Poor Law children11 • 28 
This particular recommendation had generated a divergence of opinion among 
Committee members. The Rev. Brooke Lambert and Mr. W. Vallance had 
objected to the proposal on the grounds that it would completely relieve 
the guardians of the care of the pauper children and end local controi. 29 
Conversely, Garst and Henrietta Barnett expressed misgivings regarding the 
suggested constitution of the proposed central authority which, as worded, 
envisaged placing control under the joint aegis of the Education Department 
and the Local Government Board. Because, in their view, the latter body 
had "failed to develop proper treatment of children, or to stop scandals 
26Ibid., l (Cmnd. 8027), PP, 1896, 43: 182-184. The Committee recommended 
that certain groups of children, the feeble-minded, the casual attenders, 
those suffering from opthalmia, and other contagious diseases - be housed 
in special schools. 
27 See Garst, "Conservative Programme", pp. 12-13. Garst, "Social Politics 
in England", p. 270. 
28 Report of the Poor Law Schools Committee. Vol. l (Cmnd. 8027), PP, 1896, 
43: 177. 
29 Memorandum by the Rev. Brooke Lambert and Mr. Vallance. Ibid: 180. 
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in the institution" and because they believed it was essential that pauper 
children be severed from a life-long connection with the Poor Law system, 
Garst and Henrietta Barnett urged "that the proposed central authority 
should not be a Poor Law but an educational body", and that such a body 
30 
"be under the sole supervision of the Education Department". Their 
reservations upon this issue had prompted them to sign the Report "Subject 
31 to dissent appended". 
Although the Local Government Board took no immediate steps to 
implement the Committee's recommendations, the interest aroused by the 
Report, and sustained by Gorst's speeches, had led directly to the formation 
of the State Children's Association - dedicated to obtaining "individual 
treatment for children under the Guardianship of the State" - which 
reportedly was eventually able to pressure the Local Government Board into 
32 
adopting a substantial number of the Report's proposals. Garst, meanwhile, 
30Ibid: 179. "Memorandum drawn up by the Right Honourable Sir John Garst, 
M. P., and Mrs. Barnett". The divergence of opinion on this question had 
apparently created dissention within the Committee which had led to a 
delay in completing the Report. However, through the mediation of Mrs. 
Barnett the difficulties had been overcome and the Committee had reached 
a compromise and finalized their Report at the end of February, 1896, 
although "Garst at the last moment was restive and was only brought in 
by great skill". [Barnett Papers, F/BAR/138, S.A. Barnett to F.G. Barnett, 
29 February, 1896. See also, Ibid., F/BAR/133, S.A. Barnett to F.G. Barnett, 
7 December, 1895. Ibid., F/BAR/135, S.A. Barnett to F.G. Barnett, 
1 February, 1896.] 
31Report of the Poor Law Schools Committee. Vol. 1 (Cmnd. 8027), PP, 1896, 
43: 178. The Rev. Brooke Lambert and Mr. W. Vallance, together with two 
others of the seven member Committee signed the Report "Subject to Memo-
randum appended". (Ibid: 178.) 
32H.O. Barnett, Canon Barnett, p. 295. For the interest generated by the 
Report, see H.O. Barnett, Towards Social Reform (New York, 1909), pp. 125-
126. "Children of the State", the Spectator, 76 (1896), pp. 509-510. 
Lidgett, pp. 205-220. The Times, 8 June, 1896, p.11. "Editorial Comment", 
Blackwoods Magazine, 160 (1896), pp. 538-539. 
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in his capacity as Vice-President of the Council, had already taken steps 
designed to bring the Poor Law Schools under the jurisdiction of the Educa-
tion Department. In his 1896 Education Bill, introduced into Parliament 
prior to the Report's publication, he had provided that the proposed new 
education authority - the education committee of the County and County 
Borough Councils - would "constitute a body to which may be entrusted 
hereafter those unhappy children of the State who are to be found in 
industrial and Poor Law Schoo ls". 33 Al though this prov is ion was lost as 
a result of the failure of the 1896 Bill, Gorst had succeeded in promoting 
the increased attendance of pauper children in ordinary elementary schools 
through a proposal incorporated into the Elementary Education Act of 1900.34 
One further question with which Gorst had been concerned during 
this period, and with which he was now to become increasingly involved, 
was that of the malnutrition suffered by children in the schools. It was 
in his capacity as Education Minister that Gorst grew to be aware of this 
problem amongst poorer children and of the dangers inherent in this 
condition. During his years in that office his visits to schools, 
discussions with the inspectors, and conversations with teachers, had all 
served to impress upon him the futility of attempting to educate children 
whose physical condition rendered them incapable of benefitting from the 
instruction provided. 35 Consequently, he had arrived at the conclusion 
33PD, 4th series, 39 (1896): 540. Gorst's speech introducing the 1896 
Education Bill into the Commons. 
34 See p. 259 and p. 262 above. 
under the education committees 
Chap. 41-42. Clause 14.] 
The pauper schools were eventually brought 
by the 1902 Education Act. [See 2 Edw. 7. 
35 Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Physical Deterioration. Vol. 2. 
Lists of Witnesses and Minutes of Evidence (Cmnd. 2210), !'.]:, 1904, 32: 581, 
para. 11788. Evi.dence of Sir John Gors t. 
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that the State must effect some arrangement for feeding the underfed children 
in the schools. Although during the period Garst had served as Vice-
President of the Council, the constraints of his position had "rendered it 
inexpedient and inadvisable" to make public pronouncements upon matters of 
36 general public policy, such as the condition of the people, he had 
nevertheless drawn attention to the issue of hungry school children. In 
his 1899 article on the problem of children as wage-earners, he had 
emphasized that "a child must be fed before it can be taught" and had 
' ' d h h h' h b d bl' 37 intimate tat, were necessary, tis oug t to e one at pu ic expense, 
38 
comments which evidently got him "into a great scrape", During a Supply 
debate in the Commons, in June 1900, Garst had expressed the view that it 
was the duty of the school authorities to ensure that "children were fed 
before they were taught", and if the charitable agencies were unable to 
cope with the problem the former bodies must take over the responsibility, 
because "if you compel children to go to school and compel them to receive 
instruction, then you have the obligation thrown upon you to make some 
provision by which those children are in a fit state to benefit from the 
instruction given" 39 Whilst delivering a presidential address to the 
36The Times, 12 February, 1903, p.4. Gorst's speech at Lancaster. 
37 J.E. Garst, "School Children as Wage-Earners", Nineteenth Century, 
46 (1899), pp. 8-17. 
38PD, 4th series, 84 (1900): 30. Speech of Sir John Garst. 
39Ibid. 
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Educational Association for the Advancement of Science, in 1901, he had 
stated that "Advantage should be taken of the fact that the children come 
daily under the observation of a quasi-public officer - the school teacher 
- to secure them the protection, to which they are entitled _by law, against 
40 hunger ... " as well as other forms of abuse and neglect. Following his 
resignation from the office of Vice-President in Autumn 1902, Gorst very 
soon resumed his campaign for social reform, 41 and the issue of under-
fed children featured prominently in his agitation. In January, 1903, 
Gorst travelled to South Wales to address two working men's meetings on 
the question of feeding hungry children in the schools. 42 
Up to this point, the issue of under-fed children in the schools 
had largely been the concern of philanthropic organizations. For the 
previous forty years various charitable bodies had undertaken to provide 
free or cheap dinners to the more necessitous among the school children. 
The first experiments of this nature were carried out, on a limited basis, 
40J.E. Gorst, "The National Control of Education" (Address of the president 
of the Educational Science Section of the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science, Glasgow, 1901), Popular Science Monthly, 60 (1901), 
pp. 49-57. 
41 Barnett Papers, F/BAR/136. S.A. Barnett to F.G. Barnett, 7 February, 1903. 
Wrote Samuel Barnett, "Gorst came on Thursday. He is off on a Social Reform 
Campaign and we try to bring him up to date". See also, J.E. Gorst, 
"Social Reform: The Obligations of the Tory Party", Nineteenth Century, 
53 (1903), pp. 519-532. Hereafter referred to as Gorst, "Social Reform". 
PD, 4th series, 118 (1903): 319-325, 1424-1425. The Times, 11 February, 
1903, p.S. Ibid., 12 February, 1903, p.4; 14 February, p.8. Gorst's 
speeches at Manchester, Lancaster, and Keighly. 
42Marvin Papers, MS. Eng. lett. C.257, ff.11-12. Gorst to E.M.D. Marvin, 
27 January, 1903. Edith Deverell Marvin, the former Edith :IR,verell, had 
been one of the first women inspectors appointed by the Education 
Department. 
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by Roman Catholic schools in the early eighteen sixties.43 Also in the 
early 'sixties, the Destitute Childrens' Dinner Society, was founded in 
connection with the Ragged Schools in Westminster.44 In their appeal for 
funds they expressed a concern which was to be echoed by Gorst over thirty 
years later; the children's almost constant destitution of food, they 
declared, "reduces them to so low a state that they have not vigour of 
body and mind sufficient to derive any profit from the exertions of their 
45 teachers". The Society also took pains to reassure potential critics 
of their work that their efforts were in no way pauperizing: "Our object 
is not indiscriminate Relief of the multitude of poor children to be found 
in the lowest parts of the metropolis. Our efforts are limited to those 
in attendance at ragged or other schools so as to assist the moral and 
46 
religious training thus afforded". A charge of a penny a meal was made 
by the Society, but in some localities the children were invariably unable 
47 to pay. Nevertheless, the Destitute Childrens' Dinner Society, and 
the majority of the other charitable feeding associations which sprang up 
during the period, continued to charge a nominal sum for a meal out of 
a desire to force at least a minimum of parental responsibility. 
43 see Report of the Select Committee on Education (Provision of Meals) 
Bill, 1906. Evidence of Monsignor Brown, Qu. 1038, "Many of our own (Roman 
Catholic) schools fed children even in the 'sixties". Quoted in M.E. Bulkley, 
The Feeding of School Children (London, 1914), p. 3. 
44 Bulkley, p. 3. 
45The Times, 5 December, 1867, p.6. 
461b1."d., l N b 1870 6 ovem er, , p •• 
47Ibid., 15 April, 1868, p.6. 
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Th Ch • t O • • I 48 • d h 1 d • e ari y rganization s attitu e to sc oo inners 
typified this form of approach. They approved of the work of philanthropic 
school feeding organizations which provided self-supporting dinners as a 
public service but opposed any attempts to supply food free of charge 
without inquiry into the needs and means of recipients, on the ground that 
49 
the latter method constituted "a barbarous and uncivil" system. During 
this period, school feeding was carried out only sporadically, usually the 
meal was provided on one or two days each week, and even then only during 
the winter months. This resulted not from a lack of interest on the part 
of child-feeding agencies, most of which aimed at more than a relief of 
temporary distress, but was a schedule forced on them through lack of 
funds. 50 
The onset of the 'seventies marked a rapid period of growth for 
the Destitute Childrens' Dinner Society and other similar organizations, 
the result of interest stimulated by the passing of the Forster Education 
Act of 1870, and educational considerations now became the overriding 
t . f f d. 51 mo ive or ee ing. The increased influx of children into the schools 
48The Charity Organization Society was formed in 1869 in an attempt to bring 
some organization and co-operation to Victorian philanthropy, which was 
largely inefficient as a result of the duplication of effort and a good 
deal of was·teful competition which existed between rival organizations in 
the same cause. See Judith Fido, "The Charity Organization Society and 
Social Casework in London, 1869-1900", in Social Control in Nineteenth-
Century Britain, ed. A.P. Donajgrodzki, (London, 1977), pp. 207-230. C.L. 
Mowat, The Charity Organization Society, 1869-1913: Its Ideas and Work 
(London, 1961). 
49The Times, t\l December, 1889, p .13. See also, "Children's Dinners", 
Spectator, 66 (1891): 166-167. 
SOibid., 15 April, 1868, p.6. Letter from the Treasurer of the Destitute 
Childrens' Dinner Association. 
51 Bulkley, p.6. 
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in the wake of the Act not only brought greater numbers of poverty-
stricken boys and girls into public view, whose half-starved condition 
the teachers, managers, and philanthropists found themselves compelled 
to relieve~but also heightened these individuals' awareness of the 
futility of attempting to teach hungry children. One such ·individual 
was Mrs. Burgwin, headmistress of Orange St. School, Southwark, l.Dndon, 
who was responsible for the establishment of a very successful feeding 
53 programme, the Referee Fund. The feeding association most often lauded 
by contemporaries as the ideal organization of its kind was that begun 
by Sir Henry Peek at Rousden, in Devonshire, in 1876. As a service to the 
children of the area, who had to cover large distances in order to attend 
school, Peek served penny dinners every day of the week and succeeded in 
making his programme beneficial and self-supporting.54 
52The Times, 13 November, 1872, p.11. 
School Board. 
Letter from the Chairman of Reading 
53Following her attempts to provide drinks in school for the very needy 
of the school's children, a small organization was formed and its promotion 
in the Referee by one of the paper's staff, G.R. Sims, and an appeal for 
funds in the columns of the newssheet, the Fund was established to provide 
meals for necessitous children, first in Southwark and then in other 
districts also [See Bulkley, p.7.]. 
54 Bulkley, p.7. According to a local school inspector, the experiment 
"turned out a very great success. What strikes one at once coming into 
the school is the healthy, vigorous look of the children, and that their 
vigour is not merely bodily but comes out in the course of the examination. 
There is a marked contrast between their appearance and their work 
and those of the children in many neighbouring schools". [PD, 3rd series, 
282 (1883): 577-579. Speech of A.J. Mundella.] 
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At the beginning of the 'eighties, a new concern began to be 
voiced in connection with the provision of school meals. Public opinion 
became aroused over the question of over-pressure. Critics protested 
that the schools taught too many subjects and claimed that the system of 
"payment by results" led many of the teachers to overwork the children in 
55 
order to guarantee the grant. Concerned individuals, amongst them 
teachers, doctors and school managers, began to express the fear that 
attempts to instruct half-starving children were not only futile but also 
56 
ran the risk of inflicting permanent damage on these poor unfortunates. 
The topic was the subject of a heated debate in Parliament during which 
Mr. S. Smith, Member for Liverpool, anticipated the demands of the 
parliamentary agitators of the early twentieth century, including Gorst, 
when he expressed the opinion that "If Parliament compelled persons by 
force of law to send their children to school, and the little ones were 
to be forced to undergo such a grinding system, they ought not to injure 
them in so doing, but should provide them, in case of proved necessity, 
57 
with sufficient nourishment to stand the pressure". A report submitted 
to the Education Department in 1884 by Dr, Crichton-Browne, the Lord 
Chancellor's Visitor in Lunacy, following his private inquiry into over-
pressure, served to further publicize the extent of malnutrition amongst 
55The Times, 9 April, 1880, p,11, Ibid., 10 April, 1880, p.12; 13 April, 
1880, p.11; 15 April, 1880, P•ll (Letters to the Editor). For a detailed 
analysis of the controversy, see A.B. Robertson, "Children, Teachers and 
Society: The Over-Pressure Controversy, 1880-611 , British Journal of 
Educational Studies, 20 (1970), pp. 315-23. 
56Ibid., 15 April, 1880, p.11. Dr. Sophia Jex-Blake, Letter to the Editor; 
19 April, 1880, p.12. Dr. Robert Farquherson, Letter to the Editor; 
20 April, 1880, p.14. Lucy Harrison, Letter to the Editor. 
3rd series, 282 (1883): 597. For entire debate see Ibid., 585-605. 
school children. After outlining numerous instances of near-starving 
children among the school population, Crichton-Browne stated that 
"Liberal and regular feeding is necessary in order that a child may be 
prepared to profit by education". 58 Out of all this discuss ion, one fact 
emerged quite clearly: good education results were dependent upon good 
59 health and could not be achieved where children were seriously underfed. 
By now it had come to be generally accepted that the system of compulsory 
education must include some provision of food for necessitous children.60 
There was little agreement, however, on what form the feeding should take. 
The question was, should the meals be provided free or be self-supporting? 
A bitter controversy developed as to the merits of penny dinners. 61 The 
Minister of Education, A.J. Mundella, was of the opinion that any system 
which provided meals solely for those who could afford to pay for them 
would fail to solve the problem of undernourished children in the schools, 
and that the children should not be deprived of food on account of their 
parents' vices. 62 The Charity Organization Society were adamant in their 
opposition to free food, on the ground that payment for meals was the only 
58Report of Dr. Crichton-Browne to the Education Department upon the 
alleged Over-Pressure of Work in Public Elementary Schools, PP, 1884, 61: 
268. 
59 Bulkley, p. 10. 
is now admitted that children cannot learn unless they are properly 
Leading Article, the Times, 13 December, 1884, p.9. 
61
see, Letters to the Editor, the Times, 6 October, 1884, p.12, 
11 October, 1884, p.6, 29 October, 1884, p.10, 30 October, 1884, p.11, 
11 November, 1884, p.3. 
62Leading Article, the Times, 13 December, 1884, p.9. 
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possible way of avoiding "pauperization" 63 Undeterred by criticism of 
their methods, the free-meal societies continued to provide food, without 
payment, to starving children, and at most dinner centres around the 
country, free or self-supporting, necessitous children were rarely denied 
a meal when they appeared minµs their pennies. Private philanthropists 
recognized the childrens' need and satisfied it, without inquiring too 
closely into the consequences. 64 
Meanwhile, the Poor Law Guardians, who were responsible for 
relieving destitution, shunned any participation in the child feeding 
programmes and apparently made no attempt to co-operate with the various 
voluntary organizations around the country on the matter. At this point 
State responsibility for child feeding was restricted to one small area, 
the provision of meals by local education authorities at the Day 
Industrial Schools, as stipulated in the Education Act of 1876. However, 
parents were obliged to pay a portion of the cost. As very few of these 
schools were established, State involvement was small. 65 
Hard times and social unrest during the 'eighties provided further 
stimulus to the child feeding movement. Many self-supporting school-meals 
associations were obliged to appeal for funds in order to continue their 
work and many new voluntary-funded programmes came into existence. 
Consequently, by the end of the decade, school-feeding was being undertaken 
63Leading Article, the Times, 20 January, 1885, p.9. 
64 Bulkley, pp. 12-13. 
65Ib1."d., 14 15 pp. - . 
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by many competing agencies, some of which were funded by charitable donations 
and provided their meals free of charge, and others which collected, not 
always successfully, a small sum from the children. In May 1887, Sir Henry 
Peek attempted to bring some order into the chaos by organizing a conunittee 
of representatives of the various voluntary organizations in London for 
the purpose of formulating some kind of plan for co-operation. However, 
no further developments were forthcoming and during the remainder of the 
d d h 1 f d . d d. d" · d f h" 66 eca e, sc oo ee ing procee e in a isorganize as ion. 
In 1889 the situation prompted the London School Board to appoint 
a special sub-conunittee to investigate the entire question and to report 
67 to the Board. The inquiry disclosed that, while certain areas were 
plagued with a plethora of competing organizations, the majority of 
districts lacked even one school dinner programme. The investigators 
roughly estimated the percentage of children attending the schools of the 
Board in a constant state of hunger as 43,888 or 12 percent of the total 
school population, less than half of which were provided for. 68 The 
findings of the committee prompted the formation of the London School 
Dinner Association, a central council of representatives from all the major 
dinner societies, for the purpose of improving organization of feeding in 
69 the schools. 
66 Ibid., pp. 14-16. Bentley B. Gilbert, The Evolution of National Insurance 
in Great Britain (London, 1966), p. 105. Hereafter referred to as Gilbert, 
National Insurance. 
67 C.S. Loch, Letter to the Editor, the Times, 19 December, 1889, p.13. 
68 Bulkley, p.16. 
69A.J. Mundella, et al., Letter to the Editor, the Times, 3 December, 1889, 
p.7. 
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Little appears to have been accomplished by this body for two 
subsequent inquiries conducted by committees of the London School Board, 
in 1895 and 1898, produced very similar findings, 70 indicating that the 
situation in school feeding remained in a state of inefficiency and con-
fusion despite almost ten years of the Association's efforts·. Consequently, 
the majority on the 1898 committee urged the State to take some responsi-
bility for child feeding by increasing its grants to the Centres for 
Physically and Mentally Defective Children in order that food provision 
and training at meals be included in their programmes. They were of the 
opinion that education authorities had a definite responsibility to provide 
food for those of their charges who came to school underfed. 71 They stated 
that the question of school feeding ought to be one of public concern and 
recommended the formation of a permanent committee with authorization to 
obtain reports and general assistance from the Board's staff, and the 
provision for use of school premises for feeding, and they issued the 
following statement of principle: 
(1) It should be deemed to be part of the duty of any authority by law 
responsible for the compulsory attendance of children at school to ascertain 
what children, if any, come to school in a state unfit to get normal profit 
by the school work - whether by reason of underfeeding, physical disability, 
or otherwise - and that there should be the necessary inspection for that 
purpose. (2) That where it is ascertained that children are sent to school 
'underfed' .•. it should be part of the duty of the authority to see that 
they are provided, under proper conditions, with the necessary food ••• 
(3) That existing or future voluntary efforts to that end should be 
supervised by the authority. (4) That in so far as voluntary efforts fail 
to cover the ground the authority should have the power and the duty to 
supplement them. 
70The Times, 9 November, 1895, p.11. Ibid., 2 November, 1899, p.15; 
17 November, 1899, p.14. 
71 Ibid., 2 November, 1899, p.15. 
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Meals provided by the authorities should be made available to all children 
for a small fee, the charge being waived for those unable to pay, but both 
paying and non-paying recipients should be treated on an equal basis. 
Where undernourishment was the result of parental neglect, they recommended 
that the Board prosecute the parent, and in the case of repeated neglect, 
the former body should have the power to deal with the child under the 
72 Industrial Schools Act. 
However, the London School Board rejected these proposals, 
accepting instead the recommendations of the minority who asserted that 
there was no necessity for any public authority to assume responsibility 
for school feeding, the voluntary associations being quite able to cope 
73 
effectively with the need provided some reorganization was undertaken. 
The Board's decision to leave the problem in the hands of voluntary 
agencies, who, it had been repeatedly shown, were incapable of reducing 
the great mass of hunger facing the education authorities, placed the 
school feeding movement in a position it had been in forty years previously. 
Thereafter, with the commencement of the South African War, interest in the 
movement diminished and voluntary agencies, hard-pressed financially to 
h . . bl. d k 1 f d · 74 meet t eir connnitments, were o ige to ma e urgent appea s or onations. 
Lady Burdett-Coutts utilized patriotic feelings and the cult of "national 
efficiency" to solicit funds for the Destitute Childrens' Dinner Society: 
72Ibid., 17 November, 1899, p.14. 
73Ibid., 17 November, 1899, p.14; 1 December, 1899, p.9; 15 December, 1899, 
p.6. 
74 See, for example, Lady Burdett-Coutts, Letter to the Editor, Ibid., 
14 December, 1901, p.11. Harry Philips, Letter to the Editor, 11 December, 
1901, p.7. Lord Reay, Letter to the Editor, 11 December, 1901, p.7. 
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The children do credit to their dinners, and the dinners will do credit 
to the children and will help them to grow up strong, hardy men and women 
- a credit to their own special locality and to the empire at large. In 
connection with this remark I am tempted to revert to an observation I 
made in a letter to you a year ago, that many of the men fighting for their 
country in South Africa were lads who in their childhood found their share 
of food and comfort in our dining rooms, where the foundation of their 
manhood was laid.75 
Such appeals did little to improve the voluntary programme of school 
feeding. Nevertheless, complacency in this area, as in many others, was 
to be swept away after the turn of the century by the revelations of 
weakness among army recruits. Concern over the undernourished children of 
the nation gradually brought the realization that voluntary feeding was 
an inadequate system for alleviating the chronic underfed condition of 
large sections of the nation's youth. 
Of the many weaknesses revealed by the South African War, that 
of widespread physical disability among working-class recruits had been the 
76 greatest. Because this was the first time for close to fifty years that 
large numbers of Englishmen had undergone physical examination, it was 
possible to argue that conditions discovered were new, the result of 
77 industrialization or urban environment or of a gradual racial degeneracy. 
While the war was in progress there had been warnings, largely ignored, of 
the physical condition of Britain's industrial workers. Arnold White, in 
75Lady Burdett-Coutts, Letter to the Editor, Ibid., 14 December, 1901, p.11. 
76 For an analysis of these weaknesses, see G.R. Searle, The Quest for 
National Efficiency: A Study in British Politics and Thought, 1899-1914 
(Oxford, 1971), Chap. 2. 
770ne example of this type of speculation on the topic is Alfred A. Mumford, 
"Some Considerations on the Alleged Physical Degeneration of the British 
Race", Fortnightly Review, 82 (1904), pp. 324-338. 
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his book Efficiency and Empire, published in 1901, claimed that the British 
race was deteriorating physically and supported his claim by pointing out 
that 60 percent of the recruits attempting to enlist at the Manchester 
depot in 1899 had to be rejected as physically unfit. 78 White's 
','.'[J' ( 79 
pronouncements went largely unnoticed. A few months later, Seebohm 
Rowntree published his Poverty: A Study of Town Life in which he included 
figures, gathered while surveying living conditions among the working 
classes in York, which showed that over half of the intending recruits in 
York, Leeds, and Sheffield, between 1897 and 1901, failed to meet the 
required medical standards. Accordingly, he went on to state, if this 
physical fitness was representative of the working men of the remainder of 
England, one could only conclude that at least fifty percent of the country's 
80 
manpower would be unavailable for military duty. As with Arnold's 
statements, Rowntree's comments on the physical condition of army recruits 
appear to have made little impression on the public. 81 
78Arnold White, Efficiency and Empire (London, 1901), pp. 95-121. 
79 A survey of the London Times revealed only two responses to the claims 
concerning national physique made by White. One response came in the form 
of a letter to the editor from Earl Grey; the other was the paper's leading 
article concerning this letter (See the Times, 26 November, 1901, p.5. 
Ibid., p.3.). Grey's response was prompted by concern for Empire rather 
than compassion for the working classes. He expressed the fear that if 
existing conditions remained unchanged and unchecked, the next generation 
would be unable to "bear the burden of Empire". 
80 Seebohm Rowntree, Poverty: A Study of Town Life (London, 1901), pp. 
216-221. 
81A survey of the Times published in 1901-1902 yielded only two responses 
to Rowntree's statements delivered in a series of lectures at Cambridge in 
which he had reiterated the conclusions drawn in his book. Both responses 
were negative (See Leading Article, the Times, 23 August, 1902, p.7. 
George T. Hartley, Letter to the Editor, Ibid., 29 August, 1902, p.5.) 
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However, at the beginning of 1902, the seriousness of the 
fitness problem was again brought to the attention of the public and it now 
made a more forceful impact. In January, Major-General Sir Frederick 
Maurice, writing under the pseudonym "Miles", published an article in the 
Contemporary Review in which he maintained that the current dearth of army 
recruits could be traced to the fact that only a handful of those presenting 
themselves at the recruiting station were able to meet even the severely-
reduced wartime physical requirements. 82 Repeating the ratio cited by 
White, Maurice emphasized: 
What I want to insist upon is that a state of things in which no more 
than two out of five of the population below a certain standard of life 
are fit to bear arms is a national danger which cannot be met by any mere 
scheme of enlistment, and that true patriotism requires that the danger 
be recognised".83 
Additional impact was added to Maurice's statements by the fact that they 
followed closely upon statements, all critical, regarding the problem of 
inefficiency within the nation issued by three prominent Britons, the 
84 85 86 Prince of Wales, Sidney Webb, and Lord Rosebery. Maurice's article, 
following as it did upon these criticisms of national efficiency, helped 
to set in motion a rising tide of critical and apprehensive discussions 
concerning the physical condition of the British nation. These discussions 
led the British to view the two questions of public health and national 
8211Miles", (Maj or-General, Sir John Frederick Maurice), "Where to Get Men", 
Contemporary Review, 81 (1902), pp. 78-86. 
83 Ibid., p. 81. 
84Leading Article, the Times, 6 December, 1901, p.S. 
85Sidney Webb, "Lord Rosebery's Escape from Hounds ditch", Nineteenth Century 
so (1901), pp. 366-386. 
86Leading Article, the Times, 17 December, 1901, p.10. 
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welfare as one indivisible whole. 87 National physical deterioration came 
to be seen as a danger, not only to the structure of domestic society, but 
88 
also to the existence of Britain as a world power. 
A year after the appearance of his first article, !fuurice published 
a second paper in which he stated that exhaustive inquiries he had subsequently 
conducted into the poor physical condition of army recruits had led him to 
the conclusion that the condition of these men was even worse than recruiting 
statistics indicated because patriotism was bringing in a better class of 
volunteers. In addition, army enlistment standards had been lowered and 
recruiting sergeants had been instructed to accept all those men they 
considered might pass the army's physical examination. Even so, Maurice 
claimed, 60 percent of Englishmen were unfit for the army. 89 Shortly 
afterwards, the Inspector-General of Recruiting, Major-General H.C. Berrett, 
C.B., published his annual report for 1902 in which he included figures to 
show that, despite lowered enlistment standards, the percentage rejections 
for various ailments had risen from 16.3 percent in 1900, to 19.46 percent 
for the year 1901, and for the year 1902 had increased to 22.46 percent. 
He emphasized that "one subject which was causing anxiety was the gradual 
deterioration of the physique of the working classes, from whom the bulk 
90 
of the army recruits must be drawn". Concern about the condition of the 
87Gilbert, National Insurance, pp. 84-85. 
88 See, for example, George F. Shee, "The Deterioration in the National 
Physique", Nineteenth Century, 80 (1903): 797-805. 
89Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice, "National Health: A Soldier's Study", 
Contemporary Review, 83 (1903): 41-56. 
90 Report of the Inspector-General of Recruiting for 1902.(Cmnd. 1417), Rf, 
1903, 11, p.15, para. 75, p.30, para. 150. 
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British people now became the province of all those who felt themselves 
to have the future of the nation at heart: military thinkers, imperialists 
and national efficiency advocates, as well as philanthropists and social 
91 reformers. At the same time the controversy surrounding ~he question 
of physical degeneracy began to move beyond the moral and political to 
the scientific. 92 
Although R.owntree's findings clearly showed that those below the 
artisan class in the cities he had surveyed had not sufficient food to 
maintain health, and, consequently, physical deterioration was rampant, none 
of the ensuing discussions had yet proposed that school feeding might be 
utilized by the State to check the alleged physical degeneracy among 
working-class children. Malnutrition amongs:this group was generally 
regarded as the result of lack of thrift on the part of the parents and 
the mother's ignorance of the arts of housewifery, and its remedy was 
seen to lie in education of the parents rather than government intervention 
in the area of public welfare. 93 
Meanwhile, throughout this period, the various voluntary feeding 
agencies continued their efforts to relieve the distress of the school 
children in a more-or-less unorganized fashion, despite efforts on the part 
of the London School Board to develop a more unified system. In 1900, 
acting upon the recommendation of the minority report of its General 
91Gilbert, National Insurance, p. 87. See also, Searle, Chap. 3. 
92see, for example, Alex Mackendrick, "Heredity and Environment in Social 
Development", Westminster Review, 162 (1904): 180-187. 
93 See, Leading Article, the Times, 23 August, 1902, p.7. Maurice, "Where 
to Get Men", p.85. Maurice, "National Health", pp. 50-52. "National Health 
and Military Service", British Medical Journal, 2 (1903): 207-208. 
Seebohm Rowntree, "Poverty in Provincial Towns", the Times, 20 August, 1902, 
p .9. 
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Purposes Committee's enquiry into underfed children in the schools, 94 
the Board formed a "Joint-Committee on Underfed Children" to promote and 
supervise co-operation between the Board, voluntary feeding agencies, and 
specially appointed school sub-committees, in the belief that this would 
result in a more efficient programme of school feeding. 95 These efforts 
met with little success. 96 The Board's scheme depended upon the proposed 
three-way co-operation between the voluntary agencies, sub-committees, and 
the joint-committee of the Board. In many areas this co-operation had 
failed to materialize chiefly because very few sub-committees were 
established and amongst those that were officially formed, many met only 
once and had then dissolved themselves or had taken no further action, 
while others continued intact but led a merely nominal existence. 97 
During 1900-1903, notwithstanding the joint-committee's efforts to eliminate 
from their lists of underfed children all but the most "necessitous" of 
the Board's pupils, 98 the numbers of meals provided in the Board's schools 
continued to increase. Furthermore, the "organized" system had proved to 
be quite disorganized in many areas 99 - the London School Dinners Association 
94
see the Times, 2 November, 1899, p.14. 
95Ibid., 2 March, 1900, p.14; 18 October, 1901, p.6. 
96
see London School Board Joint-Committee on Underfed Children, First Annual 
Report, 1900-1901, the Times, 18 October, 1901, p.6; Second Annual Report, 
1901-1902, Ibid., 11 July, 1902, p.13; Third Annual Report, 1902-1903, 
Ibid., 16 July, 1903, p.14. 
97The Times, 18 October, 1901, p.6. Ibid., 11 July, 1902, p.13. For an 
examination of the reasons for this lack of co-operation, see Ibid., 
11 July, 1902, p.13; 26 November, 1901, p.71. Arthur Clay, Letter to the 
Editor, Ibid., 18 December, 1901, p.12. 
98Ibid., 18 October, 1901, p.6. Arthur Clay, Letter to the Editor, Ibid., 
18 December, 1901, p.12. 
99Ibid., 18 October, 1901, p.6; 16 July, 1903, p.14. 
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being the only group of its kind to have worked with the Board, the 
majority of voluntary organizations refusing to co-operate with them in 
100 
any way. 
The meagre success achieved by the London School Board joint-
committee, the constant rise in the numbers of children fed, and the 
101 
continuing appeals of the voluntary feeding associations for donations, 
illustrate the deficiencies of the voluntary feeding programmes at the turn 
of the century. However, the growing unease over the physical condition 
of the British nation failed to produce a corresponding rise in interest 
in the question of school feeding during the war years. 102 M:,reover, the 
revelations of the apparent physical degeneracy amongst the poorer classes 
in no way diminished the stand of the ardent opponents of State feeding. 
They continued to support the position that voluntary feeding programmes 
were sufficient to deal with the problem of underfed children. The Charity 
Organization Society remained the most vocal and stalwart proponent of this 
lOOArthur Clay, Letter to the Editor, Ibid., 18 December, 1901, p.12. 
The voluntary associations' decision not to co-operate with the Board was 
no doubt influenced by the joint-committee's determination to eliminate 
"undeserving" recipients from the school lists. 
lOlThese included appeals by the London School Dinners Association, and the 
London Vegetarian Association. See Arthur Clay, Letter to the Editor, 
ibid., 10 December, 1901, p.13. Lord Reay, Letter to the Editor, 11 December, 
1901, p.7. 
102Interest in school feeding appears to have diminished rather than grown 
between 1900-1902. During the period 1900-1901 the subject of underfed 
children appeared in the Times on nine occasions; seven were letters to the 
editor - five of which were from representatives of voluntary feeding 
associations, the other two being submitted by Charity Organization Society 
spokesman, Sir Arthur Clay (see the~' 1 March, 1900, p.10. Ibid., 10 
December, 1901, p.13; 11 December, 1901, p.7; 14 December, 1901,p.14; 
18 December, 1901, p.12; 20 December, 1901, p.10); the other two instances 
were reports of the First Annual Report of the London School Board Joint-
Committee on Underfed Children and of a special meeting of the Charity 
Organization Society (see Ibid., 18 October, 1901, p.6; 26 November, 1901, 
p.7). In 1902 the subject appeared on only one occasion, that of the publica-
tion of the London School Board Joint-Committee's Annual Report for 1901-1902 
(See Ibid., 11 July, 1902, p.13). 
..l'+ I • 
view •103 It was their contention that the "party who advocated State 
feeding" had deliberately sought to undermine the work of the Board's 
joint-connnittee by strenuously opposing that body's efforts to organize 
104 
the voluntary progrannnes into a unified system. 
The "party who advocated State feeding", referred to by the 
Charity Organization Society, 105 was the Social Democratic Federation. 
They had made the provision of a free meal for all children in elementary 
schools one of the fundamental planks of their platform since the 
'eighties and had presented several memorials to the London School Board 
urging the feeding and clothing of the children of the unemployed out of 
106 the rates. Outside of the socialist group the only prominent political 
figure who appears to have concerned himself with the question of State 
l03Ibid., 26 November, 1901, p.7. See also, H. Bosanquet, Social Work in 
London, 1869-1912 (London, 1914, 2nd ed. London, 1973), pp. 230-255, 
104 Arthur Clay, Letter to the Editor, the Times, 18 December, 1901, p.12. 
105The Charity Organization Society's accusation may have arisen out of 
a belief that the Fabian Socialist members of the London School Board 
were in some type of collusion with the S.D.F. to jeopardize the workings 
of the joint-connnittee on underfed children. This appears unlikely, as 
the Fabians seem to have embraced the cause of State feeding only after 
the growth of public opinion on the matter, following the rise of the 
physical degeneracy controvers~ had made the issue politically profitable 
(see "After Bread, Education: A Plan for the State Feeding of School 
Children", Fabian Tract 120. Fabian Tracts, Nos. 96-129, 1900-1906 
(London, 1906. Kraus Reprint, Nendeln, 1969). 
106see Justice, March 29, September 13 and 27, December 
Minutes of the London School Board, November 17, 1892; 
December 7, 1899. Cited in Bulkley, pp. 25-26. 
6, 1884. 
February 20, 1896; 
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provision of school meals, at this period, was Gerst. His concern at 
this point continued to be the futility of attempting to educate children 
whose physical condition rendered them incapable of benefitting from the 
107 instruction provided by the schools. 
In the Spring of 1903, the school feeding problem became an 
integral part of the physical deterioration problem as a result of new 
evidence to support the claim that the British nation was experiencing 
racial decay. This evidence furnished ample proof of the harm 
being inflicted upon the physical health of the nation by the malnutrition 
of school children. In 1903, the Royal Commission on Physical Training 
(Scotland), which had been appointed to consider the best method of 
imparting instruction in physical exercises in Scottish schools, published 
its report in which it stated that there was an undeniable degeneration 
108 in certain classes. Moreover, the report showed indisputably the 
necessity for better feeding, a point emphasized by a large number of 
witnesses. 109 However, the Commissioners were very cautious in their 
recommendations. In spite of their conviction that feeding was necessary, 
they were uncertain as to what should be the precise extent of local 
education authority responsibility in the relieving of underfed school 
children. "It is a matter of grave consideration", they declared, 
"whether the valuable asset to the nation in the improved moral and physical 
state of a large number of future citizens counter-balances the evils of 
107S ee, for example, RQ, 4th series, 84 (1900): 30. 
108Report of the Royal Commission on Physical Training (Scotland).Vol. 1 
(Cmnd. 1507), PP, 1903, 30: 25, para. 125. 
109
see, for example, evidence of Mr, J.E. Legge and Mr. Clement Dukes. 
Ibid., Vol. 2. Minutes of Evidence (Cmnd. 1508), f!'., 1903, 30: 164-165, 
para, 760-764, 456, para. 8140-8142. 
impaired parental responsibility, or whether voluntary agencies may be 
trusted to do this work with more discrimination and consequently less 
llO danger than a statutory system". They emphasized, however, that some 
parents who had the desire to "act up to their parental responsibility" 
possessed insufficient resources to allow them to adequately.feed their 
children. This being so, they considered that "accommodation and means 
for enabling children to be properly fed should •.. be provided either in 
school or in a centre; but, except for a limited sum to provide the 
necessary equipment, no part of the cost should be allowed to fall on the 
rates". The food should be provided by voluntary agencies but the 
Commissioners proposed that where charitable donations failed to cover the 
cost, the public authorities be given the powers to pay for meals and to 
b . . b f h lll o tain reim ursement rom t e parents. Thus, almost one year after the 
conclusion of the South African War, the Royal Commission on Physical 
Training (Scotland) became the first official body to suggest school 
feeding as one way of curtailing physical deterioration amongst the nation's 
rising generation, even though the Commission was reluctant to suggest that 
local education authorities themselves be empowered to provide food.
112 
The Royal Commission's recommendations were less sweeping than 
the earlier proposals of the Social Democratic Federation and Gorst, but 
they carried the weight of an official body and Gorst lost no time in 
utilizing the report to publicize and support his demand for .State responsi-
bility for child feeding. Shortly after the report's publication, he 
llOibid., 1: 30 para. 165. 
ll1Ibid., 1: 30-31, para. 167, 172. 
112Gilbert, National Insurance, p. 108. 
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seized the oppo~tunity presented by the debate on Scottish education 
estimates, to rise in the House and launch what was to become a personal 
113 
crusade for State-supported school meals. Beginning on a note more or 
less guaranteed to gain the attention of the Members, he expressed the view 
that the enormous sums of public money expended upon education were being 
wasted because children were not in a condition to receive the instruction 
provided for them in the schools. This state of affairs had been revealed, 
and more luridly than ever before, by the Report of the Royal Commission 
on Physical Training (Scotland). Gerst reiterated the findings of the 
Commissioners regarding the poor physical condition of large numbers of 
children in both rural areas and urban centres in Scotland. He made 
special reference to a particular institution in Edinburgh, the North 
Canongate Board School, which the sub-committee of the Commission had 
investigated and had found the majority of its pupils habitually underfed. 
This school, Gerst asserted, was a replica of a type found in certain areas 
of London, particularly Bermondsey and the poor districts south of the 
Thames. Those having contact with the poorer children in these schools 
were struck by the extreme thinness of their bodies and their generally 
underfed condition, which was exactly the impression gained by the Scottish 
investigators at the Canongate institution. Evoking the popular sentiment 
of the moment, Gerst questioned Britain's ability to raise an Imperial 
race if a majority of the children in a large number of the nation's schools 
displayed these characteristics of insufficient nourishment. He drew the 
113PD, 4th series, 123 (1903): 1350-1355, 
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attention of the House to the recommendations of the medical men on the 
Commission, namely, that "Physical exercises unsupported by adequate food 
.•• must result in early physiological exhaustion and infirmity" •114 
If children inadequately fed were unfit for physical instruction, as 
stated by these medical experts, then they were even more unfit for mental 
instruction, declared Gorst. No-one who had the prosperity and welfare of 
Britain at heart could ignore the implications which the Commission's 
findings had for the nation as a whole. There was no reason for doubting 
that the conditions prevalent in many of the schools in Scotland existed 
in English schools and, therefor~ Gorst urged that the question be given 
immediate attention. He suggested two methods for attacking the problem: 
periodic medical examination of the children in schools, in order to pin-
point at its earliest stage any disease or condition likely to interfere 
with the child's school work, and feeding, because "at all hazards the 
children must be fed before they are taught" not only to ensure they 
benefited from the instruction presented but also to prevent injury through 
overstrain. The task of feeding the child could be undertaken by the 
charitable agencies, if they were able to cope adequately with the 
situation. If they could not, "then the State must see that the children 
were fed. That was the fundamental fact on which all administration and 
practice should go". Parental responsibility need not be undermined, 
emphasized Gorst. Those parents who could pay must be made to pay. However, 
those parents who had not the means to pay should be treated with tenderness. 
He, personally, had no objection to the State feeding those children; "but 
114Ib 'd. , 1352 ~ p. . 
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at any rate they could be referred to the relieving officers under the 
Poor Law" . 115 Garst' s proposals met with scant approval in the House and 
his advocacy of State provision of food, where voluntary efforts proved 
inadequate, prompted certain parliamentary colleagues to deem him 
"socialist" •1.16 
The Reports of the Inspector-General of Recruiting and the Royal 
Commission on Physical Training (Scotland), also aroused the concern of 
two prominent peers. On July 6, the Earl of Meath rose in the Lords to 
draw the attention of the government to these reports and to ask if they 
would be prepared to appoint a Royal Commission, or a committee of inquiry, 
which could be charged with the task of assessing whether or not inhabitants 
of the industrial towns and cities were existing in conditions which, if 
allowed to continue, would constitute a hazard to the national health and 
vigour. 117 Support for the Earl's suggestion came from the Bishop of Ripon 
who urged the government to give their best attention to the question of 
the alleged physical deterioration of the urban working class, and the 
conditions in which they lived, and by some form of inquiry enlighten the 
118 public on these matters. 
Replying for the government, the Duke of Devonshire concentrated 
upon the aspect of alleged physical deterioration of army recruits, 
115Ibid: 1355-1356. 
116
rbid., 4th series, 125 (1903): 196. See also, the Times, 20 February, 
1904, p.11. Gorst's speech to the Labour Co-Partnership Association at Cardiff. 
117PD, 4th series, 124 (1903): 1324-1337. 
118Ibid: 1337-1346. 
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as presented by the Report of the Inspector-General of Recruiting, and 
dismissed as less urgent the question of working-class conditions in 
industrial cities and towns. He cautioned his audience against accepting 
the evidence in the report at face value as it was not supported by any 
accurate statistics. He informed the House that, following consultations 
between the Secretary of State for War, the Local Government Board and 
the Home Ministry, it had been decided that an investigation should be 
carried out to determine the validity of the claims that "certain classes" 
within British society were undergoing physical deterioration. Thus, it 
was likely that a Royal Commission would be appointed to conduct the 
inquiry, but only after the government had consulted with the medical 
profession in order to obtain their opinions on the best means of obtaining 
information as to the causes, rather than the extent, of the undoubted 
physical deficiency existing in some parts of the population, and to hear 
their suggestions as to the most efficient means by which these deficiencies 
could be remedied. The inquiry would also await the completion of the 
report of the Registrar-General, and the memorandum on the army manpower 
problem by the Director-General, Army Medical Services, both of which were 
currently in preparation. 119 
Devonshire's emphasis on the allegations concerning the physical 
degeneracy of army recruits, to the exclusion of the problem of the physical 
condition of the working-class population, can be seen as a reflection of 
the government's desire not to emphasize those aspects of the question 
which might lead to State involvement in the area of public welfare. 
119Ibid: 1346-1352. 
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Moreover, the long-drawn-out nature of the proposed "preliminaries" to 
the establishment of the requested inquiry, may be interpreted as a 
carefully devised government plan to allow the problem to "float" in the 
120 hope that it might gradually disappear as public interest waned. 
Garst, however, was not prepared to permit the questions of 
physical deterioration and underfed children to "float" and he re-introduced 
121 the subjects in Parliament just three days later. He now urged that the 
Board of Education undertake an inquiry into the condition of children of 
London, similar to the one conducted by the sub-committee of the Royal 
Commission on Physical Training (Scotland), in order to determine if the 
appalling physical inadequacies discovered amongst children in certain 
Scottish urban schools existed among the school population in England's 
capital. The Scottish investigators had pointed out that to give physical 
instruction to undernourished children was tantamount to cruelty, said 
Garst. In his view, to give mental instruction to them was equally cruel. 
No hungry child should be forced to learn. He rejected as inadequate the 
remedy of increased philanthropic effort, proposed by Sir William Anson, 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Education. Voluntary agencies had 
rendered valuable assistance in the succouring of needy children in the 
past, but it had been shown that philanthropy alone could not remedy the 
evils resulting from inadequate feeding. Garst argued that "no public 
120The normally pro-Conservative Times apparently believed this to be so. 
See Leading Article of 7 July, 1903, p.9. 
121PD, 4th series, 125 (1903): 193-197. 
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authority should say 'let the philanthropist deal with the matter' and 
II 122 
allow the evil to go on. 
If the Board of Education was not prepared to act in the matter 
then the local authorities, the municipalities of great cities, and the 
county councils should assume the responsibility for improving the 
condition of those children found to be below an acceptable physical 
standard, insisted Gorst. Certain measures could be taken by the teachers 
themselves to greatly reduce the problem; he suggested that they conduct 
a brief daily examination of their charges in order to detect those 
children who, from hunger or overwork, were unfit to learn. There should 
also be periodic medical inspection of children conducted in the schools 
in order that diseases and debilities could be noted and treated in their 
earliest stages. He reiterated once again that "if the authorities under-
took to give instruction, either mental or physical, they had no right to 
do it without also being responsible for seeing that the children were 
adequately fed before they were instructed 11 • 123 Thus, Gorst proposed that 
the local education authorities establish self-supporting school dinner 
programmes in schools where there was proven need through which under-
nourished children, examined and passed as such by the authority, could be 
fed at no cost to the parents. Such a programme would not lessen parental 
responsibility, he asserted, because all parents who could pay would be 
required to pay and those who could not could be referred to the Poor Law 
122Ibid: 194. 
123Ibid: 196. 
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authorities and would receive public relief. 124 
Later the same day he again pressed the Parliamentary Secretary 
to the Board of Education to make some commitment on the part of his 
department with regard to the type of action, if any, it proposed to take 
in alleviatirg the sufferings of their underfed charges in the schools. 
Referring to the statement made in the Lords three days earlier by the Duke 
of Devonshire, to the effect that the government was contemplating a Royal 
Commission into the whole question of physical deterioration, Gorst 
expressed the hope that the Board of Education would not delay action of 
its own until the promised inquiry had been conducted. He believed that 
the Board had sufficient information of its own as to the physical 
condition of children in its schools, supplied by inspectors and teachers, 
to allow it to proceed immediately with the implementation of measures for 
improving the health of the children without first awaiting the results 
of any further inquiry. 125 
124Ibid: 197. 
125Ibid: 264. Gorst's concern for the near-starving children of the working 
classes also prompted him to publicly oppose the Tariff Reform proposals 
currently being espoused by Joseph Chamberlain, an issue then dividing 
the Unionist party. Gorst denounced the proposed Colonial preference, 
claiming that the resulting tax on food would reduce the already pitifully-
low living standard of the poorer workers, many of whom were already 
existing below subsistence level. If, as recent official reports had 
indicated, the British workers were experiencing physical deterioration, 
any increase in food prices would cast them into even deeper distress. 
"Such an augmentation of the present menacing destitution of the mass of 
the population in the British Isles cannot be borne", he asserted. (See, 
J.E. Gorst, Mr. Chamberlain's Proposals", North American Review, 177 (1903), 
165-171. For an examination of the Tariff Reform controversy within the 
Unionist party see Richard A. Rempel, Unionists Divided: Arthur Balfour, 
Joseph Chamberlain and the Unionist Free Traders (Hamden, Conn., 1972). 
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Gorst's remarks could no longer be dismissed by merely labelling 
his suggestions "socialistic". The few short weeks which had elapsed 
since Gorst first mooted the topic of child feeding in Parliament had been 
sufficient to allow for the development of an increased awareness of the 
question amongst the general public and now the government were obliged 
to show that they were at least alive to the problem. Thus, Anson now 
assured Gorst, and the House, that an inquiry into the whole problem of 
the physical condition of "certain classes" within the nation was soon to 
be carried out by a special committee, and this would no doubt include 
investigation of the condition of children. 126 
Shortly, thereafter, the awaited memorandum on the army manpower 
problem, compiled by the Director-General of the Army Medical Services, 
Sir William Taylor, was issued as a parliamentary paper127 and the general 
tone of his remarks indicated that he believed that the fears expressed 
with regard to physical degeneration were well-founded. He stated that his 
own investigations had produced facts which appeared to substantiate 
Maurice's claims that 60 percent of Englishmen were unfit for the army. 
He claimed that his research into the problem of army recruitment had 
yielded evidence that the rising generation, in those classes below that 
of artisan, included a large number of poor physique. Sir William concluded 
by adding his own request to those made by Maurice, the Earl of Meath, 
and the Bishop of Ripon, for an inquiry, preferably a Royal Commission, 
to discover the most suitable methods of removing defects and improving 
126
rbid: 246-247, 265-266. 
127
original Memorandum Prepared by the Surgeon-General, Sir William Taylor, 
Director-General of Army Medical Services, 1903 (Cmnd. 1501). Report of the 
Interdepartmental Committee on Physical Deterioration. Vol. 1 (Cmnd. 2175), 
PP, 1904, 32: 101-103. Appendix 1. 
128 
national health. 
The publication of the Memorandum served to stimulate further 
the physical degeneracy controversy and comments began to be heard from 
representatives of various sections of British society, particularly the 
medical profession. 129 This discussion in Parliament, in th~ press, and 
in journals, could not be ignored by the government and, consequently, at 
the beginning of September, 1903, they appointed an Interdepartmental 
Committee on Physical Deterioration, which was charged with the task of 
making a preliminary inquiry into allegations that had been made concerning 
the physical deterioration of "certain classes of the population", as 
shown by the large percentage of rejections for physical causes of recruits 
for the army, to determine if a full Royal Commission investigation was 
130 
warranted. The Unionists evidently hoped that the establishment of 
the interdepartmental committee would both satisfy those demanding government 
action and also create an image of a concerned and active government, while 
at the same time keeping the inquiry as low-key as possible, reflecting the 
128Ibid. 
129
see, for example, "National Health and Military Service", British Medical 
Journal,2(1903), 207-208. William D. Hall, M.D., Letter to the Editor, 
the Times, 1 September, 1903. See also, Leading Article, Ibid., 20 July, 
1903, p.7. 
130 Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Physical Deterioration. 
Vol. 1 (Cmnd. 2175), PP, 1904, 32: 5. See also, PD, 4th series, 131 (1904): 
724-725. 
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Balfour administration's reluctance to grasp the nettle of social reform 
at a time when its political fortunes were on the decline. 131 
H h Go I • 132 h owever, contrary tote vernment s expectations, t e 
appointment of the Interdepartmental Committee inquiry failed to dissipate 
the discussion on physical deterioration. During the succeeding months, 
while the Committee was conducting its hearings, the controversy revolving 
around the condition of the national physique and its contributory causes 
· d b d 133 continue una ate . Gorst took advantage of his public speaking 
engagements to draw attention to the question of child feeding, which he 
now placed in the context of physical deterioration and race degeneracy. 
Addressing a meeting sponsored by the Gasworkers' and General Labourers' 
Union and the Leeds Trade Council, on September 4, he supported trade 
unionist Will Thorne's resolution calling upon the Government to empower 
the local authorities to "provide at least one free meal a day for children 
attending State schools". He noted that in many schools the children were 
"anaemic, ill-nourished, degenerate, totally unfit to profit by the 
instruction .•. provided" and he stressed the need for regular medical 
131For an examination of the Unionist government's situation at this period, 
see John Ramsden, The Age of Balfour and Baldwin (London, 1978), pp. 2-20. 
See also, Bentley B. Gilbert, "Health and Politics: The British Physical 
Deterioration Report of 190411 , Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 39 
(1965), 143-153. R.R. James, The British Revolution: British Politics, 
1880-1939. Vol. 1. From Gladstone to Asquith, 1880-1914 (London, 1976), 
pp. 196-230. 
132The government's hopes in this direction were reflected in the Times 
comments following the Duke of Devonshire's announcement that an inquiry was 
to be conducted into the allegations of physical degeneracy. The Times 
welcomed the proposed investigation but observed, "we shall not be surprised 
if its effect is to dispel a considerable proportion of the fears as to 
national degeneration which have been entertained in many directions, and 
perhaps a little too loudly proclaimed in some". (Leading Article, 20 July, 
1903, p.7 .) 
133 . Between December 1903 and 3 March, 1904, twelve letters and three leading 
articles concerning the subject were published in the Times. See Letters to 
the Editor, 26, 29 and 31 December, 1903; 1, 2, 4, 11, 14, 25 and 28 January, 
1904; Leading Articles, 23 and 25 January, 1904; 3 March, 1904. 
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inspection. 134 Speaking at Halifax later that month, he stated that if the 
British people were to continue to be a great Imperial people it was 
essential that they should breed a likewise great Imperial race. In order 
to accomplish this end, regard must first be given to the health of the 
children of the nation, he declared, and this included seeing that they 
135 were properly fed. Three days later, while delivering a presidential 
address to the Navy Club in Sutton Coldfield, he reflected upon the fact 
that the British race, which had formerly been "distinguished with an 
extraordinary amount of vigour", was now evidencing signs of deterioration. 
The State should give its immediate attention to the nation's children, 
who would have to carry the burden of Empire in the future, in order that 
h . h 1 h b · · d b · d · h t 
136 
t eir eat e unimpaire y ina equate nouris men • 
The continued high level of interest in the question of physical 
degeneracy made the Unionist government realize that a more extensive 
inquiry than the one they had launched would undoubtedly be necessary. 
Consequently, the government decided to extend the scope of the Inter-
departmental Committee. The original terms of reference were enlarged to 
provide for a full-fledged investigation into the entire question of 
physical deterioration among "certain classes" of the population. 137 The 
"certain classes" mentioned were actually the urban poor and the Committee 
concentrated for the most part on the conditions existing in the city slums 
134Ib'd., 5 S t mb 1904 5 ~ ep e er, , p. • 
135Th T" e 1.mes, 30 September, 1903, p.5. 
136Ib'd., 2 O t b 1903 6 ~ c o er, , p. . 
137 Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Physical Deterioration. 
Vol. 1 (Cmnd. 2175), .J:.!:, 1904, 32: 5. See also, PD, 4th series, 131 
(1904): 724-725. 
- the over-crowding, pollution, sub-standard working conditions, and high 
infant mortality rates. 
Gorst continued to keep the question of child feeding before 
the Commons. Fearing perhaps that the Interdepartmental Committee's 
recommendations would fall short of proposing State responsi~ility for 
child feeding, given that the Committee was both official and partisan 
in composition, 138 Gorst once more expressed the opinion that the Board 
of Education had sufficient information of its own upon which to base 
action on child feeding in the schools. He reminded the Members that the 
Board had conducted three investigations into the question of underfed 
children, between 1889 and 1899, which had showed that large numbers of 
the children in its schools were being subjected to the strain of being 
instructed while in a half-starved condition. The Royal Commission on 
Physical Training (Scotland) had added further evidence to the investigations, 
giving the Board more than sufficient information upon which to act. In 
his opinion, it was the duty of Parliament to either prescribe remedies or 
delegate power to local authorities that they might fulfil this task. He 
138Although it was appointed to inquire into public health the Committee 
contained no Medical Officer of Health nor any representative of the Local 
Government Board's public health authority but was composed entirely of 
civil servants, when one uses the term in its broadest sense, a fact 
commented upon by Gorst in the House (see, .!:12, 4th series, 140 (1904): 48). 
In addition, the status and background of the Committee's chairman, Sir 
Almeric FitzRoy, was true-blue Tory. His Memoirs reveal that he was the 
confidant of many highly-placed government officials and on the day of the 
first meeting of the Committee he recorded in his diary, "The first meeting 
of the Deterioration Committee gave promise of a satisfactory course to 
the inquiry ..• I do not think I shall have any difficulty in guiding the 
team". (See Sir Almeric Fitz Roy, Memoirs, 2 vols. (London, 1923 ) , I, 
p. 162. Emphasis added.) 
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urged the Government to inform the House when the Report of the Interdepart-
mental Committee was to be expected and when they proposed to implement its 
recommendations. 139 
Some four weeks later, the question of local education authority 
provision of-school meals for elementary school children was debated in 
Parliament and Gorst once again reiterated that the time had come for "some 
definite and distinct action on the part of the Government and the local 
authorities" with regard to the provision of meals for underfed children. 
To those who claimed that such action would serve to undermine parental 
responsibility, a favourite argument of those opposed to government inter-
vention in child feeding, Gorst replied that he "objected to bringing home 
parental responsibility to the minority by letting the children starve". 
Moreover, he asserted, State involvement would serve to strengthen rather 
than weaken the parental role, in the case of the severely neglected child. 
Through the procedures instigated to gain reimbursement for the meal 
provided to a child the local authorities would be able to supply the 
police magistrate with sufficient evidence to convict the negligent parent. 
The threat of such proceedings would serve, except in a handful of cases, 
to increase the parents' sense of responsibility as well as ensuring the 
child was sufficiently nourished at home. 140 
The Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Physical 
Deterioration was duly published on July 20, 1904. With regard to the 
question of underfed children, the Committee's findings were far more 
definite and striking than those of the Royal Commission on Physical 
139PD, 4th series, 132 (1904): 905-912. 
140Ibid., 4th series, 133 (1904): 790-791. 
Training (Scotland) had been. Evidence presented before Committee members 
indicated that the extent of underfeeding was considerable. Dr. Eicholz, 
M.D., and Inspector of Schools, carried out a detailed investigation of 
the numbers of underfed children in London elementary schools and, on the 
basis of this inquiry, estimated that 122,000 or 16 percent of the 
elementary school population were unable, by reason of their underfed 
condition, to attend to their lessons. 141 Information supplied to him 
by the Education Committee and Medical Officer of Health in Manchester 
revealed that not less than 15 percent of that city's elementary school 
142 
children were underfed. Dr. W.L. Mackenzie, Medical Officer to the 
Local Government Board for Scotland, reported that a large proportion of 
the children in the slums of Edinburgh were half-starved143 and Dr. Kelly, 
the Catholic Bishop of Ross, informed the Committee that in the South of 
144 Ireland it was quite common for children to go to school unfed. 
Members of the medical profession gave striking testimony as to 
the effect of underfeeding upon the physique of school children. Dr. 
Robert Hutchinson expressed the view that if a child was insufficiently 
fed during the period of growth encompassed by the school years, it would 
be permanently stunted. 145 Stated Dr. Collie of the London School Board, 
"Apart from infectious diseases malnutrition is accountable for nine-tenths 
of child sickness". 146 
141 Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Physical Deterioration. 
Vol. 2 (Cmnd. 2210), PP, 1904, 32: 176, para. 476. 
142Ibid. 
143Ibid: 266, para. 6977-6980. 
144Ibid: 567, para. 11380. 
145Ibid: 514, para. 9973-9974. 
146Ibid: 320, para. 3992. 
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It was the opinion of Dr. Eicholz, an opinion he said "shared by most 
medical men, school managers, and teachers conversant with the conditions 
of our schools, that food is the point about which turns the whole problem 
147 
of degeneracy". Conversely, there was considerable evidence to show 
that a regular and nutritious diet could reverse the degenerative effects 
- 148 
of underfeeding. -
Facts supplied by the various witnesses concerned with malnutrition 
as a cause of physical deterioration provided the Committee with an 
exhaustive survey of the existing voluntary programmes for school feeding. 149 
Although there were varying opinions as to the most desirable method of 
providing meals for necessitous children, with scarcely an exception there 
was a general consensus of opinion that the time had come when the State 
should realize the necessity of ensuring adequate nourishment to children 
in attendance at school. 150 There was general agreement that the purely 
voluntary feeding agencies, valuable as they were, could not successfully 
151 
cope with the extent of the problem. Even those witnesses who thought 
147Ibid: 175, para. 471. 
148 See, for 
para. 486. 
example, the evidence of Dr. Eicholz and Dr. Collie, Ibid: 176, 
Ibid: 317: 3938. 
149
see, for example, the testimony of the following individuals: Ibid., 
Mr. J.B. Atkins, pp. 279-280, para. 2967-2974; Dr. Airey, pp. 634-635; 
Dr. Chalmers, p. 397, para. 6173-6177; Mr. H. Libby, p. 450, para. 7848-
7869; Sir Frederick Maurice, pp. 162-163, para. 279-286. 
150The exception was Dr. Kelly, R.C. Bishop of Ross, who though he acknow 
ledged that there was an enormous number of underfed children in Ireland, 
deprecated any measures being taken to remedy the situation, on the ground 
that it would weaken the self-respect and self-reliance both of parent and 
child. See, Ibid: 568, para. 11382-11384. 
151
see, Ibid., Mr. J.B. Atkins, pp. 281-282, para. 3000, 3006-3018; Mr. Charles 
Booth, p. 203, para. 1129-1133; Sir L. Brunton, p. 258, para. 2428, p.260, 
para. 2450-2452; Dr. Collie; p. 317, para. 3938, p.318, para. 3945-3958; Dr. 
R. Hutchinson, p.514, para. 9976, p.515, para. 1004-1006, p.517, para. 10067-
10078; Dr. Niven, pp. 403-404, para. 6349-6378. 
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that the need for school feeding had been greatly exaggerated, believed 
that those children who proved to be underfed should be given food, 
providing it was done without impairing parental responsibility. 152 
The most "uncompromising advocacy" of State provision of meals 
for underfed-children came from Gorst and Dr. Thomas Macnamara, Liberal 
153 M.P. for Camberwell. When he appeared before the Committee, Gorst first 
pointed out to its members that the evidence he would present had been 
accumulated during eight years as Vice-President of the Council on 
Education, the result of conversations with teachers and inspectors, and 
154 personal experience gained through visiting various types of schools. 
He went on to condemn the policy of submitting half-starved children to 
the processes of education which resulted in an exhaustion of the brain 
and muscles from which they might never recover. "If you do not intend 
to feed them you should not attempt to lay any stress upon either their 
155 bodies or their minds", he declared. 
Gorst drew the attention of the Committee to the fact that 
underfeeding was not restricted to schools in poorer sections of urban 
152Ibid., pp. 526-527, para. 10271-10275; p. 530, para. 10402-10410. 
Evidence of Mr. C.S. Loch and Mrs. Murphey. 
153 Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Physical Deterioration. 
Vol. 1 (Cmnd. 2175), RR., 1904, 32: 70, para. 356. For Dr. Macnamara's 
recommendations see Ibid., Vol. 2 (Cmnd. 2210), PP, 1904, 32, pp. 604-605, 
para. 12373-12377; p. 607, para. 12438; pp. 608-609, para. 12458-12477. 
154Ibid., Vol. 2 (Cmnd. 2210), PP, 1904, 32: 581, para. 11788. 
155Ibid: 583, para. 11826. 
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areas but was aiso widespread in many rural districts. The majority of 
underfed children in these areas were the sons and daughters of widowed 
mothers who simply did not have the means to sufficiently nourish their 
offspring and their only source of relief was the Poor Law, which 
invariably ~de inadequate provision. Although no statistics were 
available as to the number of insufficiently fed in country schools, he 
could personally vouch for the extent of the problem in Essex and he had 
no reason to doubt that similar conditions existed in rural districts 
156 
around the country. 
Garst urged that the school authorities organize a provision of 
school meals, both a breakfast and a dinner, in all schools where a class 
of underfed children was found to exist. The meals should be made 
available to all these children in the school who were willing to purchase 
a meal at cost price. Garst denied that such a system would tend to 
disrupt family life; he pointed out that it was commonly the case for the 
father to eat his dinner at his place of work, the mother and children 
often remaining at home to eat scraps. He thought the benevolent societies 
could undertake the responsibility of running the programmes but they should 
do it as agents of the school authority. The latter body should, however, 
be responsible for providing the premises for the cooking and serving of 
the meals and all preparations should be carried out under its guidance. 
If the programme was later found to be inefficiently run, the school 
authority should step in and take over the programme for the benevolent 
society. In Gorst's view, payment by the parents and charitable donations 
156Ibid: 583, para. 11829; p. 589, para. 11973-11976. 
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would be sufficient to make the scheme self-supporting but he believed 
that there should be recourse to the rates. He suggested that any deficit 
157 by made up out of the school rate. 
Gorst proposed a ticket system be used for distributing the 
meals. Meal.tickets could be purchased by those parents who wished to 
use the service as a convenience. The underfed children of poor parents 
who had not the means to purchase a meal for them could be given a ticket. 
Gorst emphasized that no distinction should be made between those pupils 
who purchased their tickets and those who received them gratuitously. He 
suggested that the teachers be responsible for supplying the free tickets 
because they were the most competent to undertake the task, being more 
familiar with the needs of the children under their case than either the 
district visitor or the secretary of the benevolent society. However, 
Gorst stressed that the teacher should be obliged to make a daily return, 
to the head teacher, containing details of the children receiving free 
158 food to protect the system from abuse. He also urged that the teachers 
conduct daily medical inspections of their pupils, for the purpose of 
compiling records of the childrens' general health, nutrition and standard 
of hygiene. This would provide the authorities with vital information 
currently unavailable to them. Gorst envisaged that the teachers' daily 
inspections would constitute the initial stage in a complete school medical 
inspection scheme. The teachers' inspections were to be complemented by 
quarterly examinations by qualified nurses and less-frequent ones by 
medical doctors. The nurses would conduct more complete inspections than 
157Ibid: 583, para. 11829, para. 11833, pp. 590-591, para. 11993-12000. 
1581bid: 583, para. 11833-11834. 
159 
the teachers and would locate those children requiring treatment. 
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Any such necessary medical attention ought to be furnished at public cost, 
stated Gorst, because "it is in the interest of the State to cure and 
alleviate, as far as possible, the diseases of members of the community" 
in their formative years. Children so treated would grow up to be an 
asset to society and it was simply false economy to ignore a curable 
weakness in a child and refuse treatment; "it is the most wasteful extra-
vagance not to deal with it early and cure it" . 160 
Once the underfed children had been provided with food, 
investigations could be carried out to determine whether or not the parents 
should be obliged to reimburse the school authority. Those parents who 
could pay and refused to pay could be prosecuted under existing law for 
neglect of family, he stated. Even better, he would like to see new 
legislation passed which would make the cost of the meal summarily 
recoverable from the parents, in a manner similar to the procedure currently 
used for non-payment of rates. In the cases of those parents unable to pay, 
the cost could be recoverable from the benevolent society but if subscriptions 
were insufficient to cover the cost, there must be recourse to the rates. 
Such a system would be superior to the current one in which benevolent 
societies distributed free meal tickets indiscriminately, thereby tending 
to undermine parental responsibility. 161 Garst was fully aware that only 
a programme containing the type of safeguards he proposed would have any 
kind of chance for consideration by a Unionist Administration suspicious of 
159Ibid: 586, para. 11877, para. 11880. 
160
rbid: 586, para. 11882. 
161Ibid: 583, para. 11835-11839, p. 589, para. 11919-11924. 
any plan which appeared to threaten interference with parental duties and 
anxious to avoid "social reform" expenditures which might antagonize the 
rate-paying electorate. 
Gorst emphasized, however, that investigation of the parents' 
circumstances should be made after and not before the child was fed. This 
practice might result in a small number of abuses of the system but it was 
far preferable to adopting the procedure of the Charity Organization Society 
which "made elaborate inquiries and in the meantime the patient died". 
He allowed that certain parents would take advantage of the system -
permit their children to go hungry and after they were given a meal refuse 
to pay the cost, claiming they had fed them earlier at home - but he believed 
the number of such cases would be small and that the benefits accruing to 
the masses of genuine necessitous children well worth the abuses of the 
f 162 ew. 
Gorst acknowledged that the scheme he proposed was not unique, 
that similar proposals had been carried out to a certain degree by voluntary 
agencies. But benevolent societies alone could not cope with the magnitude 
of the problem and it was now time for the local authorities to assume 
responsibility for the provision of meals for the underfed children 
163 
compelled to attend its elementary schools. 
In the light of the evidence with which it was presented the 
Physical Deterioration Connnittee was obliged to acknowledge: 
162rbid: 590, para. 12006-12008, p. 591, para. 12025-12026. 
163
rbid: 590, para. 12002-12004. 
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that the evils arising from underfeeding were so widespread, and in 
certain localities so pressing, that some authoritative intervention 
is called for at the earliest possible moment to secure that the 
education of the children who are obliged to attend school shall not be 
hampered and retarded by the physical conditions thereby engendered.164 
Nevertheless, the Committee felt that in a large number of cases voluntary 
agencies could successfully handle the feeding problem, with the assistance 
of the local authority, and, as long as this was so, the Committee would 
"strongly deprecate recourse being had to direct municipal assistance" •165 
However, in cases where "the extent or the concentration of poverty might 
be too great for the resources of local charity .•. it might be expedient 
to permit the application of municipal aid on a larger scale" •166 However, 
if the local authorities were empowered to disburse such assistance, new 
legislation would be required to facilitate the prosecution of neglectful 
parents. They proposed that the meal system be introduced on an experi-
mental basis and be funded through the apparatus of the Poor Law because 
they wished to protect society from "the somewhat dangerous doctrine that 
free meals are the necessary concommitant of free education11 • 167 
With regard to medical inspection, the Committee shied away from 
advocating Gorst's full-scale scheme, recommending only the adoption of 
164 Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Physical Deterioration. 
Vol. 1 (Cmnd. 2175), Rf, 1904, 32: 72, para. 330. 
165Ibid: 78, para. 359. 
166Ibid: 78, para. 362. 
167Ibid: 78, para. 362-365. The Committee concluded that evidence overall 
failed to support the claim that the British race was undergoing physical 
deterioration. However, they reported that their inquiry had revealed 
widespread physical incapacitation, the result of poor environmental 
conditions and inadequate diet, but that physique improved when these 
conditions were abolished. (Ibid: 19-20, para. 68-69.) 
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the initial step of his plan, namely, daily inspection and recording of 
data by the classroom teacher. They stressed that with the utilization 
of competent teachers, "the system should be so far based on their 
observation and record, that no large and expensive medical staff would 
be necessary'.'. They urged that where a child's condition was thought to 
warrant treatment, the school medical officer's function should be 
restricted to an assessment of deficiencies requiring parental attention, 
"cases of poverty and neglect being left to the proper authorities to 
deal with11 • 168 
Thus, the recommendations of the Interdepartmental Committee 
on Physical Deterioration with regard to child feeding were more positive 
and forceful than those put forward by the Royal Commission on Physical 
Training (Scotland) one year earlier. Moreover, unlike the latter report, 
that of the Physical Deterioration Committee was not allowed to recede 
into the background after its publication, but was used by Gorst as a 
weapon with which to breech Government opposition to State involvement 
in social welfare programmes. 
168Ib'd·. 71, 324 ~ para. . 
CHAPrER VII 
CAMPAIGN FOR FEEDING LEGISLATION 
The Physical Deterioration Report indicated that the best place 
to begin improving the physique of the urban poor was with the children 
of that class, through measures aimed at preventing them from degenerating 
to the level of physical debility evidenced by their parents. But welfare 
programmes require additional revenue and the Unionist Government's response 
to the Committee's recommendations was apparently determined by economic 
considerations. Although William Anson, Parliamentary Secretary to the 
Board of Education, favoured some measure of Government action on child 
feeding along the lines suggested by the Report, Balfour's Cabinet had 
already decided not to allow local authorities the right to increase rates 
to obtain revenues for social welfare programmes. Balfour informed Anson 
that on the question of child feeding he "could be as sympathetic as he 
liked, but there would be no increase in rates" . 1 That the Government was 
later forced to reverse this stand was in great measure the result of 
Gorst's determined promotion of the Physical Deterioration Report, parti-
cularly its recommendations on child feeding. 
It is difficult not to view the timing of the Report - just 
2 before the lengthy parliamentary recess of Autumn 1904 - as a deliberate 
1R.L. Morant to Balfour, December 3, 1904, British Library, Add. MSS. 
49787, Balfour Papers, Vol. CV, f.128. Quoted in Bentley B. Gilbert, The 
Evolution of National Insurance in Great Britain (London, 1966), p. 95. 
Hereafter referred to as Gilbert, National Insurance. 
2 The recess lasted from August 1904 to February 1905. 
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tactic of a Unionist Government loath to embark on a programme of costly 
social reform. If the Unionists' intention here was to avoid undue 
discussion on the Report's recommendations, thereby minimizing possible 
adverse public reaction to its proposals, they were only partially 
successful. Because Parliament recessed shortly after the Report's 
publication, discussion upon its recommendations was largely postponed to 
the next Session. However, Gorst succeeded in introducing the subject on 
one occasion before the House rose. Rising during debate on Revenue 
Department estimates, Gorst drew the attention of the Members to the 
Physical Deterioration Report's recommendations, most specifically those 
regarding State provision of meals. The Committee, he pointed out, had 
severely criticized local authorities for failing to intervene in the area 
of school feeding. They had proposed, as he had done on several occasions, 
that where the efforts of charitable organizations proved inadequate, 
local authorities should apply municipal aid. Such action on the part of 
these authorities would require Government permission but there was no 
evidence at present that the latter were willing to provide municipal 
authorities with this power. Therefore, he wished to ask the Government 
if they proposed to take such legislative action in the near future? 3 
Gorst's attempt to force discussion on the issue was successfully curtailed 
by the Unionists, his comments being ruled out of order on a point of 
procedure. However, in a parting shot, before he resumed his seat on the 
benches, he requested Anson to recommend to the Government that the 
legislative power to which he, Gorst, had referred be granted to the local 
authorities.4 
3PD, 4th series, 140 (1904): 47-53. 
4Ibid: 41-53. 
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With Parliament recessed, Garst continued his agitation outside 
the House. Fully aware that the Government could only be impelled to take 
action through pressure of public opinion, he made his campaign for State 
provision of school meals an integral part of his promotion of the Physical 
Deterioration Report. He well realized that the concern and interest 
generated by that document would ensure his agitation for child feeding a 
high level of attention and, he hoped, the weight of sympathetic public 
opinion with which to pressure the Government into meeting his demands. 
He also hoped that, pending legislation, his appeals for the relief of 
underfed children would be responded to by voluntary agencies because, 
as he told one of his supporters, "no authority can help us until 
Parliament gives power" 5 
In order to give his arguments the widest possible appeal, Garst 
included in them aspects of concern to a wide range of opinion. In his 
speeches and writings he emphasized the correlation between under-
nourishment amongst large numbers of the nation's elementary school 
6 
children, as evidenced by the Report, and physical degeneracy. He 
constantly reiterated that the Physical Deterioration Committee had found 
"the want of proper and sufficient food" to be the "one great cause" of 
7 this degeneracy. He quoted at length the medical evidence supporting 
5Marvin Papers, MS. Eng. Lett. C.257, ff. 33-34. Garst to Marvin, 20 
September, 1904. 
6see the Times, 5 November, 1904, p.11; 8 November, 1904, p.6; 13 December, 
1904, p.7; 24 December, 1904, p.2; 2 January, 1905, p.10; 17 January, 1905, 
p.9. See also, Cambridge Chronicle, 11 November, 1904, p.7. 
7Ibid., 5 September, 1904, p·.5. 
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this view presented at the Committee's hearings by various physicians, 8 
conscious that the general public would be highly impressed by information 
supplied by the medical profession. 
Garst pointed out that the findings of the Committee indicated 
that the condition of malnutrition endured by the mass of lower-class 
urban school children resulted from ignorance, neglect and poverty. The 
first, he said, could be remedied through education by instructing girls 
in the arts of housewifery in preparation for their future roles as 
mothers; the second was amenable to stricter enforcement of criminal law; 
in the case of the third cause, poverty, Government intervention could do 
much. Poverty was not a necessary condition of the people. What was 
required was legislative action on the part of the Government. However, 
as far as he could see, they had no immediate plans for such action. 
Immediate steps could and should be taken to feed the necessitous children 
at public expense, to spare them as far as possible the effects of that 
9 poverty. He emphasized that the interdepartmental investigation revealed 
beyond doubt the advantages to be gained from a regular, nutritious diet 
provided by school feeding, namely, the greatly improved health of its 
recipients. The establishment of a better standard of health among the 
children of the country was in the national interest, declared Garst, for 
it "would lead to the bringing up of a people possessing physical and 
mental strength and high mortality, and would make the English really 
a nation fit to constitute a great Empire" •10 This argument had particularly 
8Ibid., 2 January, 1905, p.10. 
9Ibid., 5 September, 1904, p.5. 
10 Ibid., 17 January, 1905, p.9. 
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wide appeal at a time when the general public was still experiencing the 
impact of the humiliating revelations of the South African War. 
To those not moved by concern for Britain's imperial future, 
there was the appeal on purely economic grounds. As he had done so 
frequently in the House, Gerst argued that the expending of iarge sums 
of money on education when the children were incapable of receiving 
instruction due to their half-starved condition, was an exercise in 
futility. What possible value was there in spending millions of pounds 
to open schools and compel children from the age of five years upwards 
to attend them, when many of their numbers were anaemic, undernourished, 
degenerate, and"totally unfit to profit from the instruction for which 
the money of the nation was provided?" 11 Moreover, the problem did not 
stop there. In acquiescing in such a state of affairs the Government was 
compounding the economic problem by bringing up children to fill hospitals, 
work-houses, and asylums, and to be life-long burdens on society. 12 
Gerst also fulminated against what he considered the injustice 
perpetrated by the State upon those children it allowed to go unfed. It 
was the duty of the State to feed necessitous children, he declared. 
Under the existing social system all children had a civil right to be 
maintained by their parents during childhood and, in their default, by 
the public. One of society's principal functions was the maintenance and 
enforcement of individual rights and no member of the community had a 
stronger claim to this service than the helpless child. In the event that 
parents failed to fulfil their duties, it became the responsibility of the 
11Ibid., 5 September, 1904, p.5. See also, Ibid., 13 December, 1904, p.4. 
12Ibid., 24 December, 1904, p.2. 
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State to enforce the rights of the child. Furthermore, to this traditional 
responsibility the State had added that of universal education on a 
compulsory basis. The assumption of this responsibility required that the 
State ensure that all those it compelled to receive instruction in its 
schools were adequately fed. To ignore this obligation was both unjust 
and cruel: "by forcing starving children to attend and receive instruction 
in its schools the State is not only failing in its general obligation 
to secure the children's rights, but it is inflicting on them a cruel and 
additional wrong 11 • 13 
Gorst's public advocacy of State feeding was viewed with alarm 
by certain individuals and groups within the society and drew from them 
criticism ranging along the scale from polite disagreement to enraged 
condemnation. Gorst's most vigorous opponent was the Charity Organization 
Society and during December and January, 1904-1905, he carried on a running 
battle with the Society's spokesman, Sir Arthur Clay, in the columns of the 
T. 14 1.mes • Clay denounced the "persistent agitation" of Gorst and his 
supporters for State feeding. He denied their assertation that private 
charity was unable to cope with the problem of underfed children in the 
schools, claiming that the 1904 Annual Report of the London School Board 
Joint-Connnittee on Underfed Children clearly showed that the organization 
of private charity was successfully meeting the needs of necessitous 
children in the schools. Moreover, he pointed out, the Report noted that 
13Ibid., 17 September, 1904, p.10. See also, Ibid., 24 December, 1904, p.2. 
14see Ibid., 22 December, 1904, p.8; 24 December, 1904, p.2; 27 December, 
·1904, p.5; 28 December, 1904, p.5; 2 January, 1905, p.10; 6 January, 1905, 
p.12; 7 January, 1905, p.8. 
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relief was often given to children not actually in want and he believed 
that if the rates were drawn upon relief would be distributed even more 
·ct 1 15 W1 e Y• Clay drew his readers' attention to Gorst's declaration that 
he intended to continue his agitation until his aim was accomplished and 
warned that "the (socialist) danger averted in 1899 is once more pressing" 16 
Clay accused Garst of emphasizing certain parts of the Physical Deteriora-
tion Committee's recommendations, those which when taken out of context 
appeared to support his claims, and of ignoring other comments of the 
Committee which would weaken his case. For example, he declared, Garst 
insisted that the Committee unequivocally declared that private charity 
could no longer successfully meet the needs of hungry children and that 
State intervention was necessary, but he failed to point out that the 
Committee had stated that the underfeeding of children was not likely to 
undergo an increase and that they "looked with confidence to the operation 
of many causes leading towards its diminuation". Furthermore, he had 
carefully avoided mentioning that the Committee believed that voluntary 
effort, under official supervision, could in the majority of cases cope 
with school feeding and, while this state of affairs was maintained, they 
"would strongly deprecate recourse being taken to direct municipal assistance". 
Garst had asserted that his proposed feeding programme would require only 
a minimum of rate assistance, stated Clay, but there was evidence to show 
that such aid would be substantial and, thus, he prophesied that adoption 
15
rbid., 22 December, 1904, p.8. 
16rbid., 27 December, 1904, p.5. The "danger" to which Clay referred was 
the State feeding of elementary school children, as discussed by the London 
School Board joint-committee on underfed children, in 1899, and depicted 
as a great social danger by the Times (see Ibid., 22 December, 1904, p.8.). 
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of Gorst's plan would lead to complete State maintenance of all school 
children as advocated by the Social Democratic Federation. He urged the 
Government to stand firm and resist the "State-feeding party's" demand 
for the introduction of "so dangerous and far-reaching a change in our 
17 
social system". 
In defending his position, Gerst insisted that Clay had mistaken 
the object of his agitation. He was not advocating State maintenance of 
all school children but only the feeding of those pupils who presented 
themselves at school in an unfit condition to benefit from the instruction 
given, as a result of undernourishment. The substance of Clay's disagree-
ment with him was, declared Gerst, that whereas Clay and the Charity 
Organization Society thought that private charity could cope with the 
problem of underfeeding, he and the Physical Deterioration Committee -
composed of "distinguished Government officials" - found that it did not, 
18 
a verdict "amply confirmed" by the evidence given before the latter group. 
Gerst quoted at length such evidence given by Dr. Eicholz and Dr. Collie 
to support his claims that charity, even in London alone, was unable to 
cope with the problem and that hunger was the chief cause of deterioration. 19 
He pointed out that his scheme was the one advocated by the Physical 
Deterioration Committee itself, after careful and detailed study of the 
evidence gathered from various areas of the country, whereas Clay's 
objections were based on a London School Board committee report which 
17Ibid. 
181b1.· d., 24 D b 1904 2 ecem er, , p. . 
191b1."d., 2 J 1905 10 anuary, , p. • 
20 
contained evidence gathered from London only. 
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Gorst denied that his proposals represented a socialist threat. 
He sought only to ensure that the State fulfilled its existing obligations 
as defined by the Court of Appeal some four years previously in the case 
of "Attorney General v. MerthyrTydfil", namely, that hungry children, if 
not provided for by their parents had a legal right to be fed by public 
authority. 21 He was at a loss to understand, he said, why his proposal 
"that local education authorities should be instruments for fulfilling the 
already existing obligation of society, and enforcing the civil rights 
already possessed by children", should be denounced as a "dangerous and 
far-reaching change in our social system11 • 22 
Gorst concluded his defence by turning Clay's attempts to raise 
the spectre of socialism back upon the Charity Organization Society 
spokesman. He expressed the view that repudiation of all public responsi-
bility for the physical condition of the nation's public school children 
was a highly dangerous position to adopt, one which, in the current state 
of popular feeling, could well lead to the outcome he feared, that of 
State feeding of all children. 23 
Gorst's agitation produced a response similar to Clay's within 
the ranks of the Unionist party, and the Times reprimanded him publicly 
for his behaviour: 
201b1."d, 28 D mb 1904 5 ece er, , p •• 
21 Ibid., 2 January, 1905, p.10 
22Ibid., 28 December, 1904, p.5. 
231b1."d., 7 J 1905 8 anuary, , p. . 
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Sir John Garst presents a not unusual combination of cynicism and 
sentimentalism. He is very lacking in sympathy with other people's 
ideals, aspirations, and efforts, and he is very much wedded to his own 
notions. On this question (of feeding) he contentedly accepts all the 24 
exaggerations that may help to make out a case for sentimental legislation. 
Echoing Clay's claim that Gorst 1 s proposals for State provision of meals 
for necessitous children constituted a fundamental and dangerous social 
change, the Times denounced his scheme as "social quackery, a cheap and 
easy method for enabling the social reformer to shirk his work by throwing 
a financial burden upon other people's shoulders". It warned of the 
collectivist consequences of adopting such a plan: 
We have already made a serious inroad upon personal responsibility and 
personal independence by relieving parents of the duty of educating their 
children. That is now used as an argument for relieving them of the duty 
of feeding their children. When we have done that the argument will be 
stronger than ever for relieving them of the duty of clothing their 
children. It will be said that we pay vast sums for teaching and feeding, 
but that the money is wasted if the children are not properly clad. 
L'appetit vient en mangeant. From that it is an easy step to paying for 
their proper housing ... If, instead of quickening parental sense of 
duty, we are going further to weaken it, we shall have to begin with the 
newborn babe. It is a race of fatherless and motherless foundlings to 
which Sir John Gorst 1 s proposals point.25 
Nor had Gorst's advocacy of State feeding, and his accompanying 
critcism of Government inaction on the question, escaped the attention of 
his constituents at the University of Cambridge. On November 25, 1904, 
Unionist supporters among the resident members of the University Senate, 
held a closed meeting and adopted the following resolution: 
24Ibid., Leading Article, 2 January, 1905, p.7. 
25Ibid. For Clay's comments, see Ibid., 27 December, 1904, p.5. 
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Considering Sir John Gorst's political action during the last two years, 
this meeting regards him as no longer representing the views of the 
supporters of the present Government, and resolves to proceed to the 26 
choice of another candidate to represent the University in Parliament. 
Thus, the Senate's mounting dissatisfaction with Gorst's behaviour in the 
House during 1903 and 1904, where he had become increasingl~ critical of 
the Unionists - on one occasion voting against the Government - was brought 
to a climax as a result of his agitation for State feeding. 27 
Upon being informed of the meeting's resolution by the Chairman 
of the Senate Executive Committee, 28 Gorst responded by making the whole 
· bl' 29 11 . h h b d h d d. issue pu ic, a eging tat t e mem ers concerne a acte in an 
unauthorized manner: 
The conveners of the meeting of the 25th at Cambridge acted on no authority 
but their own. They not only sent me no intimation of any ground of 
complaint against me, but they did not even inform me that my conduct was 
to be the subject of discussion. I was told that I should not be allowed 
to be present, while free scope has apparently been given to my accusers, 
of whose names even I am still ignorant. I have thus been deprived of 
all opportunity of either hearing the charges or making any explanation 
or defence.30 
Consequently, he would reject the judgment of the meeting, choosing 
instead to place his political future in the hands of his Cambridge 
constituents-at-large at the next election. At that time he would ask them 
26cambridge Chronicle, 2 December, 1904, p.8. Sir Robert Ball to Sir John 
Gorst, 26 November, 1904. Cambridge University Register, 50, 1, 13. 
27 cambridge University Register, 50, 1, 23. Robert S. Ball to Members of the 
Senate of the University of Cambridge, 28 December, 1905. 
28cambridge Chronicle, 2 December, 1904, p.8. Sir Robert Ball to Sir John 
Gerst, 26 November, 1904. 
29cambridge University Register, 50, 1, 21. See also, the Times, 30 November, 
1904, p.6. 
30The Times, 30 November, 1904, p.6. Sir John Gorst to Sir Robert Ball, 
28 November, 1904. 
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to return him to the Commons "to oppose protection and uphold free trade 
and to help in advancing those social reforms too long delayed - such as 
better housing, better education, more care for the health and prevention 
of intoxication - upon which the happiness of the people at home and 
the strength of the Empire abroad largely depend". 31 
Undaunted by the weight of party disapprova132 Gorst went on to 
anger them further by serving as principal speaker at a meeting organized 
by the National Union of Gasworkers and General Labourers, at which he 
shared the platform with Will Thorne and the Countess of Warwick, and 
supported a resolution proposed by the latter urging the Government to 
"grant to educational authorities the power necessary to provide food for 
33 
children attending State supported schools" Then, in January, 1905, 
he occupied the chair at the National Labour Conference on State Maintenance 
of Children held at the Guildhall in London. The Conference was attended 
by some two hundred and fifty delegates representing approximately two 
million workers, by several Members of Parliament, including Dr. Thomas 
Macnamara, and by Lady Warwick, who introduced herself as a delegate from 
the Social Democratic Federation.34 In his address to the delegates, 
Gorst emphasized that he did not endorse State maintenance of all children, 
but only the necessitous. He simply advocated the vindication of the 
31
rbid. Gorst's decision to publicize the steps taken by the resident 
members in the columns of the Times was undoubtedly made in the hope of 
eliciting the sympathy and support of the University electorate at large. 
Unfortunately for Gorst, this move failed (see pp. 414-416 below). 
32
rb'd., 7 J 1905 8 ~ anuary, , p. . 
33Ib'd., 13 D mb 1904 4 ~ ece er, , p. • 
34
rb'd., 21 J 1905 14 ~ anuary, , p. . See also Appendix C. 
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children's legal rights as set down by the Court of Appeal in 1900. This 
Court had determined that every child had the right to State maintenance 
in the event of default on the part of its parents and that was all he was 
urging. To deny a child this maintenance was to rob him of his rights, 
stated Gorst. "It was obvious that the State, whose sacred duty it was 
to protect the rights of the poor and helpless, had been robbing the 
children of the poor and leaving them to perish for the lack of that 
maintenance to which they had as valid a title as any citizen to his 
35 property". 
At its conclusion, the Conference declared unanimously in favour 
of State maintenance "as a necessary corollary of universal compulsory 
education, and as a means of partially arresting the physical deterioration 
of the industrial population of this country, which is now generally 
recognized as a grave national danger". The resolution also urged that 
"as a step towards such State maintenance, the Government introduce, without 
further delay, such legislative measures as will enable the local authorities 
to provide meals for children attending the common schools", the cost to 
be met from the National Exchequer. 36 
Gorst's association with the Labour Movement at the Guildhall 
Conference reflected his growing alienation from a Unionist Government he 
considered had abandoned the social ideals of Disraelian Tory Democracy. 
Several months before the Guildhall meeting, Gorst had achieved what one 
35The ~' 21 January, 1905, p.14, 
36Ibid. 
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contemporary had described as "one of the most important of his many 
contributions to social reform" also in alliance with Labour, which, on 
that occasion, was represented by the trade unionists. 37 Between 
September 5-9, the Trades Union Congress met in Leeds and on the evening 
of the first day Gorst was principal invited speaker at a meeting held to 
discuss the question of free meals for school children.38 In his address 
Gorst reiterated his various arguments in support of State feeding -
physical regeneration, children's rights and State obligations, economics 
and simple humanitarianism. The principal thrust of his speech, however, 
consisted of a biting indictment of the current Unionist Government, in 
particular, and Parliament, in general, for their ineptitude in the 
handling of the school feeding issue. Feeding, like all other social 
problems, declared Gorst, was hung up chiefly because the Government and 
Parliament saw no advantage to themselves in passing such legislation. 
The House was a "rich man's assembly" and the administration of the nation 
was a "rich man's pastime". The country was governed by permanent 
officials and party officials and social reform was troublesome to the 
former while the latter, of which Parliament was constituted, were people 
of high social position and their relations and supporters who were 
concerned only with party issues, namely, those matters upon which their 
existence depended. Only strong public opinion could move them to deal 
with non-party issues. Gorst outlined two steps that might be taken to 
37 Gertrude M. Tuckwell, "Trades Union Congress, 1904", Commonweal th, 9 
(1904), pp. 307-308. 
38The Times, 6 September, 1904, p.5. 
386. 
promote speedier enactment of social legislation. He suggested that one 
avenue of approach would be the establishment of an independent Labour 
Party in the House of Commons, which would be able to secure in Parliament 
a much greater attention to social questions than they currently received. 
Secondly and more importantly for the present, there should be greater 
autonomy for county and borough councils in order that they might "decide 
these social questions for themselves, make laws which they thought would 
be of advantage to their people, and carry them out without the continued 
interference of ignorant officials in London11 • 39 
In response to Gorst's appeals, the meeting unanimously adopted 
a resolution in favour of child feeding. 4° Four days later, with Gerst on 
the platform, the entire Congress followed suit by adopting without dissent, 
Will Thorne' s motion that "This Congress •.. urges the Government to 
introduce without further delay legislation instructing education authorities 
to provide at least one free meal a day for children attending State-
41 
supported schools". 
Gorst's activities around the country and his appeals in the 
press, during the parliamentary recess of Autumn and Winter, 1904-1905, 
helped to keep interest in the Physical Deterioration Committee's recom-
mendations - particularly those concerning underfed children - at a very 
high level. Consequently, on February 9, 1905, the Government decided 
it would be politic to display some regard for the plight of starving 
39 Ibid. 
40 Tuckwell, p. 308. 
41Report of the Annual Trades Union Congress, 1869-1966, p. 119. 
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children, particularly as the opening of Parliament was fast approaching 
and they anticipated that the King's speech, which was to ignore the 
Physical Deterioration Report completely, would provoke Gerst into posing 
embarrassing questions concerning this omission. Therefore, shortly before 
Parliament reassembled, the Cabinet elected to form a second committee to 
examine the findings of the Interdepartmental Committee on Physical 
Deterioration.42 
This inquiry was a delaying tactic. This was well illustrated 
by the Memorandum sent to the Cabinet, on the day following its decision 
to form the new committee, by the President of the Board of Education, 
Lord Londonderry, which contained recommendations upon which the committee 
was shortly thereafter established.43 Londonderry suggested that the 
Committee be composed exclusively of civil servants to "avoid the diffi-
culty of having persons pressed upon us who might approach the subject 
with pre-considered conclusions". He urged that the committee meet 
forthwith, "so in the event of any serious debate on the Address (King's 
Speech) we may be aided in resisting premature or too far-reaching 
proposals by referring to the lack of specific information and practical 
42 Bulkley, pp. 33-34. Bentley B. Gilbert, "Health and Politics: The 
Physical Deterioration Report of 190411 , Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 
39 (1965), pp. 143-153. Hereafter referred to as Gilbert, "Heal th and 
Poli tics". 
43Lord Londonderry to Cabinet, MS Memorandum, February 10, 1905, Ministry 
of Education, Private Office Papers, "Education (Provision of Meals) Bill, 
1906, Papers Leading up to Bill", unsorted. Extracts reproduced in 
Gilbert, "Health and Politics", pp. 150-151. As Gilbert has noted, 
Londonderry was the most active opponent of social legislation among the 
Unionist leaders and he appears to have determined the Cabinet's policy 
towards the Physical Deterioration Report. 
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suggestions II It could be pointed out that further action could 
await publication of the new committee's report. Careful attention 
should be paid to the committee's terms of reference, to ensure that 
that body be restrained from advocating "any far-reaching proposal that 
the Unionist party would be unwilling to support"; for example, recom-
mendations necessitating new legislation or increased taxation must be 
resisted. However, the terms must not be overly-restrictive or the 
Government "would be accused of parking(?) discussion while taking no 
really effective steps to discover or bring about any practical remedies 
for the evils now generally admitted to exist" •44 Thus, in place of 
action on school feeding, the Government chose to substitute a civil 
servants' investigation into the findings of a previous civil servants' 
inquiry. 
A few days after the Cabinet made this, as yet, unannounced 
decision, Garst, as they had feared and Londonderry's memorandum had 
anticipated, responded to the Unionists' total disregard of the Physical 
Deterioration Report in the King's speech with an attack upon the Government 
on the opening day of the new parliamentary session.45 Garst inquired of 
the Government what steps it proposed to take towards implementing the 
Interdepartmental Committee's recommendations on feeding of necessitous 
children. This question, he felt, was quite as important as "that of the 
adulteration of butter", an item which had appeared in the throne speech.46 
44Ibid. 
45PD, 4th series, 141 (1905): 141-145. 
46 Ibid: 145. 
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He reminded the House that the Physical Deterioration Committee had 
concluded that of all the many causes operating to produce degeneration 
in children that of insufficient and improper food was the most 
deleterious and that it was useless to eradicate other causes if these 
were not eliminated. Thus, the Committee had proposed that local 
authorities be empowered, if they so desired, to spend some of their own 
school funds in feeding those necessitous children who they were satisfied 
could not be fed by any other method. In requesting this type of action, 
no new right for the children was being solicited, argued Gorst. Children 
now had the right to be maintained by their parents and, in the event of 
their default, by the State. He and others advocating State feeding asked 
only that "this right should be made more effective, and that the State 
fulfill its obligations to the children". He expressed astonishment that 
the Government had apparently failed to appreciate the benefits which 
would accrue to the Empire from the enactment of a "short and simple Act" 
giving local authorities the right to expend funds upon school feeding. 
How could the Empire be maintained if causes of physical degeneracy such 
as inadequate feeding were allowed to continue operating among the classes 
from which future soldiers and sailors were to be drawn? Gorst concluded 
by expressing the hope "that some steps would be taken (that) session to 
carry out the recommendations of the Committee, and put an end to this 
thing which was a scandal to the race". 47 
This speech marked the beginning of an intensification of Gorst's 
campaign to keep the Physical Deterioration Report before Parliament and 
the nation. The following week he again introduced the topic of underfed 
47Ibid: 144-145. 
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children into Commons' debate and promised to "bring the subject to the 
attention of the House at every opportunity. He would bring it up on the 
Irish Estimates, the Scottish Estimates and the English Estimates, and he 
would entreat the Government, for the sake of the nation and Empire ... 
not to neglect the recommendations of the Committee (on Physical Deteriora-
t . ) ,.48 1.on • Three days later, during the question period in the House, 
Gorst rose to question in turn the Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
the President of the Local Government Board, and the Parliamentary Secretary 
to the Board of Education, as to the action their respective departments 
were taking to adopt the recommendations of the Committee on Physical 
Deterioration, as far as they fell within the jurisdictions of their 
departments. From each he received the same evasive answer, that the 
proposals had been "under consideration" for some time, and appropriate 
. h f b · · 1 d 49 measures were int e process o eing imp emente . 
During the next two months Gorst and his supporters in the House 
carried out an unremitting attack upon the Government in the Commons. 
Scarcely a day went by without one or other of the "State feeding party" 
rising to direct a question on underfed children to Government ministers, 
primarily those of the Treasury, the Board of Education, and the Local 
48Ibid: 1145. 
49Ibid: 1316 -1318. 
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50 Government Board. At the beginning of March, voluntary meals programmes 
in two of the country's largest cities, Manchester and Leeds, were forced 
to cease operations due to lack of funds. Gorst and his supporters 
pointed out that this occurrence was being repeated up and down the 
country and, in view of this failure on the part of voluntary agencies to 
cope with the needs of the hungry children, they urged the Government 
to review its decision not to empower local authorities to provide meals 
for underfed children out of the rates. 51 
The Unionists, however, planned no such reversal of their 
policy but only the formation of a further interdepartmental inquiry and 
on March 14, in response to yet another of Gorst's almost daily questions 
on the physical deterioration of school children, the Government announced 
the appointment of the Interdepartmental Committee on Medical Inspection 
52 
and Feeding of Children Attending Public Elementary Schools. In line 
with Londonderry's recommendations, its terms of reference and membership 
were suitably conservative. The Committee was directed to "ascertain •.• 
what is now being done in Medical Inspection ... and further to inquire 
50see Ibid., 4th series, 142 (1905): 731-733; 1184-1185; 143 (1905): 197-198, 
210-211, 455-456, 456-457, 869-870, 872-873, 873-874, 874-875, 875-879, 
960-966, 1231-1232, 1233-1234, 1240, 1244-1251, 1720-1721, 1738; 144 (1905): 
127, 128-129, 149-150, 645, 1040, 1272. Gorst's principal supporters were 
Liberal M.P.s, Thomas J. Macnamara, Will Crooks, and Tory Claude Hay. Although 
not a supporter of Gorst, personally, Keir Hardie contributed on several 
occasions to the agitation in the House for State relief of underfed 
children (see Ibid., 4th series, 142 (1905): 731; 143 (1905): 1231-1234, 
1720; 144 (1905): 129.). 
51Ibid., 4th series, 142 (1905): 731-733. 
52Ibid: 1185. 
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into methods employed, the sums expended •.. " by voluntary feeding agencies 
and to report "whether relief ••. could be better organized without any 
charge upon public funds". 53 Therefore, the Connnittee was to be mainly 
concerned with questions of administration. With only one exception, the 
Connnittee were all members of the Board of Education Inspectorate, the 
lone outsider being H. Franklin Parsons, Assistant Medical Officer of the 
Local Government Board. 54 
Gorst denounced the Connnittee's appointment as a "bare-faced 
expedient for hindering action while Parliament is sitting" which would 
11 b d l fl 55 serve no purpose ut e ay . He accused the Unionist Administration of 
deliberately turning a blind eye to the evidence that degeneracy was 
largely produced by undernourishment, which had been supplied by both the 
Physical Deterioration Report and the earlier Royal Connnission on Physical 
Training (Scotland). This evidence had shown that the problem affected 
all areas of England, not just one or two cities; it was a national problem. 
Therefore, the question of underfed children required the innnediate attention 
of many departments of Government - the Home Office, the Local Government 
Board, the Board of Education, the Irish Office and the Scottish Office. 
Yet, the only action taken so far was the appointment by the Board of 
Education of another committee of investigation. This inquiry was totally 
superfluous; the Government had more than enough information upon which to 
act, if it so desired. The time for inquiry was over; it was now time for 
action, insisted Gorst, and he denounced the Government's tardiness on the 
53Report of the Interdepartmental Connnittee on Medical Inspection and Feeding 
of Children Attending Public Elementary Schools. Vol. l (Crnnd. 2779), PP, 
1906, 47: 7. 
54Ibid. 
55
Ma • P S 6 4 rvin apers, M. Eng. Lett. C.257. ff.4 - 9. Gorst to Mrs. Marvin, 
25 March, 1905. 
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· the issue as "most discreditable". He hoped that before the present 
session was over the individual departments concerned would see their way 
to making positive declarations as to what measures they proposed to adopt 
to carry out the Physical Deterioration Committee's recommendations. He 
concluded by promising the Government once again that he would bring the 
matter before the Commons on every possible occasion. "The Government 
would not get rid of him until they took the matter up seriously and treated 
the interests of these children as they would the interests of any powerful 
body of constituents whose votes they were anxious to secure". 56 True 
to his word, Gorst reintroduced the subject of underfed children into 
57 debate on six different occasions during the following two weeks. 
Gorst's verbal attack stung Anson into retorting that he had 
searched in vain for evidence that Gorst had displayed any interest in 
58 feeding, while at the Education Department. He then went on to state 
that the Board of Education had no authority to provide food for underfed 
children and suggested that those who arrived at school in a starved condition 
59 
c·ould be relieved under the Poor Law. Just two days previously, Sir 
Walter Foster had urged the new President of the Local Government Board to 
"issue a circular to boards of guardians calling their attention to their 
powers and duties as to underfed children". To this appeal, Gerald Balfour 
had replied that he believed the guardians were fully aware of their 
56PD, 4th series, 143 (1905): 873-875. 
57Ibid., 4th series, 143 (1905): 1194-1195, 1196, 1247-1251; 144 (1905): 
128, 149, 645. 
58 Anson's comments provoked Gorst to reply that he had brought the question 
to the attention of the House in 1899, to which the former rejoined that 
"he was glad that after four years of official life the hon. Gentleman 
had paid attention to the subject". (see Ibid., 4th series, 143 (1905): 
875-876.). 
59
rbid., 4th series, 143 (1905): 876. 
60 
responsibilities in the area and, thus a circular was unnecessary. 
394. 
The glib assumptions on the part of Anson and Gerald Balfour 
concerning the effectiveness of the guardians' role in feeding prompted 
Gorst to test the practical value of the relieving officer's powers. There 
was in the Lambeth district of London a particular school, Johanna St. 
School, which had become notorious for the number of children in a 
chronically underfed condition which it housed. In his testimony before 
the Physical Deterioration Committee, Dr. Eicholz had testified that he 
considered that 90 percent of the Johanna St. children were unable, by 
reason of their physical condition, to attend to their lessons in a proper 
61 way. This appalling evidence had also been brought up in the Commons by 
Gorst as a means of drawing attention to the need for State feeding62 and 
he and his supporters repeatedly directed questions to the Government in 
the House as to the measures they proposed to take to rectify the state of 
affairs at Johanna St.63 The Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of 
Education, William Anson, had visited the school but had refused to admit 
in Parliament that the children were unfit to receive instruction owing to 
64 hunger. 
60Ibid: 455-456. 
61Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Physical Deterioration. 
Vol. 2 (Cmnd. 2210), PP, 1904, 32: 123. 
62PD, 4th series, 142 (1905): 1184-1185. 
63Ibid., 4th series, 142 (1905): 1184-1185; 143 (1905): 455-456, 958-959, 
1247-1248, 1379-1380. 
64Ibid., 4th series, 143 (1905): 456. 
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Now, at the end of March, Garst, Thomas Macnamara, Lady Warwick, 
and Dr. Robert Hutchinson, M:.D., Physician to the Hospital for Sick Children, 
Great Ormond St., visited the school and inspected the children for signs 
of underfeeding. From amongst these pupils Dr. Hutchinson selected twenty 
boys whom he was prepared to certify were actually suffering from hunger 
so acute that they were unable to benefit from instruction given and, 
consequently, were in urgent need of immediate relief in the form of food. 
The party then proceeded to the offices of the Lambeth Board of Guardians 
where they made an application, on behalf of the boys, for food and relief 
and demanded that the relieving officers be instructed to visit the school 
immediately and feed the children they had listed. The Guardians responded 
to this request with alacrity, immediately issuing orders for the out-
door relief of all necessitous children in the Lambeth Union. The fact 
that Gorst's group included two Members of Parliament and a peeress 
apparently prompted the rapid action on the part of the Lambeth Guardians. 65 
However, as Garst shortly thereafter pointed out in the House, the children, 
. f t t 1 · d 66 in ac , were no re ieve . 
Consequently, Garst once again pressed Anson to have the Board 
of Education issue a circular to local education authorities "advising them 
65 J.E. Garst, Children of the Nation (London, 1906), pp. 86-87. 
66PD, 4th series, 143 (1905): 1195, 1249-1250. The relieving officer later 
reported that this was because the working class parents' abhorrence of the 
Poor Law was so great that only one family applied for relief. Following 
perusal of the information in this report the Lambeth Guardians concluded 
that Gorst's contingent had overstated their case. The Guardians claimed 
that food tickets had been distributed with virtually no enquiries being 
made, a·nd that the children had acquired them simply to add variety to 
their diet. (Cited in J.S. Hurt, Elementary Schooling and the Working 
Classes, 1860-1918 (London, 1979), p. 122.). 
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to instruct the managers and teachers of public elementary schools to 
refer the case of children attending their schools hungry and destitute, 
and unable from affliction to profit by the instruction provided, to the 
proper Poor Law authorities for relief 11 • 67 When Anson responded that such 
a directive could only be issued with the concurrence of the Local Govern-
ment Board, Gorst requested Gerald Balfour to dispatch a circular to the 
local Poor Law authorities "pointing out the duties of relieving officers 
in reference to giving medical and other relief to destitute children 
irrespective of the conduct and character of their parent11 • 68 However, 
the obviously irritated Balfour would not commit himself to any such 
action, merely replying that he had no grounds for assuming that the 
guardians and their officers were "not alive to the powers and duties 
which attach to them in relation to destitute children, where application 
is made for relief 11 • 69 
This intransigence on the part of Anson and, particularly, 
Balfour, served to intensify the feeding party's attack upon the Ministers' 
respective departments. Later the same day, Gorst again castigated the 
Board of Education and the Local Government Board for their continued 
disregard of Physical Deterioration Report recommendations. He noted the 
Government's competence at forming Royal Commissions and Departmental 
Committees but expressed regret that when the time came for action the 
various Government departments were paralyzed. "They were 'ever learning 
67 Ibid: 1194. 
68Ibid: 1195 
69Ibid. 
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and were never able to arrive at the knowledge of the truth 1 • " The 
Board of Education was constantly reiterating the need to acquire further 
information before taking action, but considering the amount of evidence 
provided by the Physical Deterioration Report, and before the House, he 
failed to see how any further evidence was required. As for the investiga-
tion instigated by the Board of Education, he could not see the value in 
appointing a committee of junior officials to revise the proposals of 
senior officials. It was to be regretted that action on the urgent 
question of child feeding "was hung up by an inquiry so futile and so 
obviously for the purpose of delay". To give immediate assistance to 
necessitous children no new legislation was needed; relief could be given 
at once through the Poor Law guardians. Thus, he urged the Board of 
Education to ensure that managers and teachers were made aware of the 
existence of this channel for the relief of their half-starved charges and 
to take steps to make the reporting of destitution to the guardians the 
70 duty of the teachers. 
Also that day, Gorst, Hardie and Macnamara supported a Provision 
of Meals Bill presented by Tory 71 M. P., Claude Hay. This measure, 
70
rbid., 4th series, 143 (1905): 1244-1251. See also Ibid: 1234-1235, 
1240-1241. · Speeches of Keir Hardie and Thomas Macnamara. 
71Ibid: 1307-1309. Gorst apparently contributed to the planning of this 
Bill. On February 22, 1905, Ramsey Macdonald invited Gorst to discuss 
the matter of the Bill with him and Gorst agreed to a meeting for that 
purpose. (See, Labour Representation Committee Documents 20790 (hereafter 
referred to as .1.!l£), Ramsey Macdonald to Sir John Gorst, 22 February, 1905. 
Ramsey-Macdonald Papers, P.R.O., 30/69/1149, 1905. John E. Gorst to Ramsey-
Macdonald, 23 February, 1905.) 
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and a second bill also empowering local education authorities to provide 
school meals, introduced two days later, on March 29 by Artthur Henderson, Labour 
72 Member for Barnard Castle, were designed to pressure the Unionists into 
taking action on the question. However, the Government successfully 
73 
resisted this attempt, and both measures were subsequently withdrawn to 
make time available for debate on a provision of meals resolution. 74 
Despite the repeated requests from Garst and his supporters, 
Gerald Balfour continued to refuse to expedite Poor Law relief of 
necessitous children through the circulation of a directive to Boards of 
Guardians, insisting that new legislation was required for such relief. 75 
This position of non-responsibility assumed by Balfour on behalf of the 
Local Government Board was immediately challenged by Garst. He claimed 
that in 1896 the Board had issued its relieving officers with extracts 
from its General Orders which directed them to give relief to children 
destitute of necessary food, on whose behalf teachers made application 
for such aid. Thus, he urged the Board to issue a circular to all 
76 Guardians reminding them of their responsibilities in this regard. In 
responding to this challenge, Balfour was obliged to admit that this 
claim appeared to be a valid one and promised he would consider issuing a 
72Ibid: 1543. 
73The Unionists' intentions towards these Bills were reflected in A.J. 
Balfour's response to questions regarding the possible timetable for these 
measures: "I am not aware that any suggestion has come from this bench that 
facilities should be given to any Bill". (Ibid., 4th series, 144 (1905): 150.) 
74Ibid., 4th series, 144 (1905): 1040, 1284. For details on this resolution 
and debate, see pp. 399-403 below. 
75Ibid., 4th series, 144 (1905): 127-128. 
76Ibid: 128. 
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. 1 h b" 77 c1rcu ar on t e su Ject. Gorst and his supporters now intensified their 
pressure on the Government, in Parliament, to issue the directive they 
had requested. Questions on the subject were repeatedly directed to the 
President of the Local Government Board, the First Lord of the Treasury, 
and the Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Education by Gorst and 
78 Thomas Macnamara. 
Then, on April 18, the proponents of State-supported feeding 
succeeded in forcing a debate in the Commons on the resolution: 
That .•. local education authorities be empowered (as unanimously 
recommended by the Interdepartmental Committee on Physical Deterioration, 
1904) to make provision ..• for ensuring that all the children at any 
public elementary school in their area shall receive proper nourishment 
before being subjected to mental or physical instruction, and for 79 
recovering the cost, where expedient, from the parents or guardians. 
The promotion of this resolution by its supporters proceeded along much 
the same lines as their previous appeals had done. The House was reminded 
of the recommendations which had issued from both the Royal Commission 
on Physical Training (Scotland) and the Physical Deterioration Committee 
Report and of the importance of underfeeding as a cause of degeneracy, as 
outlined by the reports. 80 Both the Government and the Opposition were 
criticized for their attitude towards the crucial question of underfed 
children and the former was accused of failing to utilize existing laws to 
feed hungry children and of being remiss in carrying out prosecutions of 
parents who neglected to feed their offspring. The Opposition Front Bench 
77 Ibid: 129. 
78Ibid: 129, 149, 645, 1270, 1272; 145 (1905): 308. 
79 Ibid., 4th series, 145 (1905): 531. Speech of Bamford Slack. 
SOibid: 531. Speech of Bamford Slack. 
was rebuked for failing to show "an iota of interest or a breath of 
81 
suggestion" in the problem under debate. 
400. 
What they were advocating, insisted the supporters of the motion, 
was not "sham Socialism" but "real patriotism and general Imperialism". 
The disasters of the recent war had just brought to the nation's attention 
the deterioration present in the army and the poor physical condition of 
children owing to insufficient food. However, it was necessary to realize 
that "the future of the Empire, the triumph of social progress, and the 
freedom of the British Race depended not so much upon the strengthening of 
the Army as upon fortifying the children of the State for the battle of 
Life". The reformers denied that their proposals were revolutionary. 
The law already restricted the control exercised by parents over their 
children, through compulsory education and labour laws; why then could not 
feeding of hungry children be ensured by the Government? They pointed out 
that, whereas previous resolutions on the issue had sought to lay obligation 
on the Board of Education to require arrangements to be made for feeding 
of inadeuqately nourished children, the present resolution was only 
permissive and sought only to empower local authorities with the right to 
act at their own discretion. 82 
81Ibid: 540-541. Speech of Claude Hay. 
82Ibid: 533-539. Speech of Bamford Slack. The Government's obdurate 
opposition to any form of rate-supported feeding may have been a factor 
in the reformers' decision to reduce their demands. It is likely that the 
promoters of State feeding reasoned that a less radical demand might be 
granted and that this would be a concession from which others could be 
gained later. This is what did eventually occur; the Education (Provision 
of Meals) Act, 1906, was a subsequent development from the Relief (School 
Children) Order, 1905, which emerged from this debate. 
401. 
One aspect of the debate was new. In previous debates on State 
feeding, argument had chiefly revolved around the question of whether or 
not voluntary agencies could cope with the problem. Now it was no longer 
suggested that feeding be left solely to these organizations. Most members 
now recognized that charity was an inadequate solution. The point of 
contention now was finances; were the necessary funds to be derived from 
the Education rate or the Poor Law rate? 83 The reformers favoured recourse 
to the rates. They suggested that a small levy to help finance feeding 
programmes would eventually return great dividends to the community because 
"the better health of the children would be secured and better health 
meant increased intelligence, brighter homes, a more contented people, and 
more efficient workers 11 • 84 
Gerst appealed to the Board of Education to empower local 
authorities to spend the education rate in the provision of dinners and other 
meals at school. "It would be much more convenient and expeditious, and free 
from Poor Law taint" if the meals were provided in this manner rather than 
by the Poor Law authorities. It was unfortunate that the Board of Education's 
recently appointed interdepartmental committee had been debarred from 
recommending this type of scheme. The provision of meals by public 
authority would strengthen parental responsibility, not weaken it, as 
opponents of the resolution claimed, declared Gerst. It was the system of 
charitable relief, with its indiscriminate distribution of free meals, which 
83 Ibid: 554. Speech of J. Keir Hardie. 
84Ibid: 538. Speech of Bamford Slack. 
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encouraged this weakening, he concluded. 85 
Strong objections to these proposals were expressed by the 
opponents of state-aided school meal programmes. Sir George Bartley 
asserted that such a system of feeding would very quickly result in the 
whole of the children being fed and the ultimate outcome would be decreased 
parental responsibility, leading to "the destruction of the entire social 
fabric". He pointed out that, contrary to claims made during the debate, 
the Physical Deterioration Committee had recommended that as long as 
voluntary agencies were able to provide for the needy children, no 
h ld b d d . . . 1 "d 86 recourses ou e ma e to irect municipa ai . Sir Frederick Banbury 
warned that the provision of free meals would lead to a demand for free 
87 
clothing and shelter. 
While the debate was in progress, Anson rose to inform the House 
that the Local Government Board would shortly issue a circular to Guardians 
permitting them to give Poor Law relief to school children upon application 
from the school manager or teacher. This relief might be given by way of 
a loan or as out-door maintenance. In the latter case the father would 
fall under the disability of the Poor Law. With regard to relief given 
in the form of a loan, Anson was unable to state definitely whether or not 
this type of relief would disenfranchise the parent. 88 He went on to 
observe that the problem of underfed children had been vastly exaggerated 
- a criticism obviously directed at Gorst. Charitable individuals were 
85
rbid: 557-558. 
86Ibid: 542-543. 
87Ibid: 547. 
88
rbid: 562-563. 
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frequently misled by appearances, and something of this nature had 
apparently befallen "the distinguished party visiting Johanna Street 
89 School". Anson announced that he, personally, would not be able to vote 
for the resolution as it stood but that the Government would not make the 
subject a party question. Consequently, at the ensuing division the 
resolution was carried by 100 votes to 64. All the Unionist Ministers 
present voted against the resolution; none of the Liberal leaders attended 
the debate. 90 
On April 26, one week after the debate, the Local Government 
Board issued its Relief (School Children) Order empowering Guardians to 
relieve the child of an able-bodied father without requiring him to enter 
91 the workhouse or perform the outdoor labour test. In instances where 
the child's father was deemed habitually neglectful, relief had to be 
extended in the form of a loan; in other cases it was to be left to the 
discretion of the Guardians. 92 For relief extended as a loan, proceedings 
were to be initiated to recoup the cost but, in any case, the father was 
93 pauperized whether repayment was made or not. Offspring of widows, 
wives separated from their husbands, and children living with relatives, 
89Ibid: 561. 
90Ibid: 567-568. 
91Thirty Fifth Annual Report of the Local Government Board, 1905-1906. 
Appendix III (Cmnd. 3105), PP, 1906, 35: 321-322. Relief (School Children) 
Order, Article V. 
92
rbid., Article II, Sect. 2. 
93 Ibid., Article VI. 
404. 
94 
were excluded from the scope of the Order. This stipulation effectively 
prevented the relief of those children most in need of assistance. The 
reason given for this exclusion was that the Guardians were already 
authorized to deal with children in these categories, and thus, no additional 
sanction was required. Unfortunately, this was not clearly explained in 
the Order, or later, leaving the Guardians with the impression that these 
children were unprovided for, and leading many Guardians to strike from 
their relief rolls large numbers of children they had already been feeding. 95 
The Order also recommended that where voluntary feeding agencies existed 
the Guardians should make arrangements with them for the provision of 
meals; where this service was not available, a local tradesman might be 
96 
authorized to supply the food. 
The Local Government Board Order and accompanying circular of 
instructions to Boards of Guardians were sent by the Board of Education to 
local education authorities, together with a covering letter drawing their 
attention to the Order and explaining how they could co-operate in carrying 
out its provisions. Particular attention was drawn to criteria to be 
employed when classifying recipients for feeding. Underfed children were 
to be considered as falling into three separate groups:- (1) those whose 
94Ibid., Article VII. 
95 Bulkley, pp. 39-40. A critical commentary on this administrative blunder 
can be found in the Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and the 
Relief of Distress. Vol. 3. Minority Report. (Cmnd. 4499), PP, 1909, 37: 
160-161. 
96Thirty Fifth Annual Report of the Local Government Board, 1905-1906. 
Appendix III (Cmnd. 3105), PP, 1906, 35: 317-320. Circular of the Local 
Government Board accompanying the Relief (School Children) Order. 
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parents were permanently impoverished; (2) those whose parents through 
illness, loss of employment or other unavoidable cause were temporarily 
unable to make provision for them; and (3) those whose parents, though 
in a position to provide for them, had neglected to do so. It was 
suggested that children in the second group should be fed by voluntary 
agencies, while those in the first and third categories might be considered 
proper subjects for special application to the Guardians or relieving 
officer. It was stressed that, except in cases of extreme emergency, 
special application for feeding should only be made after careful inquiry 
into the child's circumstances in order to ascertain to which class the 
97 
case belonged. 
If the value of the Relief (School Children) Order is gauged by 
the ratio of results to effort expended, this measure would appear very 
scant reward for the over two years of unremitting agitation which Gorst 
had devoted to promoting State feeding. Not only did the Order's provisions 
fall short of the measures he advocated but they still involved pauperiza-
tion. However, as Lady Warwick noted, although the Order was "inadequate 
and undemocratic, ••• it certainly acknowledges the principle that the State 
owes an obligation to see to it that the children of the nation are properly 
fed 11 • 98 Thus, the value of the measure cannot be over-estimated for it 
created the precedent of State assistance for feeding, thereby marking a 
97circular issued by the Board of Education to Local Education Authorities 
re Relief (School Children) Order, 28 April, 1905. Reproduced in the Times, 
29 April, 1905, p.12. 
98The Daily Express, 1 May, 1905, quoted in M.A. Blunden, "The Educational 
and Political Work of the Countess of Warwick, 1861-1938". (M.A. 
dissertation, University of Exeter, 1966), p. 115. 
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step in the right direction for State involvement in the area of social 
benefits. Moreover, the Order was able to perform a valuable service to 
future British social policy by focussing attention on the Poor Law 
authorities' ineptitude in implementing its provisions, thereby "destroying 
forever any vestige of the possibility that the •.• guardians would be 
permitted to take part in the reforms of the next decade". 99 
In practice the Order brought few benefits to those children 
. d . d . d Ma · • d h d · · 100 it was esigne to ai • ny unions ignore t e irective. Some local 
authorities declined to implement the Relief Order provisions, correctly 
perceiving that in many areas they represented retrogressive action. The 
London County Council expressed a willingness to co-operate with local 
authorities in carrying out the Order but refused to initiate proceedings 
because they were of the opinion that it could do little to solve the 
problem of underfeeding. Furthermore, they believed that the risk of 
fathers being disenfranchised because of meals supplied to their offspring, 
101 
without their knowledge, would reduce the effectiveness of the scheme. 
In those districts where Guardians and the local education authorities 
did attempt joint action, their differing philosophies produced constant 
friction. The education authorities wished to eradicate the condition 
99Gilbert, National Insurance, p. 109. 
lOOThirty Fifth Annual Report of the Local Government Board. 1905-1906. 
Appendix III (Cmnd. 3105), PP, 1906, 35: 452-454. 
lOlMinutes of the London County Council, July 11, 1905, p. 297. Cited 
in Bulkley, p. 41. 
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which prevented the children from benefitting from the instruction they 
provided at such expense, whereas the Guardians' main concern was to restrict 
feeding to the smallest possible number of recipients. This conflict 
precluded the development of effective co-operation between the two bodies. 
In many districts the lists of underfed children compiled by the local 
education authorities were ruthlessly pared by the Guardians, not because 
they regarded the children as adequately fed but because they considered 
the parents financially capable of making provision for their offspring. 102 
Moreover, in the majority of these cases the Guardians failed to follow 
through and pressure the parents to feed their children and, as a result, 
the children remained unfed. In a large number of districts, many of the 
fathers of the children offered relief refused to allow them to be fed 
when they became aware that to do so would result in disenfranchisement. 103 
The Order's stipulation that the cost of the meals be recovered, where 
possible, from parents or charitable organizations proved highly unrealistic. 
For example, the City of Bradford's feeding programme served 101,932 meals 
in the first six months of its operation, at a total cost of ~1,300. 
During this period, the Guardians took action in county court against 51 
fathers they considered guilty of neglect. Although orders for payment 
were obtained in each case, the Guardians recovered onlyj'l 19s 3d by 
voluntary action and ,;/1 by Court Order. Approximately 45 percent of the 
lOZThirty-Fifth Annual Report of the Local Government Board, 1905-1906. 
Appendix III (Cmnd. 3105), PP, 1906, 35: 453. 
103 Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and the Relief of 
Distress. Vol. 3. Minority Report (Cmnd. 4499), PP, 1909, 37: 161. 
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financing of the programme was derived from the rates, the remaining 55 
percent coming from charity, in this case the Lord Mayor's Fund. 104 
The uncertainties regarding the scope of the Relief Order, the working-
classes' suspicion of the Poor Law authorities, and the latter's emphasis 
upon deterrence instead of relief, all combined to render the Order a dead 
letter by the end of 1906. Moreover, the general public now assumed that 
the problem of underfed children was being eradicated by the Guardians and, 
as a consequence, voluntary contributions generally declined. 105 
Meanwhile, Garst and the other reformers continued to pressure 
the Government to enact legislation empowering local education authorities 
to provide school meals out of the rates. During the second reading 
of the Education (Scotland) Bill, Garst rose to chastise the Government 
and the Scottish Department for failing to include in the Bill measures 
dealing with the feeding of necessitous school children, in total disregard 
of the recommendations of the Physical Deterioration Committee and the 
Royal Commission on Physical Training (Scotland). He pointed out that 
the President of the Local Government Board had clearly stated in the 
House that children had a legal right to be fed by public authority but 
this right was not secured for Scottish children in the measure under 
debate. It was pointless for the Government to include in the proposed 
legislation provision for the expenditure of rate money on medical 
104see Bradford City Council Proceedings, September 26, 1905, cited in 
Bulkley, p. 43, fn. 3. "Special Report and Report from the Select Committee 
on the Education (Provision of Meals) Bill, 1906; and the Education 
(Provision of Meals) (Scotland) Bill, 1906 11 , PP, Reports from Committees, 
1906, VIII, Part III, 288, p. 299, Appendix 10, cited in Gilbert, 
National Insurance, pp. 108-109. 
105 Bulkley, p. 44, fn. 1. 
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inspection if they did not give local authorities the power to mitigate 
106 the evil from which the children suffered, he declared. 
The reformers used the June 1 Committee of Supply debate to 
express their dissatisfaction with the Relief (School Children) Order, 
outlining the administrative difficulties which they claimed were rendering 
the whole scheme unworkable and once again criticizing the Government for 
denying local education authorities the power to grant extra funds for 
107 feeding programmes. A spokesman for the Labour Representation Committee 
urged that the Order be scrapped and that local education authorities be 
allowed to co-operate directly with the voluntary agencies to provide food 
for necessitous children. The funds could be granted for this purpose by 
the Guardians under their existing powers which permitted them to subscribe 
to institutions that could render useful aid in the administration of 
relief to the poor. Parents found to be grossly neglecting to feed their 
children, when not impoverished, could be prosecuted under existing law 
. h . f 1 h · ld l 08 governing t e prevention o crue ty to c i ren. 
Garst, however, did not call for cancellation of the Order, 
apparently being more realistic than his Labour colleagues in recognizing 
that a Unionist party badly divided internally by dissent, particularly 
over the question of Tariff Reform and gradually losing strength through 
by-election defeats, would be disinclined to adopt social reform measures 
106f!!., 4th series, 145 (1905): 1162-1164. 
107 See, for example, Ibid., 4th series, 147 (1905): 631-633. Speeches of 
Will Crooks and Thomas Macnamara. 
lOSibid: 632-633. 
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which would undoubtedly increase intra-party discord. Furthermore, to 
abandon the Order would be in effect to admit its total failure, a fact 
which could be used to advantage as a propaganda tool by the opponents of 
State feeding, just as well as by its supporters. Gorst no doubt felt 
that it was more advantageous to build upon concessions obtained than to 
attempt to force through legislation empowering local education authorities 
to provide rate-aided school meal programmes, in what was obviously a 
dying Parliament. All signs pointed to an early election and a Liberal 
triumph and, therefore, Gorst evidently reasoned that the legislation he 
and other reformers sought would be passed in the first session of the 
new Parliament. Consequently, he urged that in the interim the Relief 
Order be made more effective by giving voluntary organizations, working 
with the Guardians and the education authorities, the advantage of 
public authority. The Government should make members of these charitable 
bodies its official representatives in the homes within the Unions. These 
voluntary workers could visit the parents and urge them to fulfil their 
duties to their children, thereby bringing a sort of public pressure to 
bear. He pointed out that a similar system applied in certain districts 
by the London School Board had produced a noticeable improvement in the 
condition of the children involved. 109 
His parliamentary campaign having produced only a token response 
to his appeals for State aid for underfed children, Gorst now sought to 
rouse public support for his cause through the columns of the periodical 
press. In three articles, published successively between May and July, 1905, 
l09Ibid: 533-535. 
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he censured the Government not only for failing to pass legislation to 
alleviate the sufferings of countless poverty-stricken children but also 
for abdicating their responsibilities in many other areas of urgently 
needed social reforms. 110 As with previous administrations, asserted 
Gorst, the current Government had resisted social legislation - despite 
their election pledges - because they were wealthy men who thought it would 
"interfere with their convenience or curtail their pleasures" and because 
they were "afraid of burning their fingers if they applied themselves to 
h k f . f 11 111 t etas o genuine re orm. He accused the Unionists of callousness 
in their treatment of hungry children for they could, with very little 
effort and expense, eradicate their destitution and suffering, he declared. 
Apparently the Government believed that the children should be left to 
starve if their parents wilfully neglected them, or refused to apply for 
Poor Law relief - an attitude he denounced as being "only worthy of 
Barbarians". 112 Not only did such treatment defraud children of their 
rights, declared Gorst, it also caused them increased suffering through 
impelling them to learn on empty stomachs, the effects of which were 
permanently debilitating. He noted that if a starving animal, such as a 
horse, were treated in the same way as hundreds of children were treated 
daily by public authority in the elementary schools the offender would be 
prosecuted under the criminal law. Many of the nation's best statesmen 
llO J.E. Gorst, "Governments and Social Reform", Fortnightly Review, 83 
(May, 1905), 843-855; "Children I s Rights", National Review, 45 (June, 1905), 
705-715 (also published in Living Age, 246 (July, 1905), 230-237); 
"Physical Deterioration in Great Britain", North American Review, 584 
(July, 1905), 1-10. 
111 Gorst, "Governments and Social Reform", pp. 849-850. 
112Ibid., pp. 846-847. 
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and philanthropists were guilty in this respect, he claimed. They were 
aware of the children's rights but they refused to recognize their claims. 
Garst appealed to the Government to take action while there was still time. 
With proper food and attention large numbers of the debilitated children 
currently in the nation's schools could be restored to health and grow 
into strong men and women capable of maintaining the Empire. If, however, 
those in authority continued to salve their consciences with some specious 
adage about parental responsibility and leave the children to their fate, 
the nation would in the future "receive from our criminals, our lunatics, 
our cripples, our incurables, and our paupers, just punishment of the 
injustices of which they were the victims in their helpless infancy 11 • 113 
For the information of his readers, he once again reiterated the appalling 
statistics relating to the physical condition of the nation's working 
classes, as revealed in recent Royal Commission and Interdepartmental 
Committee reports, and pointed out that State assisted feeding programmes 
and school medical inspections would go a long way towards improving the 
national physique. 114 
Following his onslaught in the press, Garst "tramped the country" 
in an attempt to rouse public sympathy for his cause. 115 Early in 
September, he and Lady Warwick were principal speakers at a large meeting 
organized by the National Union of Mineworkers and General Labourers, at 
Hanley in the Midlands, at which the feeding of school children was the 
113Go t rs , "Children's Rights", pp. 712-713, p. 715. 
114Gorst, "Physical Deterioration in Great Britain", pp. 1-10. 
115 
Frances E. Maynard, Countess of Warwick, Afterthoughts (London, 1931), 
p. 233. 
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main theme. In October, Gerst included the subject of State feeding 
into addresses delivered to the Navy Club, in Sutton Coldfield, and the 
116 
student body of Reading University College. 
The following month, the Report of the Interdepartmental Committee 
on Medical Inspection and feeding of School Children was finally completed. 
Its recommendations were as meagre as the Government could have desired. 117 
The Report focussed primarily upon improving the organization of existing 
voluntary programmes. The Committee envisioned local authority involvement 
as being minimal, amounting only to supervision of voluntary effort. They 
suggested these authorities be "kept regularly informed of feeding" and 
be represented on feeding agency committees. They recommended that 
teachers be relieved of all duties attendant upon school feeding except 
for that of drawing up a preliminary list of necessitous children. 118 The 
Committee reported that, because of the diversity of viewpoints expressed 
by the witnesses, it was unable to ascertain precisely how successful 
a self-supporting school dinner service would be, but they would "welcome 
experiments made in this direction", particularly in rural areas where need 
119 
appeared to be greatest. There was no mention of recourse being made 
to the rates for purposes of feeding hungry elementary school children. 
However, the evidence presented before the Committee demonstrated once 
more the inadequacy of existing schemes to meet the needs of underfed 
116The Times, 4 September, 1905, p.4. Ibid., 5 October, 1905, p.4; 
23 October, 1905, p.3. 
117 See pp. 387-388 above. 
118Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Medical Inspection and 
Feeding of Children Attending Public Elementary Schools, 1906. Vol. 1 
(Cmnd. 2779), PP, 1906, 47: 92-93. See also p.70, para. 220. 
119Ibid: 79, para. 258; pp. 76-79, para. 242-258. 
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children, 120 thus giving credence to reformers' claims that the Relief 
(School Children) Order had proved insufficient for the purpose for which 
it was intended. 
With the Relief Order largely discredited and with reformers 
clamouring for new measures, the problem of underfeeding clearly remained 
a major embarrassment to Balfour's administration. However, in December, 
Balfour resigned and the question hung fire while the nation went to the 
polls. The issue remained, however, very much upon the minds of Gorst's 
Cambridge University constituents. After being elected unopposed in the 
two previous electoral contests, Gorst now found himself challenged by 
two other Conservative candidates. Although the election nationally was 
largely fought on the question of "Protectionism" versus "Free Trade", of 
which Gorst was a supporter, his social reform activities, his alleged 
secularist views on education, and his increasing "disloyalty" to the 
Unionist party over the previous two years became the critical issues 
f . h. . 121 J D 1 . . f d acing is constituents. ust prior to isso ution, a committee orme 
from resident members of the University Senate opposed to Gorst's candidacy 
publicly announced their position stating that "the dissatisfaction with 
Sir John Gorst originated some time before the question of Tariff Reform 
122 
was started and is due to reasons quite unconnected with Free Trade". 
Their true reasons for renouncing Gorst were the ones first stated by them 
one year earlier in November 1904, and which they now presented again to 
120see for example the evidence of Mrs. Adler, Ibid., pp. 242-249; Mrs. Burgwin, 
p. 172, para. 241-242; G.F. Grant, pp. 387-391, para. 6090-6215; Rev. J.C. 
Mantle, p.249, para. 2444; Mrs. Pillow, p.312, para. 4218-4224. 
121S ee, 
1905-12 
Cambridge University Register, SO. 1. 21.-50.1. 44., 4 December, 
January, 1906. 
122Ibid., 50. 1. 21., Robert S. Ball et al. re Representation of the University 
of Cambridge in Parliament, 4 December, 1905. 
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the Members of the University Senate:- "(l) The attitude of hostility 
taken up against the Unionist Government which he was returned to support, 
and of which he was at one time a member"; (2) Gorst's apparent failure 
to oppose a trade union resolution promoting secularist education in State 
supported schools, at a meeting where he was a main speaker; and (3) the 
fact that "some of the views expressed by Sir John Gorst on the subject of 
State interference, in connection with the providing of free meals for 
children attending State schools, seemed to tend to lessen parental 
responsibility and to be dangerously socialistic in their character". 
They noted also that several of his election committee members were 
"actively engaged in supporting the Radical candidates for the Borough of 
Cambridge11 • 123 Thereafter, Gorst's adversaries conducted a campaign based 
primarily upon their opposition to his candidacy. 124 Their appeal to 
Churchmen, both clergy and laity, to reject Gerst because of his secularist 
stance apparently made little headway, many voluntarists rallying to his 
125 support. However, despite Gorst's public denials of the accusations 
123rbid., 50.1.23., Robert S. Ball et al. to Members of the Senate of the 
University of Cambridge, 28 December, 1905. 
124rbid., 50.1.25., Notice to Electors from Robert S, Ball et al., 
6 January, 1906. See also, Cambridge Chronicle, Letter to the Editor from 
Robert S. Ball et al., 5 January, 1906, p.5. 
125cambridge University Register, 50.1.39., T.E. Cleworth et al., 
5 January, 1906. Ibid., 50.1.44., Fitzroy Stewart, Letter to the Editor, 
8 January, 1906. T.E. Cleworth,.Secretary of the Church Schools Emergency 
League, Letter to the Editor, 9 January, 1906. H.S. Torr, Letter to the 
Editor (no date). [All three letters included as cuttings from the 
Church Times of 12 January, 1906.] 
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126 127 
made by his opponents, and the active support of Free Traders and 
128 129 diverse University personnel, he was easily defeated at the polls. 
Gorst's long campaign for improved social benefits for the children of the 
nation may well have cost him his parliamentary seat. 130 
Consequently, when Parliament reassembled following the election 
Gorst was absent from the Commons' benches. As the contest had resulted 
in a resounding Liberal victory, 131 school feeding now became the concern 
of the new Liberal Government. Yet the reformers had no reason to suppose 
that the new administration would be any more sympathetic to the question 
than its outgoing counterpart. The Liberal leaders had absented themselves 
126Ibid., 50.1.22., Sir John Gorst to Members of the Senate of the University 
of Cambridge, 11 December, 1905. Ibid., 50.1.38, Sir John Gorst to Members 
of the Senate of the University of Cambridge, 3 January, 1906. See also 
the Cambridge Chronicle, 5 January, 1906, p.8. 
127
cambridge University Register, 50.1.35., Notice to Electors from A.D. 
Elliot et al., Cambridge University Free Trade Association, 12 December, 
1905. Ibid., 50.1.44, Extract from the West (?) Gazette, 10 January, 1906. 
Cambridge Chronicle, 5 January, 1906, p.8. 
128
see, for example, Cambridge University Register, 50.1.36., Letter from 
Sir John Gorst's Executive Committee to the Members of the Senate of the 
University of Cambridge, (no date). Ibid., 50.1.42., C. Taylor, Master 
of St. Johns to Robert S. Ball, 10 January, 1906. Ibid., 50.1.42., Rev. 
Stephen Selwyn, University Elector, to Members of Sir J. Gorst's Executive 
Committee, 11 January, 1906. 
129
cambridge Chronicle, 19 January, 1906, p.8. Election results: 
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1,653. 
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from the April 18 debate, which had resulted in the issuing of the Relief 
(School Children) Order, and the question of school feeding had not been 
featured by them in the 1906 election campaign. 132 The issue had, however, 
featured prominently in the election speeches of Socialist and Labour 
candidates 133 and by the opening of the new Liberal Parliament Labour had 
already prepared a new Bill, providing for the feeding of school children 
by local authorities, for presentation in the House. This went beyond 
what many Liberals desired, most hoping for no more than an extension of 
the scope of Poor Law relief as provided by the Local Government Board 
134 Order. The Board of Education itself was apparently caught off balance, 
being unprepared for any decision on the question of State aid for school 
feeding. The Board's Permanent Secretary, Robert Morant, wrote to his 
counterpart in the Local Government Board, Sir Samuel Provis, that someone, 
"I think a Labour Member", planned to introduce a Feeding Bill, "or 
something of the kind", and he suggested that the two consult on the matter. 
He confessed to having little knowledge of the measure and commented that 
his President's mind "was blank on the subject". However, he believed that 
the Government would be obliged to take a position on the matter, upon which 
"the party was considerably divided" . 135 
132Gilbert, National Insurance, p. 109. 
133Brian Simon, Education and the Labour Movement, 1870-1920 (London, 1965), 
State maintenance of school children had also been the main priority in the 
Social Democratic Party's Election manifesto. 
134F. Le Gros Clark, Social History of the School Meals Service (London, 1948), 
p.6. 
135R.L. Morant (unsigned) to Sir Samuel Provis, February 23, 1906, Bill File, 
Education (Provision of Meals) Act, 1906, Ministry of Education, cited in 
Gilbert, National Insurance, p. 110. 
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The measure was duly presented on February 22, as a Private 
Member's Bill, by W.T. Wilson, newly-elected Labour M.P. for Westhoughton, 
and it received second reading on March 2, at which time the Government 
136 indicated it would make the matter an open question for party members. 
The arguments of the Bill's supporters in the House, mainly Labour Members, 
were based chiefly upon physical deterioration as evidenced by recent 
137 
official reports and upon the inadequacy of voluntary schemes. Excluded 
now from Commons' debates, Gerst was left to promote the Bill outside 
Parliament. The spearhead of his campaign now took the form of a book 
about the nation's children - including the sick, the retarded, the over-
worked, the neglected and the orphaned children - in which he detailed the 
138 
appalling physical condition of the offspring of the poorer classes. 
The book was both a denunciation of neglect and a plea for reform. Starving 
children, declared Gerst, were being defrauded of their legal right to be 
fed by the State as a result of Government ineptitude, It had been admitted 
by the previous Unionist Administration that the Guardians were responsible 
for relieving necessitous children who were destitute for want of food, 
even in those cases where the destitution resulted from parental neglect. 
Yet, the latter rarely if ever fulfilled this duty because of bureaucratic 
mismanagement. "In plain words, children are systematically robbed of their 
rights because our administration of Government is badly organised 11 • 139 
136PD, 4th series, 152 (1906): 525, 1399. 
137 See, for example, PD, 4th series, 152 (1906): 1390-1393. Speech of 
W.T. Wilson. 
138 J.E. Gerst, The Children of the Nation (London, 1906). 
139Ibid., p. 71. 
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Garst had bitter criticism for those who advocated the processes 
of parent reformation as a means of dealing with underfed children. To 
leave children to starve in order to coerce their parents into feeding them 
was not only cruel but ineffective. Parents who neglected their offspring, 
in order to satisfy their craving for drink, would never be recalled to 
a sense of parental responsibility by the sight of their children's 
sufferings. This fact had been illustrated by evidence presented to the 
Physical Deterioration Committee. Furthermore, children were too valuable 
an asset to be used as instruments for upgrading public morality. The 
healthy development of a child was far more advantageous to the State 
than the moral rectitude of a reformed parent, he argued. To expose a 
child to the risk of degeneracy in the hope of redeeming the parent was 
bad economy. When faced with the choice of helping a parent or a child 
the Government should "save the child and let the parent go". 140 
However, Garst expressed opposition to the plan proposed by the 
Social Democratic Federation which advocated feeding all elementary school 
children at public expense. Such a scheme would undermine parental 
responsibility and make the children more charges of the State than their 
parents. Not only would mothers be deprived of their educational roles 
but children would be deprived of individual attention "which every child 
140Ibid., p. 72. 
420. 
needed and the State was unable to provide 11 • 141 Gerst urged the establish-
ment of self-supporting school meals programmes by local education 
authorities, which would serve as a convenience for working parents while 
providing for the needs af necessitous children whose paren~s were unable, 
by reason of their poverty, to feed them. Meal tickets could be purchased 
by paying children and given in confidence to necessitous children, no 
distinction being made between the two groups in the serving of the meals. 
The "free" tickets could be paid out of public funds if the parents were 
found to be destitute, presently out of Poor Law monies pending the 
successful passage of legislation empowering local authorities with recourse 
to the rates. Those parents who could pay should be made to pay but the 
first responsibility of the public authority was to ensure that hungry 
children were fed. "To feed the child at once, without any inquiry 
except into the fact of its hunger, is an imperative duty", he insisted. 
Investigation of the parent's circumstances should be the second not the 
first step in feeding. 142 
141Ibid., pp. 76-77. Gerst had frequently spoken out against complete 
State maintenance, such as was proposed by the Social Democratic Federation. 
(See, for example, Letter to the Editor, 24 December, 1904, p.2. PD 
4th series, 141 (1905): 144-145.) One reason for doing so, in addition 
to his basic opposition to such a scheme, was his desire to dissociate 
his own proposals from the "socialist" taint. Opponents repeatedly 
claimed that implementation of Gorst's schemes would lead inexorably to 
demands for free clothing, medical attention, and housing. (See, for 
example, PD, 4th series, 145 (1905): 542-543. Ibid., 166 (1906): 1662-
1670. Arthur Clay, "The Manufacture of Paupers. I. The Feeding of School 
Children", Spectator, 97 (1906): 821-822.) 
142Ib1."d., 79 85 pp. - • 
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Gorst ·agreed that the circulars issued by the Local Government 
Board and the Board of Education were the best makeshift without legis-
lation that the previous Government could have devised, it having been 
incompetent at the time to carry legislation through, but the agreement 
needed between the two departments concerned to enable the scheme to 
function effectively had not materialized. He expressed the hope that 
Parliament would move more rapidly than the Boards of Guardians had done 
if hungry children were to be denied food until the current Education 
143 (Provision of Meals) Bill had made a successful passage through the House. 
Opponents of the Bill argued their case along traditional lines, 
emphasizing the need to respect parental responsibility and the wisdom of 
maintaining the current practice of assigning all questions of relief to 
the Poor Law authorities. 144 
In the debates on the measure emphasis was placed for the first 
time upon the educational value of school meals when served under proper 
conditions. Mr. Lough, the new Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of 
Education, declared that "It was desired that this work should be a work 
of education ••. They wanted wholesome food given to the children and they 
wanted the children taught how to eat it, which was a most useful lesson11 • 145 
"This was not just a question of providing meals", said John Burns, "it 
was also one of teaching manners" . 146 The education authorities were better 
143Ibid., pp. 89-90. 
144see, for example, PD, 4th series, 166 (1906): 1274-1278. Ibid., 16 7 (1906): 
722. Speeches of Harold Cox and Sir Frederick Banbury. 
145Ibid., 4th series, 166 (1906): 1280. 
146Ibid: 1285. 
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equipped to carry out this work than the Guardians, he argued, and thus 
it was essential that the former bodies be empowered to provide meals, 
not merely for necessitous children but also for the children whose parents 
wished to purchase meals for them. 147 
By the time the Education (Provision of Meals) Bill came before 
the Commons public pressure for action on the issue was being felt by all 
1 . . 148 par iamentary parties. Consequently, in replying to W.T. Wilson's 
presentation of his Bill in the House, Augustine Birrell, President of 
the Board of Education, felt obliged to adopt a positive approach towards 
the measure. The education authorities, when faced with a hungry child, 
"must either feed it or turn it away", he declared; "and as Minister of 
Education he could not be responsible for the latter alternative. As 
d h t th h 'ld b f d h fed 't had to be 11 •
149 
everyone agree ta e c i must e e, ten ~ 
He went on to express the view that, in light of the French experience, 150 
the local education authority appeared to be the appropriate body for 
151 providing meals. 
During its second reading the Government promised time for the 
Bill152 but it, nevertheless, proceeded very slowly, Various attempts were 
made to alter it; an amendment to substitute the Poor Law Guardians for 
147Ibid: 1284-1285. 
148
clark, p. 6. 
149 PD 4th 
-· 
series, 152 (1906): 1440-1441. 
150Birrell was referring to the evidence given before the Physical Deteriora-
tion Committee, by Gorst, on the feeding methods adopted by the French Government 
for use in its schools. (See Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on 
Physical Deterioration. Vol. 2 (Cmnd. 2210), PP, 1904, 32: 583, para. 11831, 
151EQ, 4th series, 152 (1906): 1440. 
152rbid., 4th series, 152 (1906): 1446. 
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the local education authorities, as the body to administer the Act, was 
resoundingly defeated 290-36, 153 and one to limit the provision of meals 
exclusively to underfed children suffered a similarly emphatic rejection 
of 230-39. 154 Additional delay was incurred when the Bill was referred 
to a Select Committee which did not complete its report untii July as 
Parliament was about to recess. 155 
Although the Bill generated only mild opposition within the 
156 Commons, in the Lords and the Tory Press it was subjected to a great 
deal of criticism. Here, opponents of the Bill stressed that the measure, 
although fairly innocuous in itself, represented a radical departure from 
the traditional principle of limited State involvement in social welfare. 
They expressed the fear that the Bill would set the State upon the path 
to total responsibility for facets of social life hitherto held to be the 
province of individual self-help. For the first time, they warned, the 
State proposed giving relief to its members without requiring them to 
surrender their rights in exchange, thus removing the stigma normally 
attached to the reception of Poor Law relief, 157 a step viewed with 
153Ibid: 1274-1288. 
154rbid: 1339-1340, 1350. 
155special Report from the Select Committee on the Education (Provision 
of Meals) Bill, PP, 1906, 8: 59-402. 
156see RQ, 4th series, 167 (1906): 1629-1670. 
157 In fact, this step would not create the precedent claimed by the Bill's 
opponents. As J.S. Hurt has noted, from 1876, Guardians had been empowered 
to pay voluntary school fees for the children of poverty-stricken parents 
and patients had been permitted treatment at Poor Law hospitals since 1885, 
without suffering disenfranchisement (See Hurt, pp. 123-124.). For criticism 
appearing in the Tory press, see fn. 159 below. 
424. 
suspicion and trepidation by the Bill's adversaries. The most adamant and 
vocal amongst these were the Local Government Board Joint-Committee on 
Underfed Children158 and the Charity Organization Society.
159 
The Bill finally came up for third reading on December 13. By 
this time various modifications had been introduced, in keeping with the 
recommendations of the Select Committee, 160 and the final version 
represented a compromise between the parties. The Bill, when it left the 
Commons, applied to Scotland as well as England and Wales but the Lords 
proceeded to strike out the clause extending its application to Scotland. 161 
The Upper House was requested to reconsider the amendment and the Bill went 
back and forth between the two Houses, but the Lords would not revoke their 
decision to exclude Scotland. Finally, on December 21, because the Session 
was far advanced, the Commons agreed to the Lords' amendment, but not 
without protest, their action prompting the Liberal Prime Minister to enter 
the debate on the Bill, for the first and only time, to protest against 
the Lords' encroachment on the Commons' authority. 162 
158see, for example, the Times, 4 July, 1906, p.4. Report on the issuing of 
the Joint-Committee's report for the session 1905-1906. 
159 See, Arthur Clay, "The Manufacture of Paupers: 1. The Feeding of School 
Children", Spectator, 156 (1906), 821-822. Arthur Clay, Letter to the 
Editor, the- Times, 21 August, 1906, p.5. C.S. Loch, Letter to the Editor, 
Ibid., 19 November, 1906, p.16. 
160
see, .,,S:.,p:.,e:.,co,i:.,a"'l"-'R.,e=.ptco=r-=t-=f.er.:,o,.m,._,t,.,h:,e:....:S::.:e"'l'"e'"c"-t"-"C"omm='=i-=t-=t-=e"'e'--'o'-'n'-'t"'h"'e"-'E"'d"-u"-c"-"a-=t-"i"o"n'-'(..,P..,r-=o"'v'-'i"'s"'i"o"'nse 
of Meals) Bill, Rf, 1906, 8: 74-80, 98-99. 
161PD, 4th series, 167 (1906): 1662-1670. 
162rbid: 1870-1872. Speech of H. Campbell-Bannerman. See also, Clark, p.8. 
The provisions of the Bill were eventually extended to Scotland by the 
Education (Scotland) Act of 1908 (see Bulkley, p.48). 
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When the Bill finally received Royal Assent on December 26, 1906, 
it was a considerably weakened version of the measure introduced by Wilson 
the previous February. The Education (Provision of Meals) Act permitted 
but did not require local education authorities to "take such steps as they 
think fit for the provision of meals for children in attendance at public 
1 1 h 11 163 e ementary schoo sin t eir area •.•• Local education authorities 
might co-operate with established feeding agencies to establish a committee 
(to be called a School Canteen Committee), upon which the local authority 
would be represented, which would assume the task of providing the food. 
They might also assist the committee by providing facilities and the 
officers and personnel required for the operation of the service. 164 The 
local education authority could charge the children receiving the meals a 
reasonable fee and, unless satisfied that the parent was unable to pay, 
h · 1 . · 1 d b 165 recoup t e cost, sununari y as a civi et. However, parents who were 
unable to pay were not to be disenfranchised. 166 The education authorities 
could pay for the meals by soliciting charitable donations through voluntary 
organizations but, as a last resort, when such funds were insufficient to 
defray the cost of the food, they could support the meals from public funds 
providing that no rate for the purpose exceed one half-penny in the pound. 167 
163Education (Provision of Meals) Act, 1906. 6 Edward 7, Chap. 57, Clause 1. 
164Ibid. 
165Ibid., Clause 2. 
166
rbid., Clause 4. 
167Ibid., Clause 3. 
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Thus, despite the acknowledged failure of voluntary schemes to 
deal adequately with the problem of underfed children during the previous 
four decades, Parliament remained convinced that such organizations were 
the most suitable agencies through which to supply the meals. The 
proposal to make the local education authorities solely responsible for 
the task, supported entirely by public funding, was never "seriously 
168 
suggested". Local authorities might only supply rate aid when voluntary 
subscriptions were insufficient to cover the cost, and then only if the 
local authority so desired. Nevertheless, despite being hedged around 
with these various restrictions, the Act involved the assumption by the 
State of responsibility for securing for the children in its elementary 
schools, "the necessary minimum, not only of education but also of food". 169 
The issuing of the Relief (School Children) Order, 1905, and the 
confirmation of the principle it embodied by the enactment of the Education 
(Provision of Meals) Act, 1906, introduced a new principle in social 
legislation. The Government's actions "implied acceptance by the community 
170 
of responsibility for poverty", and, thus, these two feeding measures 
171 
mark the birth of the British welfare state. As one observer of the 
Act's inception noted when reflecting upon the measure some years later: 
168
special Report from 
Meals) Bill, PP, 1906, 
169 Bulkley, p. 49. 
170S. imon, p. 282. 
the Select Committee on Education (Provision of 
76: para. 13. 
171Gilbert, National Insurance, p. 112. 
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It would be difficult to place too much emphasis upon the new principle 
of state action which the Education (Provision of Meals) Act implied, 
for in a nation jealous of its individual rights and proud of its 172 
conservative instincts it was nothing less ~han a revolutionary principle". 
That such a "revolutionary principle" succeeded in gaining 
acceptance at all was due, in no small measure, to the persistent exertions 
of John Eldon Gorst. He gave to the movement for child feeding, tireless 
physical and oratorical effort and unflagging determination to succeed. 
He also brought to it the weight of his stature as a parliamentarian and 
Government administrator and, perhaps more importantly, his reputation as 
a promoter and protector of children's rights; Gorst's genuine humanitarian 
interest in the condition of impoverished children had given him a high 
profile and personal popularity among the general populace. Gorst's forceful 
presence in Parliament was an important factor in the ultimate success there 
of the Relief (School Children) Order and, because of his earlier parlia-
mentary agitation for the principle embodied therein, the 1906 Act - for 
he had been the only political figure of importance in the Commons promoting 
the cause of State aid for school feeding. 
172 Charles W. Pipkin, Social Politics and Modern Democracies (New York, 
1931), 1, pp. 72-73. 
CHAPTER VIII 
THE FINAL YEARS 
Following his defeat in the 1906 General Election, Gorst observed 
to Edith Marvin that "as I also have lost my regular employment, I have to 
invent new methods of work". However, he confessed to deriving consolation 
from the fact that, "The Tory Party by its own act emancipated me from 
the chains I have so long worn, and that I am now free to speak out". 1 
His initial post-election ventures in this direction were undertaken 
with his pen. In his Children of the Nation, published in 1906, 
Gorst urged State provision of health programmes to protect the rights 
of these young members of British society and he denounced successive 
nineteenth-century governments for their neglect of the nation's children.2 
He emphasized the disillusionment and frustration he felt towards his former 
Government colleagues by dedicating his book to "the Labour Members of 
the House of Commons in token of my belief that they are animated by a 
genuine desire to ameliorate the condition of the people". 3 In an 
"Introduction" to a work on British youth, written by the Countess of 
Warwick, Gorst delivered a stinging rebuke to the defeated Unionist 
Administration for the paucity of their social legislation while in office, 
1Marvin Papers, MS. Eng. Lett. C.257. ff.65-66. Gorst to Marvin, 3 February, 
1906. 
2 Gorst, Children of the Nation, passim. 
3Ibid., p. ii. 
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accusing them of indifference to the welfare of their poorer citizens and 
the abandonment of Tory Democracy. In contrast to the Disraelian 
Parliament of 1874, which had enacted welfare measures which the British 
workman enjoyed to the present day, the subsequent Tory Government of 
Lord Salisbury had permitted a "spirit of aristocratic privilege and 
class ascendancy" to suffuse the party. Consequently, by the advent of 
the Unionist Administration of 1895-1905 the desire to mitigate the 
hardships of the poor had dissipated declared Gorst: 
Hardly was the Government settled in office when it abandoned the 
principles of Tory Democracy in favour of a new policy invented by Mr. 
Chamberlain. The amelioration of the sad condition of the poor ••• 
gave place to schemes for extending the power and prestige of the British 
Empire •.. But the same sort of impotence fell upon them after their 
victories in Africa as fell upon their predecessors after their defeat 
on Home Rule. During the whole period for which the Unionist Government 
held office no social reform of first-rate importance in either admini-
stration or legislation was accomplished".4 
Gorst's alienation from the Tories was further underscored by his resigna-
tion from the Presidency of the Primrose League, in February 1906, an 
5 
action which severed his last formal link with the party. 
These efforts completed, Gorst now journeyed to New Zealand 
where he represented the British Government as ,Special Commissioner at an 
International Exhibition in Christchurch, which afforded him the opportunity 
to renew old friendships and to compare the Colony he had known in the 
eighteen sixties with the Dominion it was to become in 1907. 6 However, 
4J.E. Gorst, Introduction to A Nation's Youth by Frances E. Greville, 
Countess of Warwick (London, 1906), pp. vii-vx. 
5The Times, 23 February, 1906, p.8. 
Tory Association Gorst had helped to 
above). 
The Primrose League was a grass-roots 
establish in 1883 (seep. 90, fn. 119 
6Keith Sinclair, Introduction to The Maori King by J.E. Gorst (1864, London, 
1959), p. xxiii. For a description of Gorst's visit, see his New Zealand 
Revisited (London, 1908). 
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distance was to prove no barrier to fulfilling his role as party critic. 
While in the Antipodes, Gorst read Lord Rosebery's newly-published 
biography of Randolph Churchill in which the author opined that Tory 
Democracy was "an imposture" - "the wolf of Radicalism and the sheepskin 
of Toryism" and that he doubted Disraeli "ever became seriously responsible" 
for the philosophy in any shape or form. These comments prompted Gorst to 
immediately challenge Lord Rosebery's assertions with a public rebuttal 
in the Times, which included a declaration of the Tory-Democratic creed: 
The principle of Tory Democracy is that all government exists solely for 
the good of the governed; that Church and King, Lords and Commons, and all 
other public institutions are to be maintained so far, and so far only, 
as they promote the happiness and welfare of the common people; that all 
who are entrusted with any public function are trustees, not for their 
own class, but for the nation at large; and that the mass of the people 
may be trusted so to use electoral power, which should be freely conceded 
to them, as to support those who are promoting their interests. It is 
Democratic because the welfare of the people is the supreme end; it is 
Tory because the institutions of the country are the means by which that 
end is to be attained. 
He also took the opportunity to once again criticize the Tories for 
"drifting far from the principles" of this creed, charging them with using 
the popular enthusiasm for Toryism - created by Disraeli - to further not 
the interests of the masses but the interests of their own class. As a 
result of their indifference towards social reform large numbers of working-
class Tory democrats had gone over to the Labour Party, claimed Gorst, and 
consequently at the 1906 election the Conservatives had received their 
just desert. "The Tory party then fell, perhaps never to rise again", 
7 he declared. After years during which his similar and oft-repeated warnings 
7 J.E. Gorst, Letter to the Editor (written "At. sea, off Australia", 
20 December, 1906), the Times, 6 February, 1907. 
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had been attacked by the Tory press, his admonitions now moved the Times 
to suggest that the Tories heed his words and respond with a constructive 
8 
social programme. 
Following his return to England in January 1907, Garst was very 
much in demand as a guest speaker, particularly by organizations within 
9 the Labour Movement. The Times later described his public speaking 
engagements at this period thus: "After nearly half a century as a 
Conservative politician, Sir John Garst now came out as a Radical, and 
went about the country addressing Labour and Socialist meetings on the 
questions of social reform" •10 In fact, a more apt description of Garst' s 
political inclinations at this time would be Labour sympathizer rather 
than Liberal. He professed little confidence in the new Liberal Government. 
He considered them "constitutional tinkerers" and had little faith in their 
ability to change. The natural outcome of their sterility would be the 
ascendancy of the Labour Party, thought Garst, and this is reflected in 
his dedication of The Children of the Nation to that group. 11 He believed 
Labour was in an excellent position to procure from Parliament the social 
legislation neglected earlier by Liberals and Tories for, as a result of 
8Ibid., 9 February, 1907, p.11. 
9 See, for example, the Times, 30 September, 1907, p.10. Ibid., 12 October, 
p.11. See also Marvin Papers, MS. Eng. Lett. C.257. ff.153-154. Garst to 
Edith Marvin, 29 January, 1907. Ibid., MS. Eng. Lett. C.257. ff.166-167. 
Garst to Edith Marvin, 4 March, 1908. Lancashire Daily Post, 25 October, 
1909, p.2. 
lOThe Times, 5 April, 1916, p.4. 
11 Bentley B. Gilbert, "Sir John Eldon Garst and the Children of the Nation", 
Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 28 (1954, 243-251. Hereafter referred 
to as Gilbert, "Children of the Nation". 
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the 1906 Election, workers now "had a strong Labour party acting as an 
admirable spur and whip" in the Commons . 12 Gorst' s optimism was no doubt 
linked to the success the thirty-member fledgeling Labour party had had 
in pressuring the Liberal Government into enacting reform legislation, 
during 1906, notably the Education (Provision of Meals) Act, the Trade 
Disputes Act and the Workmen's Compensation Act. 13 
The passage of these measures and the subsequent enactment of 
the Children's Act of 1908, a seventy-page-long statute consolidating 
earlier Acts and also providing new provisions for the protection of a 
child's health and welfare, 14 evidently convinced Gorst that the time was 
opportune to press for further reforms. Thus he now urged the adoption of 
a government medical care scheme, a reform he had advocated in many publica-
tions but most fully in his Children of the Nation. 15 Although he favoured 
a totally tax-supported scheme, he recognized that such a plan had little 
chance of commanding Parliamentary support at this time16 and consequently 
12The Times, 30 September, 1907, p.10. Gorst's speech at an Edinburgh 
meeting held under the auspices of the Independent Labour Party. 
13 For background to the development and passage of the Trade Disputes Act 
see Clegg et al., Chaps. 8-9 and pp. 368-370, pp. 393-395. For the 
Workmen's Compensation Act, see Erny, pp. 148-149. 
14 9 Edward 7, Chap. 67. For a summary of the Act I s prov1.s1.ons, see "The 
Children Act - What it is and Does", Liberal Monthly, 4 (1909), 5. 
15 Gorst, Children of the Nation, pp. 139-149. See also his articles as 
follows: "The Conservative Programme", pp. 13-15. "Governments and 
Social Reform", p. 845. "Physical Deterioration in Great Britain", 
pp. 6-8. 
16Gilbert, "Children of the Nation", p. 250. 
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he recommended the implementation of a plan for compulsory insurance against 
sickness and accident, such as had been successfully launched in Germany, 
and he bolstered his arguments with a detailed exposition of the German 
17 system. By the time Gorst's proposals were published Lloyd-George's 
ambitious health insurance scheme, which was to form Part 1 of the 
National Insurance Act of 1911, was in preparation. His provisions had 
been formulated following an August 1908 mission to observe first-hand the 
working of the German social services, a visit which took place just one 
year after Gerst had mooted his insurance proposals in Children of the 
Nation. As Lloyd-George was both well-acquainted with Gerst and a "noted 
picker of men's minds", it is quite possible that the Minister's interest 
in the German social insurance system had been stimulated by Gorst's 
b 1 d . b . 18 ver a an written o servations. 
By the close of the decade the Liberal Party's successful 
implementation of several pieces of social legislation, 19 and their 
formulation of a National Insurance Bil~ occasioned a reversal of Gorst's 
attitude towards that party and in the Autumn of 1909 he agreed to stand 
17 John E. Gerst, "Insurance of the Working Classes in Germany", Forum 
40 (1908), 569-576. 
18see Bentley B. Gilbert, Sir John Eldon Gerst: Conservative Rebel", 
Historian, 18 (1956): 151-169. 
19By 1910 the Liberals had enacted measures establishing wage boards, 
labour exchanges, new measures to regulate town planning and to provide 
for small-holdings, and the provision of old age pensions (see Eric Evans, 
pp. 213-295. Gilbert, National Insurance, Chaps. 4 and 5. Hay, pp. 43-59. 
Donald Read, Edwardian England 1901-1915: Society and Politics (London, 
1972), Chap. 6. 
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as the Liberal Candidate for his native Preston at the next General 
Election. 20 Yet, in delivering his speech of acceptance of the candidacy, 
Garst clearly illustrated that, regardless of his new party label, he 
remained fundamentally a Tory Democrat. He promised that if elected he 
would support the Liberal Government but he noted that it was not he who 
had left the Conservative party but, rather, the party who had in recent 
years "changed completely its character, its principles, and its policy" 
and he stated that the measures which "really had won his allegiance to 
the Liberal Government was the steps they had already taken, and the steps 
they proposed hereafter to take, towards the great subject of social 
21 
reform". From November until the Election on January 17, 1910, Gorst 
conducted a tireless campaign in the riding, during which he placed great 
emphasis upon social reform issues. 22 However, despite his vigorous 
electioneering, and public support from such Liberal luminaries as Sidney 
Buxton, Postmaster-General, Lewis Harcourt, First Commissioner of Works, 
23 Joseph Pease, Chief Whip, and Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lloyd-George, 
Gorst was rejected by the Preston voters. 24 
20Lancashire Daily Post, 25 October, 1909, p.2. Ibid., 3 November, 1909, 
p.2, 14 December, 1909, p.5. Preston Guardian, 30 October, 1909, p.4. 
21Lancashire Daily Post, 3 November, 1909, p.2. See also, Ibid., 14 December, 
1909, p.5. 
22
see Ibid., 3 and 4 November, 1909. Ibid., 13, 14, 17, 18, 20, 21, 30, 
31 December, 1909; 4-7 and 10-15 January, 1910, 
23
see Ibid., 3 November, 1909, p.2, 5 November, 1909, p.2, 24 November, 
1909, p.3, 5 January, 1910, p,2, 
24Ibid., 18 January, 1910, p.3. Election results: Major G.F. Stanley 
(Unionist), 9,526. A.A. Tobin (Unionist), 9,160. J.T. Macpherson (Lab.), 
7,539. Sir John Gorst (Liberal), 6,281. H. Cox (Independent), 2,704. The 
Lancashire Daily Post claimed that the Liberal defeat derived primarily from 
two factors: (1) the Anglican and large Roman Catholic vote swung to the 
Unionists because these electors believed that party would more effectively 
protect voluntary school interests and (2) the local Liberal organization's 
inability to mount an effective counter-campaign to the Tariff Reform movement. 
Moreover, the Unionist who topped the polls, Major G.F. Stanley, was the 
younger brother of the Earl of Derby and a member of a prominent Lancashire 
family long associated with the town (see Clemesha, pp, 278-279), 
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This defeat brought Gorst's public career to a close. In 1909 
Garst had inherited the family estate upon the death of his brother, and 
h · d 1 · f f w· 1 h · · 25 e now retire to a i e o a its ire squire. However, he remained 
actively involved with child-welfare issues. In August of 1910, he made 
a public appeal to the London County Council to reduce class size in its 
schools in order to fulfill the dual purpose of improving the quality of 
the children's education while providing employment for some of the 
26 hundreds of newly-qualified teachers currently unemployed. By the close 
of the following year his acute disappointment with the progress made in 
national education since the passage of the 1902 Act, and the continuing 
incidence of physical incapacitation among the nation's children, revealed 
in a recent report of the Board of Education's Chief Medical Officer, 
prompted Garst to once again utilize the columns of the Times to draw 
public attention to the situation. He suggested that the time was "opportune 
for taking stock of our national provision for the education of the people" 
of the nation. The millions of pounds currently being expended upon the 
system were being wasted, a fact attested to by the majority of welfare 
workers and educationists in the Kingdom, claimed Garst: 
25 Arthur Bauman, "Sir John Gors t", Saturday Review, 123 (1916), 345-346. 
26The Times, 29 July, 1910, p.9. Two weeks prior to making his appeal, 
Garst had served as Chairman of a meeting of the Joint-Council of Ex-
Students of London County Council Training Colleges for Teachers at which 
were discussed the measures he advocated in his letter. 
Physical growth of the children of the nation is, except in the more 
advanced of our great cities, insufficiently provided for; children 
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are medically inspected and their ailments and defects officially noted 
and recorded •.• Remedial measures, however urgently needed are not 
compulsory by law, and in many cities and most counties are neglected. 
A starved and stunted race is at the present moment being allowed to 
grow up as a legacy to the next generation to deal with. The pernicious 
system of 'payment for results' practised by the Education Department 
up to 1895 still leavens the instruction given. Originality of teacher 
and scholar is sternly repressed. . •. The higher or secondary schools 
and the Universities are still fettered by medieval systems, which make 
the acquisition of learning, to be produced at examinations, the main 
work of students . • . We have, at the present moment ..• local authorities 
everywhere, most of whom are far more fit than any central departments 
to spend wisely and effectively the money voted by Parliament, and provided 
by rates. The time is thus ripe for a drastic revolution in the red-tape 
methods by which education is tied and bound, and the tyranny of the 
Board of Education over local authorities could now be relaxed or 
altogether removed".27 
The failure of the public authorities to provide adequate health 
care for the nation's school children induced Gorst to launch one more 
attempt to rouse public opinion on the question, in the hope that this 
might prompt the Government to take action. In his booklet, Education and 
Race-Regeneration, published in 1913, he took to task the Home Office, the 
Local Government Board, and the Board of Education for failing to ensure 
that the provisions for the care of destitute and necessitous children, 
already legally available to local authorities under these Departments' 
jurisdiction, were not employed to their fullest extent. 28 This situation 
could be rectified, he declared, by educating permanent officials in the 
public departments concerned to a new awareness of "the needs and aspirations 
of the poor", because it was these officials rather than the Ministers who 
most influenced the formulation and implementation of Government legislation. 
27Letter to the Editor, the Times, 27 November, 1911, p.6. 
28J.E. Gerst, Education and Race-Regeneration, (London, 1913), pp. 33-64. 
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Moreover, civil.servants could, "when convinced of the public need and of 
the practicability of a plan of reform, persuade the Ministers who happen 
for the time being to be in office to bring forward measures" for which 
the Government might thereafter take credit. 29 He had harsh words for the 
local education authorities in rural and "backward municipalities", which 
constituted the majority amongst non-city administrations, for neglecting 
to implement the provisions of the Education (Provision of Meals) Act and 
the medical inspection clause of the Education (Administrative Provisions) 
Act of 1907:30 
With the main object of the authority to save the rates, no expenditure 
that is permissive and not compulsory is sanctioned if it is possible to 
evade it. They do not feed necessitous children; they do not appoint 
nurses; they do not cleanse the children from vermin; they do not 
provide the remedies recommended by the school doctor, except so far as 
it can be done by charity without cost to the district or county. They 
do not co-operate with the Health Authority; they do not champion the 
rights of the children before the Boards of Guardians".31 
This publication was to be Gorst's final public appeal on behalf 
of the children of the poorer classes, bringing to a close his long campaign in 
the promotion of their social welfare which had "become the dominant passion 
29 Ib1."d., 4445 pp. - • 
30c1ause 13 of this Act, which had been inserted into its prov1.s1.ons 
clandestinely by Morant, required local authorities to carry out medical 
inspections and permitted them to provide treatment (see 8 Edward 7. 
Chap. 43, Clause 13. For background to the development and passage of 
the measure see Gilbert, National Insurance, pp. 117-131.). 
31Gorst, Education and Race Regeneration, pp. 54-55, pp. 61-64. Gorst's 
criticisms were well founded. An examination of the working of the feeding 
and medical inspection statutes shows that there was a marked discrepancy 
between the intentions of Parliament and the implementation of the provisions 
at local level, which resulted in little practical progress being made in 
both areas in the pre-war years (see Bulkley, pp. 54-55. Gilbert, National 
Insurance, pp. 113-115, pp. 138-158. Hurt, Chap. 6.). 
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of his later career11 • 32 His promotion of social issues had been terminated 
by failing health, the legacy from a heart attack suffered in 1914 33 from 
which he had never fully recovered. In 1914, he suffered the additional 
burdens of personal bereavement, the death of his wife occurring in that 
year, 34 and mental trauma brought on by the outbreak of Worlq War One. 35 
The onset of this conflict had been "a terrible blow" to Garst who had 
been something of a Germanophile, "a propensity now entirely cured11 • 36 
Some eighteen months later the effects of a second coronary thrombosis, 
combined with an influenza attack, brought his life to a close on 
April 4, 1916. 37 
Gorst's demise was announced in the Times of April 5 under the 
headline "Death of Sir John Garst: Independence as a Politician". The 
latter epithet set the tone for the obituary which followed. It consisted 
of a straightforward biographical account of Gorst's political career 
punctuated by references to his lapses into disloyalty towards the 
Conservative hierarchy and his resulting failure to achieve high office 
within Tory Administrations. His success in reorganizing the party machinery 
and orchestrating the Conservative victory of 1874 was acknowledged, albeit 
grudgingly, it being noted that even at this time of triumph "Mr. Garst 
32Wilkinson, p. 223. 
33oaglish, p. 667. 
34Ibid., 5 April, 1916, p.4. 
35Marvin Papers, MS. Eng. Lett. C.257. ff.191-192. Garst to Edith Marvin, 
14 December, 1914. 
36 Bryce MSS. U.B. 7. J.E. Garst to J. Bruce, May 4, 1915, cited in 
Daglish, p. 668. 
37Daglish, p. 668. The Times, 5 April, 1916, p.4. 
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found himself out of harmony with some of the leaders of the party, a 
state of relationship which marked the entire course of his public life 11 •38 
Tory back-bencher Arthur Baumann's assessment of his former colleague was 
even more damaging: "Sir John Gorst's career illustrates instructively 
the fate of a politician who cannot make himself a good party man", with 
the result that, despite his "first-rate mental calibre, his public life 
was an indisputable failure 11 . 39 This view of Gorst is shared by Richard 
Rempel who has observed that "Gorst became such a difficult and cantankerous 
politician that he never fulfilled the great promise he had shown in 
reorganizing the Conservative party organization in 187211 .40 These 
perspectives of Gorst as a disgruntled and failed politician are difficult 
to reconcile with the image of the man which emerges from the evidence 
presented in the preceding pages. Yet, it must be acknowledged that these 
harsh assessments contain a certain degree of truth. Gorst never achieved 
Cabinet rank and, although he gained a place on the Conservative Front 
Bench, throughout his career he occupied only secondary parliamentary 
offices. Moreover, the depiction of Gorst as an irascible malcontent 
who displayed "a cynical determination to say his say and go his own way 
without regard to the convenience of party chiefs1141 represents a reasonably 
381bid., 5 April, 1916, p.4. 
39 Baumann, p. 345. 
40Richard Rempel, Unionists Divided: Arthur Balfour, Joseph Chamberlain 
and the Unionist Free Traders (Newton-Abbot, Devon, 1972), p. 107. 
4111 Character Sketch: December. Sir John Gorst'; Review of Reviews, 
3 (1891): 580. Hereafter referred to as "Character Sketch". 
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accurate evaluation of his public personality. Credence is given to this 
evaluation by his parliamentary indiscipline during debate on the Maamtrasna 
episode,42 the Manipur incident,43 and the 1891 Factories and Workshop 
Bill, 44 and by the similar behaviour he displayed on numerous other 
occasions, in the House, on the public platform and in the press, when he 
criticized Conservative policies and leadership. Thus, his reputation as 
a "perennial sour rebe11145 with a "pushing, ambitious and prickly character1146 
has some foundation in fact. Yet it must be noted that many of Gorst's 
contemporaries held more positive views of his disposition. Chief Whip, 
Gerald Noel, who had urged Disraeli to appoint Gorst Principal Agent in 1870, 
thought him "a gentleman, with a good manner; 114 7 his former Fourth Party 
ally-turned-adversary, Arthur Balfour, who had crossed-swords with Gorst 
on many occasions, viewed him in a not entirely.unfavourable light, 
describing him as "an acute and ready debater, of more force than charm, 
but clear and incisive if somewhat cynical" .48 The estimation of Gorst 
42S ee pp. 124-126 above. 
43
see pp. 155-157 above. 
44
see pp. 158-159 above. 
45Peter Marsh, The Discipline of Popular Government: Lord Salisbury's 
Domestic Statecraft, 1881-1902 (Hassocks, Sussex, 1978), p. 58. 
46 Robert Blake, The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill (London, 1970. 
Fontana Paperback edition, London, 1976), p. 144. 
47Hughenden Papers, B/xxi/N/114. G. Noel to Disraeli, 14 April, 1870. 
48Earl of Balfour, Chapters of Autobiography, ed. Edgar Dugdale (London, 
1930), p. 135. 
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which best captures his true nature is that expressed by his long-time 
friend and associate, Henrietta Barnett: 
Under his cynical manner and often contemptuous words, under his dour 
silences or suspicious sentences, Sir John has a deeply religious nature, 
a capacity for enthusiasm, and a dogged sullen loyalty to his hopes for 
the future. The contradications between the real and the apparent man 
were exceedingly annoying to those of his friends who cared for him, 
and all the more so because a certain strain of impishness in his nature 
made him enjoy puzzling people, and take pleasure in their not always 
courteous confusion11 .49 
Unfortunately for Gerst, it was the more visible and negative 
aspects of his character which captured and held the attention of the Tory 
leadership. After the brief period from 1868-1874, during which his work 
in reorganizing and revitalizing the party machinery had won him the 
approbation of Disraeli, Gorst's parliamentary independence and critical 
pronouncements against his own Front Bench earned him the mistrust of the 
party hierarchy and a reputation as a disloyal rebel. However, the members 
of the latter group must also bear partial responsibility for the situation 
of mistrust which existed between themselves and Gerst. With the exception 
of Randolph Churchill, none of the party elite appear to have attempted 
to establish a rapport with Gerst, a fact of which he himself complained, 
first to Disraeli, in 1874,50 and then most tellingly to Salisbury, in 1899, 
when his request for a change of office had been rejected by the Prime 
Minister because of Gorst's reported anti-Government posture in the House. 51 
49 H.O. Barnett, Canon Barnett, 2 vols. (London, 1918), pp. 48-49. 
50Hughenden Papers, B/xxi/G.249, Gerst to M. Corry, 19 February, 1874. 
(Corry was Disraeli's secretary). 
51 See pp. 273-274. 
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After stating that this presumed disloyalty was a fabrication of the press, 
Gorst observed that "Unfortunately for me, few of the leading members of 
the party know me personally, so that in my case, there is little chance 
of a false character being modified and corrected by the true one". 52 
This was an amazing admission given Gorst's years of service to the party 
and the offices he had held, suggesting that the Conservative chieftains 
had done little to develop a closer affinity with their recalcitrant 
colleague which might have led to improved relations between them. This 
situation also reflected the social exclusiveness of the aristocratic Tory 
leadership,53 and this was an additional factor working against the 
development of such a rapport. Gorst's background was decidedly middle-
class. He had received his schooling at his local grammar school, amongst 
companions of similar social status, and some of a lower, and thus he 
probably retained at least some of the demeanour of his class, despite his 
subsequent undergraduate years at Cambridge. Such a background rendered 
Garst out of step socially with his aristocratic associates in the Government. 
The resulting exclusion from aristocratic social circles considerably 
reduced his chances of forming any kind of a close alliance with the members 
of the Tory elite, including his ministerial colleagues. In addition, his 
failure to attend one of the exclusive public schools prevented him from 
52
salisbury Papers, 88, Gorst to Salisbury, 30 September, 1899. (Emphasis 
added.) 
53For an analysis of the aristocratic character of the Salisbury and Balfour 
Administrations of 1886-1892 and 1895-1905, see J.P. Cornford, "The 
Parliamentary Foundations of the Hotel Cecil" in Ideas and Institutions of 
Victorian Britain, ed. Robert Robson (London, 1967), pp. 268-311. 
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developing those· contacts with sons of the hereditary ruling class which 
later might have facilitated the establishment of closer ties between 
Garst and his ministerial colleagues and smoothed the way for his advance-
ment within the party. 
It has been stated that Gorst's rebelliousness grew out of his 
resentment of the treatment he received at the hands of the party leadership.54 
However, though he had "an uncontestable right to feel that he had been 
scurvily treated11 , 55 and apparently did so, 56 personal pique was not the 
principal cause of Gorst's incompatibility with the Conservative hierarchy. 
The chief source of this difficulty resided in their conflicting ideologies. 
Following his entry into Parliament in 1866, Garst had become a virtual 
disciple of Disraeli and an adherent of Tory Democracy, which he somewhat 
mistakenly believed was the philosophy of his mentor. Thereafter, for the 
remainder of his political career he laboured to maintain within the 
Conservative party the Tory-democratic principles of responsibility for, 
and promotion of, the welfare of the working classes. Born and raised in 
a north of England industrial city, where he witnessed first-hand the 
privations of the poor, Garst had an appreciation of the benefits social 
legislation conferred on the working classes, an appreciation generally 
lacking among the aristocratic members of the Tory Front Bench. 
54 See, for example, Baumann, p. 345. "Death of Sir John Garst", the Times, 
5 April, 1916, p.4. R.R. James, Lord Randolph Churchill (London, 1959), 
p. 81. Hereafter referred to as James, Lord Randolph Churchill. Marsh, p.58. 
55 James, Lord Randolph Churchill, p.81. 
5611
character Sketch", p. 580. 
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Following Salisbury's accession to the leadership in 1881, 
Garst found himself increasingly at odds with the party hierarchy as they 
11drifted far away" from Tory-democratic ideals.57 
Gorst's pursuit of Tory-democratic policies durin~ Disraeli's 
second ministry of 1874-1880 had been limited by the demands made upon 
h . b h" t 1· d · 58 b h h d h 1 b im y is ex ra-par iamentary uties, ut e a nevert e ess een 
instrumental in obtaining passage of the Merchant Shipping Bill and minor 
1 b 1 . l . 59 a our egis ation. However, already his agitation had been tinged with 
criticism of the Government's reluctance to proceed on the issues.60 
During the subsequent Gladstone Parliament of 1880-1885 Garst, with the 
support of his Fourth-Party colleagues, had continued his campaign for 
social issues and, although they failed to obtain passage of an Employers' 
Liability Bill in the form they desired, the compromise measure they were 
instrumental in placing on the statute books provided the foundation for 
the more equitable and comprehensive Workmen's Compensation Act of 1897. 61 
Following Salisbury's assumption of power in 1885, Garst had found himself 
increasingly at odds with the party hierarchy as they "drifted far away" 
from Disraelian principles. 62 After the dissolution of the Fourth Party 
57The Times, 6 February, 1907, p.7. 
588 ee PP· 106-107 above. 
59 8 ee pp. 107-115 above. 
608 ee pp. 117-124 above. 
6i8 ee pp. 116-120 above. 
62The Times, 6 February, 1907, p.7. 
and the departure of Randolph Churchill from the Government, late in 
1886, Gerst was left an isolated and discredited figure on the ministerial 
benches, separated from his colleagues as a result of his pursuit of Tory 
Democracy. As Gilbert has noted, "Throughout most of the nearly unbroken 
Conservative tenure of office from 1886-1905 •.. Gerst was tbe sole 
occupant of the Treasury Bench to take more than a momentary interest in 
matters of domestic public welfare". 63 
The intensification of Gorst's social reform campaign, following 
his visit to the Berlin Conference in 1890, served to estrange Gerst even 
further from the party. His continual and uncompromising promotion in 
the Commons, in public speeches, and in the press, of his 1891 social 
reform programme, effectively doomed his chances of obtaining a Cabinet 
post in subsequent Salisbury and Balfour Administrations. Because Gorst's 
agitation was conducted during the waning months of the Salisbury 
Parliament of 1886-1892 and the short span of Liberal rule thereafter, 
periods inopportune for the development of social legislation, 64 his 
efforts produced no immediate concrete results. However, his continuous 
publicizing of social issues, in and out of the House, served to impress 
upon the public mind the need to reform public welfare institutions and 
"The Liberals would soon find it politically profitable to enact what he 
• 11 65 had proposed . 
63Gilbert, "Conservative Rebel", p. 152. 
64 Seep. 172, p. 174 above. 
65Gilbert, "Conservative Rebel", p. 152. 
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Gorst's appointment as Vice-President of the Committee of 
Council on Education in 1895 brought him into contact With an area 0 [' · 
national life urgently in need of reform. However, by this period Cfu':rst's 
"independence" had all but dissipated the Government's 
consequently, he was granted no real authority to implement thes~\'',i':1'1gBns. 
Despite being denied control over education in the House, 
considerable influence over the formulation stages of the 
his ill-fated measure of 1896 was in effect the "1902 Educatio'ri''.?wtiirJjffR,\ 
embryo". 66 Moreover, as Lowndes observed, Gerst accomplished iiiic 
administrative measures and minor legislation which appeared 
bring about a position in which it could be represented that a 
settlement did not change the existing order too 
Gerst 1 s resignation from the Education Department Ci/ 
concluded his public career and opened the way for him to 
crusade for child feeding, through which he was to effect 
of the "revolutionary principle" of State responsibility 
was to mark the beginning of the British Welfare State. 
never achieved Cabinet rank, and is chiefly recognized by hi_'.. 
an efficient but malcontent party organizer, the evidence 
would appear to support the claim that Gorst's endeavours 
Tory Democracy made a significant contribution 
of late Victorian and Edwardian Britain. 
66Eric Eaglesham, "Planning the Education 
of Educational Studies, 9 (1960): 3-24. 
67 G.A.N. Lowndes, The Silent Social Revolution 
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APPENDIX A 
Approximately two months after Garst completed his draft Bill, 
Sidney Webb's Fabian tract, the Education Muddle and the Way Out was 
published, with proposals bearing a strong resemblance to those contained 
in Gorst's measure (see, The Education Muddle and the Way Out, Fabian 
Tract, No. 106 (London, 1901). The Tract was unsigned but Edward Pease 
has credited the Fabian's educational plans to Webb (see, Edward R. Pease, 
The History of the Fabian Society (London, 1916), p.42). Webb proposed 
extending limited rate aid to the voluntary schools and abolition of the 
school boards, but wanted the larger boards - including London - exempted 
from the latter provision. Pease claimed that the proposals in the tract 
had been under intermittent discussion since May 1899 and that proofs of 
the tract had been supplied to the education authorities at Whitehall 
before publication (see, Pease, pp. 143-144). This raises the question 
of the extent, if any, of Webb's influence upon Gorst's 1901 draft Bill. 
Given that Garst was on friendly terms with Sidney and Beatrice Webb at 
this period, it is logical to assume they exchanged ideas on the education 
question. (For Gorst's relationship with the Webbs see, B. Webb, pp. 
132-138, p. 137. See also, M.A. Hamilton, Sidney and Beatrice Webb 
(London, 1933), p. 128. PassfieldPapers, Sect. II. 4. b41. ff.114-117. 
Garst to Sidney Webb, 24 June, 1902). However, the "one authority" and 
rate aid concepts were not new innovations in Gorst's plans at this time, 
having been propounded by him since 1896. Although, as Brennan notes, 
"there is not one shred of evidence that Sidney was ever identified with 
Garst' s policy" (see, Education for National Efficiency: the Contribution 
of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, ed. E.J.T. Brennan (London, 1975), p.8), it 
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is quite possible that interaction with Webb served to crystallize 
Gorst's ideas more fully by 1901. Nevertheless, McBriar believes that 
Fabian influence on Gorst's Bill was "slight" (A.M. McBriar, Fabian 
Socialism and English Politics, 1884-1918 (Cambridge, 1962), p.215). 
Simon appears to have pinpointed the most important benefit derived by 
Gorst from Webb's tract, namely, the authoritative support it gave to 
Tory, and thus, Gorst's, aims. Hence his distribution of the tract to 
his fellow ministers (Simon, p. 208). 
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APPENDIX B 
Reiterating the criticism levelled at the Act by the Labour 
movement of the day, Brian Simon has denounced the 1902 legislation as 
reactionary because of what he asserts were its restrictive provisions 
affecting working class higher educational opportunities as a result of 
the abolition of the boards. Their destruction eliminated the higher 
grade schools which had provided a relatively inexpensive secondary-type 
education. Thereafter, these institutions were either integrated into 
the fee-paying system of State grammar schools or became strictly 
elementary institutions, to the detriment of working class education. 
However, Simon notes that it was not so much the provisions of the Act 
as the way in which Morant, as Permanent Secretary of the Board of 
Education, subsequently interpreted and applied them which produced the 
resulting elitist secondary education system. In Morant's defence, 
however, Simon observes that his efforts "were as warmly approved by a 
Liberal as by a Conservative government", his policy being "not so much 
a party policy ... as a policy serving the interests of class" (see, Simon, 
pp. 235-239. For Labour's reaction to the measure see Ibid., pp. 223-235). 
In contrast to Simon, Keith Evans sees the 1902 Act as a positive factor 
in the development of a national system of secondary education. Although 
it began as a fee-paying system, "the Act's provision for scholarship 
awards to enable elementary school children to transfer to secondary grammar 
schools pointed the way towards a 'free-place' system (1907) and the 
ultimate rejection of the nineteenth-century concept of secondary education 
as the prerogative of the middle and upper classes" (K. Evans, pp. 69-70). 
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APPENDIX C 
The National Labour Conference on the State Maintenance of 
Children was organized by a committee representing a cross-section of 
the Labour movement. The Committee's seven members included two 
representatives from the Trades Union Congress Parliamentary Committee, 
two from the London Trades Council, one Social Democratic Federation 
member, and W.C. Steadman of the London County Council (see, Labour 
Representation Committee Documents 19/207.J. Sexton et al., 23 December, 
1904. Invitation to attend National Labour Conference on the State 
Maintenance of Children). The Labour Representation Committee was not 
represented at the Conference. Its Executive Committee had unanimously 
decided to support J. Ramsey Macdonald's decision to decline the invitation 
because they had not been consulted at all with regard to the arrangement 
of the event, or the resolutions to be discussed, and because it was 
indicated that their status at the Conference would be the same as that 
awarded the Social Democratic Federation or similar group (Ibid., 19/207-221. 
"Guildhall Conference": National Labour Conference on the State Maintenance 
of Children: correspondence endorsing decision that L.R.C. should not be 
officially represented at the Conference. Inclusions from: W. Thorne, 
W. Hudson, J.J. Stephenson, J. Parker, J. Keir Hardie, J.N. Hodge, 
J.R. Clynes, P. Curran, E. Pease, D.J. Shackleton, A. Gee, J. Ramsey 
Macdonald.) However, in accordance with a suggestion made by Edward 
Pease, the L.R.C. Executive's letter of declination to the Conference 
Committee gave the invitation's late arrival as the official reason for 
their non-attendance, it being felt that to state their true feelings on 
the issue would indicate "offended dignity, which is apt to raise a 
sneer". (Ibid., 19/218. Edward Pease to J. R. Macdonald, 5 January, 1905. 
Ibid., 19/221. J.R. Macdonald to W. Steadman, 16 January, 1905). 
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